Category: Economics: Ch 03

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Raising the minimum wage: its effects on poverty and employment

The first Budget of the new UK Labour government was announced on 30 October 2024. It contained a number of measures that will help to tackle inequality. These include extra spending on health and education. This will benefit households on lower incomes the most as a percentage of net income. Increases in tax, by contrast, will be paid predominantly by those on higher incomes. The Chart opposite (taken from the Budget Report) illustrates this. It shows that the poorest 10% will benefit from the largest percentage gain, while the richest 10% will be the only decile that loses.

But one of the major ways of tackling inequality and poverty was raising the minimum wage. The so-called ‘National Living Wage (NLW)’, paid to those aged 21 and over, will rise in April by 6.7% – from £11.44 to £12.41 per hour. The minimum wage paid to those aged 18 to 20 will rise 16.3% from £8.60 to £10.00 and for 16 and 17 year-olds and apprentices it will rise £18% from £6.40 to £7.55.

It has been an objective of governments for several years to relate the minimum wage to the median wage. In 2015, the Conservative Government set a target of raising the minimum wage rate to 60 per cent of median hourly earnings by 2020. When that target was hit a new one was set to reach two-thirds of median hourly earnings by 2024.

The Labour government has set a new remit for the minimum wage (NLW). There are two floors. The first is the previously agreed one, that the NLW should be at least two-thirds of median hourly earnings; the second is that it should fully compensate for cost of living rises and for expected inflation up to March 2026. The new rate of £12.41 will meet both criteria. According to the Low Pay Commission, ‘Wages have risen faster than inflation over the past 12 months, and are forecast to continue to do so up to March 2026’. This makes the first floor the dominant one: meeting the first floor automatically meets the second.

How effective is the minimum wage in reducing poverty and inequality?

Figure 1 shows the growth in minimum wage rates since their introduction in 1999. The figures are real figures (i.e. after taking into account CPI inflation) and are expressed as an index, with 1999 = 100. The chart also shows the growth in real median hourly pay. (Click here for a Powerpoint.)

As you can see, the growth in real minimum wage rates has considerably exceeded the growth in real median hourly pay. This has had a substantial effect on raising the incomes of the poorest workers and thereby has helped to reduce poverty and inequality.

The UK minimum wage compares relatively favourably with other high-income economies. Figure 2 shows minimum wage rates in 12 high-income countries in 2023 – the latest year for which data are available. (Click here for a PowerPoint.) The red bars (striped) show hourly minimum wage rates in US dollars at purchasing-power parity (PPP) rates. PPP rates correct current exchange rates to reflect the purchasing power of each country’s currency. The blue bars (plain) show minimum wage rates as a percentage of the median wage rate. In 2023 the UK had the fourth highest minimum wage of the 12 countries on this measure (59.6%). As we have seen above, the 2025 rate is expected to be 2/3 of the median rate.

Minimum wages are just one mechanism for reducing poverty and inequality. Others include the use of the tax and benefit system to redistribute incomes. The direct provision of services, such as health, education and housing at affordable rents can make a significant difference and, as we have seen, have been a major focus of the October 2024 Budget.

The government has been criticised, however, for not removing the two-child limit to extra benefits in Universal Credit (introduced in 2017). The cap clearly disadvantages poor families with more than two children. What is more, for workers on Universal Credit, more than half of the gains from the higher minimum wages will lost because they will result in lower benefit entitlement. Also the freeze in (nominal) personal income tax allowances will mean more poor people will pay tax even with no rise in real incomes.

Effects on employment: analysis

A worry about raising the minimum wage rate is that it could reduce employment in firms already paying the minimum wage and thus facing a wage rise.

In the case of a firm operating in competitive labour and goods markets, the demand for low-skilled workers is relatively wage sensitive. Any rise in wage rates, and hence prices, by this firm alone would lead to a large fall in sales and hence in employment.

This is illustrated in Figure 3 (click here for a PowerPoint). Assume that the minimum wage is initially the equilibrium wage rate We. Now assume that the minimum wage is raised to Wmin. This will cause a surplus of labour (i.e. unemployment) of Q3 – Q2. Labour supply rises from Q1 to Q3 and the demand for labour falls from Q1 to Q2.

But, given that all firms face the minimum wage, individual employers are more able to pass on higher wages in higher prices, knowing that their competitors are doing the same. The quantity of labour demanded in any given market will not fall so much – the demand is less wage elastic; and the quantity of labour supplied in any given market will rise less – the supply is less wage elastic. Any unemployment will be less than that illustrated in Figure 3. If, at the same time, the economy expands so that the demand-for-labour curve shifts to the right, there may be no unemployment at all.

When employers have a degree of monopsony power, it is not even certain that they would want to reduce employment. This is illustrated in Figure 4: click here for a PowerPoint (you can skip this section if you are not familiar with the analysis).

Assume initially that there is no minimum wage. The supply of labour to the monopsony employer is given by curve SL1, which is also the average cost of labour ACL1. A higher employment by the firm will drive up the wage; a lower employment will drive it down. This gives a marginal cost of labour curve of MCL1. Profit-maximising employment will be Q1, where the marginal cost of labour equals the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL). The wage, given by the SL1 (=ACL1) line will be W1.

Now assume that there is a minimum wage. Assume also that the initial minimum wage is at or below W1. The profit-maximising employment is thus Q1 at a wage rate of W1.

The minimum wage can be be raised as high as W2 and the firm will still want to employ as many workers as at W1. The point is that the firm can no longer drive down the wage rate by employing fewer workers, and so the ACL1 curve becomes horizontal at the new minimum wage and hence will be the same as the MCL curve (MCL2 = ACL2). Profit-maximising employment will be where the MRPL curve equals this horizontal MCL curve. The incentive to cut its workforce, therefore, has been removed.

Again, if we extend the analysis to the whole economy, a rise in the minimum wage will be partly passed on in higher prices or stimulate employers to increase labour productivity. The effect will be to shift the (MRPL) curve upwards to the right, thereby allowing the firm to pass on higher wages and reducing any incentive to reduce employment.

Effects on employment: evidence

There is little evidence that raising the minimum wage in stages will create unemployment, although it may cause some redeployment. In the Low Pay Commission’s 2019 report, 20 years of the National Minimum Wage (see link below), it stated that since 2000 it had commissioned more than 30 research projects looking at the NMW’s effects on hours and employment and had found no strong evidence of negative effects. Employers had adjusted to minimum wages in various ways. These included reducing profits, increasing prices and restructuring their business and workforce.

Along with our commissioned work, other economists have examined the employment effects of the NMW in the UK and have for the most part found no impact. This is consistent with international evidence suggesting that carefully set minimum wages do not have noticeable employment effects. While some jobs may be lost following a minimum wage increase, increasing employment elsewhere offsets this. (p.20)

There is general agreement, however, that a very large increase in minimum wages will impact on employment. This, however, should not be relevant to the rise in the NLW from £11.44 to £12.41 per hour in April 2025, which represents a real rise of around 4.5%. This at worst should have only a modest effect on employment and could be offset by economic growth.

What, however, has concerned commentators more is the rise in employers’ National Insurance contributions (NICs) that were announced in the Budget. In April 2025, the rate will increase from 13.8% to 15%. Employers’ NICs are paid for each employee on all wages above a certain annual threshold. This threshold will fall in April from £9100 to £5000. So the cost to an employer of an employee earning £38 000 per annum in 2024/25 would be £38 000 + ((£38 000 – £9100) × 0.138) = £41 988.20. For the year 2025/26 it will rise to £38 000 + ((£38 000 – £5000) × 0.15) = £42 950. This is a rise of 2.29%. (Note that £38 000 will be approximately the median wage in 2025/26.)

However, for employees on the new minimum wage, the percentage rise in employer NICs will be somewhat higher. A person on the new NLW of £12.41, working 40 hours per week and 52 weeks per year (assuming paid holidays), will earn an annual wage of £25 812.80. Under the old employer NIC rates, the employer would have paid (£25 812.80 + (£25 812.80 – £9100) × 0.138) = £28 119.17. For the year 2025/26, it will rise to £25 812.80 + ((£25 812.80 – £5000) × 0.15) = £28 934.72. This is a rise of 2.90%.

This larger percentage rise in employers’ wage costs for people on minimum wages than those on median wages, when combined with the rise in the NLW, could have an impact on the employment of those on minimum wages. Whether it does or not will depend on how rapid growth is and how much employers can absorb the extra costs through greater productivity and/or passing on the costs to their customers.

Articles

UK Government reports and information

Data

Questions

  1. How is the October 2024 Budget likely to affect the distribution of income?
  2. What are the benefits and limitations of statutory minimum wages in reducing (a) poverty and (b) inequality?
  3. Under what circumstances will a rise in the minimum wage lead or not lead to an increase in unemployment?
  4. Find out what is meant by the UK Real Living Wage (RLW) and distinguish it from the UK National Living Wage (NLW). Why is the RLW higher?
  5. Why is the median wage rather than the mean wage used in setting the NLW?
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Should train companies scrap peak-time fares?

In many countries, train fares at peak times are higher than at off-peak times. This is an example of third-degree price discrimination. Assuming that peak-time travellers generally have a lower price elasticity of demand, the policy allows train companies to increase revenue and profit.

If the sole purpose of ticket sales were to maximise profits, the policy would make sense. Assuming that higher peak-time fares were carefully set, although the number travelling would be somewhat reduced, this would be more than compensated for by the higher revenue per passenger.

But there are external benefits from train travel. Compared with travel by car, there are lower carbon emissions per person travelling. Also, train travel helps to reduce road congestion. To the extent that higher peak-time fares encourage people to travel by car instead, there will be resulting environmental and congestion externalities.

The Scottish experiment with abolishing higher peak-time fares

In October 2023, the Scottish government introduced a pilot scheme abolishing peak-time fares, so that tickets were the same price at any time of the day. The idea was to encourage people, especially commuters, to adopt more sustainable means of transport. Although the price elasticity of demand for commuting is very low, the hope was that the cross-price elasticity between cars and trains would be sufficiently high to encourage many people to switch from driving to taking the train.

One concern with scrapping peak-time fares is that trains would not have the capacity to cope with the extra passengers. Indeed, one of the arguments for higher peak-time fares is to smooth out the flow of passengers during the day, encouraging those with flexibility of when to travel to use the cheaper and less crowded off-peak trains.

This may well apply to certain parts of the UK, but in the case of Scotland it was felt that there would be the capacity to cope with the extra demand at peak time. Also, in a post-COVID world, with more people working flexibly, there was less need for many people to travel at peak times than previously.

Reinstatement of peak-time fares in Scotland

It was with some dismay, therefore, especially by commuters and environmentalists, when the Scottish government decided to end the pilot at the beginning of October 2024 and reinstate peak-time fares – in many cases at nearly double the off-peak rates. For example, the return fare between Glasgow and Edinburgh rose from £16.20 to £31.40 at peak times.

The Scottish government justified the decision by claiming that passenger numbers had risen by only 6.8%, when, to be self-financing, an increase of 10% would have been required. But this begs the question of whether it was necessary to be self-financing when the justification was partly environmental. Also, the 6.8% figure is based on a number of assumptions that could be challenged (see The Conversation article linked below). A longer pilot would have helped to clarify demand.

Other schemes

A number of countries have introduced schemes to encourage greater use of the railways or other forms of public transport. One of these is the flat fare for local journeys. Provided that this is lower than previously, it can encourage people to use public transport and leave their car at home. Also, its simplicity is also likely to be attractive to passengers. For example, in England bus fares are capped at £2. Currently, the scheme is set to run until 31 December 2024.

Another scheme is the subscription model, whereby people pay a flat fee per month (or week or year, or other time period) for train or bus travel or both. Germany, for example, has a flat-rate €49 per month ‘Deutschland-Ticket‘ (rising to €58 per month in January 2025). This ticket provides unlimited access to local and regional public transport in Germany, including trains, buses, trams, metros and ferries (but not long-distance trains). This zero marginal fare cost of a journey encourages passengers to use public transport. The only marginal costs they will face will be ancillary costs, such as getting to and from the train station or bus stop and having to travel at a specific time.

Articles

Questions

  1. Identify the arguments for and against having higher rail fares at peak times than at off-peak times
  2. Why might it be a good idea to scrap higher peak-time fares in some parts of a country but not in others?
  3. Provide a critique of the Scottish government’s arguments for reintroducing higher peak-time fares.
  4. With reference to The Conversation article, why is it difficult to determine the effect on demand of the Scottish pilot of scrapping peak-time fares?
  5. What are the arguments for and against the German scheme of having a €49 per month public transport pass for local and regional transport with no further cost per journey? Should it be extended to long-distance trains and coaches?
  6. In England there is a flat £2 single fare for buses. Would it be a good idea to make bus travel completely free?
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Coffee highs

Coffee prices have been soaring in recent months. This applies to the prices of both coffee beans on international markets, coffee in supermarkets and coffee in coffee shops. In this blog we examine the causes and what is likely to happen over the coming months.

As we shall see, demand and supply analysis provides a powerful explanation of what has been happening in the various sectors of the industry and the likely future path of prices.

The coffee industry

The cultivating, processing and retailing of coffee is big business. It is the second most widely traded commodity after oil and around 2.5 billion cups are consumed worldwide on a daily basis. In the UK nearly 100 million cups of coffee a day are drunk, with coffee consumers spending around £4 billion per year on sit-down and takeaway coffees and on coffee bought in supermarkets and other shops for making at home. The average takeaway coffee costs around £3.40 per cup with speciality coffees costing more.

Global production in the coffee year 2023/24 was 178 million 60 kg bags (10.7 million tonnes) and the annual income of the whole sector exceeds $200 billion. Around 25 million farmers spread across 50 countries harvest coffee. The majority of these farms are small and family run. Some 100 million families worldwide depend on coffee for their living.

Brazil is by far the biggest producer and accounts for nearly 40% of the market. A good or poor harvest in Brazil can have a significant impact on prices. Vietnam and Columbia are the second and third biggest producers respectively and, with Brazil, account for over 60% of global production.

Coffee prices are extremely volatile – more so than production, which does, nevertheless, fluctuate with the harvest. Figure 1 shows global coffee production and prices since 1996. The price is the International Coffee Organization’s composite indicator price (I-CIP) in US cents per pound (lb). It is a weighted average of four prices: Colombian milds (Arabica), Other milds (Arabica), Brazilian naturals (mainly Arabica) and Robusta. Production is measured in 60 kilo bags.

Case Study 2.3 on the student website for Economics 11th edition, looks at the various events that caused the fluctuations in prices and supply illustrated in Figure 1 (click here for a PowerPoint). In this blog we focus on recent events.

Why are coffee prices rising?

In early October 2023, the ICO composite indicator price (I-CIP), was $1.46 per lb. By 28 August, it had reached $2.54 – a rise of 74%. Colombian milds (high-quality Arabica) had risen from $1.79 per lb to $2.78 – a rise of 55%. Robusta coffee is normally cheaper than Arabica. It is mainly used in instant coffee and for espressos. As the price of Arabica rose, so there was some substitution, with Robusta coffees being added to blends. But as this process took place, so the gap between the Arabica and Robusta prices narrowed. Robusta prices rose from $1.14 in early October 2023 to £2.36 in late August – a rise of 107%. These prices are illustrated in Figure 2 (click here for a PowerPoint).

This dramatic rise in prices is the result of a number of factors.

Supply-side factors.  The first is poor harvests, which will affect future supply. Frosts in Brazil have affected Arabica production. Also, droughts – partly the result of climate change – have affected harvests in major Robusta-producing countries, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. With the extra demand from the substitution for Arabica, this has pushed up Robusta prices as shown in Figure 2. Another supply-side issue concerns the increasingly vulnerability of coffee crops to diseases, such as coffee rust, and pests. Both reduce yields and quality.

As prices have risen, so this has led to speculative buying of coffee futures by hedge funds and coffee companies. This has driven up futures prices, which will then have a knock-on effect on spot (current) prices as roasters attempt to build coffee stocks to beat the higher prices.

There have also been supply-chain problems. Attacks on shipping by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea have forced ships to take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Again, this has particularly affected the supply of Robusta, largely grown in Asia and East Africa.

New EU regulation banning the import of coffee grown in areas of cleared rainforest will further reduce supply when it comes into force in 2025, or at least divert it away from the EU – a major coffee-consuming region.

Demand-side factors.  On the demand side, the rise of the coffee culture and a switch in demand from tea to coffee has led to a steady growth in demand. Growth in the coffee culture has been particularly high in Asian markets as rapid urbanistion, a growing middle class and changing lifestyles drive greater coffee consumption and greater use of coffee shops. This has more than offset a slight decline in coffee shop sales in the USA. In the UK, the number of coffee shops has risen steadily. In 2023, there were 3000 cafés, coffee chains and other venues serving coffee, of which 9885 were branded coffee shop outlets, such as Costa, Caffè Nero and Starbucks. Sales in such coffee chains rose by 11.9% in 2023. Similar patterns can be observed in other countries, all helping to drive a rise in demand.

But although demand for coffee in coffee shops is growing, the rise in the price of coffee beans should have only a modest effect on the price of a cup of coffee. The cost of coffee beans purchased by a coffee shop accounts for only around 10% of the price of a cup. To take account of the costs to the supplier (roasting, distribution costs, overheads, etc), this price paid by the coffee shop/chain is some 5 times the cost of unroasted coffee beans on international markets. In other words, the international price of coffee beans accounts for only around 2% of the cost of a cup of coffee in a coffee shop.

Higher coffee-shop prices are thus mainly the result of other factors. These include roasting and other supplier costs, rising wages, rents, business rates, other ingredients such as milk and sugar, coffee machines, takeaway cups, heating, lighting, repairs and maintenance and profit. The high inflation over the past two years, with several of these costs being particularly affected, has been the major driver of price increases in coffee shops.

The future

The rise in demand and prices over the years has led to an increase in supply as more coffee bushes are planted. As Figure 1 shows, world supply increased from 87 million in 1995/6 to 178 million 60 kilo bags in 2023/4 – a rise of 105%. The current high prices may stimulate farmers to plant more. But as it can take four years for coffee plants to reach maturity, it may take time for supply to respond. Later on, a glut might even develop! This would be a case of the famous cobweb model (see Case Study 3.13 on the Essentials of Economics 9th edition student website).

Nevertheless, climate change is making coffee production more vulnerable and demand is likely to continue to outstrip supply. Much of the land currently used to produce Arabica will no longer be suitable in a couple of decades. New strains of bean may be developed that are more hardy, such as variants of the more robust Robusta beans. Whether this will allow supply to keep up with demand remains to be seen.

Articles

Data

Questions

  1. Use a demand and supply diagram to compare the coffee market in August 2024 with that in October 2023.
  2. How is the price elasticity of demand relevant to determining the size of price fluctuations in response to fluctuations in the supply of coffee? Demonstrate this with a supply and demand diagram.
  3. How has speculation affected coffee prices?
  4. What are ‘coffee futures’? How do futures prices relate to spot prices?
  5. What is likely to happen to coffee prices in the coming months? Explain.
  6. Why have Robusta prices risen by a larger percentage than Arabica prices? Is this trend likely to continue?
  7. Look at the price of Colombian Arabica coffee in your local supermarket. Work out what the price would be per lb and convert it to US dollars. How does this retail price compare with the current international price for Colombian milds and what accounts for the difference? (For current information on Colombian milds, see the third data link above.)
  8. Distinguish between the fixed and variable costs of an independent coffee shop. How should the coffee shop set its prices in relation to these costs and to demand?
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The CMA fuels concerns over high petrol and diesel prices

The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has been investigating road fuel pricing in the UK. In July 2022, it launched a study into the development of the road-fuel market over recent years. The final report of this study was published in July 2023 and covered the refining, wholesale and retail elements of the market.

In the retail part of the market, the CMA noted some potential causes for concern: retailer fuel margins had increased; there were geographical variations in pricing; filling stations with fewer competitors tended to charge higher prices; retail prices tended to rise rapidly when oil prices increased but fell slowly when oil prices fell (known as ‘rocket and feather’ pricing patterns); motorway service stations charged considerably higher prices than supermarkets or other filling stations.

In response to these findings, the CMA has been publishing an interim report every four months. These reports give average pump prices and margins. They also give relative average pump prices between different types of retailer, and between each of the supermarkets.

The latest interim report was published on 26 July 2024. It reiterated the finding of the 2023 report that the fuel market has become less competitive since 2019. What is more, it continues to be so. In particular, the range of retail prices and the level of retail margins remain high compared to historic levels. The interim report estimates that ‘the increase in retailers’ fuel margins compared to 2019 resulted in increased fuel costs for drivers in 2023 of over £1.6bn’.

Price leadership

Road fuel retailing is an oligopoly, with the major companies being the big supermarkets, the retail arms of oil companies (such as Shell, BP, Esso and Texaco, operating their own filling stations) and a few large specialist companies, such as the Motor Fuel Group (MFG), the EG Group and Rontec, whose filling stations sell one or other of the main brands. But although it is an oligopoly producing a homogeneous product, it is not a cartel (unlike OPEC). Nevertheless, there has been a high degree of tacit collusion in the market with price competition limited to certain rules of behaviour in particular locations. A familiar one is setting prices ending in .9 of a penny (e.g. 142.9p), with the acceptance by competitors that Applegreen will set it ending at .8 of a penny and Asda at .7 of a penny.

One of the main forms of tacit collusion in areas where there are several filling stations is that of price leadership. Asda, and in some areas Morrisons, have been price leaders, setting the lowest price for that area, with other filling stations setting the price at or slightly above that level (e.g. 0.2p, 1.2p or 2.2p higher). Indeed, other major retailers, such as Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Esso and Shell took a relatively passive approach to pricing, unwilling to undercut Asda and accept lower profit margins.

Things changed after 2019. Asda chose to increase its profit margins. In 2022 it did this by reducing prices more slowly than would previously have been the case as wholesale prices fell. In other words, it used price feathering. Other big retailers might have been expected to use the opportunity to undercut Asda. Instead, they decided to increase their own margins by following a similar pricing path. The result was a 6 pence per litre increase in the average supermarket fuel margin from 2019 to 2022.

More recently, Asda has increased its margins more than other major retailers, making it no longer the price leader. The effect has been to put less pressure on other retailers to trim their now higher profit margins.

Remedies

The 2023 CMA report made two specific recommendations to deal with this rise in profit margins.

The first was that the CMA should be given a statutory monitoring function over the fuel market to ‘hold the industry to account’. In May this year, legislation was passed to this effect. This requires the CMA to monitor the industry and report anti-competitive practice to the government.

The second was to introduce a new statutory ‘open data real-time fuel finder scheme’. This would give motorists access to live, station-by-station fuel prices.

Several major retailers already contribute to a voluntary price data sharing scheme. However, this covers only around 40% of UK forecourts. According to the CMA, it ‘falls well short of the comprehensive, real-time, station-by station data needed to empower motorists and drive competition’. The CMA has thus called on the new Labour government to introduce legislation to make its recommended system compulsory. This, it is hoped, would make the retail fuel market much more competitive by improving consumer information about prices at alternative filling stations in their area.

Articles

CMA reports

Questions

  1. What forms can tacit collusion take?
  2. Why are fuel prices at motorway service stations so much higher than in towns? What is the relevance of the price elasticity of demand to the answer?
  3. What are the main findings of the CMA’s July 2024 Interim Report
  4. What is meant by rocket and feather pricing?
  5. What recommendations does the CMA make for increasing competition in the retail road fuel market?
  6. Find out how competitive retail fuel pricing is in two other developed countries. Why are they more or less competitive than the UK?
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Getting real with house prices

When I worked as a professional economist at HM Treasury and later the Council of Mortgage Lenders (now part of UK Finance), I would regularly brief on the state of the affordability of housing, with a particular focus on the owner-occupied market. That was back in the late 1990s. Fast forward a quarter of a century and I recognise not only how much I have aged but also how deep-rooted and long-standing the affordability problem is.

It is perhaps not surprising that in her first speech as the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves, referenced directly the housing market and the need to address supply-side issues. She has set a target of one and a half million new homes built over the next five years.

It is therefore timely to revisit the trends in house prices across the UK. By applying the distinction between nominal and real values we get a very clear sense of the deteriorating affordability of housing.

Nominal house price patterns

The average UK actual or nominal house price in April 2024 was £281 000. As Chart 1 shows, this masks considerable differences across the UK. In England the average price was £298 000 (105 per cent of the UK average), though this is heavily skewed by London where the average price was £502 000 (178 per cent of the UK average). Meanwhile, in Scotland it was £190 000 (68 per cent of the UK average), in Wales £208 000 (74 per cent of the UK average) and in Northern Ireland it was £178 000 (74 per cent of the UK average). (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

A simple comparison of the average house price in April 2024 with January 1970 reveals a 72-fold increase in the UK, an 80-fold increase in England, including a 101-fold increase in London, a 65-fold increase in Wales, a 59-fold increase in Scotland and a 45-fold increase in Northern Ireland. Whilst these figures are sensitive to the particular period over which we choose to measure, there is little doubting that upward long-term trend in house prices.

Whilst nominal prices trend upwards over time, the short-term rates of increase are highly volatile. This can be seen from an inspection of Chart 2, which shows the annual rates of increase across the four nations of the UK, as well as for London. This is evidence of frequent imbalances between the flows of property on to the market to sell (instructions to sell) and the number of people looking to buy (instructions to buy). An increase in instructions to buy (housing demand) relative to those to sell (housing supply) puts upward pressure on prices; an increase in the number of instructions to sell (housing supply) relative to those to buy (housing demand) puts downward pressure on prices. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Chart 2 nicely captures the recent slowdown in the housing market. The inflationary shock that began to take hold in 2021 led the Bank of England to raise Bank Rate on 15 occasions – from 0.25 per cent in December 2021 to 5.25 per cent in August 2023 (which remains the rate at the time of writing, but could be cut at the next Bank of England meeting on 1 August 2024). Higher Bank Rate has pushed up mortgage rates, which has contributed to an easing of housing demand. Demand has also been dampened by weak growth in the economy, higher costs of living and fragile consumer confidence. The result has been a sharp fall in the rate of house price inflation, with many parts of the UK experiencing house price deflation. As the chart shows, the rate of deflation has been particularly pronounced and protracted in London, with house prices in January 2024 falling at an annual rate of 5.1 per cent.

Real house price patterns

Despite the volatility in house prices, such as those of recent times, the longer-term trend in house prices is nonetheless upwards. To understand just how rapidly UK house prices have grown over time, we now consider their growth relative to consumer prices. This allows us to analyse the degree to which there has been an increase in real house prices.

To calculate real or inflation-adjusted house prices, we deflate nominal house prices by the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Chart 3 shows the resulting real house prices series across the UK as if consumer prices were fixed at 2015 levels.

The key message here is that over the longer-term we cannot fully explain the growth in actual (nominal) house prices by the growth in consumer prices. Rather, we see real increases in house prices. Inflation-adjusted UK house prices were 5.3 times higher in April 2024 compared to January 1970. For England the figure was 5.9 times, Wales 4.8 times, Scotland 4.3 times and for Northern Ireland 3.3 times. In London, inflation-adjusted house prices were 7.4 times higher. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

As we saw with nominal house prices, the estimated long-term increase in real house prices is naturally sensitive to the period over which we measure. For example, the average real UK house price in August 2022 was 5.8 times higher than in January 1970, while in London they were 8.7 times higher. But the message is clear – the long-term increase is not merely nominal, reflecting increasing prices generally, but is real, reflecting pressures that are increasing house prices relative to general price levels.

Chart 4 shows how the volatility in house prices continues to be evident when house prices are adjusted for changes in consumer prices. The UK’s annual rate of real house price inflation was as high as 40 per in January 1973; on the other hand, in June 1975 inflation-adjusted house prices were 15 per cent lower than a year earlier. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Over the period from January 1970 to April 2024, the average annual rate of real house price inflation in the UK was 3.2 per cent. Hence house prices have, on average, grown at an annual rate of consumer price inflation plus 3.2 per cent. For the four nations, real house price inflation has averaged 3.8 per cent in England, 3.4 per cent in Wales, 3.0 per cent in Scotland and 2.9 per cent in Northern Ireland. Further, the average rate of real house price inflation in London since January 1970 has been 4.5 per cent. By contrast, that for the East and West Midlands has been 3.7 and 3.5 per cent respectively. The important point here is that the pace with which inflation-adjusted house prices have risen helps to contextualise the extent of the problem of housing affordability – a problem that only worsens over time when real incomes do not keep pace.

House building

The newly elected Labour government has made the argument that it needs to prioritise planning reform as an engine for economic growth. While this ambition extends beyond housing, the scale of the supply-side problem facing the housing market can be seen in Chart 5. The chart shows the number of housing completions in the UK since 1950 by type of tenure. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

The chart shows the extent of the growth in house building in the UK that occurred from the 1950s and into the 1970s. Over these three decades the typical number of new properties completed each year was around 320 000 or 6 per thousand of the population. The peak of house building was in the late 1960s when completions exceeded 400 000 per year or over 7.5 per thousand of the population. It is also noticeable how new local authority housing (‘council houses’) played a much larger role in the overall housing mix.

Since 1980, the average number of housing completions each year has dropped to 191 000 or 3.2 per thousand of the population. If we consider the period since 2000, the number of completions has averaged only 181 000 per year or 2.9 per thousand of the population. While it is important to understand the pressures on housing demand in any assessment of the growth in real house prices, the lack of growth in supply is also a key factor. The fact that less than half the number of properties per thousand people are now being built compared with half a century or so ago is an incredibly stark statistic. It is a major determinant of the deterioration of housing affordability.

However, there are important considerations around the protection of the natural environment that need to be considered too. It will therefore be interesting to see how the reforms to planning develop and what their impact will be on house prices and their affordability.

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Questions

  1. Explain the difference between a rise in the rate of house price inflation a rise in the level of house prices.
  2. Explain the difference between nominal and real house prices.
  3. If nominal house prices rise can real house price fall? Explain your answer.
  4. What do you understand by the terms instructions to buy and instructions to sell?
  5. What factors are likely to affect the levels of instructions to buy and instructions to sell?
  6. How does the balance between instructions to buy and instructions to sell affect house prices?
  7. How can we differentiate between different housing markets? Illustrate your answer with examples.
  8. What metrics could be used to measure the affordability of housing?
  9. Discuss the argument that the deterioration of housing affordability is the result of market failure.