If aggregate demand were to expand, would there be sufficient spare capacity to allow aggregate supply to expand to meet the additional demand? This is the question addressed by the podcast and article below.
If there is plenty of spare capacity, policies to increase aggregate demand could help to take up the slack and thereby achieve economic growth – at least as long as spare capacity remains. In other words, in the short run the aggregate supply curve may be horizontal or only gently upward sloping at the current point of intersection with the aggregate demand curve. This is illustrated by point a in the diagram. A rightward shift in the aggregate demand curve would cause a movement along the aggregate supply curve to a new higher level of real national income (Y).
If, however, there is little or no spare capacity, an increase in nominal aggregate demand is likely to be purely inflationary, or virtually so. This would the case at point b in the diagram. Real national income cannot expand beyond the full-capacity level, YFC. Under such circumstances, any attempt by the government to stimulate economic growth should focus on the supply side and attempt to shift the aggregate supply curve to the right. Examples of supply-side policy include incentives to encourage research and development, incentives for the private sector to invest in new capacity and direct public investment in infrastructure.
Unemployment is not just caused by a lack of aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply. It may be the result of a mismatching of labour supply with the demand for labour. People may have the wrong qualifications or not be where the jobs are. Unemployment may co-exist with quite high levels of vacancies. There may be vacancies for highly qualified scientists, technicians or craftspeople and unemployment of people with low skills or skills no longer in high demand. The same may apply to capital equipment. There may be a shortage of high-tech equipment or equipment to produce goods in high demand and redundant older equipment or equipment in areas of declining demand.
Part of a comprehensive set of policies to tackle unemployment and achieve economic growth would be to focus on the whole balance of the economy and the matching of the demand and supply of inputs.
Ministers are considering introducing a minimum price of 45p per unit of alcohol on all drinks sold in England and Wales. The Scottish government has already passed legislation for a minimum price of 50p per unit in Scotland. This, however, is being challenged in the Scottish courts and is being examined by the European Commission.
As we saw in a previous blog, Alcohol minimum price, the aim is to prevent the sale of really cheap drinks in supermarkets and other outlets. Sometimes supermarkets sell alcoholic drinks at less than average cost as a ‘loss leader’ in order to encourage people to shop there. Two-litre bottles of strong cider can be sold for as little as £2. Sometimes they offer multibuys which are heavily discounted. The idea of minimum pricing is to stop these practices without affecting ‘normal’ prices.
The effect of a 45p minimum price per unit would give the following typical minimum prices (depending on strength):
Strength
Size
Minimum price
Wine
12.5%
750ml
£4.22
Beer/lager (normal)
4.5%
pint (568ml)
£1.15
Beer/lager (strong)
7.5%
pint (568ml)
£1.92
Beer/lager (normal)
4.5%
2 litres
£4.05
Beer/lager (strong)
7.5%
2 litres
£6.75
Cider (normal)
5%
pint (568ml)
£1.28
Cider (strong)
8%
pint (568ml)
£2.04
Cider (normal)
5%
2 litres
£4.50
Cider (strong)
8%
2 litres
£7.20
Whisky
40%
700ml
£12.60
Vodka
37.5%
700ml
£11.81
The hope is that by preventing the sale of really cheap drinks in supermarkets, people will no longer be encouraged to ‘pre-load’ so that when they go out for the evening they are already drunk.
But how successful will such a policy be in cutting down drunkenness and the associated anti-social behaviour in many towns and cities, especially on Friday and Saturday nights? The following articles discuss the issue and look at some of the evidence on price elasticity of demand.
Draw a diagram to illustrate the effect of a minimum price per unit of alcohol on (a) cheap cider; (b) good quality wine.
How is the price elasticity of demand for alcoholic drinks relevant to determining the success of minimum pricing?
Compare the effects of imposing a minimum unit price of alcohol with raising the duty on alcoholic drinks? What are the revenue implications of the two policies for the government?
What externalities are involved in the consumption of alcohol? How could a socially efficient price for alcohol be determined?
Is imposing a minimum price for alcohol fair? How will it effect the distribution of income?
Many developing Asian countries have experienced rapid and yet relatively stable economic growth over a number of years. In other words, this has not been a short-term unsustainable boom associated with the expansionary phase of the business cycle – with aggregate demand expanding more rapidly than aggregate supply. Rather it is the result of a rapid growth in aggregate supply.
Over the period from 2000 to 2011, several Asian countries experienced average annual growth rates of over 4% and some, such as China and India, much more than that, as the following table shows. The table also shows forecasts for the period from 2012 to 2017. The high forecast growth rates are based on a continuing rapid growth in aggregate supply as the countries invest in infrastructure and adopt technologies, many of which have already been developed elsewhere.
But for aggregate supply to continue growing rapidly there must also be a stable growth in aggregate demand. With the recession in the developed world, some of the more open economies of Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore themselves suffered a slowdown or recession as demand for their exports fell. The Malaysian economy, for example, contracted by 1.5% in 2009.
Given the continuing macroeconomic problems in the developed world, many Asian countries are seeing the need to rebalance their economies away from a heavy reliance on exports. China, for example, is putting more emphasis on domestic-led demand growth. Others, such as Indonesia, have already embarked on this route. As The Economist article states:
Household consumption contributed half of the growth of just over 6% Indonesia enjoyed in the year to the third quarter (its eighth consecutive quarter of growth at that pace). Exports have fallen from about 35% of GDP ten years ago to less than a quarter in 2011. Developing Asia’s combined current-account surplus, which reflects its dependence on foreign demand, more than halved from 2008 to 2011 and is expected to fall further this year.
The continuing success story of many developing Asian economies thus lies in a balance of supply-side policies that foster continuing rapid investment and demand-side policies that create a stable monetary and fiscal environment. A crucial question here is whether they can emulate the ‘Great Moderation’ experienced by the Western economies from the mid-1990s to 2007, without creating the conditions for a crash in a few years time – a crash caused by excessive credit and an excessively deregulated financial system that was building up greater and greater systemic risk.
In a previous blog, Anyone got a crystal ball?, we reported on the Bank of England’s and other agencies’ difficulty in making forecasts. As the Governor, Mervyn King, said, “There is just enormous uncertainty out there.”
The Bank of England has just published its November Inflation Report. This quarterly publication gives forecasts of inflation, GDP and other indicators. It is clear that forecasting hasn’t become any easier. In his opening remarks, Dr. King says:
Continuing the recent zig-zag pattern, output growth is likely to fall back sharply in Q4 as the boost from the Olympics in the summer is reversed – indeed output may shrink a little this quarter. It is difficult to discern the underlying picture. It is probably neither as good as the zigs suggest nor as bad as the zags imply.
The Inflation Report looks at the various factors affecting aggregate demand, inflation, unemployment and aggregate supply. It is quite clear on reading the report why there is so much uncertainty.
A salutary lesson is to look back at previous forecasts and see just how wrong they have been. The chart above shows the forecasts for GDP made in the Inflation Reports of Nov 2012 and Aug 2011. You can see that they are significantly different and yet just 15 months apart. You might also like to compare the forecasts made a year ago (or even two!) about 2012 with the actual situation today. A good source for this is the Treasury’s Forecasts for the UK economy. This collates the forecasts from a range of independent forecasters.
The inaccuracy of forecasting is an inevitable consequence of a highly interdependent world economy that is subject to a range of economic shocks and where confidence (or lack of it) is a major determinant of aggregate demand. But when firms, governments, individuals and central banks have to make plans, it is still necessary to project into the future and try to forecast as accurately as possible – even though it might mean keeping your fingers firmly crossed.
What was being forecast for economic growth and inflation for 2012 (a) one year ago; (b) two years ago?
What are the main reasons for the inaccuracy of forecasts?
How might forecasting be made more reliable?
If sentiment is a key determinant of economic activity, how might politicians increase the confidence of firms and consumers? What are the political constraints on doing this?
Explain the following statement from the Guardian article: “The problem … is that last decade’s tailwind has become this decade’s headwind.” Why is it difficult to forecast the strength of this ‘headwind’?
How useful is it to use past trends as a guide to the future course of the economy?
UK Unemployment figures for the July to September period have just been published. Perhaps surprisingly, the rate has fallen to 7.8% from 8.0% in the previous 3-month period. What is more, there have been similar 0.2 percentage-point falls in each of the two 3-month periods prior to that (see chart below).
This would normally suggest that the economy has been growing strongly and faster than the growth in potential output. But, despite positive economic growth in quarter 3 (see A positive turn of events?), the economy has been experiencing a prolonged period of low or negative growth.
So what is the explanation for the fall in unemployment? (For a PowerPoint of the chart, click here)
One reason is a greater flexibility in the labour market than in previous recessions. People are more willing to accept below inflation wage increases, or even nominal wage cuts, in return for greater job security. Others are prepared to reduce their hours.
The other reason is a fall in productivity (i.e. output per hour worked). One explanation is that people are not working so hard because, with a lack of demand, there is less pressure on them to be productive; a similar explanation is that firms are ‘hoarding’ labour in the hope that the market will pick up again.
Another explanation is that employment growth has often occurred in the low productivity industries, such as labour-intensive service industries; another is that when people leave their jobs they are replace by less productive workers on lower wages; another is that workers are making do with ageing equipment, whose productivity is falling, because firms cannot afford to invest in new equipment. An range of possible explanations is given on page 33 of the Bank of England’s November 2012 Inflation Report.
But with many predicting that growth will be negative again in 2012 quarter 4, the fall in unemployment may not continue. Britain may join many other countries in Europe and experience rising unemployment as well as falling output.
What possible explanation are there for the latest fall in unemployment?
What has been happening to employment, both full time and part time?
What are the different ways of measuring productivity? Why will they be affected differently by a fall in the average number of hours worked?
Why might it be in firms’ interests to maintain the level of their workforce despite falling sales?
Assume that there has been a fall in aggregate demand. Compare the resulting effect on consumption of (a) a fall in wages rates; (b) a rise in unemployment. How might the design of the benefit system affect the answer?
If aggregate demand were to expand, would there be sufficient spare capacity to allow aggregate supply to expand to meet the additional demand? This is the question addressed by the podcast and article below.
Is there ‘spare capacity’ in the economy? BBC Today Programme, Evan Davis and Andrew Sentance (4/12/12)
