It was the 12th May 2010 and George Osborne’s first day as the UK’s new Chancellor of the Exchequer. His arrival at HM Treasury coincided with the latest ONS labour market release. Just in case you were rather distracted by political events, we take the opportunity here to trawl through some of the latest labour market numbers, focusing, in particular, on those that may pose real challenges for George Osborne and the new coalition government.
From the ONS release we observe that in the three months to March the total number of economically active individuals in the UK was 31.340 million. Of these, 28.829 million were employed while 2.510 million were unemployed (but actively seeking work). The number of people employed fell by 76,000 over the quarter (and by 341,000 over the year) while the number unemployed rose by 53,000 (279,000 over the year).
Now we consider the rate of unemployment. The unemployment rate expresses the total number unemployed as a percentage of those economically active. Over the first quarter of 2010 the unemployment rate rose to 8.0%, a rise of 0.2 percentage points on the previous quarter and a rise of 0.9 percentage points from a year earlier. It is the highest quarterly unemployment rate since the 8.1% recorded in Q3 1996.
Next, consider unemployment and gender. Of those unemployed in the first quarter of the year, 61.6% were male and 38.4% were female. The increase in the male unemployment rate during the economic slowdown has been especially marked. The male unemployment rate in Q1 2010 rose to 9.2%, up from 7.9% a year ago and 5.6% two years ago. The female unemployment rate has increased to 6.7% in Q1 2010 from 6.1% in Q1 2009 and 4.8% in Q1 2008. Therefore, over the past two years the male unemployment rate has risen by 3.6 percentage points while the female rate has increased by 2.1 percentage points.
Another troubling issue is unemployment amongst the young. The unemployment rate amongst those aged 18-24 is considerably higher than the overall rate. In the three months to March the unemployment rate for this age group was 17.9% compared with the overall rate of 8%. But, more than this, the current rate of unemployment amongst those aged 18-24 is actually higher than during the early 1990s when it peaked at 17.8% in Q1 1993. The male unemployment rate amongst this age group is especially high having risen to 20.7% in the first quarter of the year, up 2 percentage points on the year and up from 14.2% in Q1 2008. The female rate amongst this age group is 14.6%, up 1.3 percentage points on the year and up from 9.8% in Q1 2008.
Another issue that emerges out of the statistics is the rise in long-term unemployment. The number of people unemployed for more than one year rose to 757,000 in the first quarter, up from 509,000 a year ago and 397,000 two years ago. Perhaps, it is easier to see the magnitude of this problem when we note that 30.2% of those unemployed have been unemployed for at least one year – this is up from 24.5% in Q1 2008. Amongst females, 25% of those unemployed have been without work for at least one year, but amongst males this rises to 33.4%. In other words, one-quarter of unemployed females and one-third of unemployed males are now regarded as being long-term unemployed.
As troubling as these numbers are, the issue of long-term unemployment is one that, over the past two decades, has never really gone away. On average since 1992, 29.4% of those unemployed have been without work for at least one year (34.2% amongst men and 21.6% amongst women).
And now to our final observation: the historically high number of economically inactive individuals of working age. In the first quarter of 2010, 8.166 million of those of working age were economically inactive, up by 86,000 over the year. As a proportion of the working population, this equates to 21.5%, which is not in itself a record high – during 1983 it reached 23.2% – but it is, nonetheless, up from 20.7% a year ago. The inactivity rate amongst those of working age is highest amongst females at 25.9% (up from 25.7% a year ago) compared with 17.4% amongst men (up from 16.1% a year ago).
One factor that helps to explain the overall rise in inactivity is the 43,000 increase in the number of students who have become economically inactive over the past year. But, we also note upward pressures on inactivity over the past year from the increase of 37,000 in the number of people who are ‘long-term sick’ and from the 13,000 increase in the number who feel ‘discouraged’ from seeking work. These pressures highlight some of the many costs that arise from unemployment and potentially raise some tricky policy challenges for the new government.
Articles
UK unemployment rises in first quarter Investment Week, Hannah Smith (12/5/10)
UK unemployment climbs to a 16-year high Irish Independent, Svenja O’Donnell Brian Groom (13/5/10)
UK unemployment increases to 2.51 million BBC News (12/5/10)
Unemployment: what the experts say Guardian (12/5/10)
UK unemployment hits highest since 1994 The Times, Robert Lindsay (12/5/10)
Jobs recovery still fragile, ‘dire’ data shows Financial Times, Brian Groom (12/5/10)
Scottish unemployment rises by 10,000 in three months BBC News (12/5/10)
Unemployment rises to highest level since 1994, ONS says inthenews.co.uk, Sarah Garrod (12/5/10)
Data
Latest on employment and unemployment Office for National Statistics (12/5/10)
Labour Market Statistics, May 2010 Office for National Statistics (12/5/10)
Labour market statistics page Office for National Statistics
For macroeconomic data for EU countries and other OECD countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and Korea, see:
AMECO online European Commission
Questions
- What is meant by somebody being economically active? Do they have to be in a job to be economically active?
- Using the figures in the commentary, calculate the number of economically active people in Q1 2009 and so the change up to Q1 2010.
- If the number of people unemployed rises does this mean the rate of unemployment rises? Explain your answer.
- What factors might explain the persistent problem of long-term unemployment? What policy prescriptions would you offer the new coalition government in attempting to tackle this problem?
- Looking back through the commentary, pick out some of the notable gender differences. What factors might help to explain these?
- Are there any factors identified in the commentary that may be affecting the economy’s potential output?
The latest inflation release from the Office for National Statistics shows the annual rate of CPI inflation for April at 3.7%, up from 3.4% in March. In other words, the average price of a basket of consumer goods – the Consumer Price Index – was 3.7% higher in April than in the same month last year. In three of the last four months, the rate of inflation has been in letter-writing territory, i.e. more than 1 percentage point away from the government’s central inflation rate target of 2%. Of course, this time it was George Osborne, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was the recipient of the obligatory explanatory letter from Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England.
Over the past six months the average annual rate of rate of consumer price inflation in the UK has been 3.1%. It is, therefore, no surprise that there is considerable debate amongst commentators about the need for the Bank to raise interest rates. Part of the debate concerns the extent to which the Bank is right to argue that the current inflationary pressures are essentially short term and, according to May’s letter from the Governor to the Chancellor ‘are masking the downward pressure on inflation from the substantial margin of spare capacity in the economy’.
The Bank points to the impact on the inflation figures of what we might term ‘one-off effects’. These include, for instance, the restoration in January of the standard rate of VAT to 17½% and the raising in the Budget in March of certain excise duties (commodity taxes), such as those on alcoholic beverages and on petrol. The Bank also points to the effects from the weakening of Sterling, specifically on the prices of imports, and from the increase over the past year in the price of oil because of higher demand on the back of the global economic recovery. Again, the Bank continues to argue that these pressures should weaken over the next 12 months.
As you might expect of the economics profession, there are others who argue that the Bank is being somewhat complacent over the prospects for inflation. Of course, these are incredibly uncertain times. In effect, the Bank is having to assess, on the one hand, the significance of cost pressures, such as those emanating from oil and other commodity prices, and, on the other hand, the future strength of aggregate demand, particularly in response to the likely fiscal tightening, not only in the UK, but in many other parts of the world too.
While economists will always hold divergent views on the prospects for inflation and, more generally, the economy, we may see another debate reignited in the months ahead: the debate over the extent to which the government’s powers over both fiscal and monetary policy are constrained.
Since 1997, the Bank of England has had a clear mandate to target the rate of inflation. But, to what extent might this mandate cause tensions between fiscal and monetary policy in the months ahead given the government’s plans for fiscal consolidation? In particular, with a tightening of fiscal policy, so as to reduce the size of the government’s budget deficit, will the Bank of England be able to maintain low interest rates and thereby help to sustain aggregate demand? This will, of course, depend on the path of inflation and, importantly, the sources of inflation. Nonetheless, it will be interesting to see whether the clear, if limited, remit of the Bank of England places pressure on the UK’s macroeconomic policy framework in these difficult economic times.
Articles
UK inflation hits 17 month-high BBC News (18/5/10)
A tale of two zones BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (18/5/10)
Shock rise in inflation risks higher rates and unemployment Independent, Sean O’Grady (19/5/10)
Q&A: Unpleasant surprise for Threadneedle St Financial Times, Chris Giles (18/5/10)
Inflation rise see King rebuked Financial Times, Chris Giles (19/5/10)
UK inflation fears Financial Times (18/5/10)
Inflation: mercury rising Guardian (19/5/10)
The elephant in the room just got bigger Times Online, David Wighton (19/5/10)
Weak pound and tax rises lift inflation to a 17-month high (including video) Times Online, Grainne Gilmore (19/5/10)
Data
Latest on inflation Office for National Statistics (18/5/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Statistical Bulletin, April 2010 Office for National Statistics (18/5/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Time Series Data Office for National Statistics
For CPI (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) data for EU countries, see:
HICP European Central Bank
Questions
- What do you understand by cost-push and demand-pull inflation? To what extent are each of these significant in explaining the current rise in the rate of inflation?
- Outline the potential advantages and disadvantages of granting the Bank of England independence to set interest rates in meeting an inflation rate target.
- If the Bank of England’s remit were relaxed, say to include targeting output growth too, how might this affect its response to rising cost-push inflation? What about rising demand-pull inflation?
- Distinguish between a rise in the level of consumer prices and a rise in the rate of consumer price inflation.
- Describe the likely impact of an increase in the standard rate of VAT on the average consumer price level and on the annual rate of consumer price inflation both in the short term and in the longer term.
In our blog article IMF warns of the long-term need for fiscal consolidation we highlighted the concerns that the IMF had about the size of public debt-to-GDP ratios in those countries with weak fiscal credibility. Since 1997 the UK has undertaken a series of measures designed to enhance the credibility of fiscal policy and, in particular, to dispel the notion that fiscal policy is unduly sensitive to political needs. Firstly, we have seen the introduction of a Code for Fiscal Stability which outlines a series of principles which should underpin fiscal policy measures. Secondly, in response to the worsening state of the public finances, we have seen the introduction of a Fiscal Responsibility Act which requires governments to outline plans for delivering sound public finances and places a duty on them to deliver them.
The new UK coalition government is now introducing a new independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) which will have responsibility for assessing the public finances and the economy, including the generation of forecasts, and for assessing the public-sector balance sheets (i.e. the sector’s assets and liabilities). The OBR will begin its work immediately in readiness for an ‘emergency Budget’ on the 22nd June. According to the HM Treasury press release on 17 May the OBR will be headed by Sir Alan Budd, an economist who was a founder member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England. Sir Alan will head a 3-member Budget Responsibility Committee (BRC) which will be supported by economists and public finance experts currently working in HM Treasury, but who in the longer-term will redeployed from the Treasury. Legislation will be drawn up in order to establish the OBR on a permanent statutory basis.
In arguing the case for the OBR, the government points out that all Budget forecasts since 2000 of public borrowing for more than ‘1 year ahead’ have underestimated borrowing. For instance, the average error for ‘2 year ahead’ forecasts since 2000 is £29.5 billion, i.e. borrowing for the financial year after next has, on average, turned out to be £29.5 billion higher than predicted. Of course, we would expect shorter-term forecasts to be more accurate. The evidence presented shows the average error for ‘1 year ahead’ forecasts since 2000 to be £6 billion, i.e. actual borrowing in the following financial year has, on average, been £6 billion higher than forecast. But, more than this, since 2000 four Budgets – those in 2000, 2006, 2007 and 2009 – have produced ‘1 year ahead’ forecasts that over-predicted levels of borrowing.
While it will certainly be fascinating in the years ahead to assess the accuracy of the OBR’s own crystal ball in forecasting, the creation of the OBR is undoubtedly an interesting development in the way in which fiscal policy is both designed and implemented in the UK.
HM Treasury Press Notice
Chancellor announces policies to enhance fiscal credibility HM Treasury (17/5/10)
Articles
Osborne braced for cuts Financial Times, Lionel Barber, George Parker and Chris Giles (17/5/10)
Chancellor launches audit of government spending Independent, Andrew Woodcock (17/5/10)
Osborne gives up power to forecast Financial Times, Chris Giles (17/5/10)
Why the Office for Budget Responsibility Matters BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (17/5/10)
Osborne confirms new U.K. budget watch dog MarketWatch, William L Watts (17/5/10)
Osborne warns of ‘disastrous consequences’ for economy BBC News, Ben Wright (17/5/10)
Chancellor announces new fiscal watchdog BBC News (17/5/10)
Robert Chote on new OBR BBC Daily Politics, Robert Chote (17/5/10)
George Osborne discovers the joys of kitchen-sinking Telegraph, Tracey Corrigan (17/5/10)
George Osborne tackles Labour’s toxic handover Guardian,
Larry Elliott (17/5/10)
Mixed reaction to Office for Budget Responsibility Public Finance, Jaimie Kaffash (17/5/10)
Questions
- What do you understand by the concept of fiscal credibility?
- How important do you think the new OBR will be in enhancing the UK’s fiscal credibility?
- In what other ways have UK governments attempted to enhance the UK’s fiscal credibility in recent years?
- What do you see as the potential economic benefits of enhancing fiscal credibility?
- One of the first things that the incoming Labour Chancellor, Gordon Brown, did in 1997 was to make the Bank of England independent and create a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to set interest rates. What parallels do you see between the MPC and the newly created Budget Responsibility Committee (BRC)?
On the 14th May the IMF published its latest Fiscal Monitor. The key message coming out of this was the need for countries to reduce their public debt ratios, i.e. public debt relative to GDP. Specifically, the IMF is arguing that public debt ratios should be reduced to their ‘post-crisis levels’. In effect, this means countries need to undertake fiscal consolidation. The IMF recognises that the pace of fiscal consolidation should reflect underlying fiscal and macroeconomic conditions, but warns of the dangers of not doing so especially in those countries where the credibility of the current and medium-term fiscal position is weakest.
Underpinning the IMF’s argument for fiscal consolidation is their concern that higher public debt ratios necessitate higher interest rates in order to entice investors to purchase government debt. In those countries with weak fiscal credibility, a sizeable interest rate premium may be needed to entice investors to hold government debt over other types of investments. For instance, we have seen how the markets reacted to the perceived lack of fiscal credibility in Greece and how a series of measures, as discussed in Fixing the Euro: a long term solution or mere sticking plaster were needed to both restore normality to debt markets and to prevent contagion in markets for other country’s public debt.
The IMF argues that the impact of higher interest rates from high public debt-to-GDP ratios would be to reduce an economy’s potential growth. The mechanism by which this would happen would primarily be a reduction of labour productivity growth resulting from lower levels of investment and, hence, from slower growth in the country’s capital stock.
In short, the IMF is arguing that without credible fiscal consolidation plans, countries – particularly advanced economies – run a real risk of restricting their rate of economic growth over the longer-term. Of course, the challenge is to implement fiscal consolidation plans that protect short-term growth by cementing the current economic recovery but do not hinder longer-term growth. Now that is a real challenge!
Report
Fiscal Monitor, May 14 2010 IMF
Articles
IMF Says Rising Public Debt Risk ‘Cannot Be Ignored’ Bloomberg Businessweek, Sandrine Rastello (14/5/10)
US faces one of the biggest crunches in the world – IMF Telegraph, Edmund Conway (14/5/10)
IMF says that developed countries must curb their deficits BBC News (14/5/10)
Outlook for rich economies worsening – IMF Eurasia Review (14/5/10)
Britain’s public debt falls under IMF focus Financial Times, Alan Beattie (15/5/10)
Advanced Economies Face Tougher, Not Impossible, Fiscal Adjustment MarketNews.com, Heather Scott (14/5/10)
A good squeeze The Economist (31/3/10)
Data
IMF Data and Statistic Portal IMF
For macroeconomic data for EU countries and other OECD countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and Korea, see:
AMECO online European Commission
Questions
- Evaluate the argument put forward by the IMF that fiscal consolidation is necessary to prevent harming long-term economic growth.
- What are the economic dangers of consolidating a country’s fiscal position too quickly?
- What do you understand by short-run and long-term economic growth?
- What do you understand by potential growth?
- What could a government do to increase the perceived credibility of its fiscal position?
Each month the Bank of England reports on the amount of net lending by households. This is the amount that households have borrowed from financial institutions (gross lending) less any repayments households have made to financial institutions. In March, net lending to households was £643 million, down from £2.43 billion in February. Of the £643 million, £318 million was net secured lending (i.e. mortgage lending) and £325 million net unsecured lending (i.e. lending through credit cards, overdrafts and general loans).
Now, you might think that net lending of £643 million means that the stock of debt owed by households grew by £643 million. Well, not quite; some debt is ‘written off’ by financial institutions. When bad debts are taken into consideration we find that the stock of debt actually fell in March by £2.682 billion to stand at £1.460 trillion. Of this stock of debt, £1.239 trillion is secured debt and £221.65 billion is unsecured debt. Put another way, 84% of household debt is secured debt and 16% unsecured debt.
One of the interesting developments of late has been the decline in the household sector’s stock of unsecured debt. It has now fallen for 10 months in a row and in 16 of the last 18 months. Interestingly, in only 7 of these months was net unsecured lending actually negative. However, historically low sums of net unsecured lending combined with the writing-off of unsecured debt has meant that the stock of unsecured debt has fallen by £14.975 billion over the past 18 months. Over the same period the total stock of debt increased by £2.379 billion.
Patterns in net lending by households and in the growth of the stock of household debt reflect, on one hand, the willingness and ability of lenders to supply credit and, on the other hand, the demand by households for credit. On the supply-side, the financial crisis continues to restrict lending by financial institutions. But demand has been affected too because households as well as banks are looking to rebuild their balance sheets. Furthermore, the economic downturn, lower asset prices, including, until of late, lower house prices, as well as a sense of economic uncertainty have all contributed to a more precautionary mind-set amongst households.
This precautionary mind-set has impacted on the housing market. Housing market activity can, at best, be described as ‘thin’. Even though the seasonally-adjusted number of mortgage approvals for house purchase rose by 4.3% in March to 48,901, this is almost half the 94,043 seen on average each month over the past ten years. A further demonstration of the household sector’s precautionary behaviour is the sector using housing as a vehicle for saving. We observed in our blog article Saving through housing: households build firmer foundations that since the second quarter of 2008 additional housing investment (i.e. money spent on moving costs, including stamp duty, the purchase of newly built properties or expenditure on major home improvements) has been greater than net secured lending. This is known as negative housing equity withdrawal (HEW). In other words, the household sector’s stock of secured borrowing has increased by less than we would have expected.
In the 12 months to the end of March, the stock of secured debt rose by only 0.9% compared with an average annual growth rate of 9.8% over the past 10 years. Of course this doesn’t mean that households have simply been using some of their own money to fund housing investment, but that they have also been paying-off some of their existing secured debt. This, coupled with the 4.3% decline in the stock of unsecured debt, demonstrates the extent to which the household sector has been looking to consolidate. It would be something of a surprise if this consolidation was to stop any time soon.
Articles
Weak mortgage lending set to undermine house prices Independent, David Prosser (5/5/10)
Mortgage lending down almost 90% from 2007 peak Guardian, Katie Allen (4/5/10)
Mortgage approvals still sluggish, figures show BBC News (4/5/10)
Mortgage lending stalls this year Telegraph, Harry Wallop (4/5/10)
Lending dip fuels house price fall fears Press Association (4/5/10)
Data
Lending to individuals Bank of England
Monetary and Financial Statistics (Bankstats) Bank of England (See Tables A5.1 to A5.7, in particular)
Housing equity withdrawal (HEW) statistical releases Bank of England
Questions
- What do you understand by the term net lending? What would a negative net lending figure indicate?
- Illustrate with examples what you understand by secured and unsecured debt.
- What factors might explain why the household sector’s net secured lending has been less than the amount of its housing investment (e.g. the household sector’s purchase of new houses or its spending on major refurbishments)? Does this mean that stock of secured lending has been falling?
- What factors might explain the recent historically low levels of net unsecured lending?
- Does net lending have to be negative for the stock of debt to fall? Explain your answer.
- As well as the household sector, which other sectors might need to rebuild their balance sheets? How might such behaviour be expected to impact on the economy?