Author: John Sloman

Over the past 13 years of the Labour government, the incomes of the richest 1 per cent in the UK have grown substantially faster than that of other income groups, as they also did under the previous Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997. But, thanks to complex redistributive policies, including tax credits, the rise in relative poverty that occurred in the 1980s and 90s has been arrested. With the exception of the top 1 per cent, disposable income growth has been similar across the income groups.

As Larry Elliott, the Guardian’s Economics editor argues:

During the Thatcher-Major years, real incomes for the richest fifth of the population rose fastest, averaging growth of about 2.5% a year. The next richest quintile did a little less well, the middle 20% a bit less well still, and so on all the way down to the poorest 20% of the population, which saw the smallest real income gains of less than 1% a year.

Under Labour, the very high rewards secured by the top 1% of earners has obscured an even distribution of real income growth across the five quintiles.

The new coalition government maintains that anti-poverty policies have failed:

… Iain Duncan Smith, the work and pensions secretary, made a statement trashing Labour’s record: “Vast sums of money have been poured into the benefits system over the last decade in an attempt to address poverty, but today’s statistics clearly show that this approach has failed. Little progress has been made in tackling child poverty, society is more unequal than 50 years ago and there are more working age people living in poverty than ever before.

A new approach is needed which addresses the drivers behind poverty and actually improves the outcomes of the millions of adults and children trapped in poverty.”

The following articles explore what has been happening to inequality and poverty and look at the policies proposed by the coalition government. The data on inequality are also given, along with commentary on them by the Institute for Fiscal Studies

Articles
Labour’s poverty record may be flawed, but the damage was done by the Tories Guardian, Larry Elliott (24/5/10)
The distribution of income: For richer, for poorer Guardian editorial (24/5/10)
What the poverty figures show Guardian Joe Public blog, Julia Unwin (chief executive of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation) (21/5/10)

Data and reports
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 1994/95-2008/09 Department for Work and Pensions(19/5/10)
Households Below Average Income (pdf file) National Statistics, First Release (20/5/10)
Effects of taxes and benefits on household income Office for National Statistics (see also, especially Tables 26 and 27)
Poverty and inequality in the UK: 2010 Institute for Fiscal Studies
A range of poverty data The Poverty Site

Questions

  1. What has happened to the distribution of original, gross, disposable and post-tax income distribution (a) by percentage shares of quintile groups of income; (b) in terms of gini coefficients? (See the “Effects of taxes and benefits on household income” reference above.)
  2. Why is income inequality likely to increase unless strong redistributive policies are pursued by the government?
  3. What are ‘the drivers behind poverty’?
  4. To what extent is there a trade-off between economic growth and redistributing incomes from rich to poor?
  5. Why is it argued that in an increasingly interdependent world, senior executives have to be paid extremely high salaries and be given very large bonuses in order for a company to recruit sufficiently talented people and yet wages have to be kept low to allow goods to remain competitive?
  6. Why was income much more equally distributed in the 1960s and 70s than it is today?
  7. What redistributive policies is the new coalition government in the UK pursuing? What factors will determine their success?

With the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats now in power in the UK and with the Labour Party, having lost the election, being now in the midst of a leadership campaign, politicians from across the political spectrum are balming Gordon Brown for the ‘mess the country’s in’. The UK has a record budget deficit and debt, and is just emerging from a deep recession, when only a few years ago, Gordon Brown was claiming the end of boom and bust. But is the condition of the UK economy Mr Brown’s fault? Would it have been any better if others had been in charge, or if there had been even greater independence for the Bank of England of if there had been an Office of Budget Responsibility (see)?

The following podcast by Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator of the Financial Times, considers this question. He argues that:

Everybody would like to blame Gordon Brown for the financial crisis. But he was only acting in line with the national consensus on economic policy.

The economic legacy of Mr Brown FT podcasts, Martin Wolf (13/5/10)
The economic legacy of Mr Brown Financial Times, Martin Wolf (13/5/10)

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by ‘the great moderation’.
  2. Should regulation of the banks be handed back to the Bank of England?
  3. Why may controlling inflation not necessarily result in stable economic growth? Is this a case of Goodhart’s Law?
  4. Why was the UK economy especially fragile during the banking crisis and its aftermath?
  5. What, according to Martin Wolf, was Mr Brown’s biggest mistake?
  6. Could a mistake be now being made by following the conventional wisdom that cutting the deficit is the solution to achieving sustained recovery?

The EU competition acuthorities have just fined ten producers of memory chips a total of €331 million for operating a cartel. One of the ten, Micron, will pay no fine because it blew the whistle on the other nine. They, in turn, have had their fines reduced by 10% for co-operating with the authorities. According to the EU Press Release:

The overall cartel was in operation between 1 July 1998 and 15 June 2002. It involved a network of contacts and sharing of secret information, mostly on a bilateral basis, through which they coordinated the price levels and quotations for DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memory), sold to major PC or server original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the EEA.

“This first settlement decision is another milestone in the Commission’s anti-cartel enforcement. By acknowledging their participation in a cartel the companies have allowed the Commission to bring this long-running investigation to a close and to free up resources to investigate other suspected cartels. As the procedure is applied to new cases it is expected to speed up investigations significantly”, said Commission Vice President and Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia.

Articles
Chipmakers to pay fines of €330m over cartel Financial Times, Nikki Tait (20/5/10)
Chipmakers fined by EU for price-fixing BBC News (19/5/10)

European Commission douments and findings
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels Europa Press Release (3/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels – frequently asked questions Europa Memo (30/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission fines DRAM producers € 331 million for price cartel; reaches first settlement in a cartel case Europa Press Release (19/5/10)
Antitrust: Commission adopts first cartel settlement decision – questions & answers Europa Memo (19/5/10)

Questions

  1. Explain how the new fast-track cartel settlement procedure works.
  2. Are the incentives built into the procedure appropriate for reducing oligopolistic collusion?
  3. Are the any reasons why the chip cartel might have been in consumers’ interests?
  4. Why does EU competition legislation apply in this case given than all but one of the companies are non-EU businesses?

The International Monetary Fund published a report on banking, ahead of the G20 meeting of ministers on 23 April. The IMF states that banks should now pay for the bailout they received from governments during the credit crunch of 2008/9. As the first Guardian article states:

It is payback time for the banks. Widely blamed for causing the worst recession in the global economy since the 1930s, castigated for using taxpayer bailouts to fund big bonuses, and accused of starving businesses and households of credit, the message from the International Monetary Fund is clear: the day of reckoning is at hand.

The Washington-based fund puts the direct cost of saving the banking sector from collapse at a staggering $862bn (£559bn) – a bill that has put the public finances of many of the world’s biggest economies, including Britain and the United States, in a parlous state. Charged with coming up with a way of ensuring taxpayers will not have to dig deep a second time, the top economists at the IMF have drawn up an even more draconian blueprint than the banks had been expecting.

The IMF proposes two new taxes. The first had been expected. This would be a levy on banks’ liabilities and would provide a fund that governments could use to finance any future bailouts. It would be worth around $1500bn: some 2.5% of world GDP, and a higher percentage than that for countries, such as the UK, with a large banking sector.

The second was more surprising to commentators. This would be a financial activities tax (FAT). This would essentially be a tax on the value added by banks, and hence would be a way of taxing profits and pay. Currently, for technical reasons, many of banks’ activities are exempt from VAT (or the equivalent tax in countries outside the EU). The IMF thus regards them as under-taxed relative to other sectors. If such a tax were levied at a rate of 17.5% (the current rate of VAT in the UK), this could raise over 1% of GDP. In the UK this could be as much as £20bn – which would make a substantial contribution to reducing the government’s structural deficit of around £100bn

Meanwhile, in the USA, President Obama has been seeking to push legislation through Congress that would tighten up the regulation of banks. On 20 May, the Senate passed the bill, which now has to be merged with a version in the House of Representatives to become law. A key part of the measures involve splitting off the trading activities of banks in derivatives and other instruments from banks’ regular retail lending and deposit-taking activities with the public and firms. At the same time, there would be much closer regulation of the derivatives market. These complex financial instruments, whose value is ‘derived’ from the value of other assets, would have to be traded in an open market, not in private deals. A new financial regulatory agency will be created with the Federal Reserve having regulatory oversight of the whole of the financial markets

The measures would also give the government the power to break up financial institutions that were failing and rescue solvent parts without having to resort to a full-scale bailout. There is also a proposal to set up a nine-member Council of Regulators to keep a close watch on banking activities and to identify excessive risks. Banks would also be more closely supervised.

So is this payback time for banks? Or will higher taxes simply be passed on to customers, with pay and bonuses remaining at staggering levels? And will tougher regulation simply see ingenious methods being invented of getting round the regulation? Will the measures reduce moral hazard, or is the genie out of the bottle, with banks knowing that they will always be seen as too important to fail?

IMF Webcast
Press Briefing by IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn IMF Webcasts (22/4/10)
Transcript of the above Press Briefing

Articles
The IMF tax proposals
IMF proposes two taxes for world’s banks Guardian, Jill Treanor and Larry Elliott (21/4/10)
IMF gets tough on banks with ‘FAT’ levy Guardian, Linda Yueh (21/4/10)
Q&A: IMF proposals to shape G20 thinking Financial Times, Brooke Masters (21/4/10)
The challenge of halting the financial doomsday machine Financial Times, Martin Wolf (20/4/10)
IMF’s ‘punishment tax’ draws fire from banking industry Financial Times, Sharlene Goff, Brooke Masters and Scheherazade Daneshkhu (21/4/10)
Squeezing the piggy-banks Economist (21/4/10)
IMF, part two Economist, ‘Buttonwood’ (21/4/10)
IMF proposes tax on financial industry as economic safeguard Washington Post, Howard Schneider (20/4/10)
IMF wants two big new taxes on banks BBC News blogs, Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (20/4/10)

Obama’s proposals
Obama pleas for Wall Street support on reforms Channel 4 News, Job Rabkin (22/4/10)
Q&A: Obama’s bank regulation aims BBC News (22/4/10)
US banks may not bend to Barack Obama’s demands Guardian, Nils Pratley (22/4/10)
President Obama attacks critics of bank reform bill BBC News (23/4/10)
US Senate passes biggest overhaul of big banks since Depression Telegraph (21/5/10)
Finance-Overhaul Bill Would Reshape Wall Street, Washington Bloomberg Businessweek (21/5/10)
US Senate approves sweeping reforms of Wall Street (including video) BBC News (21/5/10)
Obama gets his big bank reforms BBC News blogs: Pestons’s Picks, Robert Peston (21/5/10)

Questions

  1. What would be the incentive effects on bank behaviour of the two taxes proposed by the IMF?
  2. What is meant by ‘moral hazard’ in the context of bank bailouts? Would (a) the IMF proposals and (b) President Obama’s proposals increase or decrease moral hazard?
  3. Why may the proposed FAT tax simply generate revenue rather than deter excessive risk-taking behaviour?
  4. What market conditions (a) encourage and (b) discourage large pay and bonuses of bankers? Will any of the proposals change these market conditions?
  5. What do you understand by the meaning of ‘excess profits’ in the context of the banks and what are the sources of such excess profits?
  6. Criticise the proposed IMF and US measures from the perspective of the banks.

According to political business cycle theory, incoming governments tend to take harsh measures at first, when they can blame the cuts on the ‘mess they’ve inherited’ from their predecessors. And then two or three years later, as an election looms, they can start spending more and/or cutting taxes, hoping that the good will this creates will help them win the election.

So are we seeing the start of a new political business cycle with the start of the new Coalition government? The following two articles look at the issue.

Coalition will inflict cuts now and spend later to win a second term Guardian, Larry Elliott (17/5/10)
If you get all the bad news out at once, the only way left to go will be up. Or will it? Independent, Sean O’Grady (18/5/10)

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by the ‘political business cycle’.
  2. Would the existence of a political dimension to the business cycle amplify or dampen the cycle, or could it do either depending on the circumstances? Explain.
  3. Does the existence of an independent central bank eliminate the political business cycle?
  4. Will the new Office for Budget Responsibility (see Nipping it in the Budd: Enhancing fiscal credibility?) help to eliminate the political business cycle? Explain your answer.