Category: Economics for Business: Ch 13

The television streaming market is currently attracting considerable attention from policy makers. This follows Warner Bros. accepting Netflix’s offer to buy part of the company for $72bn. To understand how this deal came about and why there is policy concern, we need to go back a few years.

The media and entertainment conglomerate Warner Bros. Discovery (WBD) was created in 2022 when AT&T sold Warner Bros to Discovery.1 However, in June 2025 the company announced that it would split the business into two parts. One would be (a) the studio for TV and movie production, where for example the Harry Potter franchises were made, and (b) the TV streaming business, home to for example the hit TV series Succession. The other, the more traditional and declining TV networks, including channels such as CNN, Discovery and TNT Sports, would form a new company called Discovery Global. David Zaslav, WBD President and Chief Executive stated that:

We are empowering these iconic brands with the sharper focus and strategic flexibility they need to compete most effectively in today’s evolving media landscape.2

Shortly afterwards, rival media and entertainment conglomerate, Paramount Skydance, made a series of bids to purchase the entire WBD business. But these were rejected by the WBD board. Despite this, in October 2025 WBD made public that it was open to a sale and had received unsolicited interest from several companies. It was believed that this included offers from Comcast and Netflix.

Recent developments

In December 2025, Netflix announced that it had agreed a deal with WBD to buy its studio and streaming service business, including its back catalogue of shows. The deal is planned to be put to WBD shareholders in the next few months.3 Netflix has over 300m subscribers across the globe and streams popular shows, such as Stranger Things and Squid Games.

Despite this accepted offer, Paramount has subsequently pursued a hostile takeover of WBD by going straight to its shareholders. In addition, Paramount launched a lawsuit to get further information on how Netflix was chosen as the buyer and to provide WBD shareholders with information on the value of the TV network business that WBD was selling. This, however, was quickly thrown out of the courts.

Over time, Netflix and Paramount have tinkered with their bids to make them more attractive to WBD. Whilst Paramount’s bid was all cash, originally Netflix was offering a mixture of cash and shares. However, in January, it switched this to an all-cash offer. In February, Paramount made clear that if WBD instead accepted its offer, it would pay the $2.8bn termination fee that would be owed to Netflix.4 Furthermore, from early 2027 Paramount would pay WBD shareholders payments of $650m per quarter, known as ticking fees, if combining WBD and Paramount faced regulatory delay.

In mid-February 2026, it emerged that, following a waiver from Netflix, WBD had reopened talks with Paramount. Paramount was given a week to make its offer. Then, under the agreed deal, Netflix would have the right to adjust its bid. This is an attempt by WBD to end the hostile bidding war Paramount is pursuing and to provide clarity for its shareholders. WBD has reiterated that it will:

continue to recommend and remain fully committed to our transaction with Netflix. [However], we welcome the opportunity to engage with you and expeditiously determine whether Paramount Skydance can deliver an actionable, binding proposal that provides superior value.5

The insertion of the ticking fees by Paramount is in response to the substantial attention competition authorities across the globe are paying to the acquisition of WBD. The deal is being investigated by the US Department of Justice and, in early February, Netflix was questioned by the US Senate Antitrust Sub-committee. During this hearing, one of the Senators expressed his anger with the country’s competition laws and raised concerns that the deal would result in Netflix getting:

more power over consumers and leaving fewer alternatives and streaming platforms.6

While Paramount did not attend this hearing, it is believed that it has raised concerns about the Netflix-WBD deal to regulators. Netflix co-CEO, Ted Sarandos, has also met with Donald Trump to discuss the deal. However, Trump subsequently stated that the deal ‘could be a problem’.7

The EU and UK markets

Furthermore, whilst all the companies involved are American, both the mergers with Netflix and Paramount are being investigated by the European Commission as markets in Europe would be affected.

In the UK, a group of politicians and former policymakers, have written to the Competition and Markets Authority urging it to conduct a full investigation of the Netflix-WBD merger. The letter argues that the merger could have:

damaging consequences for consumers, the UK’s world-leading creative industries and the UK cinema industry.

and that:

At a time when the British consumer can ill-afford more price increases, Netflix would possess an unprecedented ability to raise prices to access television and films.8

The letter comes at a time when pressure is being placed on the CMA to adopt a generally more business-friendly approach.

The impact of the merger on the UK market is particularly complicated since Warner Bros.’ streaming service, HBO Max, is only due to launch in the UK in March 2026. This is still the plan, with WBD’s head of global streaming, Jean-Briac Perette acknowledging that:

We are likely the last scaled global streamer to come to market. We’ve tried to learn from the rest. We’re a complementary and distinct service to the more volume-driven or basic cable-like streamers in the market. More is not better. Better is better.9

An alternative route to regulatory approval

An easier route to regulatory approval may well be instrumental in allowing Netflix or Paramount to win the battle for WBD. Netflix stresses that the deal will create economic growth and jobs. Netflix’s Sarandos highlighted that:

This is not a typical media merger where you end up with what’s called the Noah’s Ark problem — two of everything. We are buying a company that has assets that we do not, and we will keep investing in those.10

The problem of economic power

In contrast, critics argue that either of the deals would create a new company with too much power. However, given the nature of the firms involved, the competition issues will be fundamentally different between the two deals.

The Paramount deal would primarily reduce the number of studios in the market. This could provide the new merged studio with more bargaining power over distributors, advertisers and creators. Ultimately, this could negatively impact on the final product that consumers watch in the cinema and on television.

The Netflix deal on the other hand would impact directly on the streaming market. In the USA, 80% of consumers have both Netflix and HBO Max.11 After the merger, consumers would have less choice of competing services and Netflix-HBO Max combined may well have an incentive to raise its subscription prices.

In the UK, there are currently three leading streaming services: Netflix, Amazon Prime and Disney+, each with around 23% of the market.12 The merger with WBD could allow Netflix to become the clear market leader.

Concerns about YouTube

When examining streaming markets in all countries, an important factor will be whether to include YouTube in the market. Netflix certainly argues that it is a key competitor, at the hearing Sarandos stated that:

we are competing for the same content, we are competing for the same viewers, we are competing often for the same ad dollars. YouTube is not just cat videos anymore. YouTube is TV.13

If YouTube is included, in the USA it would be the market leader with 13%, ahead of Netflix on 9%. However, the competition authorities may conclude that YouTube’s product and business model is sufficiently different and so not include it in the streaming market.14

The issue of cinemas

A second concern in the Netflix deal will be the Warner Bros.’ studio content that Netflix would own. The merged business may have an incentive to discontinue, raise the price or reduce the quality of the studio output that it supplies to cinemas. Thus, the competition authorities’ investigations will also pay close attention to the impact on the cinema market.

In line with these arguments, the Hollywood screenwriters’ union, the Writers Guild of America, has indicated that the Netflix-WMD deal should be stopped and filmmakers are clearly concerned about Netflix prioritising streaming.15
 
 
The competition authorities may well consider imposing remedies before they are willing to allow either deal to go ahead. With this in mind, it is interesting that Netflix has already made clear that it will continue the 45-day exclusive window that Warner Bros. provides cinemas to show its films.

It will be fascinating to see how the competing bids play out and how the competition regulators view them.

References

  1. AT&T agrees deal to combine WarnerMedia with Discovery
  2. The Guardian, Mark Sweney (16/5/21)

  3. HBO and CNN owner to split streaming and cable businesses
  4. BBC News, Adam Hancock (10/6/25)

  5. Netflix’s co-CEO went to an antitrust hearing and a culture war broke out
  6. NBC News, Saba Hamedy (3/2/26)

  7. Warner Bros gives Paramount seven days to make ‘best and final’ offer
  8. The Guardian, Mark Sweney (17/2/26)

  9. ibid.
  10. NBC News, op. cit.
  11. Trump says $72bn Netflix-Warner Bros deal ‘could be a problem’
  12. BBC News, Osmond Chia (8/12/25)

  13. UK politicians call for competition review of Netflix bid for Warner Bros
  14. Financial Times (26/1/26)

  15. Warner streaming boss defends HBO Max UK launch ahead of Netflix takeover
  16. Financial Times (9/2/26)

  17. NBC News, op. cit.
  18. Netflix and Warner Bros struggle to defend merger
  19. BBC News, Danielle Kaye (3/2/26)

  20. Netflix, Disney+, Prime: Streaming platform market share report UK 2025
    InsiderMedia, Jennifer O’Keeffe (2/12/25)

  21. BBC News, Danielle Kaye op. cit.
  22. Paramount sweetens Warner Bros bid with offer to pay Netflix break-up cost, other fees
  23. Reuters, Harshita Mary Varghese and Aditya Soni (11/2/26)

  24. In a takeover of Warner Bros., Netflix makes a play for 21st century Hollywood’s throne
  25. NBC News, Daniel Arkin (5/12/25)

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Questions

  1. What are the similarities and differences between Netflix’ and YouTube’s business models? How close substitutes do you think they are?
  2. Do you think cinemas are a closer or more distant substitute to Netflix than YouTube?
  3. Which deal do you think raises the most competition concerns? What might be a possible remedy that could alleviate these concerns?

The approach towards mergers remains the most controversial area of competition policy. Some argue that policy makers in both the UK and EU have been too easily persuaded by the arguments put forward by firms and so have allowed too many mergers to proceed. Others claim that the opposite is true and that merger policy has prohibited mergers that should have been allowed to proceed. This, then, has a negative impact on investment, innovation, productivity and growth.

In recent years there has been more specific criticism of merger policy in the UK. The government has indicated that it wants the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to be less interventionist and take a more pro-growth approach.

In February 2025, in response to this criticism, the CMA launched its new ‘4 Ps’ approach to merger policy: Pace, Predictability, Proportionality and Process. Various changes to the investigation process have been proposed in the past 12 months using this framework.

Pace. The time taken by the CMA to initially assess a merger before deciding whether a Phase 1 investigation is necessary (i.e. the pre-notification procedure) was reduced from 65 to 40 working days. Also, the target to complete straightforward Phase 1 investigations was reduced from 35 to 25 days.

Predictability. The proposed merger guidelines, published in October 2025, provide more detail on (a) what criteria will be used to measure market shares when applying the ‘share of supply test’ (this is where the combined UK market share of two merging businesses is at least 25%, provided one business has a UK turnover of at least £10 million), and (b) the factors that are likely to lead to the competition authorities concluding that one business has gained ‘material influence over another’. Businesses had complained that there was too much uncertainty about the way the share of supply test and material influence were applied. The CMA is also considering greater alignment with other international regulators over decision making rather than its previous policy of acting independently. All these measures should increase the predictability of the investigation process.

Proportionality. Proportionality refers to the objective of addressing any competition issues in merger cases in a way that places the minimum burden on the businesses involved. To improve proportionality, the CMA has indicated that in future cases it will be more willing to use behavioural remedies – requiring firms to take or desist from certain actions. New draft guidelines identify more situations where the use of behavioural remedies may be appropriate. However, they also show that the CMA still views structural remedies (e.g. preventing the merger or requiring firms to demerge or to sell certain assets) as more effective in many situations. Another important measure to improve proportionality is the introduction of a new ‘wait and see’ approach to global mergers. The CMA will now wait to see if the actions taken by other competition authorities in global cases address any concerns in the UK market before deciding whether to launch a review.

Process. To improve the process, the CMA has announced plans to engage with businesses at a much earlier point in the process. For example, it has pledged to share its provisional thinking in the early stages of an investigation by implementing new ‘teach-in’ sessions and having more regular update meetings. Much earlier meetings that focus on possible remedies will also take place. This may make it possible for the CMA to assess the suitability of more complex remedies during a Phase 1 investigation rather than having to wait for a longer and more costly Phase 2 review. Phase 2 reviews will also no longer be managed by panels of independent experts. This role will now be carried out by the internal CMA board.

Some critics argue that the CMA has not fully considered the potential benefits of mergers in many cases. For example, a merger could (a) have procompetitive effects, known as rivalry enhancing efficiencies (REEs) and/or (b) benefits for consumers outside of the relevant market, known as relevant customer benefits (RCBs). In response to this criticism, the CMA is currently reassessing its approach to including evidence on REEs and RCBs.

The CMA is still currently consulting with interested parties about many of these proposed changes. It will be interesting to see what final decisions are made in the next couple of years.

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CMA documentation

Questions

  1. Of all the mergers considered by the CMA in 2024/25, find out what percentage were formally investigated. How many were blocked from taking place? Do you believe that this indicates that merger policy is too weak or too strong?
  2. What three criteria must be met for a business arrangement to be classed as a ‘relevant merger situation’ by the CMA?
  3. Identify some different methods that one business could use to gain material influence over the way another company operates.
  4. Outline the ‘turnover test’, the ‘share of supply test’ and the ‘hybrid test’.
  5. Discuss the potential advantages of using behavioural remedies as opposed to structural remedies in merger cases. Why has the CMA still preferred the use of structural remedies in most situations?

In a blog in October 2024, we looked at global uncertainty and how it can be captured in a World Uncertainty Index. The blog stated that ‘We continue to live through incredibly turbulent times. In the past decade or so we have experienced a global financial crisis, a global health emergency, seen the UK’s departure from the European Union, and witnessed increasing levels of geopolitical tension and conflict’.

Since then, Donald Trump has been elected for a second term and has introduced sweeping tariffs. What is more, the tariffs announced on so-called ‘Liberation Day‘ have not remained fixed, but have fluctuated with negotiations and threatened retaliation. The resulting uncertainty makes it very hard for businesses to plan and many have been unwilling to commit to investment decisions. The uncertainty has been compounded by geopolitical events, such as the continuing war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza and the June 13 Israeli attack on Iran.

The World Uncertainty Index (WUI) tracks uncertainty around the world by applying a form of text mining known as ‘term frequency’ to the country reports produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The words searched for are ‘uncertain’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘uncertainties’ and the number of times they occur as percentage of the total words is recorded. To produce the WUI this figure is then multiplied by 1m. A higher WUI number indicates a greater level of uncertainty.

The monthly global average WUI is shown in Chart 1 (click here for a PowerPoint). It is based on 71 countries. Since 2008 the WUI has averaged a little over 23 000: i.e. 2.3 per cent of the text in EIU reports contains the word ‘uncertainty’ or a close variant. In May 2025, it was almost 79 000 – the highest since the index was first complied in 2008. The previous highest was in March 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 outbreak, when the index rose to just over 56 000.

The second chart shows the World Trade Uncertainty Index (WTUI), published on the same site as the WUI (click here for a PowerPoint). The method adopted in its construction therefore mirrors that for the WUI but counts the number of times in EIU country reports ‘uncertainty’ is mentioned within proximity to a word related to trade, such as ‘protectionism’, ‘NAFTA’, ‘tariff’, ‘trade’, ‘UNCTAD’ or ‘WTO.’

The chart shows that in May 2025, the WTUI had risen to just over 23 000 – the second highest since December 2019, when President Trump imposed a new round of tariffs on Chinese imports and announced that he would restore steel tariffs on Brazil and Argentina. Since 2008, the WTUI has averaged just 2228.

It remains to be seen whether more stability in trade relations and geopolitics will allow WUI and WUTI to decline once more, or whether greater instability will simply lead to greater uncertainty, with damaging consequences for investment and also for consumption and employment.

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Uncertainty Indices

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by ‘text mining’. What are its strengths and weaknesses in assessing business, consumer and trade uncertainty?
  2. Explain how the UK Monthly EPU Index is derived.
  3. Why has uncertainty increased so dramatically since the start of 2025?
  4. Compare indices based on text mining with confidence indices.
  5. Plot consumer and business/industry confidence indicators for the past 24 months, using EC data. Do they correspond with the WUI?
  6. How may uncertainty affect consumers’ decisions?

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) outlines a new regulatory approach that the European Commission (EC) is taking to address concerns over the lack of competition in digital platform markets. The DMA complements existing European Union competition law and officially came into force on 1st November 2022.

In the first stage of this new regulatory approach, the EC identified ten core platform services (CPS). Examples include search engines, online social networking services, video sharing services, cloud computing services, web browsers and operating systems. These services act as important gateways for large numbers of businesses and consumers to interact with one another. They also have some important economic characteristics, such as large economies of scale and very strong network effects.

The next stage of the regulatory process was to assess which of the large established businesses should be designated as ‘gatekeepers’ of these CPS. To be judged as a gatekeeper, a business had to meet three qualitative criteria. Using quantitative thresholds as a guide to see if these qualitative criteria had been met, the following six companies were designated as gatekeepers by the EC in September 2023: Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Apple, ByteDance (owner of TikTok), Meta (owner of Facebook) and Microsoft. Individual companies can be gatekeeper for more than one CPS. For example, Apple was judged to be a gatekeeper for both web browsers (Safari) and operating systems (iOS and iPadOS).

Rules and compliance

Once a business has been designated as a gatekeeper for one or more CPS, the DMA imposes a set of rules on its future conduct. Some of these rules refer to conduct that the business must follow, while others refer to types of behaviour that are prohibited. The EC sometimes refer to these rules as a list of “do’s” and “don’ts”.

One of the rules refers to interoperability. This is the degree to which different (a) software, (b) devices and (c) other applications can work seamlessly together (i.e. share functionality/data) without requiring any actions by the user (i.e. how compatible they are with one another).

For example, consider the degree of interoperability between the operating system of a gatekeeper, such as Apple, and other hardware/software services. One of the requirements of the DMA is for the gatekeeper to provide the same degree of interoperability for the hardware/software services provided by rival businesses as they do for similar hardware/software services they supply. This is sometimes referred to as the interoperability obligation.

Once a business is designated as a gatekeeper, it has 6 months to submit a compliance report to the EC that demonstrates how it is meeting the rules set out in the DMA. This should include descriptions of any changes the company has had to make to its conduct to meet the new requirements. Further compliance reports must then be submitted on an annual basis.

If, after assessing a compliance report, the EC suspects that a gatekeeper is still acting in ways that do not comply with the DMA, then it can launch either a non-compliance or specification procedure.

The case of Apple

Apple submitted its first compliance report on 7 March 2024. It was far less extensive than those completed by other designated gatekeepers and adopted a very different tone: it directly challenged the EC’s view that the DMA rules would have a positive impact on consumer welfare.

In September 2024, the EC launched its first two specification proceedings that focused on Apple’s compliance with the interoperability obligation.

The first of these proceedings opened a formal discussion with Apple over the interoperability between the iPhone operating system (iOS) and connected devices such as smartwatches and headphones. The proceeding identified nine features that gave the iOS greater functional compatibility with connected devices produced by Apple than with those made by other businesses. For example:

  • Only users of connected devices produced by Apple can (a) receive iOS notifications that contain images or other attachments and (b) select the iOS notifications they want to appear on the device.
  • Only users of Apple’s wireless headphones have intelligent audio switching functionality that allows them to switch automatically to the device playing the most relevant audio.
  • The Airdrop function, which enables users to share files wirelessly between devices, only works if they are both produced by Apple.
  • Only connected devices made by Apple have the functionality for high-bandwidth data transfer from an iPhone without having to rely on network or cellular connection. This is useful for gaming and AI services.

The second specification proceeding focused on the process developed by Apple to deal with requests from other businesses that wanted to develop hardware or software services that are compatible with the iOS.

On 18th December 2024, the EC informed Apple of its preliminary specification decisions and opened a consultation exercise with other interested parties about the suitability of its proposals. Once this process was completed, the EC informed Apple of its final specification decisions on 19 March 2025.

The EC’s decisions

The first decision included a set of measures that Apple must take to improve the interoperability of connected devices produced by other businesses with the iOS. The EC stated that:

The interoperability solutions for third parties will have to be equally effective to those available to Apple and must not require more cumbersome system setting or additional user friction.

The second decision outlined measures that Apple had to take to improve the process of dealing with requests for greater compatibility with the iOS. For example, it should provide outside businesses with more (a) access to technical documentation, (b) predictable timelines for the reviews and (c) timely updates.

Apple argued that being forced to introduce these measures will (a) create significant additional costs, (b) limit its ability to develop products that work seamlessly with one another and (c) lead to its having to share sensitive customer information with its rivals.

On 30th May 2025, Apple filed an appeal against the EC’s specification decisions to the General Court of the European Union. It will be interesting to see what judgment is made on this case by the General Court and the implications this has for the enforcement of the DMA.

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Questions

  1. Identifying core platform services is similar to defining relevant markets in standard competition policy but takes a more legalistic approach. Discuss some of the problems of defining a relevant market for a digital platform.
  2. Outline the three qualitative criteria and the quantitative thresholds that are used by the EC to designate a digital platform as a gatekeeper of a core platform service.
  3. Find an example of a digital platform that met the quantitative thresholds but did not meet the qualitative criteria and so was not designated as a gatekeeper.
  4. Find an example of a digital platform that did not meet the quantitative thresholds but did meet the qualitative criteria and so was designated as a gatekeeper.
  5. Interoperability is a type of conduct that is sometimes referred to as self-preferencing: i.e. behaviour by a digital platform that gives its own products/services preferential treatment over those provided by other firms that use the same platform. What other types of conduct are possible examples of self-preferencing?
  6. What is the difference between a non-compliance procedure and a specification procedure? Find some recent examples of non-compliance procedures that have been undertaken by the EC to enforce the DMA.
  7. What are the potential advantages and disadvantages for consumer welfare of the specification decisions made by the EC?

Tesla sales have fallen dramatically recently. In Europe they were down 47.7% in January 2025 compared with January 2024. In Spain the figure was 75.4%, in France 63.4%, in Germany 59.5%, in Sweden 44.3%, in Norway 37.9%, in the UK 18.2% and in Italy 13.4%. And it was not just Europe. In Australia the figure was 33.2%, in China 15.5% and in California 11.6%. Meanwhile, Tesla’s share price has fallen from a peak of $480 on 17 December 2024 to $338 on 21 February 2025, although that compares with $192 in February 2024.

So why have Tesla sales fallen? It’s not because of a rise in price (a movement up the demand curve); indeed, Tesla cut its prices in 2024. Part of the reason is on the supply side. In several countries, stocks of Teslas are low. Some consumers who would have bought have had to wait. However, the main reason is that the demand curve has shifted to the left. So why has this happened?

A reaction to Elon Musk?

One explanation is a growing unpopularity of Elon Musk among many potential purchasers of electric vehicles (EVs). People are more likely to buy an EV if they are environmentally concerned and thus more likely to be Green voters or on the political left and centre. Elon Musk, by supporting Donald Trump and now a major player in the Trump administration, is seen as having a very different perspective. Trump’s mantra of ‘drill, baby drill’ and his announced withdrawal from the Paris agreement and the interventions of Trump, Vance and Musk in European politics have alienated many potential purchasers of new Teslas. Elon Musk has been a vocal supporter of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, describing the party as the ‘last spark of hope for this country’ (see BBC article linked below).

There has been outspoken criticism of Musk in the media and the Financial Times reports existing owners of Teslas, who are keen to distance themselves from Musk, ordering stickers for their cars which read ‘I bought this before Elon went crazy’. In a survey by Electrifying.com, 59% of UK potential EV buyers stated that Musk’s reputation put them off buying a Tesla.

Other reasons for a leftward shift in the demand for Teslas

But is it just the ‘Musk factor’ that has caused a fall in demand? It is useful to look at the general determinants of demand and see how each might have affected the demand for Teslas.

The price, number, quality and availability of substitutes  Tesla faces competition, not only from long-established car companies, such as Ford, VW, Volvo/Polestar, Seat/Cupra and Toyota, moving into the EV market, but also from Chinese companies, such as BYD and NIO. These are competing in all segments of the EV market and competition is constantly increasing. Some of these companies are competing strongly with Tesla in terms of price; others in terms of quality, style and imaginative features. The sheer number of competitor models has grown rapidly. For some consumers, Teslas now seem dated compared with competitors.

The price and availability of complements.  The most relevant complement here is electrical charging points. As Teslas can be charged using both Tesla and non-Tesla charging points, there is no problem of compatibility. The main issue is the general one for all EVs and that is how to achieve range conveniently. The fewer the charging points and more widely disbursed they are, the more people will be put off buying an EV, especially if they are not able to have a charging point at home. Clearly, the greater the range of a model (i.e. the distance that can be travelled on a full battery), the less the problem. Teslas have a relatively high range compared with most (but not all) other makes and so this is unlikely to account for the recent fall in demand, especially relative to other makes.

Expectations.  The current best-selling Tesla EV is the Model Y. This model is being relaunched in a very different version, as are other Tesla models. Consumers may prefer to wait until the new models become available. In the meantime, demand would be expected to fall.

Conclusions

As we have seen, there have been a number of factors adversely affecting Tesla sales. Growing competition is a major factor. Nevertheless, the increasing gap politically between Elon Musk and many EV consumers is a major factor – a factor that is likely to grow in significance if Musk’s role in the Trump administration continues to be one of hostility towards the liberal establishment and in favour of the hard right.

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Questions

  1. Why have BYD EV sales risen so rapidly?
  2. If people feel strongly about a product on political or ethical grounds, how is that likely to affect their price elasticity of demand for the product?
  3. Find out how Tesla shareholders are reacting to Elon Musk’s behaviour.
  4. Find out how Tesla sales have changed among (a) Democratic voters and (b) Republican voters in the USA. How would you explain these trends?
  5. Identify some products that you would or would not buy on ethical grounds. How carefully have you researched these products?