Keynes referred to the ‘paradox of thrift’ (see, for example, Box 17.5 on page 492 of Sloman and Wride, Economics, 7th edition). The paradox goes something like this: if individuals save more, they will increase their consumption possibilities in the future. If society saves more, however, this may reduce its future income and consumption. Why should this be so? Well, as people in general save more, they will spend less. Firms will thus produce less. What is more, the lower consumption will discourage firms from investing. Thus, through both the multiplier and the accelerator, GDP will fall.
What we have in the paradox of thrift is an example of the ‘fallacy of composition’ (see Sloman and Wride, Box 3.7 on page 84). What applies at the individual level will not necessarily apply at the aggregate level. The paradox of thrift applied in the Great Depression of the 1930s. People cutting back on consumption drove the world economy further into depression.
Turn the clock forward some 80 years. On 26/27 June 2010, leaders of the G20 countries met in Canada to consider, amongst other things, how to protect the global economic recovery while tackling the large public-sector deficits. These deficits have soared as a result of two things: (a) the recession of 2008/9, which reduced tax revenues and resulted in more people claiming benefits, (b) the expansionary fiscal policies adopted to bring countries out of recession.
But the leaders were divided on how much to cut now. Some, such as the new Coalition government in the UK, want to cut the deficit quickly in order to appease markets and avert a Greek-style crisis and a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to service the debt. Others, such as the Obama Administration in the USA, want to cut more slowly so as not to put the recovery in jeopardy. Nevertheless, cuts were generally agreed, although agreement about the timing was more vague.
So where is the fallacy of composition? If one country cuts, then it is possible that increased demand from other countries could drive recovery. If all countries cut, however, the world may go back into recession. What applies to one country, therefore, may not apply to the world as a whole.
Let’s look at this in a bit more detail and consider the individual elements of aggregate demand. If there are to be cuts in government expenditure, then there has to be a corresponding increase in aggregate demand elsewhere, if growth is to be maintained. This could come from increased consumption. But, with higher taxes and many people saving more (or reducing their borrowing) for fear of being made redundant or, at least, of having a cut in their incomes, there seems to be little sign that consumption will be the driver of growth.
Then there is investment. But, fearing a ‘double-dip recession’, business confidence is plummeting (see) and firms are likely to be increasingly reluctant to invest. Indeed, after the G20 summit, stock markets around the world fell. On 29 June, the FTSE 100 fell by 3.10% and the main German and French stock market indices, the Dax and the Cac 40, fell by 3.33% and 4.01% respectively. This was partly because of worries about re-financing the debts of various European countries, but it was partly because of fears about recovery stalling.
The problem is that cuts in government expenditure and rises in taxes directly affect the private sector. If government capital expenditure is cut, this will directly affect the construction industry. Even if the government makes simple efficiency savings, such as reducing the consumption of paper clips or paper, this will directly affect the private stationery industry. If taxes are raised, consumers are likely to buy less. Under these circumstances, no wonder many industries are reluctant to invest.
This leaves net exports (exports minus imports). Countries generally are hoping for a rise in exports as a way of maintaining aggregate demand. But here we have the fallacy of composition in its starkest form. If one country exports more, then this can boost its aggregate demand. But if all countries in total are to export more, this can only be achieved if there is an equivalent increase in global imports: after all, someone has to buy the exports! And again, with growth faltering, the global demand for imports is likely to fall, or at best slow down.
The following articles consider the compatibility of cuts and growth. Is there a ‘paradox of cuts’ equivalent to the paradox of thrift?
Articles
Osborne’s first Budget? It’s wrong, wrong, wrong! Independent on Sunday, Joseph Stiglitz (27/6/10)
Strategy: Focus switches from exit to growth Financial Times, Chris Giles (25/6/10)
Once again we must ask: ‘Who governs?’ Financial Times, Robert Skidelsky (16/6/10)
Europe’s next top bailout… MoneyWeb, Guy Monson and Subitha Subramaniam (9/6/10)
Hawks hovering over G20 summit Financial Times (25/6/10)
G20 applauds fiscal austerity but allows for national discretion Independent, Andrew Grice and David Usborne (28/6/10)
To stimulate or not to stimulate? That is the question Independent, Stephen King (28/6/10)
Now even the US catches the deficit reduction habit Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (28/6/10)
George Osborne claims G20 success Guardian, Larry Elliott and Patrick Wintour (28/6/10)
G20 accord: you go your way, I’ll go mine Guardian, Larry Elliott (28/6/10)
G20 summit agrees on deficit cuts by 2013 BBC News (28/6/10)
IMF says G20 could do better BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (27/6/10)
Are G20 summits worth having? What should the G20’s top priority be? (Economics by invitation): see in particular The G20 is heading for a “public sector paradox of thrift”, John Makin The Economist (25/6/10)
Why it is right for central banks to keep printing Financial Times, Martin Wolf (22/6/10)
In graphics: Eurozone in crisis: Recovery Measures BBC News (24/6/10)
A prophet in his own house The Economist (1/7/10)
The long and the short of fiscal policy Financial Times, Clive Crook (4/7/10)
G20 Communiqué
The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration (27/6/10) (see particularly paragraph 10)
Questions
- Consider the arguments that economic growth and cutting deficits are (a) complementary aims (b) contradictory aims.
- Is there necessarily a ‘paradox of cuts’? Explain.
- How is game theory relevant in explaining the outcome of international negotiations, such as those at the G20 summit?
- Would it be wise for further quantitative easing to accompany fiscal tightening?
- What is the best way for governments to avoid a ‘double-dip recession’?
‘Austerity’ seems to be the buzzword, as more and more countries across Europe make steps towards reducing substantial budget deficits. The UK has implemented £6.2 billion of cuts, with cuts of £50 billion expected by 2015 to tackle a budget deficit of over 10% of GDP. Portugal’s deficit stands at 8% of GDP and this will be tackled with rises in income, corporate and VAT tax, together with spending cuts aimed at halving the budget deficit by next year. Ireland’s austerity package includes public-sector pay cuts of up to 20%, plus reductions in child benefit, tax rises, and several key services facing cuts in employment, including emergency service and teachers. And, of course, we can’t forget Greece, with a budget deficit 12.2% of GDP, a national debt of 124.9% of GDP, and a forecast to remain in recession this year and the next. The Greek economy faces hard times with a huge austerity drive, including 12% civil service pay cuts, a large privatisation programme, and substantial pension cuts.
Greece is already in receipt of a €110bn rescue package. The Hungarian economy has already received €20bn aid from the EU, IMF and World Bank and spending cuts have been implemented, as markets began to fear that Hungary would become the next Greece. Germany is the most recent country to announce austerity measures, including plans to cut €10 billion annually until 2016.
But, what does this all mean? For years, many countries have spent beyond their means and only with the global recession did this growing problem really rear its ugly head. The only way to eliminate the budget deficit and restore confidence in the economy and ensure future prosperity is to raise taxes and/or to implement spending cuts. As the German Finance Minister said: “The main concern of citizens is that the national deficit could take on immeasurable proportions”. Unfortunately, this has already happened in some counties.
Although austerity measures are undoubtedly needed over the medium term in order to get deficits down, the impact of them is already being felt across the EU. Strikes have already occurred in massive proportions across Greece in response to the austerity package and tens of thousand of workers in Spain and Denmark also took to the streets in protest. There was anger from industry, trade unions and the media in response to €86 billion of cuts ordered in Germany between 2011 and 2014. The UK has already seen a number of strikes and more could be to come with further spending cuts in the pipeline. The Public and Commercial Services Union is threatening to re-launch strikes which began in March involving 200 000 civil servants (the action was suspended for the election.) A spokesman said: “If the cuts are anything like what is being suggested, industrial action by the unions is not only likely, it’s inevitable.”
EU governments have announced public spending cuts of €200 billion, together with a €500 billion safety blanket for the euro. Although these cuts are unlikely to have any positive effects for the everyday person for perhaps many years to come, in order to restore confidence and ensure a future economy that is both prosperous and stable, these austerity measures are deemed by many as essential. As Guy Verhofstadt (the former Belgian Prime Minister) said: “We’re entering a long period of economic stagnation. That will be the main problem for years. Europe is the new Japan.”
But will reduced aggregate demand resulting from the cuts lead to a double-dip recession and a (temporarily) worsening deficit from automatic fiscal stabilisers? We wait with baited breath.
EU austerity drive country-by-country BBC News (7/6/10)
Europe embraces the cult of austerity but at what cost? The Observer, Toby Helm, Ian Traynor and Paul Harris (13/6/10)
Germany joins EU austerity drive with €10bn cuts Guardian, Helena Smith (6/6/10)
G20 to endorse EU crisis strategy Reuters (28/5/10)
The Global recovery? It’s each state for itself Guardian, Jonathan Fenby (9/6/10)
Austerity angers grow in Europe AFP (9/6/10)
Austerity Europe: who faces the cuts? Guardian, Ian Traynor and Katie Allen (12/6/10)
Is this the end of the European welfare state? New Statesman (10/6/10)
Questions
- Are spending cuts or tax rises the best method to reduce a budget deficit? Explain your answer.
- What are the economic costs of the austerity packages across Europe?
- Who is likely to gain from the debt crisis in Europe?
- If austerity packages had not been initiated to the extent that they have, how do you think the rest of the world have reacted?
- Using the BBC News article and the Guardian article ‘Austerity measures: who faces the cuts?’, which country do you think is (a) in the best state and (b) in the worst state?
- How will you be affected by the austerity measures?
The International Monetary Fund published a report on banking, ahead of the G20 meeting of ministers on 23 April. The IMF states that banks should now pay for the bailout they received from governments during the credit crunch of 2008/9. As the first Guardian article states:
It is payback time for the banks. Widely blamed for causing the worst recession in the global economy since the 1930s, castigated for using taxpayer bailouts to fund big bonuses, and accused of starving businesses and households of credit, the message from the International Monetary Fund is clear: the day of reckoning is at hand.
The Washington-based fund puts the direct cost of saving the banking sector from collapse at a staggering $862bn (£559bn) – a bill that has put the public finances of many of the world’s biggest economies, including Britain and the United States, in a parlous state. Charged with coming up with a way of ensuring taxpayers will not have to dig deep a second time, the top economists at the IMF have drawn up an even more draconian blueprint than the banks had been expecting.
The IMF proposes two new taxes. The first had been expected. This would be a levy on banks’ liabilities and would provide a fund that governments could use to finance any future bailouts. It would be worth around $1500bn: some 2.5% of world GDP, and a higher percentage than that for countries, such as the UK, with a large banking sector.
The second was more surprising to commentators. This would be a financial activities tax (FAT). This would essentially be a tax on the value added by banks, and hence would be a way of taxing profits and pay. Currently, for technical reasons, many of banks’ activities are exempt from VAT (or the equivalent tax in countries outside the EU). The IMF thus regards them as under-taxed relative to other sectors. If such a tax were levied at a rate of 17.5% (the current rate of VAT in the UK), this could raise over 1% of GDP. In the UK this could be as much as £20bn – which would make a substantial contribution to reducing the government’s structural deficit of around £100bn
Meanwhile, in the USA, President Obama has been seeking to push legislation through Congress that would tighten up the regulation of banks. On 20 May, the Senate passed the bill, which now has to be merged with a version in the House of Representatives to become law. A key part of the measures involve splitting off the trading activities of banks in derivatives and other instruments from banks’ regular retail lending and deposit-taking activities with the public and firms. At the same time, there would be much closer regulation of the derivatives market. These complex financial instruments, whose value is ‘derived’ from the value of other assets, would have to be traded in an open market, not in private deals. A new financial regulatory agency will be created with the Federal Reserve having regulatory oversight of the whole of the financial markets
The measures would also give the government the power to break up financial institutions that were failing and rescue solvent parts without having to resort to a full-scale bailout. There is also a proposal to set up a nine-member Council of Regulators to keep a close watch on banking activities and to identify excessive risks. Banks would also be more closely supervised.
So is this payback time for banks? Or will higher taxes simply be passed on to customers, with pay and bonuses remaining at staggering levels? And will tougher regulation simply see ingenious methods being invented of getting round the regulation? Will the measures reduce moral hazard, or is the genie out of the bottle, with banks knowing that they will always be seen as too important to fail?
IMF Webcast
Press Briefing by IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn IMF Webcasts (22/4/10)
Transcript of the above Press Briefing
Articles
The IMF tax proposals
IMF proposes two taxes for world’s banks Guardian, Jill Treanor and Larry Elliott (21/4/10)
IMF gets tough on banks with ‘FAT’ levy Guardian, Linda Yueh (21/4/10)
Q&A: IMF proposals to shape G20 thinking Financial Times, Brooke Masters (21/4/10)
The challenge of halting the financial doomsday machine Financial Times, Martin Wolf (20/4/10)
IMF’s ‘punishment tax’ draws fire from banking industry Financial Times, Sharlene Goff, Brooke Masters and Scheherazade Daneshkhu (21/4/10)
Squeezing the piggy-banks Economist (21/4/10)
IMF, part two Economist, ‘Buttonwood’ (21/4/10)
IMF proposes tax on financial industry as economic safeguard Washington Post, Howard Schneider (20/4/10)
IMF wants two big new taxes on banks BBC News blogs, Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (20/4/10)
Obama’s proposals
Obama pleas for Wall Street support on reforms Channel 4 News, Job Rabkin (22/4/10)
Q&A: Obama’s bank regulation aims BBC News (22/4/10)
US banks may not bend to Barack Obama’s demands Guardian, Nils Pratley (22/4/10)
President Obama attacks critics of bank reform bill BBC News (23/4/10)
US Senate passes biggest overhaul of big banks since Depression Telegraph (21/5/10)
Finance-Overhaul Bill Would Reshape Wall Street, Washington Bloomberg Businessweek (21/5/10)
US Senate approves sweeping reforms of Wall Street (including video) BBC News (21/5/10)
Obama gets his big bank reforms BBC News blogs: Pestons’s Picks, Robert Peston (21/5/10)
Questions
- What would be the incentive effects on bank behaviour of the two taxes proposed by the IMF?
- What is meant by ‘moral hazard’ in the context of bank bailouts? Would (a) the IMF proposals and (b) President Obama’s proposals increase or decrease moral hazard?
- Why may the proposed FAT tax simply generate revenue rather than deter excessive risk-taking behaviour?
- What market conditions (a) encourage and (b) discourage large pay and bonuses of bankers? Will any of the proposals change these market conditions?
- What do you understand by the meaning of ‘excess profits’ in the context of the banks and what are the sources of such excess profits?
- Criticise the proposed IMF and US measures from the perspective of the banks.
In our blog article IMF warns of the long-term need for fiscal consolidation we highlighted the concerns that the IMF had about the size of public debt-to-GDP ratios in those countries with weak fiscal credibility. Since 1997 the UK has undertaken a series of measures designed to enhance the credibility of fiscal policy and, in particular, to dispel the notion that fiscal policy is unduly sensitive to political needs. Firstly, we have seen the introduction of a Code for Fiscal Stability which outlines a series of principles which should underpin fiscal policy measures. Secondly, in response to the worsening state of the public finances, we have seen the introduction of a Fiscal Responsibility Act which requires governments to outline plans for delivering sound public finances and places a duty on them to deliver them.
The new UK coalition government is now introducing a new independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) which will have responsibility for assessing the public finances and the economy, including the generation of forecasts, and for assessing the public-sector balance sheets (i.e. the sector’s assets and liabilities). The OBR will begin its work immediately in readiness for an ‘emergency Budget’ on the 22nd June. According to the HM Treasury press release on 17 May the OBR will be headed by Sir Alan Budd, an economist who was a founder member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England. Sir Alan will head a 3-member Budget Responsibility Committee (BRC) which will be supported by economists and public finance experts currently working in HM Treasury, but who in the longer-term will redeployed from the Treasury. Legislation will be drawn up in order to establish the OBR on a permanent statutory basis.
In arguing the case for the OBR, the government points out that all Budget forecasts since 2000 of public borrowing for more than ‘1 year ahead’ have underestimated borrowing. For instance, the average error for ‘2 year ahead’ forecasts since 2000 is £29.5 billion, i.e. borrowing for the financial year after next has, on average, turned out to be £29.5 billion higher than predicted. Of course, we would expect shorter-term forecasts to be more accurate. The evidence presented shows the average error for ‘1 year ahead’ forecasts since 2000 to be £6 billion, i.e. actual borrowing in the following financial year has, on average, been £6 billion higher than forecast. But, more than this, since 2000 four Budgets – those in 2000, 2006, 2007 and 2009 – have produced ‘1 year ahead’ forecasts that over-predicted levels of borrowing.
While it will certainly be fascinating in the years ahead to assess the accuracy of the OBR’s own crystal ball in forecasting, the creation of the OBR is undoubtedly an interesting development in the way in which fiscal policy is both designed and implemented in the UK.
HM Treasury Press Notice
Chancellor announces policies to enhance fiscal credibility HM Treasury (17/5/10)
Articles
Osborne braced for cuts Financial Times, Lionel Barber, George Parker and Chris Giles (17/5/10)
Chancellor launches audit of government spending Independent, Andrew Woodcock (17/5/10)
Osborne gives up power to forecast Financial Times, Chris Giles (17/5/10)
Why the Office for Budget Responsibility Matters BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (17/5/10)
Osborne confirms new U.K. budget watch dog MarketWatch, William L Watts (17/5/10)
Osborne warns of ‘disastrous consequences’ for economy BBC News, Ben Wright (17/5/10)
Chancellor announces new fiscal watchdog BBC News (17/5/10)
Robert Chote on new OBR BBC Daily Politics, Robert Chote (17/5/10)
George Osborne discovers the joys of kitchen-sinking Telegraph, Tracey Corrigan (17/5/10)
George Osborne tackles Labour’s toxic handover Guardian,
Larry Elliott (17/5/10)
Mixed reaction to Office for Budget Responsibility Public Finance, Jaimie Kaffash (17/5/10)
Questions
- What do you understand by the concept of fiscal credibility?
- How important do you think the new OBR will be in enhancing the UK’s fiscal credibility?
- In what other ways have UK governments attempted to enhance the UK’s fiscal credibility in recent years?
- What do you see as the potential economic benefits of enhancing fiscal credibility?
- One of the first things that the incoming Labour Chancellor, Gordon Brown, did in 1997 was to make the Bank of England independent and create a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to set interest rates. What parallels do you see between the MPC and the newly created Budget Responsibility Committee (BRC)?
On the 14th May the IMF published its latest Fiscal Monitor. The key message coming out of this was the need for countries to reduce their public debt ratios, i.e. public debt relative to GDP. Specifically, the IMF is arguing that public debt ratios should be reduced to their ‘post-crisis levels’. In effect, this means countries need to undertake fiscal consolidation. The IMF recognises that the pace of fiscal consolidation should reflect underlying fiscal and macroeconomic conditions, but warns of the dangers of not doing so especially in those countries where the credibility of the current and medium-term fiscal position is weakest.
Underpinning the IMF’s argument for fiscal consolidation is their concern that higher public debt ratios necessitate higher interest rates in order to entice investors to purchase government debt. In those countries with weak fiscal credibility, a sizeable interest rate premium may be needed to entice investors to hold government debt over other types of investments. For instance, we have seen how the markets reacted to the perceived lack of fiscal credibility in Greece and how a series of measures, as discussed in Fixing the Euro: a long term solution or mere sticking plaster were needed to both restore normality to debt markets and to prevent contagion in markets for other country’s public debt.
The IMF argues that the impact of higher interest rates from high public debt-to-GDP ratios would be to reduce an economy’s potential growth. The mechanism by which this would happen would primarily be a reduction of labour productivity growth resulting from lower levels of investment and, hence, from slower growth in the country’s capital stock.
In short, the IMF is arguing that without credible fiscal consolidation plans, countries – particularly advanced economies – run a real risk of restricting their rate of economic growth over the longer-term. Of course, the challenge is to implement fiscal consolidation plans that protect short-term growth by cementing the current economic recovery but do not hinder longer-term growth. Now that is a real challenge!
Report
Fiscal Monitor, May 14 2010 IMF
Articles
IMF Says Rising Public Debt Risk ‘Cannot Be Ignored’ Bloomberg Businessweek, Sandrine Rastello (14/5/10)
US faces one of the biggest crunches in the world – IMF Telegraph, Edmund Conway (14/5/10)
IMF says that developed countries must curb their deficits BBC News (14/5/10)
Outlook for rich economies worsening – IMF Eurasia Review (14/5/10)
Britain’s public debt falls under IMF focus Financial Times, Alan Beattie (15/5/10)
Advanced Economies Face Tougher, Not Impossible, Fiscal Adjustment MarketNews.com, Heather Scott (14/5/10)
A good squeeze The Economist (31/3/10)
Data
IMF Data and Statistic Portal IMF
For macroeconomic data for EU countries and other OECD countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and Korea, see:
AMECO online European Commission
Questions
- Evaluate the argument put forward by the IMF that fiscal consolidation is necessary to prevent harming long-term economic growth.
- What are the economic dangers of consolidating a country’s fiscal position too quickly?
- What do you understand by short-run and long-term economic growth?
- What do you understand by potential growth?
- What could a government do to increase the perceived credibility of its fiscal position?