Tag: exchange rates

The rate of growth in India has fallen to its lowest level since the first three months of 2009 – the period when many countries were plunging into recession. Although the annual rate was still 4.4% in Q2 2013 (a rate most Western governments would love to achieve!), it had averaged 8.2% from 2003 to 2007 and 9.5% from 2010 to 2011 (see).

And the rupee has been falling in value (see chart below). The exchange rate of the rupee to the dollar has depreciated by 21% since the start of the year and by 14% since the beginning of August (click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). This has pushed up the price of imports and raised fears that inflation, already approaching 10%, will rise.

There have also been concerns about the health of India’s banking sector, with worries over the possible rise in bad loans.

One result of all these factors is that the confidence of investors has been shaken. Bond prices have fallen and so too have share prices. The Mumbai Sensex index fell by 11.5% from 22 July to 27 August. Worried about possible capital flight, the Indian government imposed capital controls on Indian residents on 14 August. It has, however, since ruled out limiting the outflow of funds by foreign investors.

The following articles and videos look at the causes of the current economic problems and what can be done about them.

Webcasts

India’s sliding economy Aljazeera (24/8/13)
Economic woes grow for Indians as rupee continues to slide BBC News, Sanjoy Majumder (30/8/13)
What is behind the Indian economy’s fall from grace? BBC News, Yogita Limaye (30/8/13)
Indian rupee: How onions reflect health of economy BBC News, Nitin Srivastava (30/8/13)
The rise and fall of India’s economy NDTV (20/8/13)
Is the Indian economy heading for a doom? NDTV, Dr Arvind Virmani, Adi Godrej, P N Vijay, Sanjay Nirupam and Prakash Javadekar (20/7/13)
Can Rajan stabilise India’s economy? FT Video, Stuart Kirk and Julia Grindell (7/8/13)

Articles

India in trouble: The reckoning The Economist (24/8/13)
PM warns of short term shocks, attacks BJP for stalling Parliament The Economic Times of India (31/8/13)
External global factors led to rupee slide: Manmohan in Lok Sabha Hindustan Times (30/8/13)
India seeks allies to defend rupee as growth skids to four-year low Reuters, Manoj Kumar and Frank Jack Daniel (30/8/13)
Rupee charts in uncharted territory Reuters, Saikat Chatterjee and Subhadip Sircar (30/8/13)
Indian Prime Minister Says Rupee Crisis Will Only Make Country Stronger Time World, ilanjana Bhowmick (30/8/13)
Is India in danger of another crisis? BBC News, Linda Yueh (8/8/13)
India’s GDP shows continuing slowdown BBC News (30/8/13)
Slowest India Growth Since 2009 Pressures Singh to Support Rupee Bloomberg, Unni Krishnan (30/8/13)

Questions

  1. Why has the rupee fallen in value so dramatically? Is there likely to have been overshooting?
  2. What are the economic consequences of this large-scale depreciation? Who gain and who lose?
  3. What factors are likely to affect the rate of growth in India over the coming months?
  4. Why is the Indian economy more vulnerable than many other Asian economies?
  5. What economic policies are being pursued by the Indian government? How successful are they likely to be?

The new Japanese government under Shinzo Abe, which took office on 26 December 2012, has been pursuing a policy of weakening the yen. Using a combination of low interest rates, quantitative easing, expansionary fiscal policy and a declared aim of depreciation, the government has succeeded in driving down the value of the yen.

Since mid-November last year, the yen has depreciated by 28% against the dollar, 30% against the euro and 21% against sterling. The effective exchange rate index has fallen by 22% (see first diagram below: click here for a PowerPoint of the diagram).

But will this depreciation succeed in stimulating the Japanese economy and will it improve the balance of trade? The hope is that the falling yen will boost export sales by making them cheaper abroad, and will reduce the demand for imports by making them more expensive in Japan. The balance of trade will thereby improve and higher exports (an injection) and lower imports (a withdrawal) will stimulate aggregate demand and economic growth.

Traditionally Japan has run balance of trade surpluses, but since July 2012, it has been running monthly deficits – the longest run of deficits since 1980. But depreciation cannot be expected to turn this position around immediately. Indeed, theory suggests that the balance of trade is likely to deteriorate before it improves. This is known as the J-curve effect and is illustrated in the second diagram below. As page 768 of Economics, 8th edition states:

At first a devaluation or depreciation might make a current account deficit worse: the J-curve effect. The price elasticities of demand for imports and exports may be low in the short run (see Case Study 25.1 in MyEconLab). Directly after devaluation or depreciation, few extra exports may be sold, and more will have to be paid for imports that do not have immediate substitutes. There is thus an initial deterioration in the balance of trade before it eventually improves. In Figure 25.12 [the second diagram], devaluation takes place at time t1. As you can see, the diagram has a J shape.

Evidence suggests that the first part of the ‘J’ has been experienced in Japan: Japan’s balance of trade has deteriorated. But there is debate over whether the balance of trade will now start to improve. As the article by James Saft states:

But a look at the actual data shows Japanese companies, like British ones during a similar bout of currency weakness in 2008, appear to be more eager to use a newly competitive currency to pad profits through higher margins rather than higher export volumes. Thus far, Japanese exporters appear to be doing just that. Despite yen falls the price of Japanese exports in local currency has barely budged.

“Japanese companies have not actually cut the foreign currency prices of their exports. Just as with the UK exporters, the Japanese have chosen to hold foreign prices constant, maintain market share, and increase the yen value and thus the yen profit associated with yen depreciation,” UBS economist Paul Donovan writes in a note to clients.

The extra profits earned by Japanese companies from export sales may be stockpiled or paid out in dividends rather than reinvested. And what investment does take place may be abroad rather than in Japan. The net effect may be very little stimulus to the Japanese economy.

As stated by Saft above, the UK had a similar experience in the period 2007–9, when sterling depreciated some 27% (see the second diagram). The balance of trade improved very little and UK companies generally priced goods to markets abroad rather than cutting overseas prices.

But times were different then. The world was plunging into recession. Now global markets are mildly growing or static. Nevertheless, there is a danger that the upward slope of the J-curve in Japan may be pretty flat.

Articles
Weak yen a boon for investors, not Japan Reuters, James Saft (14/5/13)
Japan’s Trade Data Suggest Even Lower Yen Needed Wall Street Journal, Nick Hastings (22/5/13)
2 Misunderstandings About Japanese Trade Seeking Alpha, Marc Chandler (22/5/13)
Japanese trade deficit widens Financial Times, Ben McLannahan (22/5/13)

Data
BIS effective exchange rate indices Bank for International Settlements
Japan’s balance of trade Trading Economics
UK Trade, March 2013 ONS

Questions

  1. Explain the J-curve effect.
  2. Why is there some doubt about whether the Japanese balance of trade will improve significantly?
  3. What will be the consequences for Japanese growth?
  4. If foreign currency prices of Japanese exports do not change, what will determine the amount that Japan exports?
  5. What other measures is the Japanese government taking to stimulate the economy? What will determine the size of the multiplier effects of these measures?
  6. Using data from the ONS plot the UK’s quarterly balance of trade figures from 2007 to the present day. Explain the pattern that emerges.

Paul Volcker was Chair of the US Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1987. He was also Chair of the Economic Recovery Advisory Board under President Barack Obama from February 2009 to January 2011. In the webcast and articles below, he reflects on the current state of the world financial system – from regulation, to the euro crisis, to world imbalances, to the system of floating exchange rates.

He argues that global financial systems are vulnerable to breakdowns. What is needed is reform to the system, and for that there needs to be consensus by politicians, regulators and central banks.

But, in the absence of international consensus on some key points, reform will be greatly weakened, if not aborted. The freedom of money, financial markets and people to move – and thus to escape regulation and taxation – might be an acceptable, even constructive, brake on excessive official intervention, but not if a deregulatory race to the bottom prevents adoption of needed ethical and prudential standards.

Perhaps most important is a coherent, consistent approach to dealing with the imminent failure of “systemically important” institutions. Taxpayers and governments alike are tired of bailing out creditors for fear of the destructive contagious effects of failure – even as bailouts encourage excessive risk-taking.

According to Volcker, countries must be prepared to surrender some sovereignty. Policies must be co-ordinated internationally and there must be stronger regulation by international bodies, such as the IMF and stronger concerted action by global organisations, such as the G20.

Left to their own devices, in an era of floating exchange rates, countries may pursue policies that exacerbate global imbalances.

Not so long ago, we were comforted by theorising that floating exchange rates would mediate international adjustments in a timely and orderly way. But, in the real world, many countries, particularly but not limited to small, open economies, simply find it impractical or undesirable to permit their currency to float.

We are left with the certainty, however awkward, that active participation in an open world economy requires some surrender of economic sovereignty. Or, to put the point more positively, it requires a willingness to co-ordinate policies more effectively.

Webcast

Volcker Urges Global Monetary System Overhaul BloombergBusinessweek (31/5/12)

Articles

Is global financial reform possible? Guardian, Paul Volcker (6/6/12)
Volcker Urges Global Financial System Overhaul After Crisis BloombergBusinessweek, Robyn Meredith and Shamim Adam (31/5/12)

Questions

  1. What reforms, according to Volcker, need to be implemented in order for the euro to function effectively without crises?
  2. What can the USA do to ease the euro crisis?
  3. What are Volcker’s views on the regulation of the US banking system?
  4. How are incentive structures in banks related to speculative activities?
  5. Should banks be allowed to fail?
  6. What financial imbalances exist between countries?
  7. What international monetary reforms are required?
  8. What light can game theory shed on the difficulty of achieving global policy co-ordination?
  9. Is an international system of floating exchange rates appropriate given the size of international financial flows?