Category: Economics: Ch 26

In the past few days, the euro has been under immense speculative pressure. The trigger for this has been the growing concern about whether Greece would be able to force through austerity measures and cut its huge deficit and debt. Also there has been the concern that much of Greece’s debt is in the form of relatively short-term bonds, many of which are coming up for maturity and thus have to be replaced by new bonds. For example, on 19 May, Greece needs to repay €8.5 billion of maturing bonds. But with Greek bonds having been given a ‘junk’ status by one of the three global rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s, Greece would find it difficult to raise the finance and would have to pay very high interest on bonds it did manage to sell – all of which would compound the problem of the deficit.

Also there have been deep concerns about a possible domino effect. If Greece’s debt is perceived to be unsustainable at 13.5% of GDP (in 2009), then speculators are likely to turn their attention to other countries in the eurozone with large deficits: countries such as Portugal (9.4%), Ireland (14.3%) and Spain (11.2%). With such worries, people were asking whether the euro would survive without massive international support, both from within and outside the eurozone. At the beginning of 2010, the euro was trading at $1.444. By 7 May, it was trading at $1.265, a depreciation of 12.4% (see the Bank of England’s Statistical Interactive Database – interest & exchange rates data

If the euro were in trouble, then shock waves would go around the world. Worries about such contagion have already been seen in plummeting stock markets. Between 16 April and 7 May, the FTSE100 index in London fell from 5834 to 5045 (a fall of 13.5%). In New York, the Dow Jones index fell by 8.6% over the same period and in Tokyo, the Nikkei fell by 7.6%. By 5 May, these declines were gathering pace as worries mounted.

Crisis talks took place over the weekend of the 8/9 May between European finance ministers and, to the surprise of many, a major package of measures was announced. This involves setting aside €750bn to support the eurozone. The package had two major elements: (a) €60bn from EU funds (to which all 27 EU countries contribute) to be used for loans to eurozone countries in trouble; (b) a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (a ‘Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)’), which would be funded partly by eurozone countries which would provide €440bn and partly by the IMF which would provide a further €250bn. The SPV would be used to give loans or loan guarantees to eurozone countries, such as Greece, which were having difficulty in raising finance because of worries by investors. The effect would also be to support the euro through a return of confidence in the single currency.

In addition to these measures, the European Central Bank announced that it would embark on a ‘Securities Markets Programme’ involving the purchase of government bonds issued by eurozone countries in difficulties. According to the ECB, it would be used to:

.. conduct interventions in the euro area public and private debt securities markets to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments which are dysfunctional. The objective of this programme is to address the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism.

Does this amount to quantitative easing, as conducted by the US Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England? The intention is that it would not do so, as the ECB would remove liquidity from other areas of the market to balance the increased liquidity provided to countries in difficulties. This would be achived by selling securities of stronger eurozone countries, such as Germany and France.

In order to sterilise the impact of the above interventions, specific operations will be conducted to re-absorb the liquidity injected through the Securities Markets Programme. This will ensure that the monetary policy stance will not be affected.

So will the measures solve the problems? Or are they merely a means of buying time while the much tougher problem is addressed: that of getting deficits down?

Webcasts and podcasts
Rescue plan bolsters the euro BBC News, Gavin Hewitt (10/5/10)
The EU rescue plan explained Financial Times, Chris Giles, Emily Cadman, Helen Warrell and Steve Bernard (10/5/10)
Peston: ‘Crisis is not over’ BBC Today Programme (10/5/10)
Greece ‘will get into even more deep water’ BBC Today Programme (11/5/10)

Articles
EU ministers offer 750bn-euro plan to support currency (including video) BBC News (10/5/10)
EU sets up crisis fund to protect euro from market ‘wolves’ Independent, Vanessa Mock (10/5/10)
Euro strikes back with biggest gamble in its 11-year history Guardian, Ian Traynor (10/5/10)
Debt crisis: £645bn rescue package for euro reassures markets … for now Guardian, Ian Traynor (10/5/10)
The E.U.’s $950 Billion Rescue: Just the Beginning Time, Leo Cendrowicz (10/5/10)
Eurozone bail-out (portal) Financial Times
Bailout does not address Europe’s deep-rooted woes: Experts moneycontrol.com (11/5/10)
An ever-closer Union? BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (10/5/10)
Eurozone crisis is ‘postponed’ BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (10/5/10)
Multi-billion euro rescue buys time but no solution BBC News, Lucy Hooker (11/5/10)
No going back The Economist (13/5/10)
It is not Greece that worries EURO: It is China that teeters on a collapse Investing Contrarian, Shaily (11/5/10)

Data and official sources
For deficit and debt data see sections 16.3 and 18.1 in:
Ameco Online European Commision, Economic and Financial Affairs DG
For the ECB statement see:
10 May 2010 – ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets ECB Press Release

Questions

  1. Why should the measures announced by the European finance ministers help to support the euro in the short term?
  2. Why should the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme not result in quantitative easing?
  3. Explain what is meant by sterlisation in the context of open market operations.
  4. What will determine whether the measures are a long-term success?
  5. Explain why there may be a moral hazard in coming to the rescue of ailing economies in the eurozone. How might such a moral hazard be minimised?
  6. Why should concerns about Greece lead to stock market declines around the world?
  7. What is the significance of China in the current context?

On 21st April the IMF published its latest World Economic Outlook. It forecasts that the output of the world economy will grow by 4.2% in 2010, following last year’s 0.6% contraction, and by a further 4.3% in 2011. However, the Foreword to the report identifies considerable economic uncertainties. In particular, it identifies ‘fiscal fragilities’ and, hence, a ‘pressing need’ for fiscal consolidation. But, it also points to the need for policies ‘to buttress lasting financial stability’.

The IMF notes that Europe has come out of the recession slower than other parts of the world. For the EU-27 it is predicting growth of 1.0% this year, following a contraction of 4.1% last year, but with growth remaining at 1% in 2011. The UK is forecast to grow by 1.3% this year, following a contraction of 4.9% last year, and by a further 2.5% in 2011. Therefore, economic growth in the UK is forecast to be stronger than that across the European Union in both 2010 and, in particular, in 2011.

If we look at the expected growth in some of the principal components of the UK’s aggregate demand we see signs of a ‘rebalancing’. Firstly, household spending, which contracted by 3.2% last year is expected to rise by 0.2% in 2010 and by 1.4% in 2011. Secondly, general government current expenditure, which grew by 2.2% last year, is forecast to grow by 1.3% this year but, as the expected fiscal consolidation kicks in, will fall by 1% in 2011. Thirdly, gross fixed capital formation (capital expenditures) which fell by some 14.9% in 2009 is forecast to fall this year by a further 2.6%, before growing by 4.7% in 2011.

Report

World Economic Outlook, April 2010 IMF

Articles

IMF Raises 2010 Growth Outlook, Says Government Debt Poses Risk Bloomberg Businessweek, Sandrine Rastello (22/4/10)
GDP figures: what the experts say Guardian (23/4/10)
IMF cuts UK forecast in blow to Gordon Brown The Telegraph, Angela Monaghan (22/4/10)
IMF maintains U.K. 2010 forecast at 1.3 per cent Bloomberg, Svenja O’Donnell (21/4/10)
Global recovery faster than expected, says IMF BBC News (21/4/10) )
IMF nudges up world GDP view; fiscal fears mount Reuters, Lesley Wroughton and Emily Kaiser (21/4/10)

Data

World Economic Outlook Reports IMF
World Economic Outlook Databases IMF
For macroeconomic data for EU countries and other OECD countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and Korea, see:
AMECO online European Commission

Questions

  1. What economic uncertainties do you think might affect the forecasts of economic growth for both the world and UK economies? Would you expect these uncertainties to be less or more significant in the UK?
  2. What do you understand by the term ‘fiscal consolidation’? Why do you think the IMF are highlighting this as a concern?
  3. Why do you think growth across Europe has been lagging behind other parts of the world? What might explain why growth in the UK is expected to be above that across Europe over the next two years?

’The steepest and longest recession of any developed country since World War II.’ This has been the case for Ireland, which has seen national income fall by 20% since 2007. Many countries across the globe have experienced pretty bad recessions, but what makes Ireland stand out is how it has been dealt with.

In the UK, the government has continued spending in a bid to stimulate the economy and to use Gordon Brown’s phrase from 2008, we have aimed to ‘spend our way out of recession’. Ireland, however, did not have that option. With too much borrowing, Ireland was unable to stimulate the economy and needed to cut its debts in order to maintain its credibility in the eurozone. Last year, significant cuts in government spending were accompanied by tax rises equal to 5% of GDP. Similar action is to be expected in the UK following the election, where popular benefits may have to be reduced, as transfer payments do account for the majority of government spending. Whoever is in government following the election will have some hard decisions to make and everyone will be affected. Read the article below and listen to the interview and think about what the UK can learn from Ireland.

Irish lessons for the UK (including interview) BBC Stephanomics (9/4/10)

Questions

  1. In the interview, Brian Lenihan said that the UK was expecting too much from the falling value of sterling. What was the UK expecting following significant depreciations in the value of sterling and why has that not happened?
  2. What is a deflationary spiral? Why has it caused Ireland’s public debt to rise so much?
  3. Why does Brian Lenihan argue that there are limits to how much taxes can be increased? What are diminishing returns to taxation?
  4. Would the UK be any better off had we joined the euro? What about other countries: would they have benefited had we joined the euro?

The OECD published its latest interim assessment of the world economy on April 7. This showed a world gradually bouncing back from recession, with growing GDP (albeit at variable speeds in different countries), rising industrial production, increasing business confidence, a stabilising of financial markets, an easing of credit conditions and yet continuing low inflation.

The UK is forecast to have an annualised rate of growth of GDP in quarter 2 of 3.1%. This is the second highest of the G7 countries, behind only Canada. This would seem like good news – an economic spring for the UK.

Despite continuing growth in the OECD countries, in most of them recovery is fragile. The OECD thus recommends caution in removing the stimulus measures adopted in most countries and hence caution in embarking on measures to cut public-sector deficits. As the report states:

Despite some encouraging signs on activity, the fragility of the recovery, a frail labour market and possible headwinds coming from financial markets underscore the need for caution in the removal of policy support. Central banks have already begun to rein in the exceptional liquidity stimulus injected during the recession. Further action in this area will need to be guided by financial conditions. The normalisation of policy interest rates should be carried out at a pace that will be contingent on the strength of the recovery in individual countries and the outlook for inflation beyond the near-term projection horizon. As for fiscal policy, the sharp increase in government indebtedness in the OECD area during the downturn calls for ambitious, clearly communicated medium-term consolidation programmes in many countries. Consolidation should start in 2011, or earlier where needed, and progress gradually so as not to undermine the incipient recovery.

The following webcast from the OECD presents the report.

Webcast
Interim Assessment OECD, Pier Carlo Padoan, OECD Chief Economist (7/4/10)

Report
Portal to report and webcast OECD
What is the economic outlook for OECD countries? An interim assessment OECD, Pier Carlo Padoan (7/4/10)

Articles
Economy set to speed up and beat UK’s rivals, says OECD Independent, Sean O’Grady (8/4/10)
Economy poised for rapid expansion Financial Times, Norma Cohen and Daniel Pimlot (8/4/10)
OECD sees slower growth in US, Europe, Japan Sydney Morning Herald (8/4/10)
UK business confidence ‘hits four-year high’ BBC News (12/4/10)
British companies confident of recovery but need investment, BDO warns Telegraph, Angela Monaghan (12/4/10)

Questions

  1. What are the main findings in the report?
  2. What are the policy implications of the findings?
  3. What are the implications of developments in financial markets? What are the possible ‘headwinds’?
  4. What factors could threaten the recovery of the UK economy?

We have all heard about the troubles of Greece, but are things really that bad? It does have huge debts, which is costing about 11.6% of GDP to service; and estimates suggest that government borrowing will need to be €53bn this year to cover budget shortfalls. Furthermore, its situation could spell trouble for the eurozone and in particular for certain countries. However, as the article below discusses, Greece still has some trump cards to play.

Advantage Greece BBC News blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (3/3/10)

Questions

  1. “The single most important factor propping it (Greek debt) up in the past year has been that it can be swapped for free money at the ECB.” How does this prop up Greek debt?
  2. If Greek debt does fall in value, how will other members of the Eurozone be affected?
  3. Why are countries such as France and Germany hostile to a loan to Greece from the IMF?
  4. If Greece was to collapse, which countries do you think could potentially follow? Which factors have influenced your answer?