Tag: free trade areas

A general election has been called in the UK for 12 December. Central to the debates between the parties will be their policy on Brexit.

They range from the Liberal Democrats’, Plaid Cymru’s and Sinn Féin’s policy of cancelling Brexit and remaining in the EU, to the Scottish Nationalists’ and Greens’ policy of halting Brexit while a People’s Vote (another referendum) is held, with the parties campaigning to stay in the EU, to the Conservative Party’s policy of supporting the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration negotiated between the Boris Johnson government and the EU, to the DUP which supports Brexit but not a version which creates a border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to the Brexit Party and UKIP which support leaving the EU with no deal (what they call a ‘clean break’) and then negotiating individual trade deals on a country-by-country basis.

The Labour Party also supports a People’s Vote, but only after renegotiating the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, so that if Brexit took place, the UK would have a close relationship with the single market and remain in a customs union. Also, various laws and regulations on environmental protection and workers’ rights would be retained. The referendum would take place within six months of the election and would be a choice between this new deal and remain.

But what are the economic costs and benefits of these various alternatives? Prior to the June 2016 referendum, the Treasury costed various scenarios. After 15 years, a deal would make UK GDP between 3.4% and 7.8% lower than if it remained in the EU, depending on the nature of the deal. No deal would make GDP between 5.4% and 9.5% lower.

Then in November 2018, the Treasury published analysis of the original deal negotiated by Theresa May in July 2018 (the ‘Chequers deal’). It estimated that GDP would be up to 3.9% lower after 15 years than it would have been if the UK had remained in the EU. In the case of a no-deal Brexit, GDP would be up to 9.3% lower after 15 years.

When asked for Treasury forecasts of the effects of Boris Johnson’s deal, the Chancellor, Sajid Javid, said that the Treasury had not been asked to provide forecasts as the deal was “self-evidently in our economic interest“.

Other forecasters, however, have analysed the effects of the Johnson deal. The National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR), the UK’s longest established independent economic research institute, has estimated the costs of various scenarios, including the Johnson deal, the May deal, a no-deal scenario and also a scenario of continuing uncertainty with no agreement over Brexit. The NIESR estimates that, under the Johnson deal, with a successful free-trade agreement with the EU, in 10 years’ time UK GDP will be 3.5% lower than it would be by remaining in the EU. This represents a cost of £70 billion. The costs would arise from less trade with the EU, lower inward investment, slower growth in productivity and labour shortages from lower migration. These would be offset somewhat by savings on budget contributions to the EU.

Under Theresa May’s deal UK GDP would be 3.0% lower (and thus slightly less costly than Boris Johnson’s deal). Continuing in the current situation with chronic uncertainty about whether the UK would leave or remain would leave the UK 2% worse off after 10 years. In other words, uncertainty would be less damaging than leaving. The costs from the various scenarios would be in addition to the costs that have already occurred – the NIESR estimates that GDP is already 2.5% smaller than it would have been as a result of the 2016 Brexit vote.

Another report also costs the various scenarios. In ‘The economic impact of Boris Johnson’s Brexit proposals’, Professors Anand Menon and Jonathan Portes and a team at The UK in a Changing Europe estimate the effects of a decline in trade, migration and productivity from the various scenarios – again, 10 years after new trading arrangements are in place. According to their analysis, UK GDP would be 4.9%, 6.4% and 8.1% lower with the May deal, the Johnson deal and no deal respectively than it would have been from remaining in the EU.

But how much reliance should we put on such forecasts? How realistic are their assumptions? What other factors could they have taken into account? Look at the two reports and at the articles discussing them and then consider the questions below which are concerned with the nature of economic forecasting.

Articles

Reports

Questions

  1. What are the arguments in favour of the assumptions and analysis of the two recent reports considered in this blog?
  2. What are the arguments against the assumptions and analysis of the two reports?
  3. How useful are forecasts like these, given the inevitable uncertainty surrounding (a) the outcome of negotiations post Brexit and (b) the strength of the global economy?
  4. If it could be demonstrated beyond doubt to everyone that each of the Brexit scenarios meant that UK GDP would be lower than if it remained in the EU, would this prove that the UK should remain in the EU? Explain.
  5. If economic forecasts turn out to be inaccurate, does this mean that economists should abandon forecasting?

The EU has recently signed two trade deals after many years of negotiations. The first is with Mercosur, the South American trading and economic co-operation organisation, currently consisting of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay – a region of over 260m people. The second is with Vietnam, which should result in tariff reductions of 99% of traded goods. This is the first deal of its kind with a developing country in Asia. These deals follow a recent landmark deal with Japan.

At a time when protectionism is on the rise, with the USA involved in trade disputes with a number of countries, such as China and the EU, deals to cut tariffs and other trade restrictions are seen as a positive development by those arguing that freer trade results in a net gain to the participants. The law of comparative advantage suggests that trade allows countries to consume beyond their production possibility curves. What is more, the competition experienced through increased trade can lead to greater efficiency and product development.

It is estimated that the deal with Mercosur could result in a saving of some €4bn per annum in tariffs on EU exports.

But although there is a net economic gain from greater trade, some sectors will lose as consumers switch to cheaper imports. Thus the agricultural sector in many parts of the EU is worried about cheaper food imports from South America. What is more, increased trade could have detrimental environmental impacts. For example, greater imports of beef from Brazil into the EU could result in more Amazonian forest being cut down to graze cattle.

But provided environmental externalities are internalised within trade deals and provided economies are given time to adjust to changing demand patterns, such large-scale trade deals can be of significant benefit to the participants. In the case of the EU–Mercosur agreement, according to the EU Reporter article, it:

…upholds the highest standards of food safety and consumer protection, as well as the precautionary principle for food safety and environmental rules and contains specific commitments on labour rights and environmental protection, including the implementation of the Paris climate agreement and related enforcement rules.

The size of the EU market and its economic power puts it in a strong position to get the best trade deals for its member states. As EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström stated:

Over the past few years the EU has consolidated its position as the global leader in open and sustainable trade. Agreements with 15 countries have entered into force since 2014, notably with Canada and Japan. This agreement adds four more countries to our impressive roster of trade allies.

Outside the EU, the UK will have less power to negotiate similar deals.

Articles

Questions

  1. Draw a diagram to illustrate the gains for a previously closed economy from engaging in trade by specialising in products in which it has a comparative advantage.
  2. Distinguish between trade creation and trade diversion from a trade deal with another country or group of countries.
  3. Which sectors in the EU and which sectors in the Mercosur countries and Vietnam are likely to benefit the most from the respective trade deals?
  4. Which sectors in the EU and which sectors in the Mercosur countries and Vietnam are likely to lose from the respective trade deals?
  5. Are the EU–Mercosur and the EU–Vietnam trade deals likely to lead to net trade creation or net trade diversion?
  6. What are the potential environmental dangers from a trade deal between the EU and Mercosur? To what extent have these dangers been addressed in the recent draft agreement?
  7. Will the UK benefit from the EU’s trade deals with Mercosur and Vietnam?

A paper by three University of Sussex academics has just been published by the university’s UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO). It looks at possible trade relations between the UK and the EU post Brexit. It identifies four key government objectives or constraints – what the authors call ‘red lines’ – and five possible types of trade arrangement with the EU.

The four red lines the authors identify are:

Limitations on the movement of people/labour;
An independent trade policy;
No compulsory budgetary contribution to the EU;
Legal oversight by UK courts only and not by the European Court of Justice.

Just how tight each of these four constraints should be is a matter for debate and political decision. For example, how extensive the limitations on the movement of labour should be and whether or not there should be any ‘voluntary’ budgetary contributions to the EU are issues where there is scope for negotiation.

Alongside these constraints is the objective of continuing to have as much access to and influence over the Single Market as possible.

The five possible types of trade arrangement with the EU identified in the paper are as follows:

1. Full Customs Union (CU) with the EU-27
2. Partial Customs Union with EU (based on EU-Turkey CU)
3. Free Trade Area (FTA) with access to the Single Market (European Economic Area)
4. Free Trade Area without automatic access to Single Market
5. Reversion to World Trade Organisation (WTO) Most Favoured Nation (MFN) terms

To clarify the terminology: a free trade area (FTA) is simply an agreement whereby member countries have no tariff barriers between themselves but individually can choose the tariffs they impose on imports from non-member countries; a customs union is a free trade area where all members impose common tariffs on imports from non-member countries and individual members are thus prevented from negotiating separate trade deals with non-member countries; membership of the European Economic Area requires accepting freedom of movement of labour and compulsory contributions to the EU budget; WTO Most Favoured Nation rules would involve the UK trading with the EU but with tariffs equal to the most favourable ones granted to other countries outside the EU and EEA.

The red lines would rule out the UK being part of the customs union or the EEA. Although WTO membership would not breach any of the red lines, the imposition of tariffs against UK exports would be damaging. So the option that seems most appealing to many ‘Brexiteers’ is to have a free trade area agreement with the EU and negotiate separate trade deals with other countries.

But even if a tariff-free arrangement were negotiated with the EU, there would still be constraints imposed on UK companies exporting to the EU: goods exported to the EU would have to meet various standards. But this would constrain the UK’s ability to negotiate trade deals with other countries, which might demand separate standards.

The paper and The Economist article explore these constraints and policy alternatives and come to the conclusion that there is no easy solution. The option that looks the best “from the UK government’s point of view and given its red lines, would be an FTA with a variety of special sectoral arrangements”.

Article

Brexit means…a lot of complex trade decisions The Economist, Buttonwood’s notebook (15/11/16)

Paper

UK–EU Trade Relations post Brexit: Too Many Red Lines? UK Trade Policy observatory (UKTPO), Briefing Paper No. 5, Michael Gasiorek, Peter Holmes and Jim Rollo (November 2016)

Questions

  1. Explain the difference between a free trade area, a customs union and a single market.
  2. Go through each of the four red lines identified in the paper and consider what flexibility there might be in meeting them.
  3. What problems would there be in operating a free trade agreement with the EU while separately pursuing trade deals with other countries?
  4. What is meant by ‘mutual recognition’ and what is its significance in setting common standards in the Single Market?
  5. What problems are likely to arise in protecting the interests of the UK’s service-sector exports in a post-Brexit environment?
  6. What does the EU mean by ‘cherry picking’ in terms of trade arrangements? How might the EU’s attitudes in this regard constrain UK policy?
  7. Does the paper’s analysis suggest that a ‘hard Brexit’ is inevitable?

The east African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been operating with a common external tariff for some time. The East African Community (EAC), as it is known, came into force in 2000. Initially it had just three members, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; the other two countries joined in 2007. As the Community’s site says:

The EAC aims at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in, among others, political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit. To this extent the EAC countries established a Customs Union in 2005 and are working towards the establishment of a Common Market in 2010, subsequently a Monetary Union by 2012 and ultimately a Political Federation of the East African States.

This Common Market came into force on 1 July 2010, with free movement of labour being instituted between the five countries. The plan is also to do away with all internal barriers to trade, although it may take up to five years before this is completed.

The following articles and videos look at this significant opening up of trade in east Africa and at people’s reactions to it. Will all five countries gain equally? Or will some gain at the others’ expense?

Articles
East African Countries Form a Common Market New York Times, Josh Kron (1/7/10)
Dawn of an era for East Africans The Standard, John Oyuke (1/7/10)
5 East African countries create common market The Associated Press, Tom Maliti (1/7/10)
FACTBOX-East African common market begins Reuters (1/7/10)
Bold plan to have single EAC currency by 2012 Daily Nation, Lucas Barasa (1/7/10)
East Africa’s common market begins BBC News, Tim Bowler (30/6/10)
East Africa: Poor Road, Railway Network Holding Back Integration allAfrica.com, Zephania Ubwani (1/7/10)
Challenges for one East Africa Common Market The Sunday Citizen, James Shikwati (4/7/10)

Videos
Common market barriers NTVKenya (on YouTube) (2/7/10)
The fruits of E.A.C. NTVKenya (on YouTube) (2/7/10)

The East African Community (EAC)
Official site
Wikipedia entry

Questions

  1. Distinguish between a free trade area, a customs union, a common market and a monetary union.
  2. How is it possible that all five countries will gain from the establishment of a common market?
  3. Distinguish between trade creation and trade diversion. Under what circumstances is the establishment of a common market more likely to lead to (a) trade creation; (b) trade diversion?
  4. Why do some people worry about the consequences of free movement of labour with the EAC? How would you answer their concerns?
  5. What factors would need to be taken into account in deciding whether or not the five countries would benefit from forming a monetary union?