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Getting real with retail sales

In the third of our series on the distinction between nominal and real values we show its importance when analysing retail sales data. In the UK, such data are available from the Office for National Statistics. This blog revisits an earlier one, Nominal and real retail sales figures: interpreting the data, written in October 2023. We find that inflation-adjusted retail sales data reveal some stark patterns in the sector. They help contextualise some of the challenges faced by high streets up and down the UK.

The Retail Sales Index

Retail sales relate to spending on items such as food, clothing, footwear and household goods. They involve sales by retailers directly to final consumers, whether in store or online. Spending on services such as holidays, air fares and train tickets, insurance, banking, hotels and restaurants are not included, as are sales of motor vehicles. The Retail Sales Index for Great Britain is based on a monthly survey of around 5000 retailers across England, Scotland and Wales and is thought to capture around three-quarters of turnover in the retail industry.

Estimates of retail sales are published in index form. There are two indices published by the ONS: a value and volume measure. The value index reflects the total turnover of business, while the volume index adjusts the value index for price changes. Hence, the value estimates are nominal, while the volume estimates are real. The key point here is that the nominal estimates reflect both price and volume changes, whereas the real estimates adjust for price movements to capture only volume changes.

The headline ONS figures for May 2024 showed a rise by 2.9 per cent in the volume of retail sales, following a 1.8 per cent fall in April. In value terms, May saw a 3.3 per cent rise in retail sales following a 2.3 fall in March. Monthly changes can be quite volatile, even after seasonal adjustment, and sensitive to peculiar factors. For example, the poor weather in April 2024 helped to depress retail spending. It is, therefore, sensible to take a longer-term view when looking for clearer patterns in spending behaviour.

Growth of retail sales

Chart 1 plots the monthly value and volume of retail sales in Great Britain since 1996. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). In value terms, monthly spending in the retail sector has increased by 169 per cent since January 1996, whereas in volume terms, spending has increased by 77 per cent. Another way of thinking about this is in terms of the average annual rate of increase. This shows that the value of spending has risen at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent while the volume of spending has risen at an annual rate of 2.0 per cent. This difference is to be expected in the presence of rising prices, since nominal growth, as we have just noted, reflects both price and volume changes.

Chart 1 helps to identify two periods where the volume of retail spending ceased to grow. The first of these is following the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. The period from 2008 to 2013 saw the volume of retail sales stagnate and flatline, with a recovery in volumes only really starting to take hold in 2014. Yet in nominal terms retail sales grew by around 14 per cent.

The second of the two periods is from 2021. Chart 2 helps to demonstrates the extent of the struggles of the retail sector in this period. It shows a significant divergence between the volume and value of retail sales. Indeed, between April 2021 and October 2023, while the value of retail sales increased by 8.0 per cent the volume of retail sales fell by 11.0 per cent.

The recent value-volume divergence reflects the inflation shock that began to emerge in 2021. This saw consumer prices, as measured by the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), rise across 2022 and 2023 by 9.1 per cent and 7.3 per cent respectively, with the annual rate of CPI inflation hitting 11.1 per cent in October 2022. Hence, while inflation was a drag on the volume of spending it nonetheless meant that the value of spending continued to rise. Once more this demonstrates why understanding the distinction between nominal and real is important. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart).

To illustrate the longer-term trend in the volume of retail spending alongside its volatility, Chart 3 plots yearly retail sales volumes and also their percentage change on the previous year.

The chart nicely captures the prolonged halt to retail sales growth following the global financial crisis, the fluctuations caused by COVID and then the sharp falls in the volume of retail spending in 2022 and 2023 as the effects of the inflationary shock on peoples’ finances bit sharply. This cost-of-living crisis significantly affected many people’s disposable income. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart).

Categories of retail sales

We conclude by considering categories of retail spending. Chart 4 shows volumes of retail sales by four broad categories since 1996. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). These are food stores, predominantly non-food stores, non-store retail and automotive fuel (i.e. sales of petrol and diesel “at the pumps”).

Whilst all categories have seen an increase in their spending volumes over the period as a whole, there are stark differences in this rate of growth. Perhaps not surprisingly, the most rapid growth is in non-store retail. This includes online retailing, as well as market stalls and catalogues.

The volume of retail spending in the non-store sector has grown at an average annual rate over this period of 6.3 per cent, compared with 2.6 per cent for non-food stores, 1.2 per cent for predominantly food stores and 1.0 per cent for automotive fuels. The growth of non-store retail has been even more rapid since 2010, when the average annual rate of growth in the volume of purchases has been 10.2 per cent, compared to 1.8 per cent for non-food stores, 1.0 per cent for automotive fuels and zero growth for food stores.

If we focus on the most recent patterns in the categories of retail sales, we see that the monthly volume of spending in all categories except non-store retail is now lower than the average in 2019. Specifically, when compared to 2019 levels, the volume of spending in non-food stores in May 2024 was 2.6 per cent lower, while that in food stores was 4.4 per cent lower, and the volume of spending on automotive fuels was 10.8 per cent lower. In contrast, spending in non-store retail was 21.2 per cent higher. Yet this is not to imply that this sector has been immune to the pressures faced by their high-street counterparts. Although it is difficult to disentangle fully the effects of the pandemic and lockdowns on non-store retail sales data, the downward trajectory in the volume of retail sales in the sector that occurred as the economy ‘reopened’ in 2021 and 2022 continued into 2023 when purchases fell by 3.5 per cent.

Final thoughts

The retail sector is an incredibly important part of the economy. A recent research briefing from the House of Commons Library reports that there were 2.7 million jobs in the UK retail sector in 2022, equivalent to 8.6 per cent of the country’s jobs with 314 040 retail businesses as of January 2023. Yet the importance of the retail sector cannot be captured by these statistics alone. Some would argue that the very fabric and wellbeing of our towns and cities is affected by the wellbeing of the sector and, importantly, by structural changes that affect how people interact with retail.

Articles

Research Briefing

Statistical bulletin

Data

Questions

  1. Which of the following is/are not counted in the UK retail sales data: (i) purchase of furniture from a department store; (ii) weekly grocery shop online; (iii) a stay at a hotel on holiday; (iv) a meal at your favourite café or restaurant?
  2. Why does an increase in the value of retail sales not necessarily mean that their volume has increased?
  3. In the presence of deflation, which will be higher: nominal or real growth rates?
  4. Discuss the factors that could explain the patterns in the volume of spending observed in the different categories of retail sales in Chart 4.
  5. Discuss what types of retail products might be more or less sensitive to changes in the macroeconomic environment.
  6. Conduct a survey of recent media reports to prepare a briefing discussing examples of retailers who have struggled or thrived in the recent economic environment.
  7. What do you understand by the concepts of ‘consumer confidence’ and ‘economic uncertainty’? How might these affect the volume of retail spending?
  8. Discuss the proposition that the retail sales data cast doubt on whether people are ‘forward-looking consumption smoothers’.
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Getting real with growth

In the second of a series of blogs looking at applications of the distinction between nominal and real indicators, we revisit the blog Getting Real with Growth last updated in October 2021.

In this blog, we discuss how, in making a meaningful comparison over time of a country’s national income and, therefore, the aggregate purchasing power of its people, we need to take inflation into account. Likewise, if we want to analyse changes in the volume of production, we need to eliminate the effects of price changes on GDP. This is important when analysing the business cycle and identifying periods of boom or bust. Hence, in this updated blog we take another look at what real GDP data reveal about both longer-term economic growth and the extent of economic volatility – or what we refer to as the twin characteristics of economic growth.

Real and nominal GDP

The nominal (or current-price) estimate for UK gross domestic product in 2023 was £2.687 trillion. The estimate of national output or national income is based primarily on the production of final goods and services and, hence, purchased by the final user. It therefore largely excludes intermediate goods and services: i.e. goods and services that are transformed or used up in the process of making something else, although data on imports and exports do include intermediate goods and services. The 2023 figure represents a nominal increase in national income of 7.2 per cent on the £2.51 trillion recorded in 2022. These values make no adjustment for inflation and therefore reflect the prices of output that were prevailing at the time.

Chart 1 shows current-price estimates of GDP from 1955, when the value of GDP was estimated at £19.2 billion. The £2.687 trillion figure recorded for 2023 is an increase of over 140 times that in 1955, a figure that rises to 160 times if we compare the 1950 value with the latest IMF estimate for 2027. However, if we want to make a more meaningful comparison of the country’s national income we need to adjust for inflation. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

Long-term growth in real GDP

If we measure GDP at constant prices, we eliminate the effect of inflation. To construct a constant-price series for GDP, a process known as chain-linking is used. This involves taking consecutive pairs of years, e.g. 2022 and 2023, and estimating what GDP would be in the most recent year (in this case, 2023) if the previous year’s prices (i.e. 2022) had continued to prevail. By calculating the percentage change from the previous year’s GDP value we have an estimate of the volume change. If this is repeated for other pairs of years, we have a series of percentage changes that capture the volume changes from year-to-year. Finally, a reference year is chosen and the percentage volume changes are applied backwards and forwards from the nominal GDP value for the reference year.

In effect, a real GDP series creates a quantity measure in monetary terms. Chart 1 shows GDP at constant 2019 prices (real GDP) alongside GDP at current prices (nominal GDP). Consider first the real GDP numbers for 1955 and 2023. GDP in 1950 at 2019 prices was £491.2 billion. This is higher than the current-price value because prices in 2019 (the reference year) were higher than those in 1955. Meanwhile, GDP in 2023 when measured at 2019 prices was £2.273 trillion. This constant-price value is smaller than the corresponding current-price value because prices in 2019 where lower than those in 2023.

Between 1955 and 2023 real GDP increased 4.6 times. If we extend the period to 2027, again using the latest IMF estimates, the increase is 4.9 times. Because we have removed the effect of inflation, the real growth figure is much lower than the nominal growth figure.

Crucially, what we are left with is an indicator of the long-term growth in the volume of the economy’s output and hence an increase in national income that is backed up by an increase in production. Whereas nominal growth rates are affected by changes in both volumes and prices, real growth rates reflect only changes in volumes.

The upward trajectory observed in constant-price GDP is therefore evidence of positive longer-term growth. This is one of the twin characteristics of growth.

Short-term fluctuations in the growth of real GDP

The second characteristic is fluctuations in the rate of growth from period to period. We can see this second characteristic more clearly by plotting the percentage change in real GDP from year to year.

Chart 2 shows the annual rate of growth in real GDP each year from 1955 to 2025. From it, we see the inherent instability that is a key characteristic of the macroeconomic environment. This instability is, of course, mirrored in the output path of real GDP in Chart 1, but the annual rates of growth show the instability more clearly. We can readily see the impact on national output of the global financial crisis of 2007–8 and the global COVID pandemic.

In 2009, constant-price GDP in the UK fell by 4.6 per cent, whereas current-price GDP fell by 2.8 per cent. Then, in 2020, constant-price GDP and, hence, the volume of national output fell by 10.4 per cent, as compared to a 5.8 per cent fall in current-price GDP. These global, ‘once-in-a-generation’ shocks are stark examples of the instability that characterises economies and which generate the ‘ups and downs’ in an economy’s output path, known more simply as ‘the business cycle’. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Determinants of long-and short-term growth

The twin characteristics of growth can be seen simultaneously by combining the output path (shown by the levels of real GDP) with the annual rates of growth. This is shown in Chart 3. The longer-term growth seen in the economy’s output path is generally argued to be driven by the quantity and quality of the economy’s resources, and their effectiveness when combined in production (i.e. their productivity). In other words, it is the supply side of the economy that determines the trajectory of the output path over the longer term. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

However, the fluctuations we observe in short-term growth rates tend to reflect shocks, also known as impulses, that originate either from the ability and or willingness of purchasers to consume (demand-side shocks) or producers to supply (supply-side shocks). These impulses are then amplified (or ‘propagated’) via the multiplier, expectations and other factors, and their effects, therefore, transmitted through the economy. Unusually in the case of the pandemic, the lockdown measures employed by governments around the world resulted in simultaneous negative aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks.

Persistence effects

Explanations of the business cycle and of long-term growth are not mutually exclusive. The shocks and the propagation mechanisms that help to create and shape the business cycle can themselves have enduring or persistent effects on output. The global financial crisis, fuelled by unsustainable lending and the overstretch of private-sector balance sheets, which then spilt over to the public sector as governments attempted to stabilise the financial system and support aggregate demand, is argued by some to have created the conditions for low-growth persistence seen in many countries in the 2010s. This type of persistence is known as hysteresis as it originates from a negative demand shock.

Economists and policymakers were similarly concerned that the pandemic would also generate persistence in the form of scarring effects that might again affect the economy’s output path. Such concerns help to explain why many governments introduced furlough schemes to protect jobs and employment income, as well as provide grants or loans to business.

Per capita output

To finish, it is important to recognise that, when thinking about living standards, it is the growth in real GDP per capita that we need to consider. A rise in real GDP will only lead to a rise in overall living standards if it is faster than the rise in population.

Our final chart therefore replicates Chart 3 but for real GDP per capita. Between 1955 and 2023 real GDP per capita grew by a factor of 3.45, which increases to 3.6 when we consider the period up to 2027. The average rate of growth of real GDP per capita up to 2023 was 1.87 per cent (lower than the 2.34 per cent increase in real GDP).

But the rate of increase in real GDP per capita was much higher before 2007 than it has been since. If we look at the period up to 2007 and, hence, before the global financial crisis, the figure is 2.32 per cent (2.7 per cent for real GDP), whereas from 2008 to 2023 the average rate of growth of real GDP per capita was a mere 0.42 per cent (1.1 per cent for real GDP). (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

The final chart therefore reiterates the messages from recent blogs, such as Getting Real with Pay and The Productivity Puzzle, that long-term economic growth and the growth of real wages have slowed dramatically since the financial crisis. This has had important implications for the wellbeing of all sectors of the economy. The stagnation of living standards is therefore one of the most important economic issues of our time. It is one that the incoming Labour government will be keen to address.

Data and Reports

Articles

Questions

  1. What do you understand by the term ‘macroeconomic environment’? What data could be used to describe the macroeconomic environment?
  2. When a country experiences positive rates of inflation, which is higher: nominal economic growth or real economic growth?
  3. Does an increase in nominal GDP mean a country’s production has increased? Explain your answer.
  4. Does a decrease in nominal GDP mean a country’s production has decreased? Explain your answer.
  5. Why does a change in the growth of real GDP allow us to focus on what has happened to the volume of production?
  6. What does the concept of the ‘business cycle’ have to do with real rates of economic growth?
  7. When would falls in real GDP be classified as a recession?
  8. Distinguish between the concepts of ‘short-term growth’ and ‘longer-term growth’.
  9. What do you understand by the term ‘persistence’ in macroeconomics? Given examples of persistence effects and the means by which they can be generated?
  10. Discuss the proposition that the pandemic could have a positive effect on longer-term growth rates because of the ways that people and business have had to adapt.
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Getting real with pay

In the first of a series of updated blogs focusing on the importance of the distinction between nominal and real values we look at the issue of earnings. Here we update the blog Getting Real with Pay written back in February 2019. Then, we noted how the macroeconomic environment since the financial crisis of the late 2000s had continued to affect people’s pay. Specifically, we observed that there had been no growth in real or inflation-adjusted pay. In other words, people were no better off in 2019 than in 2008.

In this updated blog, we consider to what extent the picture has changed five years down the line. While we do not consider the distributional impact on pay, the aggregate picture nonetheless continues to paint a very stark picture, with consequences for living standards and financial wellbeing.

While the distinction between nominal and real values is perhaps best known in relation to GDP and economic growth, the distinction is also applied frequently to analyse the movement of one price relative to prices in general. One example is that of movements in pay (earnings) relative to consumer prices.

Pay reflects the price of labour. The value of our actual pay is our nominal pay. If our pay rises more quickly than consumer prices, then our real pay increases. This means that our purchasing power rises and so the volume of goods and services we can afford increases. On the other hand, if our actual pay rises less quickly than consumer prices then our real pay falls. When real pay falls, purchasing power falls and the volume of goods and services we can afford falls.

Figures from the Office for National Statistics show that in January 2000 regular weekly pay (excluding bonuses and before taxes and other deductions from pay) was £293. By April 2024 this had risen to £640. This is an increase of 118 per cent. Over the same period, the consumer prices index known as the CPIH, which, unlike the better-known CPI, includes owner-occupied housing costs and council tax, rose by 82 per cent. Therefore, the figures are consistent with a rise both in nominal and real pay between January 2000 to April 2024. However, this masks a rather different picture that has emerged since the global financial crisis of the late 2000s.

Chart 1 shows the annual percentage changes in actual (nominal) regular weekly pay and the CPIH since January 2001. Each value is simply the percentage change from 12 months earlier. The period up to June 2008 saw the annual growth of weekly pay outstrip the growth of consumer prices – the blue line in the chart is above the red dashed line. Therefore, the real value of pay rose. However, from June 2008 to August 2014 pay growth consistently fell short of the rate of consumer price inflation – the blue line is below the red dashed line. The result was that average real weekly pay fell. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Chart 2 show the average levels of nominal and real weekly pay. The real series is adjusted for inflation. It is calculated by deflating the nominal pay values by the CPIH. Since the CPIH is a price index whose value averages 100 across 2015, the real pay values are at constant 2015 consumer prices. From the chart, we can see that the real value of weekly pay peaked in April 2008 at £473 at 2015 prices. The subsequent period saw rates of pay increases that were lower than rates of consumer price inflation. This meant that by March 2014 the real value of weekly pay had fallen by 6.3 per cent to £443 at 2015 prices. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Although real (inflation-adjusted) pay recovered a little after 2014, 2017 again saw consumer price inflation rates greater than those of pay inflation (see Chart 1). This meant that at the start of 2018 real earnings were 3.2 per cent lower than their 2008-peak (see Chart 2). Real earnings then began to recover, buoyed by the economic rebound following the relaxation of COVID lockdown measures and increasing staffing pressures. Real earnings finally passed their 2008-peak in August 2020. By April 2021 regular weekly pay reached £491 at 2015 prices which was 3.8 per cent above the pre-global financial crisis peak.

However, the boost to real wages was to be short-lived as inflationary pressures rose markedly. While some of this was attributable to the same pressures that were driving up wages, inflationary pressures were fuelled further by the commodity price shock arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and, in particular, its impact on energy prices. This saw the CPIH inflation rate rise to 9.6 per cent in October 2022 (while the CPI inflation rate peaked in the same month at 11.1 per cent). The result was that real weekly earnings fell by 2.7 per cent between January and October 2022 to stand at £471 at 2015 consumer prices. Consequently, average pay was once again below its pre-global financial crisis level.

Although inflationary pressures have recently weakened and real earnings have begun to recover, real regular weekly earnings in April 20024 (£486 at 2015 prices) were a mere 2.7 per cent higher than back in the first half of 2008. This compares to a nominal increase of around 58 per cent over the same period thereby demonstrating the importance of the distinction between nominal and real values in understanding what developments in pay mean for the purchasing power of households.

Chart 3 reinforces the importance of the nominal-real distinction. It shows nicely the sustained period of real pay deflation (negative rates of pay inflation) that followed the financial crisis, and the significant rates of real pay deflation associated with the recent inflation shock.

The result is that since June 2008 the average annual rate of growth of real regular weekly pay has been 0.1 per cent, despite nominal pay increasing at an annual rate of 2.9 per cent. In contrast, the period from January 2001 to May 2008 saw real regular weekly pay grow at an annual rate of 2.1 per cent with nominal pay growing at an annual rate of 4.0 per cent. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

If we think about the growth of nominal earnings, we can identify two important determinants.

The first is the expected rate of inflation. Workers will understandably want wage growth at least to match the growth in prices so as to maintain their purchasing power.

The second factor is the growth in labour productivity. Firms will be more willing to grant pay increases if workers are more productive, since productivity helps to offset pay increases and maintain firms’ profit margins. Consequently, since over time the actual rate of inflation will tend to mirror the expected rate, the growth of real pay is closely related to the growth of labour productivity. This is significant because, as John discusses in his blog The Productivity Puzzle (14 April 2024), labour productivity growth in the UK, as measured by national output per worker hour, has stalled since the global financial crisis.

Understanding the stagnation of real earnings therefore nicely highlights the interconnectedness of economic variables. In this case, it highlights the connections between productivity, levels of investment and people’s purchasing power. It is not surprising, therefore, that the stagnation of both real earnings and productivity growth since the global financial crisis have become two of the most keenly debated macroeconomic issues of recent times. Indeed, it is likely that their behaviour will continue to shape macroeconomic debates and broader conversations around government policy for some time.

Articles

Questions

  1. Using the examples of both GDP and earnings, explain how the distinction between nominal and real relates to the distinction between values and volumes.
  2. In what circumstances would an increase in actual pay translate into a reduction in real pay?
  3. In what circumstances would a decrease in actual pay translate into an increase in real pay?
  4. What factors might explain the reduction in real rates of pay seen in the UK following the financial crisis of 2007–8?
  5. Of what importance might the growth in real rates of pay be for consumption and aggregate demand?
  6. Why is the growth of real pay an indicator of financial well-being? What other indicators might be included in measuring financial well-being?
  7. Assume that you have been asked to undertake a distributional analysis of real earnings since the financial crisis. What might be the focus of your analysis? What information would you therefore need to collect?
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The perplexing rally in gold prices

Gold has always held an allure and with the price of gold on international markets trending upwards since October 2022 (see Figure 1: click here for a PowerPoint), people seem to be attracted to it once again. The price reached successively higher peaks throughout 2023 before surging to above $2300 per oz in 2024 and peaking at $2425.31 per oz on 20 May 2024.

While gold tends to become attractive during wartime, economic uncertainty and bouts of inflation, all of which have characterised the last few years, the sustained price rise has perplexed market analysts and economists. The rally had been expected to peter out over the past 20 months. But, as the price of gold rose to sustained higher levels, with no significant reversals, some analysts have speculated that it is not the typical short-term factors which are driving the increased demand for and price of gold but more fundamental changes in the global economic system.

This blog will first discuss the typical short-term factors which influence gold prices before discussing the potential longer-term forces that may be at work.

Short-term factors

So, what are the typical short-term economic forces which drive the demand for gold?

The most significant are the real rates of interest on financial assets. These rates represent the opportunity cost of holding an asset such as gold which offers no income stream. When the real return from financial assets like debt and equity instruments is low, the demand for and price of gold tends to be high. In contrast, when the real return from such assets is high, the price of gold tends to be lower. An explanation for this is that real rates of return are strongly related to inflation rates and investors perceive gold as a hedge against inflation since its price is positively correlated with a general rise in prices. Higher unexpected inflation reduces the real rate of return of securities like debt and equity whose value is derived from cash flows anticipated in the future. In such circumstances, gold become an attractive alternative investment. As inflationary expectations decline, real returns from financial assets should rise, and the demand for gold should fall.

The relationship between real returns, proxied by the yield on US 10-year TIPS (Treasury inflation-protected securities), and gold prices can be used to examine this explanation. Real returns rose steadily in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet the price of gold, which rose during the early stages of the pandemic in 2020, has not fallen. Instead, it has remained at elevated levels for much of that time (see Figure 2: click here for a PowerPoint).

There have been short periods when changes in real returns seemed to have a high correlation with changes in gold prices. In late 2022, for example, falling real rates coincided with rising gold prices. The same pattern was repeated between October and December 2023. However, when real returns rose again in the New Year of 2024, in response to stubbornly higher expected inflation and the expectation of ‘higher-for-longer’ interest rates, particularly in the USA, gold prices continued to rise. Indeed, across the 5-year period the correlation coefficient between the two series is actually positive at 0.268, showing little evidence supporting this explanation for the pattern for the gold price.

Real returns in the USA, however, may not be the correct ones to consider when seeking explanations for the pattern of gold’s price. Much of the recent demand is from China. Analysts suggest that Chinese investors are looking for a safe asset to hold as their economy stagnates and real returns from alternatives, like domestic property and equity, have decreased. Further, there are some concerns that the Chinese currency, the renminbi, may be undervalued in response to the sluggish growth. Holding gold is a good hedge against inflation (currency depreciation produces inflationary pressure). Consequently, the Chinese market may be exerting pricing power in relation to real returns in a way not seen before (see the Dempsey and Leng FT article linked below).

However, some analysts suggest that the rise in price is disproportionate to these short-term factors and point to potential long-term structural changes in the global financial order which may produce significant changes in the market for gold.

Long-term factors

Since 2018, there have been bouts of gold purchasing by central banks around the world. In contrast to the 1990s and 2000s, central banks have been net purchasers since 2010. The purchasing fell back during the coronavirus pandemic but has surged again, with over 1000 metric tonnes purchased in both 2022 and 2023 (see Figure 3: click here for a PowerPoint).

Analysts have pointed to similarities between the recent pattern and central bank purchases of gold during the late 1960s and early 1970s (see The Conversation article linked below). Then, central banks sought to diversify themselves from dollar-denominated assets due to concerns about higher inflation in the USA and its impact on the value of the US dollar. Under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, central banks could redeem dollars for gold from the US Federal Reserve at a fixed rate. The pressure on the USA to redeem the gold led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system.

While the current period of central bank purchases does not appear to be related to expected inflation, some commentators suggest it could signal a regime change in the global financial system as significant as the collapse of Bretton Woods. The rise of Chinese political power and the resurgence of US isolationist tendencies portend an increasingly multipolar geopolitical scene. Such concerns may cause central bankers to diversify away from dollar denominated assets to avoid being caught out by geopolitical tensions. Gold may be perceived as an asset through which investors can hedge that risk better.

Indeed, the rise in demand among Chinese investors may indicate a reluctance to hold US assets due to their risk of seizure during heightened geopolitical tensions between China and the USA. Chinese holdings of US financial assets as a percentage of GDP are back to the level they were  when the country joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (see the Rana Foroohar FT article linked below). Allied to this is an increasing tendency to repatriate gold bullion from centres such as London and New York.

Added to these worries about geopolitical risk are concerns about traditional safe-haven assets – government debt securities. US government budget deficits and debt levels continue to rise. Similar patterns are observed across many developed market economies (DMEs). Analysts are concerned such debts are reaching unsustainable levels (economist.com). The view is that at some point, perhaps soon, a tipping point will be reached where investors recognise this. They will demand higher rates of return on these government debt securities, pushing yields up and prices down (bond yields and prices have a negative relationship).

In expectation of this, investors may be wary of holding such government debt securities and move to hold gold as an alternative safe-haven asset to avoid potential capital losses. However, there has been no sign of this behaviour in bond prices and yields yet.

Finally, there are economists who argue that the increased demand for gold is caused by a different regime-change in the global economy. This is not one driven by geopolitics, but by changing inflationary expectations – from a low-inflation, low-interest-rate environment to a higher-inflation, higher-interest-rate environment.

Some of the anticipation relating to inflation is derived from the persistent fiscal stimulus, evidenced by the higher government debt levels described above, coupled with the long period of monetary stimulus (quantitative easing) in developed market economies during the 2010s.

Further, some economists highlight the substantial capital investment needed for the green transition and reindustrialisation. While the financing for this capital investment may absorb some of the excess money flowing around financial markets, the scale involved will create a great demand for resources, fuelling inflation and raising the cost of capital as borrowers compete for resources.

Finally, the demographic forces from an aging population will also cause inflationary pressures. Rising dependency ratios across many developed market economics will create shortages, particularly of labour. This persistent scarcity of labour will continually drive up wages and prices, fuelling inflation and the demand for gold.

Conclusion

The recent surge in the price of gold has led to great interest by investors, financial market analysts and economists. At first, there was a perception that the price increase was similar to recent history and driven by short-term decreases in the real rate of return from financial assets, which reduced the opportunity cost of holding gold.

However, as the upward trend in the price of gold has persisted and does not seem to be explained by changes in real interest rates, economists have considered other reasons that might signal longer-term significant changes in the global financial system. These relate to changing geopolitical risk derived from an increasingly multipolar environment, concerns about the sustainability of government debt levels and expectations of persistently higher inflation in the world economy.

Only time will tell whether these explanations prove correct. If inflationary pressures subside, particularly in the USA, and if real returns from financial assets rebound, a decrease in the demand for and price of gold will suggest that the previous rise was driven by short-term forces.

If prices don’t fall back, it will only fuel the debate that it is a sign of significant changes in the global financial order.

Articles

Speech

Data

  • Gold

    • Trading Economics

Questions

  1. Explain the relationship between real returns and inflation for financial securities like debt and equity.
  2. Why is gold perceived to be an effective hedge against inflation?
  3. Contrast the factors which influenced the demand for gold in the period which preceded the end of Bretton Woods with those influencing demand now?
  4. What has happened to the price of gold since this blog was published? Is there any evidence for the profound changes in the global economic order suggested or was it the short-term forces driving demand after all?