Category: Economics for Business: Ch 06

Recently, a flurry of bankruptcies among non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) in the USA has drawn attention to the risks associated with alternative credit channels in the shadow-banking sector – lending which is not financed with deposits. There is concern that this could be the start of a wave of bankruptcies among such NBFIs, especially given concerns about a potential downswing in the economic cycle – a time when defaults are more likely.

While providing alternative sources of funding, the opacity of lending in the shadow-banking sector means it is not clear what risks NBFIs face themselves and, more significantly, what risks they pose to the financial system as a whole. There is particular concern about the impact on regulated banks.

Already, JP Morgan Chase in its third quarter earnings report announced a $170m charge stemming from the bankruptcy of Tricolor, which specialised in sub-prime car financing. Mid-sized banks, Western Alliance and Zions Bancorp, have reported losses from loans to a group of distressed real estate funds. This has highlighted the interconnectedness between NBFIs and regulated banking, and the potential for problems in the shadow-banking sector to have a direct impact on mainstream banks.

In this blog, we will trace the secular trends in the financial systems of more advanced economies which have given rise to alternative credit channels and, in turn, to potential banking crises. We will explain the relationship between regulated banks and shadow banks, analysing the risks involved, the potential impact on the financial system and the policy implications.

What are the secular trends in banking?

The traditional model of commercial banking involved taking deposits and using them to finance loans to households and firms. However, cycles of banking crises, regulatory changes and financial innovation over the past 50 years produced new models.

First, banks diversified away from direct lending to providing other banking services – on-balance sheet activities, such as investing in financial securities, and off-balance sheet activities, such as acting as agents in the sale of financial securities.

Second, alternative credit channels based on financial markets have grown in significance.

In the 1980s, international regulations around traditional banking activities – taking deposits and making loans – were being formalised by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) under what became known as the Basel framework (see, for example, Economics section 18.2 or Economics for Business section 28.2). For the first time, this stipulated liquidity and capital requirements for international banks relating to their traditional lending activities. However, at the same time the deregulation of financial markets and financial innovation provided banks with opportunities to derive revenues from a range of other financial services.

After the financial crisis, liquidity and capital requirements for banks were tightened further through the Basel III regulations. Commercial banks had to have even higher levels of capital as a buffer for bad debts associated with direct lending. A higher level of capital to cover potential losses increases the marginal cost of lending, since each pound of additional loan requires additional capital. This reduced the marginal return, and consequently, the incentive to lend directly.

These regulatory developments created an incentive to pursue activities which do not require as much capital, since their marginal cost is lower and potential return is higher. Consequently, banks have placed less emphasis on lending and more on purchasing short-term and long-term financial securities and generating non-interest income from off-balance sheet activities. For instance, research by the Bank of England found that during the 1980s, interest income accounted for more than two-thirds of total income for large international banks. In contemporary times, non-interest income tends to be greater than interest income. Figure 1 illustrates the declining proportion of total assets represented by commercial and consumer loans for all regulated US banks. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

With banks originating less lending, activity has migrated to different avenues in the shadow-banking sector. This sector has always existed, but deregulation and financial innovation created opportunities for the growth of shadow banking – lending which is not financed with deposits. Traditionally, non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs), such as pension funds, hedge funds and insurance companies, use funds from investors to buy securities through financial markets. However, new types of NBFIs have emerged which originate loans themselves, notably private credit institutions. As Figure 2 illustrates, a lot of the expansion in the activities of NBFIs has been the due to increased lending by these institutions (defined as ‘other financial institutions (OFIs)). Note that the NBFI line includes OFIs. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

Since, NBFIs operate outside conventional regulatory frameworks, their credit intermediation and maturity transformation are not subject to the same capital requirements or oversight that banks are. As a result, they do not need to have the same level of capital to insulate against loan losses. Therefore, lending in the shadow-banking sector has a lower marginal cost compared to equivalent lending in the banking sector. Consequently, it generates a higher rate of return. This can explain the large growth in the assets of OFIs illustrated in Figure 2.

Risks in shadow banking

Banking involves trade-offs and this is the case whether the activities happen in the regulated or shadow-banking sector. Increasing lending increases profitability. But as lending continues to increase, at some point the risk-return profile becomes less favourable since institutions are lending to increasingly higher-risk borrowers and for higher-risk projects.

In downturns, when rates of defaults rise, such risks become apparent. Borrowers fail and default, causing significant loan losses for lenders. With lower levels of capital, NBFIs will have a lower buffer to insulate investors from these losses, increasing the likelihood of default.

Is this a problem? Well, for a long-time regulators thought not. It was thought that failures in the shadow-banking sector would have no implications for deposit-holders in regulated banks and the payments mechanism. Unfortunately, current developments in the USA have highlighted that this is unlikely to be the case.

The connections between regulated and shadow banking

The financial system is highly interconnected, and each successive financial crisis has shown that systemic risks lurk in obscure places. On the face of it, NBFIs appear separate from regulated banks. But banks’ new business models have not removed them from the lending channel, merely changed their role. Short-term financing used to be conducted and funded by banks. Now, it is conducted by NBFIs, but still financed by banks. Long-term loan financing is no longer on banks’ balance sheets. However, while the lending is conducted by NBFIs, it is largely funded by banks.

NBFIs cannot be repositories of liquidity. Since they do not have deposits and are not part of the payments system, they have no access to official liquidity backstops. So, they do so indirectly by using deposit-taking banks as liquidity insurance. Banks provide this liquidity in a variety of ways:

  • Investing in the securities issued by private capital funds;
  • Providing bridge financing to credit managers to securitise credit card receivables;
  • Providing prime broker financing to a hedge fund engaged in proprietary trading.

Furthermore, banks have increasingly made loans to NBFIs. Data for US commercial banks lending to the shadow-banking sector are publicly available only since 2015. But, as Figure 3 illustrates, it has seen a steady upward trend with a surge in activity in 2025. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

Banks had an incentive to diversify into these activities since they are a source of revenue requiring less regulatory capital. The model requires risk and return to follow capital out of the banking system into the shadow-banking sector. However, while risky capital and its associated expected return have moved in the shadow-banking system, not all of the liquidity and credit default risk may have done so. Ultimately, some of that risk may be borne by the deposit-holders of the banks.

This is not an issue if banks are fully aware of the risks. However, problems arise when banks do not know the full risks they are taking.

There are reasons why this may be the case. Credit markets involve significant asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. This creates conditions for the classic problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.

Moral hazard is a hidden action problem, whereby borrowers take greater risks because they share the possible downside losses with the lender. Adverse selection is the hidden information problem, whereby lenders do not have full information about the riskiness of borrowers or their activities.

The economics of information suggests that banks exploit scale, scope and learning economies to overcome the costs associated with asymmetric information in lending. However, that applies to direct lending when banks have full information about credit default risk on their loan book. When banks finance lending indirectly through NBFIs, there is an extension of the intermediation chain, and while banks may know the NBFIs, they will have much less information about the risks associated with the lending they are ‘underwriting’. This heightens their problems of asymmetric information associated with credit default risk.

What are the risks at present?

The level of debt in the global economy is at unprecedented levels. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that it rose to $351 trillion dollars in 2024, approximately 235% of weighted global gross domestic product (GDP). It is in this environment that private credit channels through NBFIs have been expanding. With this, it is more likely that NBFIs’ trade-off between credit risk and return has tilted greatly in favour of the former. Some point to the recent collapse of Tricolor and First Brands – both intermediary financing companies funded by private credit – as evidence of elevated levels of risk.

Many are pointing out that the failures observed in the USA so far have a whiff of fraud associated with them, with suggestions of multiple loans being secured against the same working capital. However, such behaviour is symptomatic of ‘late-cycle’ lending, where the incentive to squeeze more profit from lending in a more competitive environment leads to short-cuts – short-cuts that banks, at one stage removed along the intermediation chain, will have less information about.

It is in a downturn that such risks become apparent. Widening credit spreads and the reduced availability of credit causes financial stress for higher-risk borrowers. Inevitably, that higher risk will lead to higher defaults, more provision for loan losses and write-downs in the value of loan assets.

While investors in NBFIs are first in line to bear the losses, they are not the only ones exposed. At moments of stress, the credit lines that banks have provided get drawn and that increases the exposure of banks to the risks associated with NBFIs and whoever they have lent to. As NBFIs fail, the financing provided by banks will not be repaid and they will thus have to absorb losses associated with the lending of the NBFIs. So, while it appears that risk has left the banking system, it hasn’t. Ultimately, the liquidity and credit default risk of the non-bank sector is financed by bank deposits.

Furthermore, the opaqueness of the exposure of banks to risks in the shadow-banking sector may have issues for the wider financial system. In 2008, banks became wary of lending to each other during the financial crisis because they didn’t know the exposure of counterparty institutions to losses from securitised debt instruments. Now, as more and more banks reveal exposures to NBFIs, concerns about the unknown position of other banks may produce a repeat of the credit crunch which occurred then. A seizing up of credit markets will worsen any downturn. However, unlike 2008, the financial resources available to central banks and governments to deal with any consequences are severely limited.

Only time and the path of the US economy will reveal the extent of any contagion related to lending in the shadow-banking sector. However, central banks are already worried about the risks associated with the shadow-banking sector and have been taking steps to identify and ameliorate them. Events in the USA over the past few weeks may accelerate the process and bring more of that lending within the regulatory cordon.

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Questions

  1. Explain why the need to hold more capital raises its cost for banks.
  2. Why does this reduce the lending they undertake?
  3. What is the attraction of ‘off-balance sheet transactions’ for regulated banks?
  4. Analyse the asymmetric information that banks face when providing liquidity to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
  5. Examine the dangers for the financial system associated with regulated banks’ exposure to NBFIs?
  6. Discuss some policy recommendations regarding bank lending to NBFIs.

The gold market has become one of the most talked-about commodity markets in 2025, with prices reaching record highs. This is largely due to increased demand from investors, who see gold as a ‘safe haven’ during times of economic and political uncertainty. Central banks are also buying more gold as a way to reduce their reliance on currencies like the US dollar. With many analysts predicting prices could reach over $4000 per ounce in the next year, the gold market is showcasing how supply and demand, confidence, and global events can all influence a commodity market.

The commodities market is where basic agricultural products, raw materials and metals, such as gold, are bought and sold, often in large quantities and across global exchanges. Commodities are typically traded either in their physical form (like gold bars) at current market prices (spot prices) or through financial contracts, where investors buy or sell in futures markets. These are where a price is agreed today to buy or sell on a specific future date.

As with other commodities, the price of gold is determined by supply and demand. Demand for gold typically rises during times of economic uncertainty as investors want a safer store of value. This results in an increase in its price. Supply and demand, and hence price, also respond to other factors, including interest rates, currency movements, economic growth and growth prospects, and geopolitical events.

Record high prices

This year, the gold market has seen a remarkable rally, with the price of gold hitting a record high. Demand for the precious metal has resulted in spot prices surging over 35% to date (see the chart: click here for a PowerPoint). Rising prices earlier this year have been attributed to the US President, Donald Trump, announcing wide-ranging tariffs which have upset global trade. On 2 September, the spot gold price hit $3508.50 per ounce, continuing its upwards trend.

The price has also been lifted by expectations that the Federal Reserve (the US central bank) will cut its key interest rate, making gold an even more attractive prospect for investors. If the Federal Reserve cuts interest rates, the price of gold usually increases. This is because gold does not pay any interest or yield, so when interest rates are high, investors can earn better returns from alternatives, such as savings accounts or bonds. However, when interest rates fall, those returns become less attractive, making gold relatively more appealing.

Lower interest rates also tend to weaken the US dollar, which makes gold cheaper for foreign buyers, increasing global demand. Since gold is priced in dollars, a weaker dollar usually leads to higher gold prices.

Additionally, interest rate cuts are often a response to economic problems or uncertainty. As gold is viewed as a safer asset for investors during times of economic uncertainty, investors will typically increase their demand.

Unlike the market for currencies or shares, gold doesn’t rely on the performance of a government or company. This makes it attractive when people are worried about things like inflation, recession, war or stock market crashes. Gold is thus seen as a ‘safe haven’.

Gold and the Federal Reserve

The rise in the price of gold by more than a third this year can be linked to the US election last year, according to the director of research at BullionVault (see the BBC article below). Attitudes of the Trump administration towards the Federal Reserve have created concerns among investors. Fears that the US administration could erode the independence of the world’s most important central bank have fuelled the latest flows into the metal, which is traditionally viewed as a hedge against inflation.

According to the BBC article, Derren Nathan from Hargreaves Lansdown claims that it is Trump’s ‘attempts to undermine the independence of the Federal Reserve Bank’ that were ‘driving renewed interest in safe haven assets, including gold’. Investors are concerned that a politicised Fed would be more inclined to cut interest rates than would otherwise be the case, sending long-term inflation expectations higher.

This could lead to fears that future interest rates would then be pushed higher. This would increase the yields on longer-term government bonds by pushing down their price, as investors demand higher compensation for the increased risk of higher future interest rates reducing the value of their fixed-rate investments. This would force the US Treasury to pay higher interest on new bonds, making it more expensive to service US government debt.

Expected price rises for 2026

As we saw above, it is predicted that the price of gold will rise to $4000 per ounce next year. However, if the market sees investors move away from dollar assets, such as US Treasuries, the price increases would be even higher. Daan Struyven, co-head of global commodities research at Goldman Sachs explains ‘If 1 per cent of the privately owned US Treasury market were to flow to gold, the gold price would rise to nearly $5000 per troy ounce’ (see Financial Times article below).

If the Federal Reserve does come under political pressure, it could affect the stability of the US economy and beyond. When gold prices rise sharply, demand usually falls in countries like China and India, which are the world’s largest buyers of gold jewellery. However, in 2025, this trend has changed. Instead of reducing their gold purchases, people in these countries have started buying investment gold, such as bars and coins, showing a shift in consumer behaviour from jewellery to investment assets.

At the same time, global events are also influencing the gold market. Suki Cooper, a metals analyst at Standard Chartered, said that events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have added to political uncertainty, which tends to increase demand for gold as a safe-haven asset. She also highlighted how changes in international trade policies have disrupted supply chains and contributed to higher inflation, both of which have made gold more attractive to investors. Additionally, a weaker US dollar earlier in the year made gold cheaper for buyers using other currencies, which boosted global demand even further.

Conclusion

Although the gold market is expected to remain strong over the next six months, some uncertainty remains. Many analysts predict that gold prices will stay high or even increase further, especially if interest rates in the US are cut as expected. Continued global instability, is also likely to keep demand for gold as a safe haven high. At the same time, if inflation stays elevated or trade disruptions continue, more investors may turn to gold to protect their wealth.

However, if economic conditions stabilise or interest rates rise again, gold demand could fall slightly, leading to a potential dip in prices. Overall, the outlook for gold remains positive, but sensitive to changes in global economic and political events.

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Questions

  1. What factors influence the price of a commodity such as gold on the global market?
  2. Use a demand and supply diagram to illustrate what has been happening to the gold price in recent months.
  3. Find out what has been happening to silver prices. Are the explanations for the price changes the same as for gold?
  4. Why might investors choose to buy gold during times of economic or political uncertainty?
  5. How will changes in interest rates affect both the demand for and the price of gold?
  6. What are the possible consequences of rising gold prices for countries like India and China, where there is a traditionally high demand for gold jewellery?
  7. How do global events impact commodity markets? Use gold as an example in your answer.

According to Ofcom’s November 2024 Online Nation report (see report linked below), UK adults are falling out of love with dating apps. Use of the top three platforms in the UK (Tinder, Hinge, and Bumble) is declining, even though most users are juggling multiple apps at once. So, what’s going on? Economics may have some valuable insights to help explain the decline.

Too much choice

First, dating platforms don’t function like typical commodity markets, where prices adjust until supply and demand balance. Instead, dating can be seen as what economists call a ‘matching market’, where success depends on mutual interest, not on a specific price. So even with thousands of potential matches, forming actual connections remains difficult, and more choice doesn’t necessarily translate into better outcomes.

In fact, more choice can backfire. The paradox of choice, a behavioural economics concept, suggests that too many options can lead to choice paralysis. Instead of feeling empowered by an abundance of potential partners, users can feel overwhelmed, unsure, and often less satisfied with whatever choice they end up making (if they make one at all).

So, while we often think of dating apps, like many other platforms, benefiting from positive network effects, where more users increase the platform’s value by offering more potential matches, this can also have negative effects. Swiping through endless profiles and repeating the same small talk, can turn dating into a chore rather than an exciting opportunity.

Adverse selection

What makes this even harder is that users can’t easily distinguish between who’s genuinely looking for the same thing you are, and who’s just there to pass the time. This information asymmetry leads to the adverse selection problem – a concept famously explored by economist George Akerlof in his 1970 paper ‘The Market for Lemons’ (see link below). He showed how lack of information about product quality can cause high-quality sellers to exit, resulting in market failure where the market becomes dominated by low-quality goods (i.e. ‘lemons’).

A similar dynamic can play out on dating apps. If users believe most profiles are unserious or not genuine, they become less willing to engage, or even stay on the platform. Meanwhile, the most genuine users may give up altogether, worsening the quality of the pool and discouraging others.

In economics, there are some well-known ways in which the problem of adverse selection could be overcome. One such possibility is through signalling, where the more informed person tries to reveal important information to the uninformed person. Indeed, platforms have experimented with signalling mechanisms, like verification tools for example. Paid subscriptions have also been implemented, which could help to some extent (assuming that those who are willing to pay are those who are genuine and serious about finding a match). But these solutions only go so far, and with fewer users paying to signal intent, the problem persists.

Lack of innovation

This ties into the wider revenue model of dating apps. Unlike many apps that rely on revenue from advertising on one side of the market to offer the app free to consumers on the other side, dating platforms often rely more on revenue through monthly subscriptions and paid upgrades. But with fewer users willing to pay, these platforms may be under pressure. This financial pressure may also affect their ability to innovate or improve the service.

In fact, in the dating app world, there is another reason why platforms may not be innovating as much as they should, aside from simply trying to convince their users to pay for a better service. While it seems like there’s endless choice in the dating app world, much of the market is controlled by a single company, InterActiveCorp (IAC), which owns Tinder, Hinge, Match.com and more. With limited competition, there’s less incentive to compete on quality.

Worse still, dating apps face a unique business problem: if their service works too well, users leave and delete the app. So, there may be a built-in tension between helping users succeed and keeping them swiping.

The outlook for dating apps

So, is the decline in dating app use just temporary, or the start of something bigger? Time will tell. However, from an economics perspective, there is a noticeable shift in demand towards substitutes, such as organised in-person social events and activities, which encourages more and more of these opportunities to emerge. This shift may reflect changing preferences and the costs (in terms of time and emotional energy) that users are willing to invest in online dating.

At the same time, AI already plays a key role in dating apps, and new possibilities seem to be emerging. For example, we could see a bigger rollout of AI-driven chatbots that facilitate conversations or even interact on behalf of users. This could make it easier to connect with potential matches and might help in addressing some of the other issues discussed above.

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Questions

  1. How might ‘signalling’ and ‘screening’ be used to create new features or services that could help overcome the adverse selection problem in this market?
  2. Can you think of any other ways in which the adverse selection problem could be overcome in this context?
  3. Draw a diagram to illustrate the two-sided nature of the dating app market, making clear where there may be positive or negative network effects.
  4. How else might dating app platforms be making revenue that allows them to offer the app to users at no charge?
  5. Is the dating app market competitive? You might consider factors such as the availability of substitutes, barriers to entry and innovation.

Tesla sales have fallen dramatically recently. In Europe they were down 47.7% in January 2025 compared with January 2024. In Spain the figure was 75.4%, in France 63.4%, in Germany 59.5%, in Sweden 44.3%, in Norway 37.9%, in the UK 18.2% and in Italy 13.4%. And it was not just Europe. In Australia the figure was 33.2%, in China 15.5% and in California 11.6%. Meanwhile, Tesla’s share price has fallen from a peak of $480 on 17 December 2024 to $338 on 21 February 2025, although that compares with $192 in February 2024.

So why have Tesla sales fallen? It’s not because of a rise in price (a movement up the demand curve); indeed, Tesla cut its prices in 2024. Part of the reason is on the supply side. In several countries, stocks of Teslas are low. Some consumers who would have bought have had to wait. However, the main reason is that the demand curve has shifted to the left. So why has this happened?

A reaction to Elon Musk?

One explanation is a growing unpopularity of Elon Musk among many potential purchasers of electric vehicles (EVs). People are more likely to buy an EV if they are environmentally concerned and thus more likely to be Green voters or on the political left and centre. Elon Musk, by supporting Donald Trump and now a major player in the Trump administration, is seen as having a very different perspective. Trump’s mantra of ‘drill, baby drill’ and his announced withdrawal from the Paris agreement and the interventions of Trump, Vance and Musk in European politics have alienated many potential purchasers of new Teslas. Elon Musk has been a vocal supporter of the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, describing the party as the ‘last spark of hope for this country’ (see BBC article linked below).

There has been outspoken criticism of Musk in the media and the Financial Times reports existing owners of Teslas, who are keen to distance themselves from Musk, ordering stickers for their cars which read ‘I bought this before Elon went crazy’. In a survey by Electrifying.com, 59% of UK potential EV buyers stated that Musk’s reputation put them off buying a Tesla.

Other reasons for a leftward shift in the demand for Teslas

But is it just the ‘Musk factor’ that has caused a fall in demand? It is useful to look at the general determinants of demand and see how each might have affected the demand for Teslas.

The price, number, quality and availability of substitutes  Tesla faces competition, not only from long-established car companies, such as Ford, VW, Volvo/Polestar, Seat/Cupra and Toyota, moving into the EV market, but also from Chinese companies, such as BYD and NIO. These are competing in all segments of the EV market and competition is constantly increasing. Some of these companies are competing strongly with Tesla in terms of price; others in terms of quality, style and imaginative features. The sheer number of competitor models has grown rapidly. For some consumers, Teslas now seem dated compared with competitors.

The price and availability of complements.  The most relevant complement here is electrical charging points. As Teslas can be charged using both Tesla and non-Tesla charging points, there is no problem of compatibility. The main issue is the general one for all EVs and that is how to achieve range conveniently. The fewer the charging points and more widely disbursed they are, the more people will be put off buying an EV, especially if they are not able to have a charging point at home. Clearly, the greater the range of a model (i.e. the distance that can be travelled on a full battery), the less the problem. Teslas have a relatively high range compared with most (but not all) other makes and so this is unlikely to account for the recent fall in demand, especially relative to other makes.

Expectations.  The current best-selling Tesla EV is the Model Y. This model is being relaunched in a very different version, as are other Tesla models. Consumers may prefer to wait until the new models become available. In the meantime, demand would be expected to fall.

Conclusions

As we have seen, there have been a number of factors adversely affecting Tesla sales. Growing competition is a major factor. Nevertheless, the increasing gap politically between Elon Musk and many EV consumers is a major factor – a factor that is likely to grow in significance if Musk’s role in the Trump administration continues to be one of hostility towards the liberal establishment and in favour of the hard right.

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Questions

  1. Why have BYD EV sales risen so rapidly?
  2. If people feel strongly about a product on political or ethical grounds, how is that likely to affect their price elasticity of demand for the product?
  3. Find out how Tesla shareholders are reacting to Elon Musk’s behaviour.
  4. Find out how Tesla sales have changed among (a) Democratic voters and (b) Republican voters in the USA. How would you explain these trends?
  5. Identify some products that you would or would not buy on ethical grounds. How carefully have you researched these products?