Should economists have foreseen the credit crunch? A few were warning of an overheated world economy with excessive credit and risk taking. Most economists prior to 2007/8, however, were predicting a continuation of steady economic growth. Inflation targeting, fiscal rules and increasingly flexible markets were the ingredients of this continuing prosperity. And then the crash happened!
So why did so few people see the downturn coming? Were the models used by economists fundamentally flawed, or was it simply a question of poor assumptions or poor data? Do we need a new way of modelling the economy, or is it simply a question of updating theories from the past? Should, for example, models become much more Keynesian? Should we abandon the new classical approach of assuming that markets are essentially good at pricing in risk and that herd behaviour will not be seriously destabilising?
The following podcast looks at these issues. “Aditya Chakrabortty’s joined in the studio by the Guardian’s economics editor Larry Elliott, as well as Roger Bootle, the managing director of Capital Economics, and political economist and John Maynard Keynes biographer Robert Skidelsky. Also in the podcast, we hear from Nobel prize-winning economist, Elinor Ostrom, Freakonomics author Steven Levitt, and UN advisor and developmental economist Daniel Gay.”
The Business: A crisis of economics Guardian podcast (25/11/09)
See also the following news items from the Sloman Economics news site:
Keynes is dead; long live Keynes (3/10/09)
Learning from history (3/10/09)
Macroeconomics – Crisis or what? (6/8/09)
The changing battle grounds of economics (27/7/09)
Repeat of the Great Depression – or learning the lessons from the past? (23/6/09)
Animal spirits (30/4/09)
Keynes – do we need him more than ever? (26/10/08)
Questions
- Why did most economists fail to predict the credit crunch and subsequent recession? Was it a problem with the models that were used or the data that was put into these models, or both?
- What was the Washington consensus? To what extent did this consensus contribute to the current recession?
- What is meant by systemic risk? How does this influence the usefulness of ‘micro’ financial models?
- What particular market failures were responsible for the credit crunch?
- What is meant by ‘rational behaviour’? Is it reasonable to assume that people are rational?
- Is macroeconomics too theoretical or too mathematical (or both)? If you think it is, how can macroeconomics be reformed to improve its explanatory and predictive power?
- Does a ‘really good economist’ need to have a good grounding in a range of social sciences and in economic history?
This podcast is from the Library of Economics and Liberty’s EconTalk site. In it, Scott Sumner of Bentley University discusses with host Russ Roberts the role of monetary policy in the USA since 2007 and whether or not it was as expansionary as many people think.
In fact, Sumner argues that monetary policy was tight in late 2008 and that this precipitated the recession. He argues that the standard indicators of the tightness or ease of monetary policy, namely the rate of interest and the growth in the money supply, were misleading.
Sumner on Monetary Policy EconTalk podcast (9/11/09)
Questions
- Why is it important to look at the velocity of circulation of money when deciding the effect of interest rate changes or changes in the monetary base? Can the Fed’s failure to take velocity sufficiently into account be seen as a cause of the recession?
- Is there evidence of a liquidity trap operating in the USA in late 2008?
- How could the Fed have pursued a more expansionary policy, given that interest rates were eventually cut to virtually zero and the monetary base was expanded substantially?
- Why does Sumner argue that monetary policy should focus on influencing the growth in aggregate demand?
- How useful is the quantity equation, MV = PT (or MV = PY) in understanding the role and effectiveness of monetary policy?
- What is the Keynesian approach to monetary policy in a recession? How does this differ from the monetarist approach? Are both approaches focusing on the demand side and thus quite different from supply-side analysis of recession?
- Why is the consumer prices index (CPI) a poor indicator of a nominal shock to the economy? Should the central bank focus on nominal GDP, rather than CPI, as an indicator of the state of the economy and as a guide to the stance of monetary policy?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of using a Taylor rule as a guide to monetary policy? Would nominal GDP futures be a better target for monetary policy?
A key determinant of the length of any phase of the business cycle is consumer confidence. If people have gloomy expectations and confidence of a recovery is low, then a recession that should have lasted 6 months ends up lasting for years. Companies don’t see an end to the recession and keep holding off on investment plans and the public don’t want to go out and start spending, because there’s no guarantee that the economy is on its way back up. The more you worry about your finances, the less likely you are to go out and start spending, even though that could be the stimulus that a shrinking economy needs.
According to the British Retail Consortium, consumer confidence in the UK is on its way back up and currently stands at an 18-month high – which doesn’t actually say much given the past 18-months!! Despite this, job worries still remain and this has been highlighted significantly in the past week, when Britain’s youngest person ever was made redundant: a 13-year old paper boy. Whilst consumer confidence is argued to be returning to the UK, consumer confidence has been going in the opposite direction in the USA, with further fears of job losses. US confidence had been improving but unexpectedly fell in October. Is that what the UK has to look forward to?
So, why is consumer confidence so important? How does it affect the length of recovery and what is expected to happen over the next few months? Read the articles below to find out more.
US consumer confidence takes hit BBC News (27/10/09)
Consumer confidence hits 18-month high The Independent, David Prosser (1/11/09)
Consumer confidence on the rise BBC News (2/11/09)
Confidence boost hints that worst of recession now over The Scotsman, Peter Ranscombe (2/11/09)
US Michigan Sentiment fell to 70.6 this month Bloomberg, Courtney Schlisserman (30/10/09)
Euro-zone Consumer confidence improves The Wall Street Journal, Ilona Billington and Roman Kessler (30/10/09)
Retailers set for a merry Christmas DIYWeek (2/11/09)
Job fears still remain despite biggest increase in consumer confidence in 18 months, says British Retail Consortium Liverpool Echo, Neil Hodgson (2/11/09)
Business and consumer surveys in each of the EU countries and in the EU as a whole can be found at:
Business and Consumer Surveys European Commission
Questions
- In what ways does consumer confidence affect economic growth?
- Are there likely to be any adverse consequences of consumer confidence returning to the market?
- What are some of the reasons for the unexpected fall in consumer confidence in the USA? Do you think a similar thing is likely to happen in the UK?
- Expectations are crucial in economics. What is the difference between adaptive and rational expectations? How do they affect adjustment to the short- and long-run equilibrium?
- Can anything be done to improve confidence or is it simply a case of leaving things as they are … and waiting?
CPI inflation in the 12 months to September 2009 fell to 1.1% (from 1.6% in the 12 months to August). RPI inflation for the same period was -1.3%. In other words, retail prices actually fell by 1.3% in the 12 months to September. According to the ONS, “By far the largest downward pressure affecting the change in the CPI annual rate came from housing and household services. This was principally due to average gas and electricity bills, which were unchanged between August and September this year but rose a year ago when some of the major suppliers increased their tariffs.” (See below for link.)
If the CPI inflation rate falls below 1% (or rises above 3%), the Governor of the Bank of England is required to write a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer explaining why and also what the Bank of England intends to do about this. The Bank of England targets the forecast CPI inflation 24 months’ hence and attempts to achieve a rate of 2%. Normally, if the forecast rate is below 2%, the Monetary Policy Committee will decide to cut the rate of interest. The last Bank of England Inflation Report (August 2009) forecast CPI inflation of around 1.5% in 24 months’ time. If the November Inflation Report forecasts a similar figure, or even below, what can be done? Bank Rate is already at a historic low of just 0.5% and a further cut is unlikely to have much effect. Should the Bank of England, then, engage in another dose of quantitative easing? Perhaps the letter, if it has soon to be written, will make it clear.
UK consumer price inflation at 5-year low BusinessWeek (13/10/09)
Recession helps push inflation to five-year low Independent (14/10/09)
Inflation falls to lowest in five years Guardian (13/10/09)
Inflation dip likely to be short-lived Guardian (13/10/09)
Deflation, not inflation would be the bigger threat if the Conservatives do what they say Jeremy Warner blog, Telegraph (13/10/09)
Pound hit by falling UK inflation BBC News (13/10/09)
Pound hit by falling UK inflation (video) BBC News (13/10/09)
Pound pays price as inflation slides to five-year low Times Online (14/10/09)
Investors weigh risks of inflation and deflation Financial Times (12/10/09)
Wage ‘catch up’ for public sector BBC Today Programme (14/10/09)
Current data on UK Inflation (National Statistics)
Time series data (annual, quarterly and monthly) on UK prices and inflation Economic and labour Market Review (National Statistics)
Questions
- Why did the annual rate of CPI inflation fall so much in September 2009?
- Is the Bank of England Governor likely to have to write a letter (or letters) to the Chancellor in the coming months? Explain why or why not. What is likely to be the role of expectations in determining whether a letter has to be written?
- Why did the sterling exchange rate fall on the announcement of the inflation figure? What are likely to be the effects of this? What will determine the size of these effects?
- Why may additional amounts of quantitative easing be necessary in the coming months? How would a contractionary fiscal policy affect the desirability of additional quantitative easing?
According to Brad DeLong, professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley, if we are to get a full understanding of the financial crisis and recession of the past two years, we need to take a historical perspective. In the following article from The Economic Times of India, he argues that modern macroeconomists need to learn from history if their assumptions and models are to be relevant and predictive.
The anti-history boys The Economic Times (India) (1/10/09)
A fuller version of the above article, along with comments from readers, can be found on Brad deLong’s blog site, a Semi-Daily Journal of an Economist at:
Economic History and Modern Macro: What Happened? (30/9/09)
Questions
- According to Narayana Kocherlakota, most macroeconomic models “rely on some form of large quarterly movements in the technological frontier. Some have collective shocks to the marginal utility of leisure. Other models have large quarterly shocks to the depreciation rate in the capital stock (in order to generate high asset price volatilities)…”. How could these models explain business cycles? Would you classify them as ‘real business cycle theories’: i.e. as ‘supply-side’ explanations?
- How does Brad deLong explain recessions?
- Why does a change in the velocity of circulation of money contribute to a crash?
- What are the strengths and limitation of using economic history to understand the current crisis?