The sun may have been shining of late across the UK, but there are increasing signs that economic sentiment is deteriorating, more especially amongst consumers. The EU’s economic sentiment index for the UK fell for the first time since November of last year and is now just a little below its long-run average.
The EU’s economic sentiment index is a composite indicator of confidence in that it captures confidence levels amongst both consumers and businesses. While overall sentiment actually increased in each month from December of last year through to this May, the decline in consumer confidence in the UK is now well established having fallen each month since March.
We might expect the falls in consumer confidence to be reflecting the prevailing economic environment and, in particular, the increasing number of people unemployed. However, since the sentiment survey contains forward-looking questions too, it may be that declining consumer sentiment reflects concerns amongst households about the impact of fiscal consolidation measures. These consumer expectations could be important in affecting consumer behaviour today. It could be very important to track consumer confidence in the coming months, especially in light of the measures announced in the Budget of 22 June (which occurred after June’s polling of consumers) and subsequent announcements too.
Interestingly, declining levels of consumer confidence in the UK had until June been offset by rising confidence amongst businesses. However, confidence across most sectors of industry deteriorated in June. In particular, confidence amongst manufacturers fell back very sharply. Bucking the trend were businesses in the service sector who reported feeling more confident than at any time since March 2008. However, given waning sentiment elsewhere, one would expect this to be relatively short-lived.
The profile of the average economic sentiment indicator across all 27 member states of the EU is broadly similar to that for the UK. It exhibits a sharp and continuous rise from the historic lows of the indicator recorded in March 2009, but fell back, although very slightly, in June. The improvement in sentiment amongst business has been especially marked. Sentiment too had been improving amongst consumers, but recent evidence points to consumer confidence easing, although not quite to the extent seen here in the UK.
There are, of course, some notable national trends in sentiment across EU countries. It will come as little surprise to know that in Greece the economic sentiment indicator has, in recent months, been at historic lows. If you are looking for countries where sentiment is above average, then perhaps try, amongst others, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Germany!
Articles
Euro economic sentiment near-static RTE (29/6/10)
Eurozone confidence unchanged Bloomberg Business Week, Associated Press (29/6/10)
Eurozone economic sentiment picks up Financial Times, Stanley Pignal (29/6/10)
FTSE loses more than 3% as Wall Street slides on confidence data Guardian (Market Forces Blog) (29/6/10)
How long can the housing market avoid a crash? Independent, Sean O’Grady (30/6/10) (Article stresses link between confidence and the housing market)
Data
Business and Consumer Surveys The Directorate General for Economics and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Consumer Confidence Nationwide Building Society
Questions
- Think about your confidence in your own financial situation. Draw up a list of those factors that might affect this confidence. How might this list change if you were thinking about the level of confidence across all consumers?
- Why might confidence amongst UK consumers have been falling well before that amongst businesses? Do you think such divergences can persist for any length of time?
- What factors do you think might be particularly important in affecting the sentiment amongst consumers and businesses in the weeks and months ahead?
- Imagine that you are given a choice of plotting a chart over time of the economic sentiment indicator and either the level of real GDP or the rate of growth in real GDP. Which plot would you go for and why?
- Perhaps the key question of all! Do you think economists can learn anything from tracking the patterns in economic sentiment?
What’s going to happen to stock market prices? If we knew that, we could be very rich! Nevertheless, financial analysts constantly try to predict the movements of shares in order to decide when to buy and when to sell. One thing they do is to look at charts of price movements and look for patterns. These ‘chartists’, as they are sometimes called, refer to something known as the ‘death cross’ or ‘dark cross’.
So what is the death cross? Imagine a chart of the movements of share prices, such as the FTSE 100 in the UK or the Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P 500 in the USA. These movements can be shown as a moving average. In other words, for each day you plot the average of the past so many days. Typically, 200-day (sometimes 100-day) and 50-day moving averages are plotted. The 200-day (or 100-day) is taken as the long-term moving average and the 50-day as the short-term moving average. In a falling market, if the short-term moving average crosses below the long-term moving average, this is called the ‘death cross‘ as it signifies growing downward pressure in the market. The fall in the long-term average in these circumstances will indeed lag behind the fall in the short-term moving average.
Markets around the world are experiencing the death cross. So should be be worried? Or is this like looking for patterns in tea leaves, or the stars, and using them to make bogus predictions? So: science or mumbo jumbo?
First the science: the death cross indicates a fall in confidence. And at present, there is much for investors to worry about. Burgeoning debts, austerity measures and fears of a double-dip recession are spooking markets.
Now the mumbo jumbo. Just because markets are falling at the moment, this does not prove that they will go on falling. Markets are often spooked, only to recover when ‘sanity’ returns. People may soon start to believe that a second credit crunch will not return, given all the regulatory and support measures put in place, the huge amount of liquidity waiting to be invested and the support packages from the ECB and IMF for Greece and, potentially, for other eurozone countries having difficulties servicing their debts. In other words, patterns may repeat themselves, but not necessarily. It depends on circumstances.
Articles
Market’s Swoon Prompts Fears Of the Dreaded ‘Death Cross’ CNBC, Jeff Cox (1/7/10)
Death Cross in S&P 500 May Not Lead to Rout: Technical Analysis Bloomberg Businessweek, Alexis Xydias (30/6/10)
Are the markets about to encounter the”Death Cross”? BBC News, Jamie Robertson (1/7/10)
MarketBeat Q&A: Debunking the ‘Death Cross’ Wall Street Journal blogs, Matt Phillips (30/6/10)
Technical analysis and market data
Moving Average Crossovers TradingDay.com, Alan Farley
Death Cross Investopedia
FTSE 100 historical prices Yahoo Finance
S&P 500 historical prices Yahoo Finance
Dow Jones historical prices Yahoo Finance
Questions
- Explain what is meant by the death cross and use a diagram to illustrate it. What is menat by the golden cross. Again, use a diagram to illustrate it.
- Under what circumstances would speculation against stock market price movements be (a) stabilising and (b) destabilising?
- What is the implication for stock market prices of a ‘wall of money’?
- How much faith should be put in chartist explanations of stock market prices? Do criticisms of chartism apply to all time-series analysis that is used for forecasting?
- Look back at newspaper articles from a year ago and see what they were predicting about stock market prices. Have their preductions been borne out? If so, why? If not, why not?
Keynes referred to the ‘paradox of thrift’ (see, for example, Box 17.5 on page 492 of Sloman and Wride, Economics, 7th edition). The paradox goes something like this: if individuals save more, they will increase their consumption possibilities in the future. If society saves more, however, this may reduce its future income and consumption. Why should this be so? Well, as people in general save more, they will spend less. Firms will thus produce less. What is more, the lower consumption will discourage firms from investing. Thus, through both the multiplier and the accelerator, GDP will fall.
What we have in the paradox of thrift is an example of the ‘fallacy of composition’ (see Sloman and Wride, Box 3.7 on page 84). What applies at the individual level will not necessarily apply at the aggregate level. The paradox of thrift applied in the Great Depression of the 1930s. People cutting back on consumption drove the world economy further into depression.
Turn the clock forward some 80 years. On 26/27 June 2010, leaders of the G20 countries met in Canada to consider, amongst other things, how to protect the global economic recovery while tackling the large public-sector deficits. These deficits have soared as a result of two things: (a) the recession of 2008/9, which reduced tax revenues and resulted in more people claiming benefits, (b) the expansionary fiscal policies adopted to bring countries out of recession.
But the leaders were divided on how much to cut now. Some, such as the new Coalition government in the UK, want to cut the deficit quickly in order to appease markets and avert a Greek-style crisis and a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to service the debt. Others, such as the Obama Administration in the USA, want to cut more slowly so as not to put the recovery in jeopardy. Nevertheless, cuts were generally agreed, although agreement about the timing was more vague.
So where is the fallacy of composition? If one country cuts, then it is possible that increased demand from other countries could drive recovery. If all countries cut, however, the world may go back into recession. What applies to one country, therefore, may not apply to the world as a whole.
Let’s look at this in a bit more detail and consider the individual elements of aggregate demand. If there are to be cuts in government expenditure, then there has to be a corresponding increase in aggregate demand elsewhere, if growth is to be maintained. This could come from increased consumption. But, with higher taxes and many people saving more (or reducing their borrowing) for fear of being made redundant or, at least, of having a cut in their incomes, there seems to be little sign that consumption will be the driver of growth.
Then there is investment. But, fearing a ‘double-dip recession’, business confidence is plummeting (see) and firms are likely to be increasingly reluctant to invest. Indeed, after the G20 summit, stock markets around the world fell. On 29 June, the FTSE 100 fell by 3.10% and the main German and French stock market indices, the Dax and the Cac 40, fell by 3.33% and 4.01% respectively. This was partly because of worries about re-financing the debts of various European countries, but it was partly because of fears about recovery stalling.
The problem is that cuts in government expenditure and rises in taxes directly affect the private sector. If government capital expenditure is cut, this will directly affect the construction industry. Even if the government makes simple efficiency savings, such as reducing the consumption of paper clips or paper, this will directly affect the private stationery industry. If taxes are raised, consumers are likely to buy less. Under these circumstances, no wonder many industries are reluctant to invest.
This leaves net exports (exports minus imports). Countries generally are hoping for a rise in exports as a way of maintaining aggregate demand. But here we have the fallacy of composition in its starkest form. If one country exports more, then this can boost its aggregate demand. But if all countries in total are to export more, this can only be achieved if there is an equivalent increase in global imports: after all, someone has to buy the exports! And again, with growth faltering, the global demand for imports is likely to fall, or at best slow down.
The following articles consider the compatibility of cuts and growth. Is there a ‘paradox of cuts’ equivalent to the paradox of thrift?
Articles
Osborne’s first Budget? It’s wrong, wrong, wrong! Independent on Sunday, Joseph Stiglitz (27/6/10)
Strategy: Focus switches from exit to growth Financial Times, Chris Giles (25/6/10)
Once again we must ask: ‘Who governs?’ Financial Times, Robert Skidelsky (16/6/10)
Europe’s next top bailout… MoneyWeb, Guy Monson and Subitha Subramaniam (9/6/10)
Hawks hovering over G20 summit Financial Times (25/6/10)
G20 applauds fiscal austerity but allows for national discretion Independent, Andrew Grice and David Usborne (28/6/10)
To stimulate or not to stimulate? That is the question Independent, Stephen King (28/6/10)
Now even the US catches the deficit reduction habit Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (28/6/10)
George Osborne claims G20 success Guardian, Larry Elliott and Patrick Wintour (28/6/10)
G20 accord: you go your way, I’ll go mine Guardian, Larry Elliott (28/6/10)
G20 summit agrees on deficit cuts by 2013 BBC News (28/6/10)
IMF says G20 could do better BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (27/6/10)
Are G20 summits worth having? What should the G20’s top priority be? (Economics by invitation): see in particular The G20 is heading for a “public sector paradox of thrift”, John Makin The Economist (25/6/10)
Why it is right for central banks to keep printing Financial Times, Martin Wolf (22/6/10)
In graphics: Eurozone in crisis: Recovery Measures BBC News (24/6/10)
A prophet in his own house The Economist (1/7/10)
The long and the short of fiscal policy Financial Times, Clive Crook (4/7/10)
G20 Communiqué
The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration (27/6/10) (see particularly paragraph 10)
Questions
- Consider the arguments that economic growth and cutting deficits are (a) complementary aims (b) contradictory aims.
- Is there necessarily a ‘paradox of cuts’? Explain.
- How is game theory relevant in explaining the outcome of international negotiations, such as those at the G20 summit?
- Would it be wise for further quantitative easing to accompany fiscal tightening?
- What is the best way for governments to avoid a ‘double-dip recession’?
For some, thoughts will have turned to events on football pitches in South Africa. Perhaps though we should spare a thought for the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, who is likely to be concerned by his own team’s recent performance in missing the inflation rate target! Mervyn’s resulting ‘yellow card’ involves writing a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer every time the annual rate of CPI (Consumer Price Index) inflation deviates by more than one percentage point from the government’s central target of 2%. Unfortunately for the Governor, since the turn of the year, only in February has the annual rate of CPI inflation failed to exceed 3%. And, even that was within in a whisker of missing the goal since the rate of inflation squeaked in at 3%. Perhaps February was more a case of hitting the post!
As all sports fans know, a run of disappointing results can lead to dissent amongst players and supporters alike. We can see from the minutes of June’s meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee the extent of the debate over the persistence of inflation. The debate included discussions concerning the impact of the expected fiscal consolidation measures (the MPC met before the Budget), the public’s higher inflation rate expectations, the price of oil and other commodities and the margin of spare capacity in the economy (the output gap). The minutes reveal that one member of the MPC, Andrew Sentance, voted for an increase in interest rates believing that inflation had been particularly resilient in the aftermath of the recession.
We now have new forecaster in town: The Office of Budget Responsibility. In our blog article Who’d be a forecaster? A taxing time for the new OBR we looked at the growth forecasts produced by the Office of Budget Responsibility taking into account the Budget Measures of 22 June. The June 2010 OBR Budget forecasts also contain predictions for CPI inflation. So what do the OBR say?
The OBR predicts that the annual rate of CPI inflation will stay around 3% in the near term. It is now slightly more pessimistic about the prospects for inflation beyond the near term than it was in its pre-Budget forecasts. More specifically, it says that CPI inflation will ‘decline more gradually’ than first thought because of the rise in the standard rate of VAT to 20% in January 2001 and its belief that oil prices will be higher than originally envisaged. The OBR is forecasting the average price of a barrel of oil in 2010/11 to be $78 rising to $82 in 2011/12.
Going further ahead, the OBR expects the rate of inflation to fall back to ‘a little under 2 per cent in early 2012’. It argues that this will reflect the unwinding of the VAT effect, and, significantly, the downward pressure on prices from the larger negative output gap that will result from the fiscal consolidation measures in the Budget. In other words, the expectation is that there will be greater slack or spare capacity in the economy which will help to subdue price pressures.
If the OBR is right, the Governor may have more letter-writing to do in the near term and perhaps well into 2011. But, the fiscal consolidation measures should, once the impact of the VAT rise on the inflation figures ‘drops out’, see the rate of inflation fall back. Perhaps then, the final whistle can be blown on the Governor’s inflation troubles. In the mean time it will be interesting to see how MPC members take on board, in their deliberations over interest rates, the Budget measures and the OBR’s own thoughts on inflation. Could interest rates be rising shortly despite fiscal consolidation? Let Mervyn and his team play on!
OBR Forecasts
Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (22/6/10)
Pre-Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (14/6/10)
Monetary Policy Committee
Overview of the Monetary Policy Committee
Monetary Policy Committee Minutes
Inflation Data
Latest on inflation Office for National Statistics (15/6/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Statistical Bulletin, May 2010 Office for National Statistics (15/6/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Time Series Data Office for National Statistics
For CPI (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) data for EU countries, see:
HICP European Central Bank
Articles
MPC minutes reveal Bank split on inflation risk Financial Times, Daniel Pimlott (23/6/10)
Bank of England minutes reveal surprise split on interest rates Guardian, Katie Allen (23/6/10)
Instant view: Bank split 7-1 on June vote Reuters UK (23/6/10)
Now even the Bank isn’t sure it can bring down inflation Independent, Sean O’Grady (24/6/10)
An inflation hawk hovers over the Bank of England Guardian, Nils Pratley (24/6/10)
Questions
- Explain why an output gap – the amount of spare capacity in the economy – might impact on price pressures.
- What impact would you expect the rise in the standard rate of VAT next January to have on the CPI (price level) and on the CPI inflation rate? What about the following year?
- Some economists believe that by being more aggressive in cutting the fiscal deficit, interest rates will be lower than they otherwise would have been. Evaluate this argument.
- Now for your turn to be a member of the MPC and to decide on interest rates! How would you vote next month? Are you a ‘dove’ or a ‘hawk’?
Under its terms of reference the new Office for Budget Responsibility is required to provide updated forecasts for the economy and the public finances at the time of each Budget in order take into account the impact of those measures contained in the Budget. Here we consider those economic forecasts contained in the June 2010 OBR Budget Forecast relating to economic growth. In particular, we consider the OBR’s interpretation of how growth is likely to be affected by the policy measures unveiled by George Osborne in his first Budget as Chancellor of Exchequer on 22 June.
The OBR forecasts that the UK economy will grow by 1.2% in 2010 and by a further 2.3% in 2011. These estimates are lower than those published by the OBR in its Pre-Budget Forecast published on 14 June. The Pre-Budget Forecasts predicted growth of 1.3% in 2010 and 2.6% in 2011. The downward revisions reflect the OBR’s assertion that the Budget’s measures to meet the Government’s fiscal mandate and, hence the resultant fiscal consolidation package, will weaken aggregate demand.
In terms of the components of aggregate demand, the fiscal consolidation will mean restraints on government spending (G) and, if the OBR is right, lower growth in household consumption (C). Lower consumption growth is expected as a result of reduced growth in household incomes and the rise in the standard rate of Value Added Tax next January from 17½% to 20%.
The OBR now forecasts that real household consumption will grow by just 0.2% in 2010, following last year’s contraction of 3.2%, and by 1.3% in 2011. General government final consumption – the Government’s expenditure on current goods and services – is forecast to grow in real terms by 1.7% this year before falling by 1.1% next year. The forecasts for general government capital spending are for a real fall of 4.9% this year, following last year’s rise of 15.7%, followed by a sizeable 19% decline in 2011.
A more positive note emerging from the OBR forecasts relates to capital expenditure by businesses. The measures to reform corporation tax, which include a reduction in the main rate of corporation tax from 28 per cent to 24 per cent over four years beginning with a one per cent reduction from April 2011, are predicted to have a favourable effect on investment. Business investment is forecast to rise in real terms by 1.4% this year, following last year’s fall of 19.3%, and to rise again in 2011 by 8.1%.
The projections for growth from 2013 are now stronger than in the OBR’s Pre-Budget Forecast with the economy portrayed as adjusting more quickly at this point towards its potential output. Potential output is the level of output level when the economy’s resources are operating at ‘normal capacity utilisation’. But, in 2015, which is at the end of the OBR’s five year forecast period, the UK economy is still forecast to be experiencing a negative output gap. In other words, actual output will still be less than potential output.
To help paint a picture of how the economy’s output will adjust towards its potential level consider the OBR estimates for the output gap. The OBR estimates that in financial year 2009-10 the economy’s output was 4.1% below its potential. This negative output gap is now expected to be reduced to 3.7% of potential output in 2010-11, to 2.8% in 2012-13 and to 0.9% of potential output in 2015-16.
Office for Budget Responsibility
OBR home page
Office for Budget Responsibility Terms of Reference
Documents
Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (22/6/10)
Pre-Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (14/6/10)
Budget 2010 HM Treasury (22/6/10)
Articles
OBR endorses Budget but faces questions over its own predictions Telegraph, Philip Alrdrick (23/6/10)
UK growth forecasts could be revised again, says Sir Alan Budd Citywire, Deborah Hyde (23/6/10)
OBR says growth will take bigger hit Financial Times, Norma Cohen (22/6/10)
Budget 2010: Government cuts will slow economic recovery, says watchdog Telegraph, James Kirkup (23/6/10)
Highlights from the Budget BBC News (22/6/10)
Budget statement: George Osborne’s speech in full BBC Democracy Live (22/6/10)
Questions
- What do you understand by the concept of aggregate demand?
- What are the component expenditures of aggregate demand? Which of these do you think is the largest in value terms?
- The OBR is forecasting the household sector’s disposable income to grow in real terms this year by 0.2% and by 1.2% next year. Why then is the OBR identifying weaker consumer demand as a result of the Budget measures as a major reason for revising down its predictions for economic growth?
- The OBR argues that the fiscal consolidation measures will have a ‘direct effect’ on household incomes and so on spending, but that this will be ‘partially offset by a decline in saving’. Why might the OBR be arguing that a fiscal consolidation will lead to a decline in saving? Evaluate the OBR’s arguments.
- What do you understand by the concept of an output gap? What does a negative output gap signify?
- To see the sorts of problems that forecasters commonly face, try identifying reasons why the output gap could be eliminated more quickly or less quickly as a result of the Budget measures.