UK unemployment is rising. According to figures released by the Office for National Statistics, in the third quarter of 2011 the unemployment rate was 8.3%, the highest since 1986. The number unemployed was 2.62 million, up 129,000 on the previous quarter.
The figures for those aged from 16 to 24 are particularly worrying. If you include those in full-time education but who are looking for employment and are available for work, the unemployment rate in this age group was 23.3%. If you exclude those in full-time education, the rate was 20.6% (up 1.8 percentage points since the previous quarter).
The government was quick to blame the eurozone crisis for the rise in unemployment. The Minister of State for Employment, Chris Grayling, said, “What we are seeing are the consequences of the crisis in the eurozone.”
But is this true? Unemployment is a lagging indicator. In other words, it takes time for unemployment to respond to changing economic circumstances. Thus the rise in unemployment from quarter 2 to quarter 3 2011 was the result of the economic conditions at the beginning of 2011 and earlier – a time when growth in the eurozone was faster than that in the UK. The eurozone economy grew by 2.4% in the 12 months to 2011Q1, whereas the UK economy grew by only 1.6% over the same period. Even taking the 12 months up to 2011Q3, the eurozone economy grew by 1.4%, whereas the UK economy grew by only 0.5%.
Of course, if the crisis in the eurozone leads to another recession, then this will almost certainly lead to a rise in unemployment. But that’s to come, not what’s happened.
The following articles look at the rise in unemployment and especially that of young people. They examine its causes and consider possible solutions at a time when governments in the UK and around the world are concerned to reduce public-sector deficits and debt.
Articles
Youth unemployment breaks 1m mark Independent, Alan Jones (16/11/11)
UK unemployment increases to 2.62m BBC News (16/11/11)
Youth unemployment reaches 1986 levels The Telegraph, Donna Bowater (16/11/11)
Over a million young people are jobless BBC News, Hugh Pym (16/11/11)
Unemployment figures rise ‘related to eurozone crisis’ BBC News, Employment minister Chris Grayling (16/11/11)
Labour’s Liam Byrne: Young jobless paying ‘brutal price’ BBC News, Shadow Secretary for Work and Pensions Liam Byrne (16/11/11)
UK unemployment ‘nothing to do with eurozone’ BBC News, Lord Oakeshott (16/11/11)
Coalition sheds crocodile tears over young jobless Guardian, Larry Elliott (16/11/11)
Is youth unemployment really rising because of the eurozone crisis? Guardian, Polly Curtis (16/11/11)
Eurozone and the UK: A tale of two crises BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (15/11/11)
Data
Latest on the labour market – November 2011 ONS on YouTube (16/10/11)
Labour Market Statistics, November 2011 ONS (16/10/11)
Harmonised unemployment levels and rates for OECD countries (annual, quarterly and monthly) OECD StatExtracts
Economic Data freely available online Economics Network
Questions
- What are the causes of the UK’s rise in unemployment in quarter 3 of 2011?
- Why is unemployment particularly high for the 16 to 24 year old age group?
- Find out the unemployment rates for the 16 to 24 age group for other European countries for both females and males. How does the UK rate compare with the rest of Europe?
- What are meant by a ‘lagging indicator’ and a ‘leading indicator’? Why is unemployment a lagging indicator?
- Identify some other lagging indicators and some leading indicators and explain why they lag or lead the level of economic activity.
- What solutions are there to high unemployment of young people (a) in the short run; (b) in the long run?
The UK and US governments face a conundrum. To achieve economic recovery, aggregate demand needs to expand. This means that one or more of consumption, government expenditure, exports and investment must rise. But the government is trying to reduce government expenditure in order to reduce the size of the public-sector deficit and debt; exports are being held back by the slow recovery, or even return to recession, in the eurozone and the USA; and investment is being dampened by business pessimism. This leaves consumer expenditure. For recovery, High Street spending needs to rise.
But herein lies the dilemma. For consumer spending to rise, people need to save less and/or borrow more. But UK and US saving rates are already much lower than in many other countries. You can see this by examining Table 23 in OECD Economic Outlook. Also, household debt is much higher in the UK and USA. This has been largely the result of the ready availability of credit through credit cards and other means. The government is keen to encourage people to save more and to reduce their reliance on debt – in other words, to start paying off their credit-card and other debt. That way, the government hopes, the economy will become ‘rebalanced’. But this rebalancing, in the short run at least, will dampen aggregate demand. And that will hardly help recovery!
In the following podcast, Sheldon Garon discusses his new book Beyond Our Means. He describes the decline of saving in the USA and UK and examines why other countries have had much higher saving rates.
‘He also seeks to explain why high interest rates didn’t encourage saving in the boom years and why current levels of relatively high inflation haven’t stopped savings rates shooting up again in Britain.’
Living beyond our means Guardian: the Business Podcast, Sheldon Garon talks to Tom Clark (2/11/11)
Questions
- Why have saving rates in the UK and USA been much lower than those in many other countries? How significant has been the availability of credit in determining savings rates?
- Why have saving rates increased in the UK and USA since 2008/9 despite negative real interest rates in many months?
- Explain what is meant by the “paradox of thrift”. What are the implications of this paradox for government policy at the present time?
- Why may it be difficult to have a consumer-led recovery in the UK and US economies?
- What is the life-cycle theory of consumption and saving? How well does it explain saving rates?
- Can people be given a “nudge” to spend more or to save more? If so, what nudges might be appropriate in the current situation?
- Why do countries with a more equal distribution of income have higher saving rates?
- What is the relationship between the saving rate and (a) the rate of inflation and (b) the real rate of interest? Why is this the case?
With all the concerns recently about Greek and Italian debt and about the whole future of the eurozone, you would be forgiven for thinking that the problems of the UK economy had gone away. This couldn’t be further from the truth. Problems are mounting and pessimism is growing.
First there is the problem of a contracting eurozone economy. This will directly impact on the UK as almost half of UK exports go to eurozone countries. Second there is the impact of the government expenditure cuts, most of which have still not taken effect yet. Third there is the fact that, with the combination of inflation over 5% and nominal pay typically rising by no more than 2%, real take-home pay is falling and hence too is the volume of consumer expenditure. Fourth, there is the increasingly pessimistic mood of consumers and business. The more pessimistic people become about the prospects for their jobs and incomes, the more people will rein in their spending; the more pessimistic businesses become, the more they will cut back on investment and economise on stock holding.
Forecasts for the UK economy have become considerably bleaker over the past few weeks. These include forecasts by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR), the accountancy network BDO, Ernst & Young’s ITEM Club and the CBI in its SME Trends Survey and November Economic Forecast. The Treasury’s latest Forecasts for the UK Economy, which brings together forecasts by 29 different organisations, also shows a marked increase in pessimism from September to October.
So is it now time for the government to change course to prevent the economy slipping back into recession? Do we need a Plan B? Certainly, it’s something we’ve considered before on this news site (see Time for a Plan B?). The latest call has come from a group of 100 leading academic economists who have written to the Observer. In their letter they spell out what such a plan should contain. You’ll find a link to the letter below and to other articles considering the proposals.
The letter
We economists have a Plan B that will work, Mr Osborne Observer letters (29/10/11)
Articles
Plan B: the ideas designed to restart a stalled UK economy Observer, Daniel Boffey and Heather Stewart (29/10/11)
Plan B could have been even more aggressive, but it would definitely work Observer, Will Hutton (29/10/11)
The economy: we need Plan B and we need it now Observer editorial (30/10/11)
If tomorrow’s growth figures disappoint, Plan B will be a step closer, whatever David Cameron says The Telegraph, Daniel Knowles (31/10/11)
Plan B to escape the mess we are in Compass, John Weeks (7/11/11)
The report
Plan B; a good economy for a good society Compass, Edited by Howard Reed and Neal Lawson (31/10/11)
Questions
- What are the main proposals in Compass’s Plan B?
- How practical are these proposals?
- Without a Plan B, what is likely to happen to the UK economy over (a) the coming 12 months; (b) the next 3 years?
- Why might sticking to Plan A worsen the public-sector deficit – at least in the short term?
- What are the main arguments for sticking to Plan A and not easing up on deficit reduction?
- Find out what proportion of the UK’s debt is owed to non-UK residents? (See data published by the UK’s Debt Management Office (DMO).) How does this proportion and the average length of UK debt affect the arguments about the sustainability of this level of debt and the ease of servicing it?
- If you had to devise a Plan B, what would it look like and why? To what extent would it differ from Compass’s Plan B and from George Osborne’s “Plan A”?
Economic growth in developed countries, like the UK, exhibits two important characteristics. First, growth is positive over the long run such that the volume of output increases over time. Second, growth in the short-term is highly variable with patterns in the volume of output creating business cycles. With increased global interdependence through trade and integrated financial systems, domestic business cycles often resemble a global or international business cycle. This was certainly the case during the late 2000s. Recent releases from the Office for National Statistics provide an opportunity to look again at the characteristics of UK economic growth. In particular, they show the importance of differentiating between nominal and real values. Furthermore, revisions to the data have somewhat revised our view of economic growth before and after the economic crisis of the late 2000s.
The value of goods and services produced in the UK in 2010, as measured by GDP, is estimated at £1.46 trillion. This is the nominal GDP estimate because it measures the economy’s output for 2010 using the prices of 2010. Back in 1948, GDP measured at 1948 prices was £11.97 billion. Based on these nominal estimates the size of the UK economy would appear to have grown some 122 times which is the equivalent of growing by 8.1 per cent each year. However, some of this increase relates not to the volume of output but to the prices of the goods and services produced. It is for this reason that when analysing economic growth we ordinarily look at constant-price or real estimates of GDP. Such estimates effectively show what GDP would have been if prices had remained at the levels of a chosen year known as the base year. The base year now being used in the UK is 2008.
GDP at constant 2008 prices in 2010 is estimated at £1.40 trillion as compared with £314.5 billion in 1948. The real GDP figures reveal that the volume of UK output increased not by a factor of 122 but by a factor of 4.44; this is the equivalent to growth of 2.4 per cent each year.
The nominal GDP estimates for each year from 1948 up to 2010 rise with only one exception: 2009. In 2009, nominal GDP fell by 2.8 per cent. However, over the same period, real GDP fell during seven of the years. What this tells us, is that in six of the seven years, price increases were enough to offset falls in the volume of output such that nominal GDP increased. However, in 2009, the average price of the economy’s output, which is measured by the GDP deflator, rose by a just a little under 1.7 per cent, while the volume of output and, hence, real GDP, fell by almost 4.4 per cent.
The real annual GDP numbers estimate that the volume of UK output declined both in 2008 and 2009. In 2008 output is thought to have fallen by 1.1 per cent, while in 2009, as we have just seen, it fell by 4.4 per cent. The last time the UK experienced two consecutive annual (yearly) falls in output was in 1980 and 1981 when output fell by 2.1 per cent and 1.3 per cent respectively.
If we want to identify recessions then yearly GDP numbers will not do, rather, we need to use quarterly GDP numbers. This is because we are looking for two consecutive quarters where real GDP (output) declined. The revised GDP data show that the UK experienced five consecutive quarterly falls in real GDP in the late 2000s. We went into recession in Q2 of 2008 and came out in Q3 of 2009. As a result, real GDP was 7 per cent lower than before the UK economy entered recession. The previous recession, from Q3 of 1990 to Q3 of 1991 (5 quarters), saw UK output fall by 2.5 per cent. Between these two recessions the UK experienced 66 consecutive quarters of economic growth during which time the revised estimates show that the average annual rate of growth was 3 per cent. Compared with the recession of 2008/09, the next deepest recession in recent times occurred between Q1 of 1980 and Q1 of 1981 (5 quarters) when output fell by 4.7 per cent. In other words, these figures help to illustrate the extraordinary depth of the 2008/9 recession.
Articles
QE plus Economist (8/10/11)
Cameron steadfast as economy halts Sky News Australia, Matt Falloon and Christina Fincher (6/10/11)
Recession was deeper and recovery slower than expected Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (31/10/11) )
Mr Cameron, GDP and the hole in the recovery BBC News, Stephanie Flanders, (5/10/11)
UK economy grinds to virtual halt AFP (5/10/11) )
Recession concern as economy fails to grown Herald Scotland, Ian McConnell (5/10/11)
Data
Quarterly National Accounts, Q2 2011 Office for National Statistics (5/10/11)
For macroeconomic data for EU countries and other OECD countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and Korea, see:
AMECO online European Commission
Questions
- Explain what you understand by the terms nominal GDP and real GDP. Can you think of other examples of where economists might distinguish between nominal and real variables?
- Explain under what circumstances nominal GDP could rise despite the output of the economy falling.
- The average annual change in nominal GDP since 1948 is 8.2% while that for real GDP is 2.4%. What do you think we can learn from each of these figures about long-term economic growth in the UK?
- What do you understand to be the difference between short-term and long-run economic growth?
- What is meant by the concept of a business cycle? In what ways can the characteristics of business cycles differ across time? What about across countries?
- How might the position within the business cycle impact on an economy’s potential output?
- What factors might influence a country’s long-term rate of economic growth?
At its meeting on 26 October, the eurozone countries agreed on a deal to tackle the three problems identified in Part A of this blog:
1. Making the Greek debt burden sustainable
2. Increasing the size of the eurozone bailout fund to persuade markets that there would be sufficient funding to support other eurozone countries which were having difficulties in servicing their debt.
3. Recapitalising various European banks to shield them against possible losses from haircuts and defaults.
The following were agreed:
1. Banks would be required to take a loss of 50% in converting existing Greek bonds into new ones. This swap will take place in January 2012. Note that Greek debt to other countries and the ECB would be unaffected and thus total Greek debt would be cut by considerably less than 50%.
2. The bailout fund (EFSF) would increase to between €1 trillion and €1.4 trillion, although this would be achieved not by direct contributions by Member States or the ECB, but by encouraging non-eurozone countries (such as China, Russia, India and Brazil) to buy eurozone debt in return for risk insurance. These purchases would the form the base on which the size of the fund could be multiplied (leveraged). There would also be backing from the IMF. Details would be firmed up in November.
3. Recapitalising various European banks to shield them against possible losses from haircuts and defaults. About 70 banks will be required to raise an additional €106.4 billion by increasing their Tier 1 capital ratio by 9% by June 2012 (this compares with the Basel III requirement of 6% Tier 1 by 2015).
On the longer-term issue of closer fiscal union, the agreement was in favour of achieving this, along with tight constraints on the levels of government deficits and debt – a return to something akin to the Stability and Growth Pact.
On the issue of economic growth, whilst constraining sovereign debt may be an important element of a long-term growth strategy, the agreement has not got to grips with the short-term problem of a lack of aggregate demand – unless, of course, the relief in markets at seeing a solution to the debt problem may boost business and consumer confidence. This, in turn, may provide the boost to aggregate demand that has been sadly lacking over the past few months.
Certainly if the reaction of stock markets around the world are anything to go by, the recovery in confidence may be under way. The day following the agreement, the German stock market index, the Dax, rose by 6.3% and the French Cac index rose by 5.4%.
Articles
Eurozone crisis explained BBC News (27/10/11)
Leaders agree eurozone debt plan in Brussels BBC News, Matthew Price (27/10/11)
Eurozone agreement – the detail BBC News, Hugh Pym (27/10/11)
10 key questions on the eurozone bailout Citywire Money, Caelainn Barr (27/10/11)
European debt crisis: ‘Europe is going to have a very tough winter’ – video analysis Guardian, Larry Elliott (27/10/11)
Eurozone crisis: banks agree 50% reduction on Greece’s debt Guardian, David Gow (27/10/11)
The euro deal: No big bazooka The Economist (29/10/11)
Europe’s rescue plan The Economist (29/10/11)
European banks given just eight months to raise €106bn The Telegraph, Louise Armitstead (26/10/11)
EU reaches agreement on Greek bonds Financial Times, Peter Spiegel, Stanley Pignal and Alex Barker (27/10/11)
Unlike politicians, the markets are seeing sense Independent, Hamish McRae (27/10/11)
Market view: Eurozone rescue deal buys time FT Adviser, Michael Trudeau (27/10/11)
Greece vows to build on EU deal, people sceptical Reuters, Renee Maltezou and Daniel Flynn (27/10/11)
Markets boosted by eurozone deal Independent, Peter Cripps, Jamie Grierson (27/10/11)
Has Germany been prudent or short-sighted? BBC News blogs, Robert Peston (27/10/11)
Germany’s Fiscal union with a capital F BBC News blogs, Stephanie Flanders (27/10/11)
Questions
- What are the key features of the deal reached in Brussels on 26 October?
- What details still need to be worked out?
- How will the EFSF be boosted some 4 or 5 times without extra contributions fron eurozone governments?
- Why, if banks are to take a 50% haircut on their holdings of Greek debt, will Greek debt fall only to 120% per cent by 2020 from just over 160% currently?
- On balance, is this a good deal?