The UK economy shrank by 0.3 per cent in the final quarter of 2012. A significant factor in the fall was the UK’s balance of trade, which measures the difference between the value of goods and services exported and those imported. The balance of trade deficit rose in 2012 to £36.2 billion or 2.3 per cent of GDP. If we measure only the balance in goods, the deficit was an eye-watering £106.3 billion – a record high for the UK. The balance of trade remains a drag on British growth.
The balance of payments is a record all the flows of money between a country’s residents and the rest of the world. Inflows represent credits on the balance of payments while outflows represent debits. We focus here on perhaps the best-known component of the overall balance of payments: the current account. The current account comprises three separate accounts. First, there is the balance of trade (in goods and services). It records payments for exports (X) and imports (M). Second, there is net income flows. Net income flows are flows of money between countries in the form of wages, profits and interest. Finally, there is current transfers. Current transfers are transfers of money between countries for the purpose of consumption, including, for instance, a transfer payment by the British government to overseas organisations.
Chart 1 presents the UK’s current account. It is based on data from Balance of Payments Q4 2012 dataset published by the Office for National Statistics. The current account deficit in 2012 was £57.7 billion (up from a deficit of £20.2 billion in 2011). This is the equivalent to 3.7 per cent of GDP (up from a deficit of 1.3 per cent in 2011) and the highest current account deficit since 1989 when it reached 4.6 per cent of GDP. Back in 1989, the UK economy was growing by 2.6 per cent having grown by 5.6 per cent in 1988. In 2012, the UK economy grew by just 0.3 per cent following growth of 1.0 per cent in 2011. The mean average rate growth of the UK economy since 1950 is 2.6 per cent. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
The net income balance, which while remaining in surplus, worsened significantly. From a surplus of £25.9 billion (1.7 per cent of GDP) in 2011, it fell to a surplus of just £1.6 billion (0.1 per cent of GDP) in 2012. This is largely attributable to a decline in the surplus of direct investment income and, in particular, the earnings abroad of non-bank private corporations. Meanwhile, the deficit on current transfers in 2012 was £23.1 billion, up from £22.0 billion in 2011. This is the highest on record. The current transfers deficit with EU institutions rose in 2012 to £10.5 billion, up by £1 billion on 2011.
The balance of trade deficit too worsened in 2012. The deficit rose from £24.1 billion in 2011 (1.6 per cent of GDP) to £36.2 billion in 2012 (2.3 per cent of GDP). The persistent balance of trade deficit continues to occur despite a persistent surplus on the trade in services. In 2012, the balance of trade surplus in services was £70 billion (4.6 per cent of GDP). As Chart 2 shows, the UK now has a record deficit in the balance of trade in goods. This was down from £76.1 billion in 2011 (5 per cent of GDP). (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
The last time the UK ran a surplus on the balance of trade in goods was back in 1982. Since 1983, the average UK balance of trade deficit in goods has been the equivalent of 3.67 per cent of GDP. Over the same period, the UK has run a balance of trade surplus in services of 2.37 per cent. The figures point very clearly to the work to be done if we are to see a rebalancing of the industrial composition of the UK economy.
Data
Statistical Bulletin: Balance of Payments, Q4 2012 ONS, 27 March 2013
Balance of Payments, Q4 2012 dataset ONS, 27 March 2013
Articles
Fasten your seat belts – a balance of payments crisis looms Telegraph, Jeremy Warner 27/3/13)
Britain, the world and the end of the free lunch? BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (27/3/13)
March of the makers? Balance of payments figures make dismal reading Guardian, Larry Elliott (27/3/13)
Britain’s current account deficit at worst level since 1989 Guardian, Phillip Inman (27/3/13)
Pound fears as current account deficit jumps to near 25 per cent high Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (27/3/13)
Current account deficit highest since 1989 Financial Times, Claire Jones (27/3/13)
Questions
- What does the balance of payments measure?
- In explaining what the current account of the balance of payments measures, distinguish between the three principal accounts comprising the current account.
- Why might we expect the current account to worsen when economic growth is strongest and improve when economic growth is weakest? Is this what we observe in the UK?
- The UK has experienced a persistent current account deficit since the early 1980s. What might be some of the contributory factors to this persistent deficit?
- How might we expect a country’s exchange rate to be affected by movements on the balance of payments?
VAT was introduced on the 1st of April 1973, as part of the conditions for the UK entering the Common Market. Designed by a French tax expert, Maurice Lauré, it was initially envisaged as a straightforward replacement for purchase tax, which would be applied to most goods and services.
Forty years on, VAT is increasingly complex, with numerous exemptions, many anomalies in its scope, and increasingly expensive challenges to its imposition. How did we get to this point? And is it time for VAT to undergo a mid-life makeover?
All governments have to raise taxes – to redistribute income and to fund public spending. They have a number of mechanisms they can use, but essentially they have to tax incomes (direct taxes), spending (indirect taxes) or a mix of both. The main indirect tax in the UK is VAT, which now raises over £100bn a year, compared with £1.5bn in its first year (see above chart: click here for a PowerPoint version). Initially envisaged as a simple, cross-Europe purchase tax, the current system is complex and at times appears to have been formulated ‘on the hoof’, never a good way to build a tax system.
In the 2012 Budget, the Chancellor decided to apply the standard rate of income tax to hot takeaway pasties; previously they had been zero-rated. However, he had sharply underestimated the ability of the industry to lobby against the tax, working closely with the tabloid press. Perhaps more importantly, he also missed the complex nature of the good; when is a hot pasty just cooling down? And what is hot? The government backtracked and now 20% VAT is only charged on pasties that are deliberately kept hot. You might think that this change of heart avoided introducing an anomaly, but consider how you might feel if you sell takeaway baked potatoes, which are subject to VAT.
Apart from the complexity of the system, VAT is unpopular with some commentators who feel that it falls too heavily on low-income households. Although many foodstuffs are zero-rated and housing is exempt, VAT is charged at 20% on clothing and many necessities such as cleaning materials. Gas and electricity are subject to a reduced rate of 5% and both alcohol and cigarettes have additonal excise duties imposed and yet are disproportionally consumed by the poor. When the standard rate of VAT was temporarily dropped to 15% in 2010, but then permanently raised to 20% in 2011, many felt that this was a shift in the tax burden to the poor.
So complex, irrational and prone to changes following political lobbying or expensive legal cases, VAT does seem to be stumbling into its forties under something of a cloud. However, it remains the case that it raises a large proportion of UK tax revenues at relatively low direct cost and provides the Chancellor with a reasonably effective fiscal policy tool. Even if a government wanted to put in place an alternative, it is likely that the associated political risks would be too high for it to do so. We might hope for some rationalisation of the current system, but there is little doubt that we will be raising a glass to VAT’s 50th birthday in 2023.
The links below include some articles on VAT’s 40th birthday and some more general articles on VAT.
Articles
VAT is 40 years old- and now has middle-age spread The Guardian, Juliette Garside (31/1/13)
Is VAT suffering a mid-life crisis at 40? BBC News, Colin Corder (31/3/13)
VAT at 40, not simple, not popular, but central to government revenue-raising The Chartered Institute of Taxation (28/3/13)
Happy birthday VAT, here’s how not to pay you The Telegraph, Rosie Murray-West (31/3/13)
Poorest spend higher proportion of VAT than richest BBC News (31/10/11)
A Value- Added Tax offers much to love- and hate New York Times, Gregory Mankiw (1/5/10)
EC Standard VAT Declaration European Commission Roadmap (2012)
Data and information
VAT pages HMRC
Public sector finance statistics HM Treasury (follow link to latest Public finances databank (Excel file) and go to Worksheet C2)
Latest European Union EU VAT rates VATLive
Questions
- Explain why VAT might be deemed regressive. Can you formulate an argument that it falls more heavily on the rich than the poor?
- Why is VAT administratively cheap? Other than generating tax revenues, can you think of any advantages of the tax?
- Newspapers and books are zero-rated in the UK, while e-books and news apps are standard rated at 20%. Can you identify some other anomalies in the UK VAT system? Is there an argument that a better approach would be to charge a lower rate on all goods and services?
- Who pays VAT, consumers or producers? Illustrate your answer with a diagram, or two.
- A business has to register for VAT once it has a turnover of £77,000 pa. Does this system give rise to any perverse incentives?
- Countries across the European Union have varying VAT rates, applied to very different ranges of products. Explain why this might hinder the workings of a single European market.
- Imagine you were running a brand new economy; would you use a value-added tax to raise revenues? What are the alternatives open to governments?
House prices have long been an obsession with the UK media and much of the public; when they rise, homeowners feel rich, when they fall, consumer confidence dives. Following the financial crisis and subsequent recession, there has been a great deal of attention focused on the overall health of the housing market.
But the UK faces a particular problem of a sharp and growing divide in regional house prices. First time buyers in London face having to find high deposits and even then, many are unable to access mortgages. Meanwhile those in the regions can access more affordable housing, but may be reluctant to enter the market when prices are stagnant. What are the implications of this divide for the housing market and for the broader economy?
The housing market demonstrates characteristics which are typical of those for goods that are both consumable and involve capital growth; when prices rise housing is seen as a good ‘investment’ and demand increases, this in turn leads to higher prices. Conversely when values drop, demand falls and the market slumps. Markets like this are described as being prone to price bubbles.
Looking at UK house prices as a whole can, however, mask large variations across the economy; variations which can cause problems for jobseekers, for employers and for the government. Recently one of the UK’s largest mortgage lenders predicted continuing regional variance in house prices. Halifax’s figures looked at the price of housing across a number of UK towns and showed that changes seen during 2012 ranged from a 14.8 per cent rise to an 18.4 per cent fall. The biggest rise seen during the year was in Southend on Sea, in Essex, while the greatest fall was in Craigavon, in Northern Ireland. Of the ten towns with the biggest rises, eight were found in London or the south east, with Durham being the only northern town showing growth. Of the ten towns that the Halifax identified with the biggest falls, four are in Scotland, three are in the north west, one is in the north of England and one is in Northern Ireland.
Martin Ellis, housing economist at the Halifax, said:
We expect continuing broad stability in house prices nationally in 2013. The generalised north/south divide in house price performance seen during 2012 is likely to continue next year. House prices are expected to be strongest in London and the south east as this part of the country performs best in economic terms.
These disparities present a particular problem in a recession. While London and the south east show signs of economic growth, with relatively low unemployment and high levels of inward investment, many regions outside London see house prices falling further as unemployment grows. There are some exceptions – the arrival of the BBC in Salford has resulted in a sharp increase in prices there – but, in general, confidence is low outside the south east.
The articles below consider regional differences in the housing market.
Articles
House prices creep up over 2012 The Guardian, Patrick Collinson (29/1/13)
Which regions of the UK will show the biggest house price rises in the next 5 years? This is Money, Rachel Rickard Straus (17/1/13)
Figures reveal scale of regional house price divide Inside Housing, Tom Lloyd (2/1/13)
Property market gets a budget boost, so are things looking up? This is Money, Simon Lambert (21/3/13)
Help to Buy scheme could drive up house prices, says OBR The Guardian, Josephine Moulds and Jennifer Rankin (26/3/13)
London house prices outstrip 2007 peak with a 2.8% increase The Guardian, Hilary Osborne (28/3/13)
Housing market in southeast is worth £2tn Financial Times, James Pickford and Ed Hammond (1/2/13)
House prices show annual increase Evening Standard (28/3/13)
House price data
Links to house price data The Economics Network
Regional Historical House Price Data Halifax House Price Index (Lloyds Banking Group)
Questions
- Thinking about the market for owner-occupied housing, what are the factors that will determine demand? How might these explain variations in demand across different regions of the UK?
- How does the supply of housing vary across the UK?
- What would you predict about regional variations in rents?
- What is the impact of high house prices in London on first time buyers? Does this matter?
- What are the implications for the labour market of sharp variations in house prices across regions?
- Why might the Chancellor want to put in place policies to boost the housing market?
- Who gains from high house prices? Who loses? You might want to think about this in term of the life-cycle.
The UK economy is suffering from a lack of aggregate demand. Low spending in real terms is preventing the economy from growing. A simple solution would seem to be to stimulate aggregate demand through fiscal policy, backed up by even looser monetary policy. But this is easier said than done and could result in undesirable consequences in the medium term.
If increased borrowing were to be used to fund increased government expenditure and/or cuts in taxes, would any resulting growth be sufficient in the medium term to reduce the public-sector deficit below the initial level through automatic fiscal stabilisers? And would the growth be sustainable? The answer to this second question depends on what happens to the supply side of the economy. Would there be an increase in aggregate supply to match the increase in aggregate demand?
This second question has led many economists to argue that we need to see a rebalancing of the economy. What is needed is an increase in investment and exports, rather than an increase in just consumer expenditure funded by private borrowing and government current expenditure funded by public borrowing.
But how will exports and investment be stimulated? As far as exports are concerned, it was hoped that the depreciation of the pound since 2008 would give UK exporters a competitive advantage. Also domestic producers would gain a competitive advantage in the UK from imports becoming more expensive. But the current account deficit has actually deteriorated. According to the EU’s AMECO database, in 2008 the current account deficit was 1% of GDP; in 2012 it was 3.7%. It would seem that UK producers are not taking sufficient advantage of the pound’s depreciation, whether for exports or import substitutes.
As far as investment is concerned, there are two major problems. The first is the ability to invest. This depends on financing and things such as available land and planning regulations. The second is the confidence to invest. With not little or no growth in consumer demand, there is little opportunity for the accelerator to work. And with forecasts of sluggish growth and austerity measures continuing for some years, there is little confidence in a resurgence in consumer demand in the future. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the above chart. Note that the 2013 plots are based on AMECO forecasts.)
So hope of a rebalancing is faint at the current time. Hence the arguments for an increase in government capital expenditure that we looked at in the last blog post (The political dynamite of calm economic reflection). The problem and the options for government are considered in the following articles.
Articles
Budget 2013: Chancellor’s rebalancing act BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (11/3/13)
Why George Osborne is failing to rebalance the economy The Guardian, Larry Elliott (17/3/13)
Economy fails to ‘rebalance’ Financial Times, Sarah O’Connor (27/2/13)
Analysis – Long haul ahead for Britain’s struggling economy Reuters, William Schomberg (3/3/13)
Can banks be forced to lend more? BBC News, Robert Peston (12/3/13)
Budget 2013: What the commentators are saying BBC News (13/3/13)
Data
UK Trade, January 2013 (ONS) (12/3/13)
Business investment, Q4 2012 ONS (27/2/13)
Questions
- Draw a diagram to illustrate the effects of a successful policy to increase both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. What will determine the effect on the output gap?
- For what reasons has the UK’s current account deteriorated over the past few years while those of the USA and the eurozone have not?
- Using ONS data, find out what has happened to the UK’s balance of trade in (a) goods and (b) services over the past few years and explain your findings.
- Why are firms reluctant to invest at the moment? What policy measures could the government adopt to increase investment?
- With interest rates so low, why don’t consumers borrow and spend more, thereby aiding the recovery?
In a carefully argued article in the New Statesman, the UK Business Secretary, Vince Cable, considers the slow recovery in the economy and whether additional measures should be adopted. He sums up the current state of the economy as follows:
The British economy is still operating at levels around or below those before the 2008 financial crisis and roughly 15 per cent below an albeit unsustainable pre-crisis trend. There was next to no growth during 2012 and the prospect for 2013 is of very modest recovery.
Unsurprisingly there is vigorous debate as to what has gone wrong. And also what has gone right; unemployment has fallen as a result of a million (net) new jobs in the private sector and there is vigorous growth of new enterprises. Optimistic official growth forecasts and prophets of mass unemployment have both been confounded.
He argues that supply-side policies involving “a major and sustained commitment to skills, innovation and infrastructure investment” are essential if more rapid long-term growth is to be achieved. This is relatively uncontroversial.
But he also considers the claim that austerity has kept the economy from recovering and whether policies to tackle the negative output gap should be adopted, even if this means a short-term increase in government borrowing.
But crude Keynesian policies of expanding aggregate demand are both difficult to implement and may not take into account the particular circumstance of the current extended recession – or depression – in the UK and in many eurozone countries. World aggregate demand, however, is not deficient. In fact it is expanding quite rapidly, and with the sterling exchange rate index some 20% lower than before the financial crisis, this should give plenty of opportunity for UK exporters.
Yet expanding UK aggregate demand is proving difficult to achieve. Consumers, worried about falling real wages and large debts accumulated in the years of expansion, are reluctant to increase consumption and take on more debts, despite low interest rates. In the light of dampened consumer demand, firms are reluctant to invest. This makes monetary policy particularly ineffective, especially when banks have become more risk averse and wish to hold higher reserves, and indeed are under pressure to do so.
So what can be done? He argues that there is “some scope for more demand to boost output, particularly if the stimulus is targeted on supply bottlenecks such as infrastructure and skills.” In other words, he advocates policies that will simultaneously increase both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Monetary policy, involving negative real interest rates and quantitative easing, has helped to prevent a larger fall in real aggregate demand and a deeper dive into recession, but the dampened demand for money and the desire by banks to build their reserves has meant a massive fall in the money multiplier. Perhaps monetary policy needs to be more aggressive still (see the blog post, Doves from above), but this may not be sufficient.
Which brings Dr Cable to the political dynamite! He advocates an increase in public investment on infrastructure (schools and colleges, hospitals, road and rail projects and housing, and considers whether this should be financed, not by switching government expenditure away from current spending, but by borrowing more.
Such a strategy does not undermine the central objective of reducing the structural deficit, and may assist it by reviving growth. It may complicate the secondary objective of reducing government debt relative to GDP because it entails more state borrowing; but in a weak economy, more public investment increases the numerator and the denominator.
He raises the question of whether the balance of risks has changed: away from the risk of increased short-term borrowing causing a collapse of confidence to the risk of lack of growth causing a deterioration in public finances and this causing a fall in confidence. As we saw in the blog post Moody Blues, the lack of growth has already caused one ratings agency (Moody’s) to downgrade the UK’s credit rating. The other two major agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch may well follow suit.
The day after Dr Cable’s article was published, David Cameron gave a speech saying that the government would stick to its plan of deficit reduction. Not surprisingly commentators interpreted this as a split in the Coalition. Carefully argued economics from Dr Cable it might have been, but political analysts have seen it as a hand grenade, as you will see from some of the articles below.
When the facts change, should I change my mind? New Statesman, Vince Cable (6/3/13)
Keynes would be on our side New Statesman, Vince Cable (12/1/11)
Exclusive: Vince Cable calls on Osborne to change direction New Statesman, George Eaton (67/3/13)
Vince Cable: Borrowing may not be as bad as slow growth BBC News (7/3/13)
Vince Cable makes direct challenge to Cameron over economic programme The Guardian, Nicholas Watt (7/3/13)
Vince Cable Says George Osborne Must Change Course And Borrow More To Revive Growth Huffington Post, Ned Simons (6/3/13)
David Cameron and Vince Cable at war over route to recovery Independent, Andrew Grice (6/3/13)
Vince Cable: Borrowing may not be as bad as slow growth BBC News, James Landale (6/3/13)
David Cameron: We will hold firm on economy BBC News (7/3/13)
David Cameron: We will hold firm on economy BBC News (7/3/13)
Clegg Backs Cable Over Controversial Economy Comments LBC Radio, Nick Clegg (7/3/13)
It’s plain what George Osborne needs to do – so just get on and do it The Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (6/3/13)
Vince Cable’s plan B: a “matter of judgement” BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (7/3/13)
George Osborne needs to turn on the spending taps The Guardian, Phillip Inman (12/3/13)
Questions
- Why has monetary policy proved ineffective in achieving a rapid recovery from recession?
- Distinguish between discretionary fiscal policy and automatic fiscal stabilisers.
- Why has the existence of automatic fiscal stabilisers meant that the public-sector deficit has been difficult to bring down?
- In what ways has the balance of risks in using discretionary fiscal policy changed over the past three years?
- In what ways is the depression of the late 2000s/early 2010s (a) similar to and (b) different from the Great Depression of the early 1930s?
- In what ways is the structure of public-sector debt in the UK different from that in many countries in the eurozone? Why does this give the government more scope for expansionary fiscal policy?
- Why does the Office of Budget Responsibility’s estimates of the tax and government expenditure multipliers suggest that “if fiscal policy is to work in a Keynesian manner, it needs to be targeted carefully, concentrating on capital projects”?
- Why did Keynes argue that monetary policy is ineffective at the zero bound (to use Dr Cable’s terminology)? Are we currently at the zero bound? If so what can be done?
- Has fiscal tightening more than offset loose monetary policy?
The UK economy shrank by 0.3 per cent in the final quarter of 2012. A significant factor in the fall was the UK’s balance of trade, which measures the difference between the value of goods and services exported and those imported. The balance of trade deficit rose in 2012 to £36.2 billion or 2.3 per cent of GDP. If we measure only the balance in goods, the deficit was an eye-watering £106.3 billion – a record high for the UK. The balance of trade remains a drag on British growth.
