Tag: consumer information

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Shrinkflation, skimpflation and sneakflation: ways of hiding inflation

Have you noticed that many products in the supermarket seem to be getting smaller or are poorer quality, or that special offers are not as special as they used to be? When you ring customer services, does it seem that you have to wait longer than you used to? Do you now have to pay for extras that used to be free? These are all ways that producers try to pass on cost increases to consumers without rising prices. There are three broad ways in which producers try to hide inflation.

The first is called ‘shrinkflation’. It is defined as having less product in the same package or a smaller package for the same price. For example, reducing the number of chocolates in a tub, reducing the size of a can of beans, jar of coffee or block of butter, reducing the number of sheets in a toilet roll, or the length of a ride in a fairground or portion sizes in a restaurant or takeaway. A 2023 YouGov poll revealed that 75% of UK adults are either ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ concerned about shrinkflation. A similar poll in 2025 showed that this figure had increased to 80%. The product category with the greatest concerns was snack foods (e.g. crisps, confectionery items, nuts, etc.).1

The second form of hidden inflation is called ‘skimpflation’. This is defined as decreasing the quality of a product or service without lowering the price. Examples include cheaper ingredients in food or confectionery, such as using palm oil instead of butter, or reducing the cocoa content in chocolate or the meat content in sausages and pies, or package holidays reducing the quality of meals, or customer service centres or shops reducing the number of staff so that people have to wait longer on the phone or to be served.

The third is called ‘sneakflation’. This is similar to skimpflation but normally refers to reducing what you get when you pay for a service, such as a flight, by now charging for extras, such as luggage or food. Sometimes shrinkflation or skimpflation are seen as subsets of sneakflation.

These practices have had a lot of publicity in recent months, with consumers complaining that they are getting less for their money. Many people see them as a sneaky way of passing on cost increases without raising the price. But the changes are often subtle and difficult for shoppers to spot when they are buying an item. Skimpflation especially is difficult to observe at the time of purchase. It’s only when people consume the product that they think that it doesn’t seem as good as it used to be. Even shrinkflation can be hard to spot if the package size remains the same but there is less in it, such as fewer biscuits in a tin or fewer crisps in a packet. People would have to check the weight or volume, while also knowing what it used to be.

If firms are legitimately passing on costs and are up-front about what they are doing, then most consumers would probably understand it even if they did not like it. It’s when firms do it sneakily that many consumers get upset. Also, firms may do it to increase profit margins – in other words, by reducing the size or quality beyond what is necessary to cover the cost increase.

Does the official rate of inflation take such practices into account?

The answer is that some of the practices are taken into account – especially shrinkflation. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) accounts for shrinkflation by monitoring price changes per unit of weight or volume, rather than just the price. Data collectors track the weight, volume or count of item. When a product’s size is reduced, the ONS records this as a price increase in CPI or CPIH inflation statistics. This is known as a ‘quality adjustment’ process and allows the ONS to isolate price changes from product size changes. As CPI data from the ONS is used by the Bank of England in monitoring its 2% inflation target, it too is incorporating shrinkflation.

ONS quality adjustments are also applied to non-market public services, such as healthcare, education and policing to measure changes in service quality rather than just volume. This allows a more accurate measurement of productivity as it focuses on outcomes and user experience per pound spent rather than just focusing on costs.

Skimpflation is more difficult to monitor. The quality adjustment process may miss some quality changes and hence some skimpflation goes unrecorded. This means that the headline inflation rate might understate the true decline in purchasing power felt by consumers.

How extensive is hidden inflation?

Despite public perception, shrinkflation has a relatively small impact on the headline CPI and CPIH inflation rate in the UK because it is largely confined to certain sectors, such as bread and cereals, personal care products, meat products, and sugar, jams, syrups, chocolate & confectionery. Nevertheless, in these sectors it is particularly prevalent, especially in the packaged foodstuffs and confectionery sector. The latest research by the ONS in 2019 covered the period June 2015 to June 2017 and is shown in the following figure.2

According to research in the USA by Capital One Shopping, some major brands reduced product sizes by over 30% in 2025 without reducing prices, with shrinkflation averaging 14.8% among selected national grocery brands.3 Shrinkflation had been observed by 74% of Americans at their grocery store. Of these, 81% took some kind of action as a result, with 48% abandoning a brand. Nevertheless, across all products, shrinkflation accounts for quite a small percentage of any overall price rises.

A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that shrinkflation accounted for less than 1/10 of a percentage point of the 34.5% increase in overall consumer prices from 2019 to 2024.4 The reason is that the items that were downsized comprised a small percentage of goods and services. Indeed, many goods and services, such as housing, cannot be downsized in the same way that household products can.

Nevertheless, with consumer budgets being squeezed by the inflation that followed the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, hidden inflation has become more prevalent in many countries and an increasing concern of consumers.

References

  1. Shrinkflation concern rises in 2025, but fewer Britons are changing shopping habits

    2. YouGov (15/8/25)

  2. Shrinkflation: How many of our products are getting smaller?

    3. Office for National Statistics (21/1/19)

  3. Shrinkflation Statistics

    4. Capital One Shopping (30/12/25)

  4. What is “Shrinkflation,” And How Has It Affected Grocery Store Items Recently?

    5. U.S. Government Accountability Office (12/8/25)

Videos

Articles

Journal Article

Questions

  1. If shrinkflation, when included in CPI statistics, accounts for such a small percentage of inflation, why are people so concerned about it?
  2. From a company’s perspective, is it a good idea to engage in (a) shrinkflation; (b) skimpflation?
  3. Go round you local supermarket and identify examples of shrinkflation and skimpflation.
  4. How are various EU countries attempting to inform consumers of shrinkflation?
  5. Why is skimpflation often harder to detect than shrinkflation?
  6. Give some other examples of sneakflation in the provision of services.
  7. How could behavioural economists help firms decide whether or how to engage in shrinkflation or skimpflation?
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The economics of fake reviews

Imagine a situation where you are thinking of buying a good and so you go to an e-commerce marketplace such as Amazon, eBay, Etsy or Onbuy. How confident are you about the quality of the different brands/makes that are listed for sale on these digital platforms? How do you choose which product to buy? Is the decision strongly influenced by customer reviews and rating?

When a customer is choosing what to buy it raises an interesting question: to what extent can the true quality of the different goods/services be observed at the time of purchase? Although perfect observability is highly unlikely, the level of consumer information about a product’s true quality will vary between different types of transaction.

For example, when consumers can physically inspect and test/try a product in a shop, it can help them to make more accurate judgements about its quality and condition. This poses a problem for online sellers of high-quality versions of a good. Without the ability to inspect the item physically, consumers may be unsure about its characteristics. They may worry that the online description provided by the seller deliberately misrepresents the true quality of the item.

Consumers may have other concerns about the general reliability of online sellers. For example, in comparison to buying the product from a physical store, consumers may worry that:

  • They will have to wait longer to receive the good. In many cases, when consumers purchase a product from a high-street store, they can walk away with the item and start using it straight away. When purchasing on line, they may end up waiting weeks or even longer before the product is finally delivered.
  • It will be more difficult to return the product and get a refund.
  • They are more likely to come across fraudulent sellers who have set-up a fake website.

This greater level of uncertainty about the true characteristics of the product and the general reliability of the seller will have a negative impact on consumers’ willingness to pay for all goods. This impact is likely to be particularly strong for high-quality versions of a product. If consumers’ willingness to pay falls below the reservation price of many sellers of high-quality goods, then the market could suffer from adverse selection and market failure.

Are there any within-market arrangements that could help deal with this issue? One possibility is for sellers to signal the quality of their products by posting consumer ratings and reviews. If consumers see that a product has many positive ratings, then this will increase their confidence in the quality of the product and so increase their willingness to pay. This could then reduce both levels of asymmetric information and the chances of adverse selection occurring in the market,

There is survey evidence that many people do read consumer reviews when choosing products on line and are heavily influenced by the ratings.

The problem of fake reviews

However, when consumers look at these reviews can they be sure that they reflect consumers’ honest opinions and/or actual experience of using the good or service? Firms may have an incentive to manipulate and post fake reviews. For example, they could:

  • Deliberately fail to display negative reviews on their website while claiming that all reviews are published.
  • Use internet bots to post thousands of automated reviews.
  • Take positive reviews from competitors’ websites and post them on their own website.
  • Pay some customers and/or employees to write and post 5-star reviews on their own website.
  • Pay some customers and/or employees to write and post 1-star reviews on their competitors’ websites.
  • Set up a website that they claim is independent and use it to provide positive endorsements of their own products.

If the benefits of this type of behaviour outweigh the costs, then we would expect to see fake reviews posted on websites. If their use becomes widespread, then the value of posting genuine reviews will fall. The market may then settle into what economists call a ‘pooling equilibrium’.

What evidence do we have on the posting of fake reviews? Given their nature, it is difficult to collect reliable data and there are large variations in the reported figures. One recent study found evidence of fake reviews being purchased and posted for approximately 1500 products on Amazon.

Can consumers screen reviews and identify those that are more likely to be fake? The following are some tell-tale signs.

  • Products that receive a large number of very positive reviews over a short period (i.e. a few days). There are then long periods before the product receives another large number of positive reviews.
  • A high percentage of 5-star reviews. Two, three and four start reviews are more likely to be genuine.
  • Reviews that specifically mention a rival firm’s products.
  • Reviewers who have given very high ratings to large number of different products over a short period of time.
  • Reviews that include photos/videos.

Competition authorities around the world have been investigating the issue and the Competition and Markets Authority has announced plans to introduce new laws that make the purchasing and posting of fake reviews illegal.

Articles

Questions

  1. Outline different types of asymmetric information and explain the difference between adverse selection and moral hazard.
  2. Using a diagram, explain the impact of uncertainty over the quality of a good on consumers’ willingness to pay.
  3. Will consumers always face greater uncertainty over quality when purchasing goods on line rather than visiting the high street? Discuss your answer making reference to some specific examples.
  4. Using diagrams, explain how a market for high-quality versions of a good might collapse if there is asymmetric information. Using price elasticity of supply, explain the circumstances when the market is more likely to collapse.
  5. Discuss some of the benefits and costs for a firm of purchasing and posting fake reviews.
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Energising the energy market

In June 2014, the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (which governs the energy regulator, Ofgem) referred Great Britain’s retail and wholesale gas and electricity markets to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The market is dominated by the ‘big six‘ energy companies (British Gas, EDF, E.ON, npower, Scottish Power and SSE) and Ofgem suspected that this oligopoly was distorting competition and leading to higher prices.

The CMA presented its report on 10 March 2016. It confirmed its preliminary findings of July and December 2015 “that there are features of the markets for the supply of energy in Great Britain that result in an adverse effect on competition”. It concludes that “the average customer could save over £300 by switching to a cheaper deal” and that “customers could have been paying about £1.7 billion a year more than they would in a competitive market”.

It made various recommendations to address the problem. These include “requiring the largest suppliers to provide fuller information on their financial performance” and strengthening the role of Ofgem.

Also the CMA wants to encourage more people to switch to cheaper suppliers. At present, some 70% of the customers of the big six are on default standard variable tariffs, which are more expensive than other tariffs available. To address this problem, the CMA proposes the setting up of “an Ofgem-controlled database which will allow rival suppliers to contact domestic and microbusiness customers who have been stuck on their supplier’s default tariff for 3 years or more with better deals.”

Another area of concern for the CMA is the 4 million people (16% of customers) forced to have pre-payment meters. These tend to be customers with poor credit records, who also tend to be on low incomes. Such customers are paying more for their gas and electricity and yet have little opportunity to switch to cheaper alternatives. For these customers the CMA proposed imposing transitional price controls from no later than April 2017 until 2020. These would cut typical bills by some £80 to £90 per year. In the meantime, the CMA would seek to remove “restrictions on the ability of new suppliers to compete for prepayment customers and reduce barriers such as debt issues that make it difficult for such customers to switch”.

Despite trying to address the problem of lack of competition, consumer inertia and barriers to entry, the CMA has been criticised for not going further. It has also been criticised for the method it has chosen to help consumers switch to cheaper alternative suppliers and tariffs. The articles below look at these criticisms.

Podcast

Competition and Markets Authority Energy Report BBC You and Yours (10/3/16)

Articles

Millions could see cut in energy bills BBC News (10/3/16)
Shake-up of energy market could save customers millions, watchdog says The Telegraph, Jillian Ambrose (10/3/16)
UK watchdog divided over energy market reforms Financial Times, Kiran Stacey (10/3/16)
How the CMA energy inquiry affects you Which? (10/3/16)
UK watchdog accused of bowing to pressure from ‘big six’ energy suppliers The Guardian, Terry Macalister (10/3/16)

CMA documents
CMA sets out energy market changes CMA press release (10/3/16)
Energy Market Investigation: Summary of provisional remedies Competition and Markets Authority (10/3/16)

Questions

  1. Find out the market share of the ‘big six’ and whether this has changed over the past few years.
  2. What, if any, are the barriers to entry in the gas and electricity retail markets?
  3. Why are the big six able to charge customers some £300 per household more than would be the case if they were on the cheapest deal?
  4. What criticisms have been made of the CMA’s proposals?
  5. Discuss alternative proposals to those of the CMA for dealing with the problem of excessive prices of gas and electricity.
  6. Should Ofgem or another independent not-for-profit body be allowed to run its own price comparison and switching service? Would this be better than the CMA’s proposal for allowing competitors access to people’s energy usage after 3 years of being with the same company on its standard tariff and allowing them to contact these people?