Tag: oligopoly

In 2007, BT, Virgin, Top up TV and Setanta complained about Sky’s dominance within the pay-TV industry. Sky, who have an estimated 85% share of the market were investigated by Ofcom and a decision has now been made. Sky will be forced to reduce the price it charges to other Broadcasters for showing premium sport channels. The wholesale price of Sky Sports 1 and 2 (two of my favourite channels!!) will each be reduced by just over 23% to £10.63 a month each. The idea is that this decision will benefit consumers by increasing choice. However, Sky argues that it will be to the ‘detriment of consumers’ as incentives to invest and take risks will be blunted.

Furthermore, there are also concerns that it will mean less money going into sport. Rugby, football, tennis etc benefit from some very lucrative TV rights deals and if Sky is forced to reduce prices (it is appealing the decision), then the value of these deals is likely to decline, which may lead to less investment in grass-routes participation.

Whilst progress has been made within this area, critics argue that Ofcom have not gone far enough and should have extended their decision to more sport channels (not just Sky Sports 1 and 2) and even to the premium movie channels. This would again increase consumer choice and provide more people with access to premium TV. This would work alongside more innovation within the pay-TV industry, which has seen Sky being given permission to offer pay-TV services on freeview, which will open up pay-TV to millions more consumers. Whilst no action has been taken regarding Sky’s dominance of premium movie channels, this issue has been referred to the Competition Commission. Is Sky’s dominance over sporting events about to come to an end?

Articles

BSkyB ordered to cut sports channels rates Reuters, Kate Holton (31/3/10)
Sky forced to cut price of sports channels Telegraph (31/3/10)
Consumers are big winners in BSkyB ruling Financial Times, Ben Fenton and Andrew Parker (31/3/10)
BSkyB should shake hands and move on Financial Times (31/3/10)
Sky told to cut wholesale prices by regulator Ofcom BBC News (31/3/10)
Ofcom v Sky BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (31/3/10)
BSkyB ‘restricting competition’ BBC Today Programme (31/3/10)
Ofcom orders Sky Sports price cut Guardian, Mark Sweney (31/3/10)
Sky ruling: Culture Secretary challenges Tories to back Ofcom Guardian, Mark Sweney (31/3/10)
Sky forced to cut the price for top sports events: Q and A Telegraph, Rupert Neate (31/3/10)
New ruling lets fans see Premier League on TV for just £15 a month London Evening Standard, Jonathan Prynn (31/3/10)
Regulator sets the fuse for shake-up of pay-TV Independent, Nick Clark (31/3/10)

Ofcom report
Delivering consumer benefits in Pay TV Ofcom Press Release (31/3/10)
Pay TV Statement Overview (31/3/10)
Pay TV Statement Summary (pdf file) (31/3/10)
Pay TV Statement Full document (pdf file) (31/3/10)

Questions

  1. To what extent will Ofcom’s decision to force Sky to reduce prices lead to an increase in consumer choice? Why is consumer choice good?
  2. Why has Sky been able to charge such high prices in the past, in particular for sports channels?
  3. According to the BBC News article, Sky shares were the biggest risers on the FTSE by midday on the day of the announcement. Why do you think this was the case?
  4. Would a similar decision on premium movie channels significantly increase consumer choice?
  5. Into which market structure does the Premium TV industry best fit? Consider the characteristics of the pay-TV industry. Into which market structure does it best fit?
  6. Why may Ofcom’s decision lead to less investment in sport at the grass roots?

Ofcom, the communications regulator, is keen to encourage the spread of super-fast broadband through investment in fibre-optic cabling. So far, super-fast broadband is available to around 46 per cent of the UK population. Both Virgin Media (formerly Telewest and NTL) and BT have invested in fibre optic cables, but Ofcom is keen to extend the use to rival companies.

It proposes two methods: the first is to give competitors access to BT’s cables; the second is to allow competitors to install their own cables using BT’s ducts and telegraph poles. In both cases BT would charge companies to use its infrastructure and would be free to set prices so as to ensure a ‘fair rate of return’.

The articles below consider this ‘solution’ and its likely success in developing competition in the super-fast broadband market through competition, or whether BT’s and Virgin’s market dominance will continue to the detriment of consumers. You can also find links below to the Ofcom report and summaries

Articles
BT welcomes Ofcom’s fibre access plans Reuters, Kate Holton (23/3/10)
Ofcom to encourage super-fast broadband Business Financial Newswire (23/3/10)
Ofcom tells BT to open its fibre network ShareCast (23/3/10)
Ofcom wants BT to open up infrastructure Financial Times, Philip Stafford (23/3/10)
Ofcom push to give broadband rivals access to BT tunnels Financial Times, Tim Bradshaw and Andrew Parker (23/3/10)
BT UK Pushes Ofcom to Open Virgin Medias Broadband Cable Ducts SamKnows, Phil Thompson (23/3/10)
BT welcomes Ofcom’s fibre access plans ISPreview, MarkJ (8/3/10)

Report and summaries
Summary: Enabling a super-fast broadband Britain Ofcom (23/3/10)
Review of the wholesale local access market: full document Ofcom (23/3/10)
Review of the wholesale local access market: summary Ofcom (23/3/10)

Questions

  1. What forms does competition take in the broadband market?
  2. What are the barriers to entry to the super-fast broadband market?
  3. Are fibre-optic networks a natural monopoly? Explain the significance of your answer for competition in the super-fast broadband market.
  4. Will Ofcom’s desire for BT to get a fair return on its wholesale pricing of access to its cabling, ducts and telegraph poles be sufficient to ensure effective competition and that profits are not excessive?
  5. Explain whether it would be in consumers’ interests for competitors to be given access to Virgin’s cables and ducts.

Kraft was seeking to take over Cadbury since September 2009, (see Cadbury: Chocolate all change and A Krafty approach to Cadbury). But the Cadbury board had rejected previous bids as being too low. The September bid, for example, was valued at £10.2bn. On 19 January 2010, however, after heated negotiations the board accepted the latest offer by Kraft valued at £11.5bn ($19bn).

But is the deal good news? Or will what is sweet for senior management and the financial institutions which brokered the deal be dark bitter news for the main stakeholders – consumers, workers and shareholders? The following articles explore the issues.

Cadbury battle ends with midnight handshake Financial Times, Lina Saigol (19/1/10)
Cadbury takeover: a crafty bit of business or an overpriced confection? Telegraph, Jonathan Sibun (20/1/10)
Cadbury’s sweet City deal leaves a bitter taste in Bournville Guardian, Heather Stewart and Nick Mathiason (19/1/10)
Thousands of Cadbury jobs under threat as Kraft swallows a British icon (including video) Times Online, Helen Nugent and Catherine Boyle (20/1/10)
Cadbury deal ‘the price of globalisation’ Financial Times, Jenny Wiggins and Jonathan Guthrie (19/1/10)
Cadbury sale ‘right thing to do’ FT video (19/1/10)
Bitterness as Kraft wins Cadbury Independent, Nick Clark (20/1/10)
The winners: Management duo in line for bumper pay packet from takeover deal Independent, Nick Clark (20/1/10)
Kraft came hunting in the only country that would sell – Britain Independent, James Moore (20/1/10)
Kraft’s takeover leaves a bitter taste in the mouth Telegraph, Tracy Corrigan (19/1/10)
A sweet deal – or a takeover that is hard to swallow? Independent, Hamish McRae (20/1/10)
Cadbury: banks are the real winners BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (20/1/10)
Warren Buffett blasts Kraft’s takeover of Cadbury Guardian, Graeme Wearden (20/1/10)
Cadbury says job cuts inevitable after Kraft takeover (including videos) BBC News (19/1/10)
Cadbury and the open market theory: they’d better be right Guardian blog, Michael White (20/1/10)
The Business: Bonus season and the Cadbury takeover Guardian podcast, Aditya Chakrabortty
How did Quakers conquer the British sweet shop? BBC News Magazine, Peter Jackson (20/1/10)
Why Kraft must keep organic cacao farmers sweet Guardian blog, Craig Sams (20/1/10)

Questions

  1. What were the incentives for the Cadbury board to accept the proposed offer by Kraft?
  2. Do such incentives lead to the efficient operation of markets?
  3. Explain what is meant by ‘competition for corporate control’. To what extent is such competition in the interests of consumers?
  4. What economies or diseconomies of scale are likely to result from the takeover? What will determine the extent to which changes in costs are passed on to the consumer?
  5. How will the following stakeholders fare from the takeover, both in the short run and in the long run: (a) consumers; (b) workers; (c) shareholders?
  6. Examine Warren Buffet’s arguments for rejecting the deal.

When we examine industries and markets in economics, one of the key things we look for is how competitive the market is. A question that we ask is, under what type of market structure is this firm operating? To answer this, we will need information on the number of competitors, the products, prices, advertising, profits, efficiency and how the firms are likely to behave in both the short and long run.

A lot of the time firms are independent: their behaviour doesn’t affect the actions of rivals. This is usually because each firm within the industry only has a relatively small market share. If one firm changes the price, or how much it spends on advertising/product development, this won’t have an impact on the market equilibrium.

However, it’s not as easy for an oligopolist, as interdependence is a key characteristic of this market structure. As such, it’s not surprising that firms have a decision to make: should they compete with the other firms and try to maximise our own profits, or should they collude and try to maximise industry profits? Whilst collusion is illegal in many countries, activities such as price fixing do go ahead and it can be difficult to prove, as the ACCC is finding with a petrol price-fixing case in Melbourne. In 49 of the 53 weeks studied, when one of the big petrol stations changed their price, the industry followed these movements exactly.

As competition in a market decreases, it could be a sign that an oligopoly is developing. A few firms are beginning to dominate the market and this could spell trouble for customers. Indeed, in the Australian banking sector, there are concerns that an oligopoly will develop if more competition is not introduced. The Deputy Chairman of the Australian Bankers’ Association said: “We’ve got four major banks that are repricing all their commercial and small business customers’ margins upwards”. Customers may therefore lose out with higher prices and less choice, while the dominant firms see their profits growing.

The market structure under which a firm is operating will have a major impact on its decisions and the outcomes in the market, as shown in the articles below.

ACCC on safe political ground in targeting the Mobil takeover The Australian Business, John Durie and Martin Collins (3/12/09)
Nippon Steel Chairman warns of Australian oligopolies Market Watch, Stephen Bell (10/11/09)
Government’s bank guarantee hurting BOQ: Libby Business Day (2/12/09)
Regulators to scrutinise BHP and Rio’s Australian joint venture Financial Times, William McNamara and Elizabeth Fry (7/12/09)
Crackdown on price fixing draws mixed reaction The Korea Herald (7/12/09)

Questions

  1. What are the main characteristics of an oligopoly?
  2. Illustrate a cartel that fixes prices and show how a member of this cartel must sell at that price and at a given quantity.
  3. Some factors make collusion more likely to occur and more likely to succeed. In the Australian banking sector, which factors do you think are allowing price fixing to occur?
  4. Is the example of petrol price fixing barometric price leadership or dominant firm price leadership? Explain both of these terms and use a diagram, where possible, to illustrate the effects.
  5. The articles suggest that oligopolies are bad for competition. Explain why this is the case.
  6. To what extent are oligopolies against the public interest? Use examples from the articles to back up your argument.

On 11 November, the European Commission announced that it was imposing fines totalling €173 million on plastic additives producers for operating a price fixing and market sharing cartel. There were 24 companies involved in the cartel. As Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, said, “These companies must learn the hard way that breaking the law does not pay and that repeat offenders will face stiffer penalties. The companies’ elaborate precautions to cover their tracks did not prevent the Commission from revealing the full extent of their determined efforts to rip-off their customers”.

An interesting feature of this particular case is that one of the companies fined is AC Treuhand, a Swiss-based consultancy company. It is not a plastics producer, but took on the role of organising the cartel. Neelie Kroes said that “the company’s Swiss premises were chosen for secret meetings of cartel participants as they were outside the EU and beyond the commission’s jurisdiction. This made it harder for the watchdog to seize documents.”

Antitrust: Commission fines plastic additives producers €173 million for price fixing and market sharing cartels Europa Press Release (11/11/09)
FACTBOX-EU fines heat stabilisers cartel 173 mln euros Reuters (11/11/09)
EU fines consultant for alleged cartel role Financial Times, Nikki Tait (11/11/09)
EU cartel fine for plastics firms BBC News (11/11/09)
EU fines plastics cartel euro173 million Forbes (11/11/09)

Questions

  1. What conditions must apply if a cartel is to succeed in raising prices? To what extent did these conditions apply to the plastic additives cartel?
  2. What powers does the European Commission have under Article 81 of the Treaty of Amsterdam? (See and also. See also page 369 in Sloman and Wride Economics 7th ed.)
  3. Are cartel activities necessarily against the interests of the consumer? Explain.