The European Parliament, Council and Commission have agreed on reform to the Common Agricultural Policy as part of the EU’s long-term budget settlement for 2014–20. The CAP accounts for some 38% of the EU’s budget and, over the years, has drawn considerable criticism for resulting in food mountains and support being biased towards large intensive farms.
As section 3.5 in Economics (8th ed) explains, the CAP has been through a number of reforms since the early 1990s. Prior to that, the main form of support was that of guaranteed minimum prices backed up, where necessary, by levies (tariffs) on imported food. Any surplus of production at the minimum price was bought by the relevant EU Intervention Board and either stored or exported at world prices. The effect of minimum prices is shown in the diagram.
Assume that the EU demand is DEU and that EU supply is SEU. Assume also that the world price is Pw. This will be the equilibrium price, since any shortage at Pw (i.e. b – a) will be imported at that price. Thus before intervention, EU demand is Qd1 and EU supply is Qs1 and imports are Qd1 – Qs1.
Now assume that the EU sets an intervention price of Pi. At this high price, there will be a surplus of d – e (i.e. Qs2 – Qd2). Assume for the moment that none of this surplus is exported. It will all, therefore, be bought by the appropriate Intervention Board. The cost to the EU of buying this surplus is shown by the total shaded area (edQs2Qd2: i.e. the surplus multiplied by the intervention price). Unless the food is thrown away, exported or otherwise disposed of, there will obviously then be the additional costs of storing this food: costs that were very high in some years as wine ‘lakes’ and grain and dairy ‘mountains’ built up. If, however, the surplus is sold on world markets at the world price Pw, this will earn the green area for the EU, leaving a net cost of just the pink area.
From 1992, there was a gradual move towards lowering intervention prices and paying farmers direct aid unrelated to current output. From 2004, the main form of support became these direct aid payments. Annual payments to each farm were based on the average support it had received over the three years from 2000 to 2002. At the same time, payments to large farms were gradually reduced, with 80 per cent of the money saved in each country being diverted to rural development. Payments were also made conditional on farmers making environmental improvements to their land.
A problem with this system is that farmers who had high average output in the years 2000–2 have been receiving the same large payments ever since, while farmers who had small yields in those years have received correspondingly small payments.
A proposal two years ago by Dacian Cioloş, the EU Commissioner for Agriculture, was for flat-rate payments per hectare. But objections were raised that this would benefit inefficient farmers who would receive the same as efficient ones. In the end a compromise agreement was reached which saw a capping of the amount of payment per hectare. The result is that the most intensive farmers will see a reduction in their payments by some 30% – a process that will happen gradually over the period 2014–19.
In addition it has been agreed that 30% of the direct aid payments will be conditional on farmers adopting various measures to protect the environment and wildlife.
Farmers will have to be ‘active’ producers to receive direct aid payments. This is designed to exclude businesses such as airports or sports clubs, some of which had been receiving support under the previous system.
It was also agreed to provide 25% extra support for five years to farmers under 35 in an attempt to attract more young farmers into agriculture. Other details of the settlement are given in the EU documents, videos and articles below.
Webcasts
The great shake-up of the Common Agricultural Policy EPP Group in the European Parliament (25/1/13)
Planned reforms of Common Agricultural Policy under fire BBC News, Roger Harrabin (24/6/13)
Mixed response to compromise CAP deal RTE News (26/6/13)
Farm reforms may not increase food production, warns MEP europeandyou, Diane Dodds MEP (26/6/13)
Articles
Big farms to see European subsidies slashed The Telegraph, Rowena Mason (26/6/13)
Common Agricultural Policy deal agreed at last RTE News, Damien O’Reilly (26/6/13)
CAP Reform: MEPs, Council and Commission strike deal FarmingUK (27/6/13)
EU agricultural overhaul puts onus on farmers to be green Financial Times, Joshua Chaffin (26/6/13)
CAP reform deal agreed in Brussels Farmers Guardian, Alistair Driver (26/6/13)
‘Bad for farmers and wildlife’ – CAP reform reaction Farmers Guardian, Alistair Driver (27/6/13)
EU documents
Political agreement on new direction for common agricultural policy Europa Press Release (26/6/13)
CAP Reform – an explanation of the main elements Europa Press Release (26/6/13)
Press release, 3249th Council meeting : Agriculture and Fisheries The Council of the European Union (25/6/13)
Questions
- Why will a system of agricultural support based solely on direct aid not result in any food mountains?
- Show in a diagram the effect of high minimum prices (plus import levies) on an agricultural product in which a country is not self-sufficient (and is still not made so by the high minimum price). How much will be imported before and after the intervention?
- What are the arguments for and against making direct aid payments based solely per hectare?
- Find out how sugar quotas have worked. What will be the effects of abolishing them by 2017?
- What ‘green’ measures are included in the agreement and how effective are they likely to be?
- Consider the arguments for and against removing all forms of support for agriculture in the EU.
- What are the effects of (a) price support and (b) direct aid payments unrelated to output for EU farmers on farmers in developing countries producing agricultural products in competition with those produced in the EU?
- Why may the environmental measures in the new agreement be seen as too weak?
When people take out loans they typically do so to spend and with the UK economy in its current state, many would argue that this is a good thing. The ‘payday loan’ industry took advantage of the weak economy and the squeezed households in the UK and for the past few years, we have seen constant adverts that will appeal to many households. But, is the industry as competitive as the adverts would have us believe?
An inquiry into this industry has been on-going for some time, and it has now been referred to the Competition Commission, due to ‘deep-rooted problems with the way competition works’. For some, a payday loan is a short term form of finance, but for others it has become a way of living that has led to a debt spiral. Frank McKillop, policy manager at Abcul said:
There is a clear demand for instant credit and across the country we are increasingly seeing members who have debts with multiple payday lenders and a record of rolling over debts, or going to one payday lender to clear the debt to another.
One problem identified by the OFT is that customers have found it difficult to compare costs and this has led, in some cases, to customers paying back significantly more than they originally thought. Customers being unable to repay loans will ring warning bells for many people, with no-one wanting a return to the height of the credit crunch.
The OFT has criticized payday loan companies for competing not on costs, but on the speed of approval and using certain unapproved tactics as part of their advertising. The selling point of such companies is that you can have the money in a very short time period. However, the criticism is that this leads to loans being given to those who are unable to afford them. Key credit checks are not being done and with late night texts being sent to often financially vulnerable people, it is no wonder that complaints have been received. In a statement, the OFT said:
The competitive pressure to approve loans quickly may give firms an incentive to skimp on the affordability assessment which is designed to prevent irresponsible lending and protect consumers.
[the business models of companies were] predicated on making loans which are unaffordable, leading to borrowers paying far more than expected through rollovers, additional interest and other charges.
While payday loans are legal and there are many companies offering them, it is what they are competing over, which seems to be in question. The industry itself has begun to change its practices, providing more information to customers, only allowing loans to be rolled over three times and the potential to freeze repayments if the customer gets into financial difficulty. If more stringent checks are completed and hence timing does not become the only grounds for competition, then the problems above may become less significant. With the ongoing OFT inquiry into the practices of the payday loan industry and the continuing demand for such financing, it is likely that we will see much more of both the good and the bad that it has to offer. The following articles consider the investigation.
Webcasts
Balls warns against payday loans ‘blank cheque’ BBC News (27/6/13)
Payday lender investigation could be delayed by bureaucracy Telegraph, Steve Hawkes (27/6/13)
Payday lenders to face ‘tougher restrictions’ on advertising BBC News, Simon Gompertz (1/7/13)
Payday lending rates BBC News, Julio Martino and Stella Creasy (2/7/13)
Articles
Regulator to investigate payday loan industry Financial Times, Elaine Moore and Robert Cookson (27/6/13)
Q&A: Payday loans BBC News (31/5/13)
Payday loans: reining in an industry that is a law unto itself Guardian (27/6/13)
Payday loans industry to face competition inquiry BBC News (27/6/13)
Payday loans firms face competition inquiry Sky News (27/6/13)
Payday loans market faces competition inquiry Guardian, Hilary Osborne (27/6/13)
OFT refers payday loans to Competition Commission Scotsman, Jane Bradley (27/6/13)
Five reasons why we all need to worry about payday lenders Telegraph, Emma Simon (27/6/13)
OFT documents
Payday lending compliance review Office of Fair Trading (27/6/13)
Questions
- Into which market structure would you place the payday loans industry? Make sure you justify your answer.
- What is the role of the (a) the OFT and (b) the Competition Commission? Do these authorities overlap?
- What part does advertising play in this industry?
- To what extent is the payday loan industry a possible cause of another credit crunch?
- Why has the OFT referred this industry to the Competition Commission?
- To what extent are payday loans an essential part of an economy?
Over the past few years, the term ‘bail-out’ has been a common phrase. But, what about the term ‘bail-in’? The latest bank to face financial ruin is the Co-operative Bank, but instead of turning to the tax-payer for a rescue, £1.5 billion will come from bond holders being offered shares in the bank. This will mean that the bank will become listed on the stock market.
Back in 2009, the Co-operative Bank bought Britannia Building Society and it seems that this was the start of its downfall. It took over many bad mortgage loans and loans to companies, and these played a large part in its current financial difficulties.
In order to rescue the bank and raise the capital needed to absorb current and future losses, without turning to the tax-payer, bond-holders of £1.3 billion of loans to the bank will be asked to swap them for shares and bonds, thus leading to significant losses for them. These bond-holders include 7000 private investors.
Since the financial crisis five years ago, the conventional banking model has seen much criticism and many suggested that the mutual structure of the Co-operative provided a better model, creating trust, due to its many stakeholders, who are not as focused on profitability and returns as those shareholders of a listed bank. However, the problems of the Co-operative seem to have put paid to that idea. The bail-in will mean that the bank is now listed on the stock market and thus will have shareholders expecting returns and profitability. This will undoubtedly change the focus of the bank. Euan Sutherland, the new Chief Executive said:
We are very clear that the bank will remain true to responsible and community-based banking and retain its ethical investment stance … Clearly there are lessons to learn and clearly there will be a time to look back and do that but, to be honest, in the last six weeks, where I have been involved with the Co-operative group, we have focused on driving a very solid future for this bank.
The good news is that the savings of those in the Co-operative are safe and taxpayers will not have to fork out any more money.
Yet, the co-operative structure of the bank has long been praised by customers and government alike. But is it perhaps this structure, which has led to its collapse? Furthermore, will the change in structure that will see it listed on the stock market, lead to a change in its approach to banking? The following articles consider the latest bank to run into difficulties.
Webcast
Co-op Bank unveils rescue plan to tackle the £1.5bn hole BBC News (17/6/13)
Articles
Co-op Bank travails show weakness of mutual model Financial Times, Sarah Gordon (21/6/13)
Co-operative Bank to list on stock market in rescue deal The Guardian, Jill Treanor (17/6/13)
Troubled Co-operative Bank unveils rescue plan to plug £1.5bn hole in balance sheet Independent, Nick Goodway (17/6/13)
Co-op Bank announces plan to plug £1.5bn hole Which? (17/6/13)
The Co-operative Bank and the challenge of finding co-op capital The Guardian, Andrew Bibby (13/6/13)
Co-op Bank seeks to fill £1.5bn capital hole Sky News (17/6/13)
Does Co-op Group deserve to keep control of Co-op Bank? BBC News, Robert Peston (9/7/13)
Questions
- Why did the Co-operative Bank move into financial trouble?
- What are the key characteristics of a Mutual? Are they disadvantages or advantages?
- What is a ‘bail-in’? Who will gain and who will lose?
- The Co-operative Bank will now be listed on the stock market. What does this mean?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of floating a company on the stock market?
- Why are all banks required to hold capital to absorb losses?
Since coming to office in December 2012, Shinzo Abe’s government has been determined to revive the Japanese economy. For the past 20 years, Japan’s growth has averaged only 0.8% per annum. This compares with 1.3% for Germany, 2.3% for the UK, 2.6% for the USA, 4.9% for South Korea and 10.4% for China.
Japanese real GDP per capita was only 14.5% higher in 2012 than 20 years earlier. This compares with figures for Germany, the UK, the USA, South Korea and China of 27%, 45%, 34%, 126% and 497% respectively.
So what has the Japanese government done to boost both short-term and long-term growth after years of stagnation? There are ‘three arrows’ to the policy, targeted at reviving and sustaining economic growth.
The first arrow is monetary policy. The Bank of Japan has engaged in extensive quantitative easing through bond purchases in order to drive down the exchange rate (see A J-curve for Japan?), stimulate expenditure and increase the rate of inflation. A target inflation rate of 2% has been set by the Bank of Japan. Part of the problem for the Japanese economy over the years has been stagnant or falling prices. Japanese consumers have got used to waiting to spend in the hope of being able to buy at lower prices. Similarly, Japanese businesses have often delayed stock purchase. By committing to bond purchases of whatever amount is necessary to achieve the 2% inflation target, the central bank hopes to break this cycle and encourage people to buy now rather than later.
The second arrow is fiscal policy. Despite having the highest debt to GDP ratio in the developed world, Japan is embarking on a large-scale programme of infrastructure investment and other public works. The package is worth over $100bn. The expansionary fiscal policy is accompanied by a longer-term plan for fiscal consolidation as economic growth picks up. In the short term, Japan should have no difficulty in financing the higher deficit, given that most of the borrowing is internal and denominated in yen.
The third arrow is supply-side policy. On 5 June, Shinzo Abe unveiled a series of goals his government would like to achieve in order to boost capacity and productivity. These include increasing private-sector investment (both domestic and inward), infrastructure expenditure (both private and public), increasing farmland, encouraging more women to work by improving day-care facilities for children, and deregulation of both goods, capital and labour markets. The prime minister, however, did not give details of the measures that would be introduced to achieve these objectives. More details will be announced in mid-June.
The following videos and articles look at the three arrows of Abenomics and the effects they are having on confidence and attitudes as well as on expenditure, output and the exchange rate. They also look at the crucial third arrow: at whether supply-side reforms will be enough to achieve a sustained increase in economic growth.
Videos
Abenomics an uncertain future for most Financial Times on YouTube, Ben McLannahan (30/5/13)
Assessing Abenomics NHK World (3/6/13)
Adam Posen on Abenomics NHK World (30/5/13)
Japanese concerned over ‘Abenomics’ AlJazeera on YouTube (30/5/13)
Abenomics – the cure for deflation? BBC News, Rupert Wingfield-Hayes (10/5/13)
Japan PM’s economic speech ‘short on detail’ BBC News, Rupert Wingfield Hayes (5/6/13)
Pretty Positive on Abenomics Bloomberg, Jan Hatzius, Goldman Sachs (5/6/13)
Why Abenomics is Bonkers: Pro CNBC, Graeme Maxton, (27/5/13)
‘Abe’nomics Not About BOJ Printing Money Bloomberg, Derek Halpenny (31/5/13)
Abenomics Aims `Third Arrow’ at Business Rules Bloomberg, Willie Pesek (5/6/13)
Analysis on Abe’s Growth Plan NHK World (5/6/13)
Articles
Will three arrows find their target? On Line Opinion, Andrew Leigh (6/6/13)
Japan Fires ‘Third Arrow,’ but Will It Work? CNBC, Dhara Ranasinghe (5/6/13)
Japan’s ‘3 Arrows’ May Run Into German Wall CNBC, Michael Ivanovitch (19/5/13)
Japan’s recovery – the power of Abe’s three arrows Commonwealth Bank, Australia, Melanie Timbrell (31/5/13)
So Far, the Battery Charger Is Working in Japan The New York Times, Jeff Sommer (18/5/13)
Abenomics Could Light A Fire Under The Japan Trade Again Business Insider, Matthew Boesler (4/6/13)
Japan’s New Prime Minister Unveils The ‘Most Important’ Plank Of Abenomics Business Insider (5/6/13)
Japan PM pledges to boost incomes by 30% Channel NewsAsia (5/6/13)
Abe’s growth strategy disappoints economists, investors The Asahi Shimbun (6/6/13)
Abenomics Won’t Be ’Magic Bullet’ for Japan, Says Johnson of MIT Bloomberg, Cordell Eddings (5/6/13)
Too soon to call time on Abenomics BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (19/6/13)
Abenomics: The objectives and the risks BBC News, Puneet Pal Singh (19/7/13)
Data
World Economic Outlook Database IMF
Bank of Japan Statistics Bank of Japan
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OECD
Country statistical profile: Japan 2013 OECD
Questions
- Demonstrate on (a) an aggregate demand and supply diagram and (b) a Keynesian 45° line diagram the effects of the three arrows (assuming they are successful) in meeting their objectives.
- What will determine the effectiveness of the first two arrows in boosting short-term economic growth?
- Would you characterise the policies of the third arrow as interventionist or market-orientated, or as a mixture? Explain.
- What are the dangers in ‘Abenomics’?
- Find out what has been happening to Japanese bond rates. What are the implications of this for monetary policy?
- What are the ‘markets telling Abe’?
- In what ways will expectations influence the effectiveness of Abenomics?
Here are a series of videos examining the case for and against austerity policy. Is such policy necessary to re-balance countries’ economies and retain or regain the confidence of investors? Or does such policy harm not just short-run growth but long-run growth too? Does it reduce investment and thereby aggregate supply?
These videos follow on from the news item Keynes versus the Classics: a new version of an old story. In the first video, Mark Blyth, author of Austerity: the History of a Dangerous Idea, argues that austerity policy has not worked and never can. George Osborne, by contrast, argues that although it has been a ‘hard road to recovery’, austerity policy is working.
International bodies take a more nuanced stand. The IMF, while supporting the objective of reducing the government deficit, argues that the pace of the cuts in the UK should be slowed until more robust growth returns. The OECD, in examining the global economy, is more supportive of countries maintaining the pace of deficit reduction, but argues that the ECB needs to take stronger monetary measures to boost bank lending in the eurozone.
With austerity having increasingly alarming effects on unemployment and social cohesion, especially within certain eurozone countries, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, it is not surprising that there are growing demands for rethinking macroeconomic policy.
There is general agreement that more needs to be done to promote economic growth, and a growing consensus that an increase in infrastructure expenditure is desirable. But whether such expenditure should be financed by increased borrowing (with the extra deficit being reduced subsequently as a result of the extra growth), or whether it should be financed by reductions in expenditure elsewhere, is a continuing focus of debate.
Austerity: the History of a Dangerous Idea The Guardian, Mark Blyth (27/5/13) (see also)
IMF: UK austerity will be a ‘drag on growth’ BBC News. Hugh Pym (22/5/13)
George Osborne: ‘Hard road to recovery for UK economy’ BBC News (22/5/13)
Economy and austerity BBC News, Sajid Javid and Stephen Timms (1/5/13)
IMF’s Olivier Blanchard urges UK austerity rethink BBC News (16/4/13)
OECD ‘supportive of Osborne austerity plans’ BBC news (29/5/13)
Stimulus vs. austerity measures in EU CNN, Mohamed El-Erian (29/5/13)
‘No time to wobble’ on deficit reduction YouTube, Sir Roger Carr (CBI president) (16/5/13)
Deficit-Cutting: Not If, But When Wall Street Journal Live, David Wessel (8/5/13)
Questions
- What are the arguments for maintaining a policy of deficit reduction through tight fiscal policy?
- What are the three principles put forward by Mark Blyth for designing an appropriate macroeconomic policy?
- How does the fallacy of composition relate to the effects of all countries pursuing austerity policy simultaneously?
- Is the IMF for or against austerity? Explain.
- Assess the policies advocated by the OECD to stimulate economic growth in the eurozone.
The European Parliament, Council and Commission have agreed on reform to the Common Agricultural Policy as part of the EU’s long-term budget settlement for 2014–20. The CAP accounts for some 38% of the EU’s budget and, over the years, has drawn considerable criticism for resulting in food mountains and support being biased towards large intensive farms.
From 1992, there was a gradual move towards lowering intervention prices and paying farmers direct aid unrelated to current output. From 2004, the main form of support became these direct aid payments. Annual payments to each farm were based on the average support it had received over the three years from 2000 to 2002. At the same time, payments to large farms were gradually reduced, with 80 per cent of the money saved in each country being diverted to rural development. Payments were also made conditional on farmers making environmental improvements to their land.
In addition it has been agreed that 30% of the direct aid payments will be conditional on farmers adopting various measures to protect the environment and wildlife.
