Category: Essential Economics for Business 7e and 6e

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The growth of autarky: is globalisation dead?

Over the decades, economies have become increasingly interdependent. This process of globalisation has involved a growth in international trade, the spread of technology, integrated financial markets and international migration.

When the global economy is growing, globalisation spreads the benefits around the world. However, when there are economic problems in one part of the world, this can spread like a contagion to other parts. This was clearly illustrated by the credit crunch of 2007–8. A crisis that started in the sub-prime market in the USA soon snowballed into a worldwide recession. More recently, the impact of Covid-19 on international supply chains has highlighted the dangers of relying on a highly globalised system of production and distribution. And more recently still, the war in Ukraine has shown the dangers of food and fuel dependency, with rapid rises in prices of basic essentials having a disproportionate effect on low-income countries and people on low incomes in richer countries.

Moves towards autarky

So is the answer for countries to become more self-sufficient – to adopt a policy of greater autarky? Several countries have moved in this direction. The USA under President Trump pursued a much more protectionist agenda than his predecessors. The UK, although seeking new post-Brexit trade relationships, has seen a reduction in trade as new barriers with the EU have reduced UK exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s November 2022 Economic and Fiscal Outlook, Brexit will result in the UK’s trade intensity being 15 per cent lower in the long run than if it had remained in the EU.

Many European countries are seeking to achieve greater energy self-sufficiency, both as a means of reducing reliance on Russian oil and gas, but also in pursuit of a green agenda, where a greater proportion of energy is generated from renewables. More generally, countries and companies are considering how to reduce the risks of relying on complex international supply chains.

Limits to the gains from trade

The gains from international trade stem partly from the law of comparative advantage, which states that greater levels of production can be achieved by countries specialising in and exporting those goods that can be produced at a lower opportunity cost and importing those in which they have a comparative disadvantage. Trade can also lead to the transfer of technology and a downward pressure on costs and prices through greater competition.

But trade can increase dependence on unreliable supply sources. For example, at present, some companies are seeking to reduce their reliance on Taiwanese parts, given worries about possible Chinese actions against Taiwan.

Also, governments have been increasingly willing to support domestic industries with various non-tariff barriers to imports, especially since the 2007–8 financial crisis. Such measures include subsidies, favouring domestic firms in awarding government contracts and using regulations to restrict imports. These protectionist measures are often justified in terms of achieving security of supply. The arguments apply particularly starkly in the case of food. In the light of large price increases in the wake of the Ukraine war, many countries are considering how to increase food self-sufficiency, despite it being more costly.

Also, trade in goods involves negative environmental externalities, as freight transport, whether by sea, air or land, involves emissions and can add to global warming. In 2021, shipping emitted over 830m tonnes of CO2, which represents some 3% of world total CO2 emissions. In 2019 (pre-pandemic), the figure was 800m tonnes. The closer geographically the trading partner, the lower these environmental costs are likely to be.

The problems with a globally interdependent world have led to world trade growing more slowly than world GDP in recent years after decades of trade growth considerably outstripping GDP growth. Trade (imports plus exports) as a percentage of GDP peaked at just over 60% in 2008. In 2019 and 2021 it was just over 56%. This is illustrated in the chart (click here for a PowerPoint). Although trade as a percentage of GDP rose slightly from 2020 to 2021 as economies recovered from the pandemic, it is expected to have fallen back again in 2022 and possibly further in 2023.

But despite this reduction in trade as a percentage of GDP, with de-globalisation likely to continue for some time, the world remains much more interdependent than in the more distant past (as the chart shows). Greater autarky may be seen as desirable by many countries as a response to the greater economic and political risks of the current world, but greater autarky is a long way from complete self-sufficiency. The world is likely to remain highly interdependent for the foreseeable future. Reports of the ‘death of globalisation’ are premature!

Podcasts

Articles

Report

Questions

  1. Explain the law of comparative advantage and demonstrate how trade between two countries can lead to both countries gaining.
  2. What are the main economic problems arising from globalisation?
  3. Is the answer to the problems of globalisation to move towards greater autarky?
  4. Would the expansion/further integration of trading blocs be a means of exploiting the benefits of globalisation while reducing the risks?
  5. Is the role of the US dollar likely to decline over time and, if so, why?
  6. Summarise Karl Polanyi’s arguments in The Great Transformation (see the Daniel W. Drezner article linked below). How well do they apply to the current world situation?
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Digital Markets: Reform of competition laws

The emergence of the digital economy has brought about increased competition across a wide range of products and services. The digital economy has provided businesses with the opportunity to produce new categories of goods and services with the aid of artificial intelligence. This new digital era has also been beneficial for consumers who now have greater choice and access to often higher-quality products at lower prices.

But while the digital revolution has facilitated greater competition, it also presents some challenges for competition law enforcement. Competition agencies continue to intensify their scrutiny of the digital economy as they try to get to grips with both the opportunities and challenges.

The role of regulation

Many agencies are aware that regulatory overreach could have negative effects on the development of digital markets. Therefore, any competition enforcement in this area needs to be evidenced-based.

A number of agencies have commissioned market studies or appointed experts in the digital field to prepare industry reports. While many of these reports and studies have found that existing competition rules generally continue to provide a solid basis for protecting competition in the digital age, there is growing demand for various changes to regulation. The reports have generally noted that the traditional tools for competition analysis may require some adaptation or refinement to address better the specificities of online markets, such as the multisided nature of platforms, network effects, zero-price markets, ‘big data’ and the increased use of algorithms.

Tech giants and online platforms, in particular, have been a focus of recent intervention by competition authorities. Investigations and intervention have related to a range of practices, including self-preferencing in the ranking of search results, the bundling of apps (and other alleged anti-competitive leveraging strategies), the collection, usage and sharing of data, and the setting of access conditions to mobile ecosystems and app stores.

The duration and complexity of these investigations have been met with concerns that competition authorities are not sufficiently equipped to protect competition in fast-moving digital markets. These concerns have been amplified by the growth in size and importance of online platforms, their significant economies of scale and network effects, and the risk that market power in digital markets can become quickly entrenched.

In addition to the commissioned reports, some agencies have established or appointed specialist digital markets units or officers. The aim of such units is to develop expertise and regulation to deal with fast-paced digital markets. In Europe, The Digital Markets Act (DMA) was adopted by the EU in response to these concerns to establish a uniform ex-ante regulatory regime to make digital markets fairer and more competitive, and to prevent a fragmentation of the EU’s internal market.

A recent case concerns Apple. Because of the Digital Markets Act, Apple has been required to allow app store competitors onto its products. This will come into effect in 2024.

UK policy

In the UK, the government has been concerned that ‘the unprecedented concentration of power amongst a small number of digital firms is holding back innovation and growth’. UK competition rules are thus set to change significantly, with the government setting out the framework for an entirely new ‘pro-competition regime’ for digital markets. As it states in the Executive Summary to its proposals for such a regime (see linked UK official publication below):

The size and presence of ‘big’ digital firms is not inherently bad. Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that the particular features of some digital markets can cause them to ‘tip’ in favour of one or two incumbents… This market power can become entrenched, leading to higher prices, barriers to entry for entrepreneurs, less innovation, and less choice and control for consumers.

It has established a new Digital Markets Unit (DMU) within the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). It was launched in ‘shadow form’ in April 2021, pending the introduction of the UK’s new digital regulatory regime. Under the proposals, the new regime will focus on companies that the DMU designates as having ‘strategic market status’.

The government is expected to publish its much-awaited Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill, which, according to legal experts, will represent the most significant reform of UK competition and consumer protection laws in years.

It is expected that the Bill will result in important reforms for competition law, but it is also expected to give the DMU powers to enforce a new regulatory regime. This new regime will apply to UK digital firms that have ‘strategic market status’ (SMS). This will be similar to the EU’s Digital Markets Act in how it applies to certain ‘gatekeeper’ digital firms. However, the UK regulations are intended to be more nuanced than the EU regime in terms of how SMS firms are designated and the specific obligations they will have to comply with.

A report by MPs on the influential Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee published in October, urged the Government to publish a draft Digital Markets Bill that would help deter predatory practices by big tech firms ‘without delay’.

On 17th November 2022, the UK Government announced in its Autumn Statement 2022 that it will bring forward the Bill in the third Parliamentary session. There has been no specific date announced yet for the first reading of the Bill, but it will probably be in Spring 2023. Current expectations are that the new DMU regime and reforms to competition and consumer protection laws could be effective as early as October 2023.

Proposals for the Bill were trailed by the Government in the Queen’s Speech. It announced measures that would empower the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) Digital Markets Unit (DMU) to rein in abusive tech giants by dropping the turnover threshold for immunity from financial penalties from £50 million to £20 million and hiking potential maximum fines to 10% of global annual income. Jeremy Hunt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said that the Bill, once enacted, would ‘tackle anti-competitive practice in digital markets’ and provide consumers with higher quality products and greater choice. The strategy includes tailored codes of conduct for certain digital companies and a bespoke merger control regime for designated firms.

The Bill is also expected to include a wide range of reforms to the competition and consumer law regimes in the UK, in particular:

  • wide-ranging changes to the CMA’s Competition Act 1998 and market study/investigation powers, including significant penalties for non-compliance with market investigation orders;
  • significant strengthening of the consumer law enforcement regime by enabling the CMA directly to enforce consumer law through the imposition of fines;
  • changes to UK consumer laws to tackle subscription traps and fake reviews and to enhance protections for savings schemes.

Competition law expert Alan Davis of Pinsent Masons said:

Importantly, the Bill will bring about major reforms to consumer protection law, substantially strengthening the CMA’s enforcement powers to mirror those it already uses in antitrust cases, as well as important changes to merger control and competition rules.

It is anticipated that the Bill will announce the most significant reforms of UK competition and consumer protection laws in years and is expected to have an impact on all business in the UK to varying degrees. It is advised, therefore, that businesses need to review their approach to sales and marketing given the expected new powers of the CMA to impose significant fines in relation to consumer law breaches.

Conclusions

Technological innovation is largely pro-competitive. However, competition rules must be flexible and robust enough to deal with the challenges of the online world. A globally co-ordinated approach to the challenges raised in competition law by the digital age remains important wherever possible. Under the EU’s Digital Markets Act, firms that are designated as gatekeepers, and those defined as having strategic market status under the UK regime, will be required to undertake significant work to ensure compliance with the new rules.

Articles

UK official publications

Questions

  1. For what reasons may digital markets be more competitive than traditional ones?
  2. What types of anti-competitive behaviour are likely in digital markets?
  3. Explain what are meant by ‘network economies’? What are their implications for competition and market power?
  4. Explain what is meant by ‘bundling’? How is this likely to occur in digital markets?
  5. Give some examples where traditional markets are combined with online ones. Does this make it difficult to pursue an effective competition policy?
  6. Give some examples of ways in which firms can mislead or otherwise take advantage of consumers in an e-commerce environment.
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The costs of Brexit: a clearer picture

At the time of the 2016 referendum, the clear consensus among economists was that Brexit would impose net economic costs on the UK economy. The size of these costs would depend on the nature of post-Brexit trading relations with the EU. The fewer the new barriers to trade and the closer the alignment with the EU single market, the lower these costs would be.

The Brexit deal in the form of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (see also) applied provisionally from January 2021, after the end of the transition period, and came into force in May 2021. Although this is a free-trade deal in the sense that goods made largely in the UK or EU can be traded tariff-free between the two, the deal does not apply to services (e.g. financial services) or to goods where components made outside the UK or EU account for more than a certain percentage (the ‘rules of origin‘ condition). Also there has been a huge increase in documentation that must be completed to export to or import from the EU.

Even though the nature of the Brexit deal has been clear since it was signed in December 2020, assessing the impact of the extra barriers to trade it has created has been hard given the various shocks that have had a severe impact on the UK (and global) economy. First COVID-19 and the associated lockdowns had a direct effect on output and trade; second the longer-term international supply-chain disruptions have extended the COVID costs beyond the initial lockdowns and acted as a brake on recovery and growth; third the Russian invasion of Ukraine imposed a severe shock to energy and food markets; fourth these factors have created not just a supply shock but also an inflationary shock, which has resulted in central banks seeking to dampen demand by significantly raising interest rates. One worry among analysts was that the negative effects of such shocks might be greater on the UK economy than on other countries.

However, the negative effects of Brexit are now becoming clearer and various institutions have attempted to quantify the costs. These costs are largely in terms of lower GDP than otherwise. This results from:

  • reduced levels of trade with the EU, thereby reducing the gains from exploiting comparative advantage;
  • increased costs of trade with the EU;
  • disruptions to supply chains;
  • reduced competition from European firms, with many no longer exporting to the UK because of the costs;
  • reduced inward investment;
  • labour market shortages, particularly in certain areas such a hospitality, construction, social care and agriculture as many European workers have left the UK and fewer come;
  • a reduction in productivity.

Here is a summary of the findings of different organisations.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)

The OBR has argued that Brexit as negotiated in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement:

will reduce long-run productivity by 4 per cent relative to remaining in the EU. This largely reflects our view that the increase in non-tariff barriers on UK-EU trade acts as an additional impediment to the exploitation of comparative advantage.21

In addition the OBR estimates that:

Both exports and imports will be around 15 per cent lower in the long run than if the UK had remained in the EU.21

Recent evidence supports this. According to the OBR:

UK and aggregate advanced economy goods export volumes fell by around 20 per cent during the initial wave of the pandemic in 2020. But by the fourth quarter of 2021 total advanced economy trade volumes had rebounded to 3 per cent above their pre-pandemic levels while UK exports remain around 12 per cent below.22

This assumption was repeated in the November 2022 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (p.26) 23. What is more, new trade deals will make little difference, either because they are a roll-over from previous EU trade deals with the respective country or have only a very small effect (e.g. the trade deal with Australia).

The Bank of England

The Bank of England, ever since the referendum in 2016, has forecast that Brexit would damage trade, productivity and GDP growth. In recent evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee5, Andrew Bailey, the Governor, stated that previous work by the Bank concluded that Brexit would reduce productivity by a bit over 3% and that this was still the Bank’s view.

His colleague, Dr Swati Dhingra, stated that, because of Brexit, there was a ‘much bigger slowdown in trade in the UK compared to the rest of the world’. She continued:

The simple way of thinking about what Brexit has done to the economy is that in the period after the referendum, the biggest depreciation that any of the world’s four major economies have seen overnight contributed to increasing prices [and] reduced wages. …We think that number is about 2.6% below the trend that real wages would have been on. Soon afterwards and before the TCA happened came the effects of the uncertainty that was unleashed, which basically translates into reduced business investment and less certainty of the FDI effects. Those tend to be very long-pay things.

She continued that now we are seeing significantly reduced trade directly as a result of the Brexit trade agreement (TCA).

Her colleague, Dr Catherine Mann, argued that ‘the small firms are the ones that are the most damaged, because the cost of the paperwork and so forth is a barrier’. This does not only affect UK firms exporting to the EU but also EU firms exporting to the UK. Reduced imports from EU firms reduces competition in the UK, which tends to lead to higher prices.

The Institute for Fiscal Studies

The IFS has consistently argued that Brexit, because of increased trade barriers with the EU, has reduced UK trade, productivity and GDP. In a recent interview6, its Director, Paul Johnson, stated that ‘Brexit, without doubt, has made us poorer than we would otherwise have been’. That, plus other convulsions, such as the mini-Budget of October 2022, have reduced foreigners’ confidence in the UK, with the result that investment in the UK and trade with the rest of the world have fallen.

Resolution Foundation

In a major Resolution Foundation report24, the authors argued that the effects of Brexit will take time to materialise fully and will occur in three distinct phases. First, in anticipation of permanent effects, the referendum caused sterling to depreciate and this adversely affected household incomes. What is more, the uncertainty about the future caused business investment to fall (but not inward FDI). Second, the Trade and Cooperation Act, by introducing trade barriers, reduced UK trade with the EU. But trade with the rest of the world also fell suggesting that Brexit is impacting UK trade openness and competitiveness more broadly. Third, there will be structural changes to the UK economy over the long-term which will adversely affect economic growth:

A less-open UK will mean a poorer and less productive one by the end of the decade, with real wages expected to fall by 1.8 per cent, a loss of £470 per worker a year, and labour productivity by 1.3 per cent, as a result of the long-run changes to trade under the TCA. This would be equivalent to losing more than a quarter of the last decade’s productivity growth.

Nuffield Trust

One of the key effects of Brexit has been on the labour market and especially on sectors, such as hospitality, agriculture, construction, health and social care. These sectors are experiencing labour shortages, in part due to EU nationals leaving the UK. In 2021, the Nuffield Trust looked at the supply of workers in health and social care25 and found that, as a result of increased bureaucratic hurdles, the number of EU/EFTA-trained nurses had declined since 2016. In social care, new immigration rules have made it virtually impossible to recruit from the EU. A more recent report looked at the recruitment of doctors in four specific specialties.26 In each case, although the number recruited from the EU/EFTA was still increasing, the rate of increase had slowed significantly. The reason appeared to be Brexit not COVID-19.

Ivalua

Research by Coleman Parkes for Ivalua18 shows that 80% of firms found Brexit to have been the biggest cause of supply-chain disruptions in the 12 months to August 2022, with 83% fearing the biggest disruptions from Brexit are yet to come. Brexit was found to have had a bigger effect on supply chains than the war in Ukraine, rising energy costs and COVID-19.

Centre for European Reform

Modelling conducted by John Springford27 used a ‘doppelgängers’ method to show the effects of Brexit on the UK economy. Each doppelgänger is ‘a basket of countries whose economic performance closely matches the UK’s before the Brexit referendum and the end of the transition period’. Comparing the UK’s performance with the doppelgänger can show the difference between leaving and not leaving the UK. Doppelgängers were estimated for GDP, investment (gross fixed capital formation), total services trade (exports plus imports) and total goods trade (ditto).

The results are sobering. In the final quarter of 2021, UK GDP is 5.2 per cent smaller than the modelled, doppelgänger UK; investment is 13.7 per cent lower; and goods trade, 13.6 per cent lower.

Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) (Ireland)

Similar results for UK trade have been obtained by Janez Kren and Martina Lawless in research conducted for the ESRI.28 They used product-level trade flows between the EU and all other countries in the world as a comparison group. This showed a 16% reduction in UK exports to the EU and a 20% reduction in UK imports from the EU relative to the scenario in which Brexit had not occurred.

British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) survey

According to a BCC survey of 1168 businesses33, 92% of which are SMEs, more than three quarters (77%) for which the Brexit deal is applicable say it is not helping them increase sales or grow their business and 56% say they have difficulties in adapting to the new rules for trading goods. The survey shows that UK firms are facing significant challenges in trying to trade with EU countries under the terms of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. What is more, 80% of firms had seen the cost of importing increase; 53% had seen their sales margins decrease; and almost 70% of manufacturers had experienced shortages of goods and services from the EU.

Academic studies

Research at the Centre for Business Prosperity, Aston University, by Jun Du, Emine Beyza Satoglu and Oleksandr Shepotylo20, 29 found that UK exports to the EU ‘fell by an average of 22.9% in the first 15 months after the introduction of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement’. The negative effect on UK exports persisted and deepened from January 2021 to March 2022. The research involved comparing actual trade with an ‘alternative UK economy’ model based on the UK having remained in the EU. What is more, the researchers found that there had been a reduction of 42% in the number of product varieties exported to the EU, with a large number of exporters simply ceasing to export to the EU and with many of the remaining exporters streamlining their product ranges.

Research at the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance by Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Richard Davies and Josh De Lyon31 found that leaving the EU added an average of £210 to UK household food bills over the two years to the end of 2021. This amounted to a total cost to consumers of £5.8 billion. This confirmed the findings of previous research30 that the increase in UK-EU trade barriers led to food prices in the UK being 6% higher than they would have been.

Finally, a report from the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford32 examined the effects of the ending of the free movement of labour from the EU to the UK. Visas are now required, but ‘low-wage occupations that used to rely heavily on EU workers are now ineligible for work visas, with some limited exceptions for social care and seasonal workers’. Many industries are facing labour shortages. Reasons include other factors, such as low pay and unattractive working conditions, and workers leaving the workforce during the pandemic and afterwards. But the end of free movement appears to have exacerbated these existing problems.

References

    Videos

  1. The Brexit effect: how leaving the EU hit the UK

    2. Financial Times film (18/10/22)

  2. What impact is Brexit having on the UK economy?

    3. Brexit and the UK economy, Ros Atkins (29/10/22)

  3. Why Brexit is damaging the UK economy both now and in the future

    4. Economics Help on YouTube, Tejvan Pettinger (5/12/22)

  4. Why the Costs of Brexit keep growing for the UK economy

    5. Economics Help on YouTube, Tejvan Pettinger (17/10/22)

  5. Treasury Committee (see also)

    6. Parliament TV (25/11/22) (see 15:03:00 to 15:08:12) (Click here for a transcript: see Q637 to Q641)

  6. UK economy made worse by ‘own goals’ like Brexit and Truss mini-budget, IFS economist says

    7. Sky News, Paul Johnson (IFS) (18/11/22)

    Articles

  7. Brexit and the economy: the hit has been ‘substantially negative’

    8. Financial Times, Chris Giles (30/11/22)

  8. ‘What have we done?’: six years on, UK counts the cost of Brexit

    9. The Observer, Toby Helm, Robin McKie, James Tapper & Phillip Inman (25/6/22)

  9. Brexit did hurt the City’s exports – the numbers don’t lie

    10. Financial News, David Wighton (9/11/22)

  10. Brits are starting to think again about Brexit as the economy slides into recession

    11. CNBC, Elliot Smith (23/11/22)

  11. Brexit has cracked Britain’s economic foundations

    12. CNN, Hanna Ziady (24/12/22)

  12. Mark Carney: ‘Doubling down on inequality was a surprising choice’

    13. Financial Times, Edward Luce (14/10/22)

  13. Brexit: Progress on trade deals slower than promised

    14. BBC News, Ione Wells & Brian Wheeler (2/12/22)

  14. How Brexit costs this retailer £1m a month in sales

    15. BusinessLive, Tom Pegden (22/11/22)

  15. Brexit Is Hurting The UK Economy, Bank Of England Official Says

    16. HuffPost, Graeme Demianyk (16/11/22)

  16. Brexit and drop in workforce harming economic recovery, says Bank governor

    17. The Guardian, Richard Partington (16/11/22)

  17. Brexit a major cause of UK’s return to austerity, says senior economist

    18. The Guardian, Anna Isaac (14/11/22)

  18. 80% of UK businesses say Brexit caused the biggest supply chain disruption in the last 12 months

    19. Ivalua (28/11/22)

  19. Brexit added £210 to household food bills, new research finds

    20. Sky News, Faye Brown (1/12/22)

  20. Brexit changes caused 22.9% slump in UK-EU exports into Q1 2022 – research

    21. Expertfile (8/12/22)

    Research and analysis

  21. Brexit analysis

    22. OBR (26/5/22)

  22. The latest evidence on the impact of Brexit on UK trade

    23. OBR (March 2022)

  23. Economic and fiscal outlook – November 2022 (PDF)

    24. OBR (17/11/22)

  24. The Big Brexit (PDF)

    25. Resolution Foundation, Swati Dhingra, Emily Fry, Sophie Hale & Ningyuan Jia (June 2022)

  25. Going it alone: health and Brexit in the UK

    26. Nuffield Trust, Mark Dayan, Martha McCarey, Tamara Hervey, Nick Fahy, Scott L Greer, Holly Jarman, Ellen Stewart and Dan Bristow (20/12/21)

  26. Has Brexit affected the UK’s medical workforce?

    27. Nuffield Trust, Martha McCarey and Mark Dayan (27/11/22)

  27. What can we know about the cost of Brexit so far?

    28. Centre for European Reform, John Springford (9/6/22)

  28. Brexit reduced overall EU-UK goods trade flows by almost one-fifth

    29. Economic and Social Research Institute (Ireland), Janez Kren and Martina Lawless (19/10/22)

  29. Post-Brexit UK Trade – An Update (PDF)

    30. Centre for Business Prosperity, Aston University, Jun Du, Emine Beyza Satoglu and Oleksandr Shepotylo (November 2022)

  30. Post-Brexit imports, supply chains, and the effect on consumer prices (PDF)

    31. UK in a Changing Europe, Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh De Lyon, Luisa Opitz and Dilan Yang (25/4/22)

  31. Non-tariff barriers and consumer prices: evidence from Brexit

    32. Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Richard Davies and Josh De Lyon (December 2022)

  32. How is the End of Free Movement Affecting the Low-wage Labour Force in the UK?

    33. Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, Madeleine Sumption, Chris Forde, Gabriella Alberti and Peter William Walsh (15/8/22)

  33. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Two Years On – Proposals For Reform by UK Business

    34. British Chambers of Commerce (21/12/22)

  34. The Detriments of Brexit

    35. Yorkshire Bylines (June 2022) (see also)

Questions

  1. Summarise the negative effects of Brexit on the UK economy.
  2. Why is it difficult to quantify these effects?
  3. Explain the ‘doppelgängers’ method of estimating the costs of Brexit? How reliable is this method likely to be?
  4. How have UK firms attempted to reduce the costs of exporting to the EU?
  5. Is Brexit the sole cause of a shortage of labour in many sectors in the UK?
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The UK Autumn Statement 2022

The Autumn Statement was announced by Jeremy Hunt in Parliament on Thursday 17th November. This was Hunt’s first big speech since becoming Chancellor or the Exchequer a few weeks ago. He revealed to the House of Commons that there will be tax rises and spending cuts worth billions of pounds, aimed at mending the nation’s finances. It is hoped that the new plans will restore market confidence shaken by his predecessor’s mini-Budget. He claimed that the mixture of tax rises and spending cuts would be distributed fairly.

What is the Autumn statement?

The March Budget is the government’s main financial plan, where it decides how much money people will be taxed and where that money will be spent. The Autumn Statement is like a second Budget. This is an update half a year later on how things are going. However, that doesn’t mean it is not as important. This year’s Autumn Statement is especially important given the number of changes in government in recent months. The Statement unfortunately comes at a time when the cost of living is rising at its fastest rate for 41 years, meaning that it is going to be a tough winter for many people.

Statement overview

It was expected that the Statement was not going to be one to celebrate, given that the UK is now believed to be in a recession. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) forecasts that the UK economy will shrink by 1.4% next year. However, Hunt said that his focus was on stability and ensuring a shallower downturn. The Chancellor outlined his ‘plan for stability’ by announcing deep spending cuts and tax rises in the autumn statement. He said that half of his £55bn plan would come from tax rises, and the rest from spending cuts.

The Chancellor plans to tackle rising prices and restore the UK’s credibility with international markets. He said that it will be a balanced path to stability, with the need to tackle inflation to bring down the cost of living while also supporting the economy on a path to sustainable growth. It will mean further concerns for many, but the Chancellor argued that the most vulnerable in society are being protected. He stated that despite difficult decisions being made, the plan was fair.

What was announced?

The government’s overall strategy appears to assume that, by tightening fiscal policy, monetary policy will not have to tighten as much. The hopeful consequence of which is that interest rates will be lower than they otherwise would have been. This means interest-rate sensitive parts of the economy, the housing sector in particular, are more protected than it would have been.

The following are some of the key measures announced:

  • Tax thresholds will be frozen until April 2028, meaning millions will pay more tax as their nominal incomes rise.
  • Spending on public services in England will rise more slowly than planned – with some departments facing cuts after the next election.
  • The state pensions triple lock will be kept, meaning pensioners will see a 10.1% rise in weekly payments.
  • The household energy price cap per unit of gas and electricity has been extended for one year beyond April but made less generous, with typical bills then being £3000 a year instead of £2500.
  • There will be additional cost-of-living payments for the ‘most vulnerable’, with £900 for those on benefits, and £300 for pensioners.
  • The top 45% additional rate of income tax will be paid on earnings over £125 140 instead of £150 000.
  • The UK minimum wage (or ‘National Living Wage’ as the government calls it) for people over 23 will increase from £9.50 to £10.42 per hour.
  • The windfall tax on oil and gas firms will increase from 25% to 35%, raising £55bn over the period from now until 2028.

The public finances

A key feature of the Autumn Statement was the Chancellor’s attempt to tackle the deteriorating public finances and to reduce the public-sector deficit and debt. The following three charts are based on data from the OBR (see data links below). They all show data for financial years beginning in the year shown. They all include OBR forecasts up to 2025/26, with the forecasts being based on the measures announced in the Autumn Statement.

Figure 1 shows public-sector current expenditure and receipts and the balance between them, giving the current deficit (or surplus), shown by the green bars. Current expenditure excludes capital expenditure on things such as hospitals, schools and roads. Since 1973, there has been a current deficit in most years. However, the deficit of 11.5% of GDP in 2020/21 was exceptional given government support measures for households and business during the pandemic. The deficit fell to 3.3% in 2021/22, but is forecast to grow to 4.6% in 2022/23 thanks to government subsidies to energy suppliers to allow energy prices to be capped. (Click here for a PowerPoint of this chart.)

Figure 2 shows public-sector expenditure (current plus capital) from 1950. You can see the spike after the financial crisis of 2007–8 when the government introduced various measures to support the banking system. You can also see the bigger spike in 2020/21 when pandemic support measures saw government expenditure rise to a record 53.0% of GDP. It has risen again this financial year to a predicted to 47.3% of GDP from 44.7% last financial year. It is forecast to fall only slightly, to 47.2%, in 2023/24, before then falling more substantially as the tax rises and spending cuts announced in the Autumn Statement start to take effect. (Click here for a PowerPoint of this chart.)

Figure 3 shows public-sector debt since 1975. COVID support measures, capping energy prices and a slow growing or falling GDP have contributed to a rise in debt as a proportion of GDP since 2020/21. Debt is forecast to peak in 2023/24 at a record 106.7% of GDP. During the 20 years from 1988/89 to 2007/8 it averaged just 30.9% of GDP. After the financial crisis of 2007–8 it rose to 81.6% by 2014/15 and then averaged 82.2% between 2014/15 and 2019/20. (Click here for a PowerPoint of this chart.)

Criticism

The government has been keen to stress that Mr Hunt’s statement does not amount to a return to the austerity policies of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, in office between 2010 and 2015. However, Labour Shadow Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, said Mr Hunt’s Autumn Statement was an ‘invoice for the economic carnage’ the Conservative government had created. There have also been some comments raised by economists questioning the need for spending cuts and tax rises on this scale, with some saying that the decisions being made are political.

Paul Johnson, the director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies has commented on the plans, stating that the British people ‘just got a lot poorer’ after a series of ‘economic own goals’ that have made a recovery much harder than it might have been. He went on to say that the government was ‘reaping the costs of a long-term failure to grow the economy’, along with an ageing population and high levels of historic borrowing.

Disapproval also came from Conservative MP, Jacob Rees-Mogg, who criticised the government’s tax increases. He raised concerns about the government’s plans to increase taxation when the economy is entering a recession. He said, ’You would normally expect there to be some fiscal support for an economy in recession.’

Economic Outlook

High inflation and rising interest rates will lead to consumers spending less, tipping the UK’s economy into a recession, which the OBR expects to last for just over a year. Its forecasts show that the economy will grow by 4.2% this year but will shrink by 1.4% in 2023, before growth slowly picks up again. GDP should then rise by 1.3% in 2024, 2.6% in 2025 and 2.7% in 2026.

The OBR predicts that there will be 3.2 million more people paying income tax between 2021/22 and 2027/28 as a result of the new tax policy and many more paying higher taxes as a proportion of their income. This is because they will be dragged into higher tax bands as thresholds and allowances on income tax, national insurance and inheritance tax have been frozen until 2028. Government documents said these decisions on personal taxes would raise an additional £3.5bn by 2028 – the consequence of ‘fiscal drag’ pulling more Britons into higher tax brackets. The OBR expects that there will be an extra 2.6 million paying tax at the higher, 40% rate. This is going to put more pressure on households who are already feeling the impact of inflation on their disposable income.

However, this pressure on incomes is set to continue, with real incomes falling by the largest amount since records began in 1956. Real household incomes are forecast to fall by 7% in the next few years, which even after the support from the government, is the equivalent of £1700 per year on average. And the number unemployed is expected to rise by more than 500 000. Senior research economist at the IFS, Xiaowei Xu, described the UK as heading for another lost decade of income growth.

There may be some good news for inflation, with suggestions that it has now peaked. The OBR forecasts that the inflation rate will drop to 7.4% next year. This is still a concern, however, given that the target set for inflation is 2%. Despite the inflation rate potentially peaking, the impact on households has not. The fall in the inflation rate does not mean that prices in the shops will be going down. It just means that they will be going up more slowly than now. The OBR expects that prices will not start to fall (inflation becoming negative) until late 2024.

Conclusion

The overall tone of the government’s announcements was no surprise and policies were largely expected by the markets, hence their muted response. However, this did not make them any less economically painful. There are major concerns for households over what they now face over the next few years, something that the government has not denied.

It has been suggested that this situation, however, has been made worse by historic choices, including cutting state capital spending, cuts in the budget for vocational education, Brexit and Kwasi Kwarteng’s mini-Budget. It is evident that Britons have a tough time ahead in the next year or so. The UK has already had one lost decade of flatlining living standards since the global financial crisis and is now heading for another one with the cost of living crisis.

Articles

Videos

Analysis

  • Autumn Statement 2022 response

    • Institute for Fiscal Studies, Stuart Adam, Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson, Robert Joyce, Heidi Karjalainen, Peter Levell, Isabel Stockton, Tom Waters, Thomas Wernham, Xiaowei Xu and Ben Zaranko (17/11/22)

  • Help today, squeeze tomorrow: Putting the 2022 Autumn Statement in context

    • Resolution Foundation, Torsten Bell, Mike Brewer, Molly Broome, Nye Cominetti, Adam Corlett, Emily Fry, Sophie Hale, Karl Handscomb, Jack Leslie, Jonathan Marshall, Charlie McCurdy, Krishan Shah, James Smith,
    Gregory Thwaites & Lalitha Try (18/11/22)

Government documentation

Data

Questions

  1. What do you understand by the term ‘fiscal drag’?
  2. Provide a critique of the Autumn Statement from the left.
  3. Provide a critique of the Autumn Statement from the right.
  4. What are the concerns about raising taxation during a recession?
  5. Define the term ‘windfall tax’. What are the advantages and disadvantages of imposing/increasing windfall taxes on energy producers in the current situation?
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Interest rates and the impending recession

On 3 November, the Bank of England announced the highest interest rate rise in 33 years. It warned that the UK is facing the longest recession since records began. With the downturn starting earlier than expected and predicted to last for longer, households, businesses and the government are braced for a challenging few years ahead.

Interest rates

The Monetary Policy Committee increased Bank Rate to 3% from the previous rate of 2.25%. This 75-basis point increase is the largest since 1989 and is the eighth rise since December. What is more, the Bank has warned that it will not stop there. These increases in interest rates are there to try to tackle inflation, which rose to 10.1% in September and is expected to be 11% for the final quarter of this year. Soaring prices are a growing concern for UK households, with the cost of living rising at the fastest rate for 40 years. It is feared that such increases in the Bank’s base rate will only worsen household circumstances.

There are various causes of the current cost-of-living crisis. These include the pandemic’s effect on production, the aftermath in terms of supply-chain problems and labour shortages, the war in Ukraine and its effect on energy and food prices, and poor harvests in many parts of the world, including many European countries. It has been reported that grocery prices in October were 4.7% higher than in October 2021. This is the highest rate of food price inflation on record and means shoppers could face paying an extra £682 per year on average.

There is real concern about the impact of the interest rates rise on the overall economy but, in particular, on peoples’ mortgages. Bank of England Governor, Andrew Bailey, warned of a ‘tough road ahead’ for UK households, but said that the MPC had to act forcefully now or things ‘will be worse later on’.

However, it could be argued that there was a silver lining in Thursday’s announcement. The future rises in interest rates are predicted to peak at a lower rate than previously thought. Amongst all the mini-budget chaos, there was concern that rates could surpass the 6% mark. Now the Bank of England has given the assurance that future rate rises will be limited and that Bank Rate should not increase beyond 5% by next autumn. The Bank was keen to reassure markets of this by making clear the thinking behind the decision in the published minutes of MPC meeting.

Recession

With the Bank warning of the longest recession since records began, what does this actually mean? Economies experience periods of growth and periods of slowdown or even decline in real GDP. However, a recession is defined as when a country’s economy shrinks for two three-month periods (quarters) in a row. The last time the UK experienced a recession was in 2020 during the height of the pandemic. During a recession, businesses typically make less profits, pay falls, some people may lose their jobs and unemployment rises. This means that the government receives less money in taxation to use on public services such as health and education. Graduates and school leavers could find it harder to get their first job, while others may find it harder to be promoted or to get big enough pay rises to keep pace with price increases. However, the pain of a recession is typically not felt equally across society, and inequality can increase.

The Bank had previously expected the UK to fall into recession at the end of this year but the latest data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) show that GDP fell by 0.3% in the three months to August. The Bank is predicting that GDP will shrink by 0.5% between May and August 2023, followed by a further fall of 0.3% between September and December. The Bank then expects the UK economy to remain in recession throughout 2023 and the first half of 2024.

With the higher interest rates, borrowing costs are now at their highest since 2008, when the UK banking system faced collapse in the wake of the global financial crisis. The Bank believes that by raising interest rates it will make it more expensive to borrow and encourage people not to spend money, easing the pressure on prices in the process. It does, however, mean that savers will start to benefit from higher rates (but still negative real rates), but it will have a knock-on effect on those with mortgages, credit card debt and bank loans.

The recession in 2020 only lasted for six months, although the 20.4% reduction in the UK economy between April and June that year was the largest on record. The one before that started in 2008 with the global financial crisis and went on for five quarters. Whilst it will not be the UK’s deepest downturn, the Bank stressed that it will be the longest since records began in the 1920s.

Mortgages

Those with mortgages are rightly feeling nervous about the impact that further increases in mortgage interest rates will have on their budgets. Variable mortgage rates and new fixed rates have been rising for several months because of this year’s run of rate rises but they shot up after the mini-Budget. The Bank forecasts that if interest rates continue to rise, those whose fixed rate deals are coming to an end could see their annual payments soar by an average of £3000.

Homebuyers with tracker or variable rate mortgages will feel the pain of the rate rise immediately, while the estimated 300 000 people who must re-mortgage this month will find that two-year and five-year fixed rates remain at levels not seen since the 2008 financial crisis. However, the Bank said that the cost of fixed-rate mortgages had already come down from the levels seen at the height of the panic in the wake of Kwasi Kwarteng’s mini-Budget, which sent them soaring above 6%.

There is a fear of the devastating impact on those who simply cannot afford further increases in payments. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) said an extra 120 000 households in the UK, the equivalent of 400 000 people, will be plunged into poverty when their current mortgage deal ends. The analysis assumes that mortgage rates remain high, with homeowners forced to move to an interest rate of around 5.5%. For people currently on fixed rates typically of around of 2% which are due to expire, this change would mean a huge increase. Such people, on average, would find the proportion of their monthly income going on housing costs rising from 38% to 54%. In cash terms this equates to an average increase of £250, from £610 a month to £860 a month.

In addition to these higher monthly home-loan costs threatening to pull another 400 000 people into poverty, such turmoil in the mortgage market would increase competition for rental properties and could result in rents for new lets rising sharply as the extra demand allows buy-to-let landlords to pass on their higher loan costs (or more).

Unemployment

Since the mini-Budget, the level of the pound and government borrowing costs have somewhat recovered. However, mortgage markets and business loans are still showing signs of stress, adding to the prolonged hit to the economy. The Bank now forecasts that the unemployment rate will rise, while household incomes will come down too. The unemployment rate is currently at its lowest for 50 years, but it is expected to rise to nearly 6.5%.

Looking to the future

It is the case that the lasting effects of the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the energy shock have all played their part in the current economic climate. However, it could be argued that the Bank and the government are now making decisions that will inflict further pain and sacrifice for millions of households, who are already facing multi-thousand-pound increases in mortgage, energy and food bills.

There have been further concerns raised about the possible tax rises planned by the Chancellor Jeremy Hunt. If large tax rises and spending cuts are set out in the Autumn Statement of 17 November, the Bank of England’s chief economist has warned that Britain risks a deeper than expected economic slowdown. This could weigh on the British economy by more than the central bank currently anticipates, in a development that would force it to rethink its approach to setting interest rates.

There is no doubt that the future economic picture looks painful, with the UK performing worse than the USA and the eurozone. The Bank Governor, Andrew Bailey, believes that the mini-Budget had damaged the UK’s reputation internationally, stating, ‘it was very apparent to me that the UK’s position and the UK’s standing had been damaged’. However, both the Governor and the Chancellor or the Exchequer agree that action needs to be taken now in order for the economy to stabilise long term.

Jeremey Hunt, the Chancellor, explained that the most important thing the British government can do right now is to restore stability, sort out the public finances and get debt falling so that interest rate rises are kept as low as possible. This echoes the Bank’s belief in the importance of acting forcefully now in order to prevent things being much worse later on. With the recession predicted to last into 2024, the same year as a possible general election, the Conservatives face campaigning to remain in government at the tail end of a prolonged slump.

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Articles

Questions

  1. Define the term ‘recession’ and how is it measured.
  2. Explain what happens to the key macroeconomic indicators during this period of the business cycle.
  3. Which policies would governments normally implement to get a economy into the
  4. expansionary/recovery phase of the business cycle and how do they work?
  5. What is the issue of raising interest rates during a downturn or recession?
  6. With unemployment expected to rise, explain what type of unemployment this is. What policies could be introduced to reduce this type of unemployment?