Consumer spending is crucial to an economy. In the UK total consumer spending is equivalent to almost two-thirds of the value of country’s GDP. Understanding its determinants is therefore crucial in attempting to forecast the short-term path of the economy. In other words, the growth of the economy in 2013 will depend on our inclination to spend.
While the amount of disposable income (post-tax income) will be one factor influencing our spending, other factors matter too. Amongst these ‘other factors’ is the stock of wealth of households. Here we look at the latest available figures on the net worth of the UK household sector. Will our stock of wealth help to underpin spending or will it act to constrain spending?
The household sector’s net worth is the sum of its net financial wealth and non-financial (physical) wealth. Net financial wealth is the balance of financial assets over financial liabilities. Financial assets include funds in savings accounts, shares and pension funds. Financial liabilities include debts secured against property, largely residential mortgages, and unsecured debts, such as overdrafts and unpaid balances on credit cards. Non-financial wealth largely includes the value of the sector’s holdings of property and buildings.
The following table summarises the net worth of the UK household sector at the end of 2011 and 2010. The figures are taken from the Office for National Statistics release, National Balance Sheet. They show that at the end of 2011, the household sector had a net worth of £7.04 trillion. This was up just 0.1 per cent up 2010. At the end of 2011, the stock of net worth of the household sector was 7 times the amount of disposable income earned by the sector in 2011.
We can also see from the table the significance of the value of non-financial assets to net worth. The value of households’ physical wealth is slightly larger than the value of its financial assets, though in 2011 both equate to around 4¼ times the annual flow of disposable income.
2011 saw the value of the stock of non-financial wealth grow by 0.7 per cent while the value of the sector’s stock of financial assets fell by 0.4 per cent. Meanwhile, the value of the stock of financial liabilities was virtually unchanged at a little over £1½ trillion. In 2011, the sector’s financial liabilities were equivalent to around 1½ times its annual disposable income. While this is down from the 2007 peak of 1¾ times income, it is considerably higher than during the period from 1987 to 1999 when the financial liabilities to income ratio remained consistently close to 1. The 2000s saw a rapid expansion of the sector’s liabilities relative to its income and, hence, today there remains what economists call a debt overhang.
Despite the very small overall increase in net worth in 2011, the stock of net wealth was up by 18 per cent on 2008. During 2008, net worth fell by 12 per cent. This was on the back of a fall in non-financial wealth of 9.4 per cent, a fall in the value of financial assets of 10.1 per cent and an increase in the value of financial liabilities of 1.9 per cent.
Chart 1 gives an historical picture of net worth. It shows the two principal balances that comprise net worth: net financial wealth and physical wealth. Each is shown relative to annual disposable income. Again, we can see the importance of physical wealth to overall net worth. The growth in house prices from the late 1990s through to the economic downturn of the late 2000s helps to explain its rising relative importance in net worth. We can also see from the chart that the relative level of net worth is roughly on a par with its value at the end of the 1990s. However, the composition is different. Today, relatively more of the sector’s net worth comes from non-financial wealth compared with that from net financial wealth.
A crucial question for spending in the months ahead is how inclined the household sector feels to consolidate its balance sheets further. Chart 2 includes more recently available data on financial assets and liabilities from United Kingdom Economic Accounts, Q3 2012. From it we can see the declining stock of financial liabilities relative to disposable income. This has been driven by an actual fall in the stock of unsecured financial liabilities. In the 12-month period up to the end of Q3 2012, the stock of unsecured financial liabilities fell by 6.4 per cent (the stock of secured debt rose by 1.8 per cent). This consolidation of unsecured debt suggests that households remain understandably cautious given the uncertain economic environment. Hence, the household balance sheet will most probably continue to constrain consumption growth in the short-term.
Are the components of the balance sheet stocks or flows. Explain your answer. What about disposable income?
List those factors that might affect the value of each component of the household balance sheet.
Again considering the balance sheet, try drawing up a list of ways in which the components of the balance sheet could affect spending.
What do you think has been the motivating factor behind the declining stock of unsecured financial liabilities? What impact is this likely to have on consumer spending?
If the real value of disposable income increases in 2013 shouldn’t this be enough to see real value of consumption increase?
How would the balance sheet of a household that rents differ from a household that is an owner-occupier?
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8, the international banking regulatory body, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, sought to ensure that the global banking system would be much safer in future. This would require that banks had (a) sufficient capital; (b) sufficient liquidity to meet the demands of customers.
The Basel III rules set new requirements for capital adequacy ratios, to be phased in by 2019. But what about liquidity ratios? The initial proposals of the Basel Committee were that banks should have sufficient liquid assets to be able to withstand for at least 30 days an intense liquidity crisis (such as that which led to the run on Northern Rock in 2007). Liquid assets were defined as cash, reserves in the central bank and government bonds. This new ‘liquidity coverage ratio’ would begin in 2015.
These proposals, however, have met with considerable resistance from bankers, who claim that higher liquidity requirements will reduce their ability to lend and reduce the money multiplier. This would make it more difficult for countries to pull out of recession.
In response, the Basel Committee has published a revised set of liquidity requirements. The new liquidity coverage ratio, instead of being introduced in full in 2015, will be phased in over four years from 2015 to 2019. Also the definition of liquid assets has been significantly expanded to include highly rated equities, company bonds and mortgage-backed securities.
This loosening of the liquidity requirements has been well received by banks. But, as some of the commentators point out in the articles, it is some of these assets that proved to be wholly illiquid in 2007/8!
Should the object of monetary policy be simply one of keeping inflation within a target range? In a speech given on 9 October, the Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Mervyn King, questioned whether the interest-rate setting policy of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has been too narrow.
He considered whether interest rates should have been higher before the financial crisis and crash of 2007–9. This could have helped to reduce the asset price bubble and discouraged people from taking out excessive loans.
But then there is the question of the exchange rate. Would higher interest rates have pushed the exchange rate even higher, with damaging effects on exports? Today the trade weighted exchange rate is some 20% lower than before the crash. The government hopes that this will encourage a growth in exports and help to fuel recovery in demand. But as Dr King said, “The strategy of reducing domestic spending and relying more on external demand is facing a real problem because not everyone can do it at the same time.”
Then there is the question of economic growth. Should a target rate of growth be part of the MPC’s target? Should the MPC adopt a form of Taylor rule which targets a weighted average of the inflation rate and the rate of economic growth?
Certainly monetary policy today in the UK and many other countries is very different from five years ago. With interest rates being close to zero, there is little scope for further reductions; after all, nominal rates cannot fall below zero, otherwise people would be paid for borrowing money! So the focus has shifted to the supply of money. Several attempts have been made to control the money supply through programmes of quantitative easing. Indeed many economists expect further rounds of quantitative easing in the coming months unless there is a substantial pick up in aggregate demand.
So what should be the targets of monetary policy? The following articles look at Dr King’s speech and at various alternatives to a simple inflation target.
What are the arguments for using monetary policy to target a particular rate of inflation?
Would it ever be a good idea to adjust the targeted rate of inflation up or down and if so when and why?
Explain how a Taylor rule would work and in what ways it is superior or inferior to pursuing a simple inflation target.
Are attempts to control the money supply through quantitative easing (or tightening) consistent or inconsistent with pursuing an inflation target? Explain.
What are the arguments for and against abandoning targeting in monetary policy and replacing it with discretionary policy that takes a number of different macroeconomic indicators into account?
The ECB president, Mario Draghi, has announced a new programme of ‘Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs)’ to ease the difficulties of countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The idea is to push down interest rates for these countries’ bonds. If successful, this will make it more affordable for them to service their debts.
OMTs involve the ECB buying these countries’ bonds on the secondary market (i.e. existing bonds). This will be limited to bonds with no more than three years to maturity. Although restricting purchases to the secondary market would not involve the ECB lending directly to these countries, the bond purchases should push down interest rates on the secondary market and this, in turn, should allow the countries to issue new bonds at lower rates on the primary market.
The OMT programme replaces the previous Securities Markets Programme (SMP), which began in May 2010. This too involved purchasing bonds on the secondary market. By the time of the last actions under SMP in January 2012, €212 billion of purchases had been made. Unlike the SMP, however, OMTs are in principle unlimited, with the ECB president, Mario Draghi, saying that the ECB would do ‘whatever it takes’ to hold the single currency together. This means that it will buy as many bonds on the market as are necessary to bring interest rates down to sustainable levels.
Critics, however, argue that this will still not be enough to stimulate the eurozone economy and help bring countries out of recession. They give two reasons.
The first is that OMTs differ from the quantitative easing programmes used in the UK and USA. OMTs would not increase the eurozone money supply as the ECB would sell other assets to offset the bond purchases. This process is known as ‘sterilisation’, which is defined as actions taken by a central bank to offset the effects of foreign exchange flows or its own bond transactions so as to leave money supply unchanged.
The second reason is that OMTs will be conducted only if countries stick to previously agreed strong austerity measures. This is something that it looking increasingly unlikely as protests against the cuts mount in countries such as Greece and Spain.
What are the key features of the OMT programme? How does it differ from the former Securities Markets Programme (SMP)?
In what ways does the OMT programme differ from the quantitative easing programmes in the USA and UK?
How will the ECB’s buying bonds in the secondary market influence the primary bond market? What will influence the size of the effect?
How does sterilisation work in (a) the bond market; (b) the foreign exchange market?
Why is it claimed that the OMT programme is a necessary but not sufficient condition for solving the crisis in the eurozone? What additional measures would you recommend and why?
What are the risks associated with the OMT programme?
Original post As a resident of Bristol it is with considerable interest that I’m following the development of the Bristol pound, due for launch in September 2012. One Bristol pound will be worth one pound sterling.
The new currency will be issued in denominations of £1, £5, £10 and £20 and there is a local competition to design the notes. Participating local traders will open accounts with Bristol Credit Union, which will administer the scheme. It has FSA backing and so all deposits will be guaranteed up to £85,000.
The idea of a local currency is not new. There are already local currencies in Stroud in Gloucestershire, Totnes in Devon, Lewes in East Sussex and Brixton in south London. The Bristol scheme, however, is the first to be introduced on a city-wide scale. The administrators are keen that use of the currency should be as easy as possible; people will be able to open accounts with Bristol Credit Union, pay bills online and pay shopkeepers by mobile phone text message (a system used in many countries, but not in the UK).
As the money has to be spent locally, the aim is to help local business, of which more han 100 have already signed up to the scheme. Bristol has a large number of independent traders – in fact, the road where I live is off the Gloucester Road, which has the largest number of independent traders on one street in the UK. The organisers of the Bristol pound are determined to preserve the diversity of shops and prevent Bristol from becoming a ‘clone town’, with high streets full of chain stores.
But how likely is the scheme to encourage people to shop in independent shops and deal with local traders? Will the scheme take off, or will it fizzle out? What are its downsides?
Update The Bristol pound was duly launched on September 19 and there has been much local interest. The later videos and articles below look at reactions to the new currency and at its chances of success in driving local business.
What are the advantages of having a local currency?
What are the dangers in operating a local currency?
What steps can be taken to avoid the dangers?
Can Bristol pounds be ‘created’ by Bristol Credit Union? Could the process be inflationary?
What market failures are there in the pattern of shops in towns and cities? To what extent is the growth of supermarkets in towns and the growth of out-of-town shopping malls a result of market failures or simply of consumer preferences?
Are local currencies only for idealists?
What benefits are there for shoppers in Bristol of using Bristol pounds?
Consumer spending is crucial to an economy. In the UK total consumer spending is equivalent to almost two-thirds of the value of country’s GDP. Understanding its determinants is therefore crucial in attempting to forecast the short-term path of the economy. In other words, the growth of the economy in 2013 will depend on our inclination to spend.
