Tag: oligopoly

The market for food in the UK is highly competitive. From dining in style to a simple take-away, one of the key words when it comes to dining seems to be choice. Competitive prices and high quality are on offer, which is largely due to the sheer number of restaurants available to consumers. However, consolidation seems to be on the menu.

Nando’s is a well known restaurant and a popular eating destination on UK and Irish high streets, with more than 230 restaurants. This chicken restaurant group has made a £30 million bid for Clapham House, the company behind the Gourmet Burger Kitchen chain with 53 branches. Clapham’s shareholders were advised to accept the deal and on the 17th September 2010, it is reported that a deal was reached with Nando’s Group Holdings and its private equity owner Capricorn Ventures International. The 74 pence per share deal was met with disappointment by some analysts, who felt that the company was under-valued, despite failed attempts by Clapham House’s Board to persuade Capricorn to raise the offer price or find an alternative bidder.

The restaurant industry has suffered from the recession and especially by the weak economic recovery, so perhaps lower valuations are to be expected. Nando’s said:

‘As macroeconomic weakness has persisted in the UK, the trading environment for restaurant businesses in the UK has been difficult. This is evidenced by Clapham House’s vaolatile weekly trading performance.’

Nando’s intend to invest significantly in Clapham Houses’ businesses to reinvigorate their previous competitor. This may be essential, given the expectation that conditions in the UK will remain fragile, with consumer confidence staying low, as well as a somewhat untimely rise in VAT in January next year, which is almost certain to have an adverse effect on the restaurant business.

This take-over deal is not the first in the restaurant industry and nor is it likely to be the last, as the UK economy remains in a vulnerable state. The following articles look at this and over takeovers.

Nando’s to buy Gourmet Burger Kitchen for £30m BBC News (17/9/10)
UK restaurants serve up £50m in takeover deals Management Today, Emma Haslett (17/9/10)
Nando’s swallows Gourmet Burger Daily Mirror News, Clinton Manning (18/9/10)
GBK team plots next move after Nandos deal Telegraph, Jonathan Sibun (18/9/10)
Nando’s to buy Real Greek chain for £30m Independent, Alistair Dawber (18/9/10)
Mithcells & Butlers and Nando’s to feast on rival restaurant chains Mail Online, Ben Laurance (17/9/10)
GBK owner Clapham agrees to Nando’s offer Reuters (17/9/10)

Questions

  1. What type of takeover is Nando’s purchase of Clapham House?
  2. Why has the weak macroeconomic environment adversely affected the restaurant industry? What might be the impact of next January’s rise in VAT?
  3. Will Nando’s takeover (or indeed any other takeover in the restaurant industry) allow the company to prosper from the weak economic climate?
  4. In which type of market structure would you place the restaurant industry in the UK? Explain the characteristics of the market structure you choose and why you have placed the restaurant industry in it.
  5. How was the finance for the deal raised by Nando’s Holdings Group? What other sources of finance are available to firms for this purpose? What are the (a) advantages and (b) disadvantages of each?
  6. What other takeovers have occurred recently in the restaurant industry? What types of takeovers are they?

In October 2004, the USA lodged a complaint with the WTO. The claim was that the EU was paying illegal subsidies to Airbus to develop new aircraft, such as the superjumbo, the A380. This provoked a counter-complaint by Airbus, claiming unfair subsidies for Boeing by the US government since 1992. In July 2005, two panels were set up to deal with the two sets of allegations.

A ruling on the US claim was published on 30 June 2010. The WTO found Airbus guilty of using some illegal subsidies to win contracts through predatory pricing. For example, some of the ‘launch aid’ (LA) for research and development was given at below market rates and hence violated WTO rules. Also the provision of infrastructure and infrastructure grants for runways, factories, etc. also violated the rules. However, the WTO dismissed some of Boeing’s claims, as many of the subsidies were reimbursable at commercial rates of interest.

We still await a ruling on the EU’s complaint against US support for Boeing. This is due later in July.

Articles
WTO backs Boeing in Airbus dispute Financial Times, Joshua Chaffin and Jeremy Lemer (30/6/10)
FACTBOX-Subsidies and the WTO – issue at heart of Airbus case Reuters (30/6/10)
Q&A-What next in the Airbus dispute? Reuters (30/6/10)
TIMELINE-Key dates in Airbus subsidy dispute Reuters (30/6/10)
EU Airbus subsidies illegal, says WTO BBC News (30/6/10)
Boeing and Airbus row ruling to be made public BBC News, Richard Scott (30/6/10)
European loan rates to Airbus illegally low, says WTO Europolitics, Chiade O’Shea (30/6/10)
Airbus Subsidies From Europe Are Ruled Improper New York Times, Christopher Drew (30/6/10)
Airbus-Boeing Rivals May Benefit From Spat Aviation Week, Madhu Unnikrishnan (28/6/10)

WTO ruling
WTO issues panel report on Airbus dispute WTO (30/6/10)

Data on orders and deliveries
Competition between Airbus and Boeing (orders and deliveries) Wikipedia

Questions

  1. What is meant by ‘predatory pricing’?
  2. Which subsidies were found to be illegal by the WTO? What was it about them that violated WTO rules?
  3. What is Airbus’s complaint against Boeing?
  4. How might strategic trade theory be used to justify subsidies given to Airbus?
  5. In what ways might the disputes between Boeing and Airbus benefit other aircraft manufacturers?

The EU competition acuthorities have just fined ten producers of memory chips a total of €331 million for operating a cartel. One of the ten, Micron, will pay no fine because it blew the whistle on the other nine. They, in turn, have had their fines reduced by 10% for co-operating with the authorities. According to the EU Press Release:

The overall cartel was in operation between 1 July 1998 and 15 June 2002. It involved a network of contacts and sharing of secret information, mostly on a bilateral basis, through which they coordinated the price levels and quotations for DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memory), sold to major PC or server original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the EEA.

“This first settlement decision is another milestone in the Commission’s anti-cartel enforcement. By acknowledging their participation in a cartel the companies have allowed the Commission to bring this long-running investigation to a close and to free up resources to investigate other suspected cartels. As the procedure is applied to new cases it is expected to speed up investigations significantly”, said Commission Vice President and Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia.

Articles
Chipmakers to pay fines of €330m over cartel Financial Times, Nikki Tait (20/5/10)
Chipmakers fined by EU for price-fixing BBC News (19/5/10)

European Commission douments and findings
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels Europa Press Release (3/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels – frequently asked questions Europa Memo (30/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission fines DRAM producers € 331 million for price cartel; reaches first settlement in a cartel case Europa Press Release (19/5/10)
Antitrust: Commission adopts first cartel settlement decision – questions & answers Europa Memo (19/5/10)

Questions

  1. Explain how the new fast-track cartel settlement procedure works.
  2. Are the incentives built into the procedure appropriate for reducing oligopolistic collusion?
  3. Are the any reasons why the chip cartel might have been in consumers’ interests?
  4. Why does EU competition legislation apply in this case given than all but one of the companies are non-EU businesses?

Two of America’s airlines have agreed to merge to form the world’s largest carrier. The deal between United and Continental Airlines is worth £2.1 billion and the management of the two companies hope that the new airline, to be called United Airlines, will bring cost savings of some £800 million per year. Last year, the two companies lost a total of £900 million. It is also hoped to increase revenues by providing more routes and more effective competition against rivals, such as Delta Air Lines.

But just how significant will any economies of scale be and to what extent will they involve job losses? Certainly the merger has been greeted with caution by the Air Line Pilots Association and unions such as the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Also, will the larger company be able to compete more effectively to the benefit of consumers, or will the increased market power see a rise in fares?

And this is not the only airline merger. In April, British Airways and Iberia of Spain signed a deal to merge, thereby creating one of the world’s biggest airlines. Other mergers are expected as airlines battle to cope with rising costs and lower passenger numbers in the wake of the global recession. So will such mergers benefit passengers, or will it simply result in less choice and higher fares? The following articles look at the issues

Articles
1st priority for new United-Continental combo: Keep customers, workers happy Chicago Tribune, Julie Johnsson (3/5/10)
Debating future of US Airways Philadelphia Business Today, Linda Loyd (4/5/10)
Arpey points out good, bad of United-Continental deal The Dallas Morning News, Terry Maxon (3/5/10)
US airline merger creates world’s biggest carrier Independent, Nick Clark (4/5/10)
We can’t fix fares, says chief of merging US airlines Telegraph, James Quinn (3/5/10)
United and Continental Airlines to merge BBC News (3/5/10)
British Airways and Iberia sign merger agreement BBC News (8/4/10)
Are mergers good for airlines? BBC News, Edwin Lane (4/5/10)
United boss Glenn Tilton on Continental merger BBC News (3/5/10)
United and Continental bosses’ press conference on merger BBC News (3/5/10)

Data
Aviation Data & Statistics Federal Aviation Administration
TransStats RITA, Bureau of Transportation Statistics
Airline and Airport Statistics European Regions Airline Association

Questions

  1. What type of merger is the one between United and Continental: horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or a mixture?
  2. What types of economies of scale can be achieved by a merger of airlines?
  3. For what reasons may a merger of airlines result in higher revenues?
  4. To what extent will passengers (a) gain and (b) lose from airline mergers? What determines the size of these gains and losses?
  5. Is the airline industry an oligopoly? To what extent is there collusion between the various airlines?
  6. What should be the attitude of regulatory authorities across the world to airline mergers?

In 2003, the Office of Fair Trading launched an investigation into possible collusion between tobacco manufacturers and retailers to fix prices. The investigation sought to establish whether the firms had breached the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998. Chapter I is concerned with Restrictive Practices.

The allegation was that two tobacco manufacturers, Imperial Tobacco and Gallaher, had colluded with 11 retailers to fix the retail prices and thereby reduce competition. The details of the allegations are given in a 2008 press release.

As a result of its investigations, the OFT has decided to impose fines of £225m. “The OFT has concluded that each manufacturer had a series of individual arrangements with each retailer whereby the retail price of a tobacco brand was linked to that of a competing manufacturer’s brand. These arrangements restricted the ability of these retailers to determine their selling prices independently and breached the Competition Act 1998.” As the Times Online article states:

The OFT said that the companies were guilty of “price-linking” or “price matching”. It said that Imps and Gallaher had come to an arrangement with each retailer that if one or other manufacturer increased or decreased prices the retailer would alter the price of the competitor brand in line, up or down accordingly – a practice known in competition law circles as “vertical price collusion”.

Articles
‘Unlawful’ tobacco pricing leads to £225m fine by OFT BBC News (16/4/10)
OFT levies £225m fine for cigarette price fixing Guardian, Richard Wray (17/4/10)
Tobacco giants face £225m fine for price-fixing Independent, Alistair Dawber
(17/4/10)
OFT case will send smoke signals Financial Times, Michael Peel, Elizabeth Rigby and Pan Kwan Yuk (16/4/10)
Imperial and Morrison set to appeal OFT fine Financial Times, Michael Peel, Pan Kwan Yuk and Elizabeth Rigby (16/4/10)
OFT faces challenge to £225m price-fixing ruling Times Online, Robert Lea (17/4/10)
OFT gets tough on tobacco as price-fixing net is cast wider Independent, Nick Clark (26/4/08)

OFT Press Release
OFT imposes £225m fine against certain tobacco manufacturers and retailers over retail pricing practices OFT Press Release (16/4/10)

Questions

  1. What are the allegations against the tobacco manufacturers and retailers?
  2. Why has the OFT judged that such behaviour is in breach of the 1988 Competition Act, and hence against the public interest?
  3. What are the arguments put by the tobacco companies and retailers in their defence?
  4. Is giving companies an amnesty if they alert the OFT an example of a prisoners’ dilemma game? What credible threats or promises may the companies have in such a situation?