The debate about a minimum price for alcohol continues to be prompted by concerns over high levels of drinking, its effect on public health and public order, and a widespread belief that most of the alcohol that contributes to drunken behaviour is irresponsibly priced and sold. Minimum pricing for alcohol, although considered a radical intervention, is not a new policy. A minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol was introduced in Scotland in 2018, in Wales in 2020, in the Republic of Ireland in 2022 and looks likely to be introduced in Northern Ireland.
Despite more countries following Scotland’s lead, there are no current plans to consider an application of an MUP in England. However, with recent increases in the MUP in Scotland and the findings of a five-year review in Wales, it would suggest that this policy will continue to be at the forefront of discussions of how to tackle impacts of alcohol consumption.
Reasons and options for intervention
The main goal of introducing a minimum unit price for alcohol is to tackle unwanted consequences from the consumption of alcohol. While many people consume alcoholic drinks safely without any problems, some patterns of alcohol use are associated with significant physical, mental and social harm.
It costs UK society more than £27 billion a year through a combination of health, crime, workplace and social welfare costs. Therefore, some governments in the British Isles have deemed it necessary to intervene in this market to reduce alcohol-related harm and protect the health of those regularly drinking more than the recommended 14 units per week.
Research has shown that making alcohol less affordable can reduce consumption and hence related harms. The World Health Organization considers minimum pricing one of its ‘best buys’ for tackling harmful alcohol use.
There are three main policy options that aim to reduce the consumption of alcohol by making alcohol less affordable. One is to tax alcoholic drinks; the second is to set a minimum price per unit of alcohol; the third is to ban the sale of alcohol drinks below cost price (the level of alcohol duty plus VAT).
The policy option of an MUP has been adopted by Scotland, Wales and the Republic of Ireland; England has opted to use a ban on selling alcohol below the level of alcohol duty plus VAT (since 28 May 2014).
What is a minimum price?
The introduction by the government of a minimum price for a product means that it cannot legally be sold below that price. It can be set in order to achieve certain economic or social objectives that are not currently being achieved at equilibrium in the market. In order for the policy to have an effect, the minimum price must be set above the equilibrium price. This price floor then prevents prices from falling too low and settling back at equilibrium below the MUP.
A common misconception is that introducing a minimum price for alcohol is a form of taxation. However, this is not the case. Implementing an MUP means that any extra money from higher prices goes to the retailers and producers, not to the government.
Why choose a minimum price floor?
The policy has two main objectives. The first is to protect the interests of drinkers who may make poor decisions on their own behalf. This may be from lack of information, social pressures or a disregard for their own long-term health or welfare.
The second objective is to reduce the external costs placed on health services, the police, the criminal justice system, on fellow citizens or employers. There are also longer-term external costs when alcohol abuse impacts on productivity or leads to repeated absences from work.
It is argued that MUP intervention can encourage positive changes in behaviour of both consumers and producers. It can target harmful excessive drinking, while leaving the more moderate drinker relatively unaffected.
A positive impact on consumers is the possible changes in demand. People who previously consumed cheap, and often strong, drinks, such as cheap cider, will find that their marginal private cost of consuming alcohol has increased. Depending on the price elasticity of demand, their consumption will decrease and there will be a reduction in alcohol-related violence and other external costs. A positive impact on producers is that it can encourage drinks manufacturers themselves to reduce the alcohol content of their products and, therefore, limit any increase in price passed on to the consumer.
How it differs in the different parts of the British Isles
While minimum alcohol pricing is in place in several countries, policies differ. In terms of the British Isles, in 2018 Scotland became the first country to introduce a national minimum price for all types of alcohol. Two years later, Wales followed suit. The Republic of Ireland introduced minimum pricing in January 2022, while Northern Ireland has been engaged in consultation on the policy for several years. The following table shows when MUP was introduced and at what rates.
Has the MUP been effective?
Wales has reached the five-year review point since the MUP was introduced. Many of the findings within the Welsh evaluation have strong resonance with those elsewhere, particularly those of the final Scottish evaluation. There have been five main findings:
- Implementation has been smooth. Retailers have largely complied with the law, and enforcement has been effective.
- Certain cheap alcohol products have disappeared. Large bottles of strong cider, for example, are now rare. There have also been shifts in promotions and product availability.
- There are indications that overall alcohol consumption in Wales has declined. While it is difficult to measure directly, purchasing data suggests a reduction.
- Concerns about unintended consequences have not materialised significantly. Predictions of a rise in home brewing, substance switching, shoplifting and cross-border purchasing have not been widely observed.
- Some drinkers have changed their purchasing habits. A minority have switched from cider to wine or spirits as price differences narrowed. Others, particularly those on low incomes, experienced further struggles in financially maintaining their drinking habits.
There was also a study published last year (2024) in the journal Economic Inquiry, looking at the impacts of the policy during lockdown restrictions. The study showed that the introduction of MUP in Wales resulted in a 15% increase in transaction prices and a sharp reduction in the amount of alcohol bought, around 20%, with an overall drop in expenditure per customer compared to England over the same period.
However, it should be noted that the COVID pandemic disrupted drinking habits and the availability of alcohol. In addition, evaluating the overall effects of the policy has been complex with other economic factors, including the cost-of-living crisis, also influencing affordability.
Is it a fair policy?
A counter argument to applying a price intervention on alcohol is that it may have unintended private and external costs. One argument claims that young people could decide to switch to cheaper non-alcoholic drugs instead. Alternatively, they may seek to purchase alcohol on illegal shadow markets.
Critics of the policy argue that it negatively impacts those who consume alcohol responsibly, especially families on average or below-average incomes. The wine and spirits industry tried to lobby against the Scottish government, arguing that it is inconsistent with the operation of the free market and that the intervention creates a barrier to trade. They claim that lower sales of alcoholic drinks will cost jobs in the UK, both in manufacturing and from reduced revenues of corner shops, pubs and other retailers.
There is also an argument that relying solely on an MUP targets the affordability of drinking rather than addressing all aspects of alcohol harm. Therefore, this policy is not necessarily effective in achieving all the government’s goals. Critics argue that this policy should be one component of a more comprehensive strategy delivery, which might include education, restricting the availability of alcohol, banning advertising, increasing alcohol duty, etc.
Conclusion
Although there are currently no plans to implement an MUP in England, there is ongoing pressure for the Government to consider adopting one. In the Autumn of 2024, Lord Darzi carried out an independent investigation of the NHS in England. This investigation into the NHS highlighted the ‘alarming’ death toll in England caused by cheap drink (see link below). This led public health leaders to call for action to increase the price of cheap alcohol in supermarkets and off-licences.
However, the policy itself is not without its critics, especially those citing continued trends in actual numbers of alcohol-related deaths. Therefore, it is suggested that the policy needs to be accompanied by well-funded treatment and support services for people experiencing alcohol-related difficulties. If combined with other policy measures and social support, it has the potential to contribute significantly to reductions in alcohol-related harm.
Despite reservations, overall a minimum price per unit of alcohol is viewed by many as a justified intervention and is well supported by evidence. It has been accepted that a minimum price is required to reduce consumption closer towards the social optimum and in order to bring about change in consumer and producer behaviour. Given the evidence provided from current MUP countries and ongoing discussions of alcohol-related deaths in England, health officials believe a review is almost certain, even though the current government reportedly ruled out minimum unit pricing shortly after winning power.
Articles
Reports
Questions
- Using a supply and demand diagram, discuss the effect of introducing a minimum price per unit of alcohol.
- How is the price elasticity of demand for alcoholic drinks relevant to determining the success of minimum pricing?
- Compare the effects on alcohol consumption of imposing a minimum unit price of alcohol with a ban the sale of alcohol below cost price. What are the revenue implications of the two policies for the government?
- What negative externalities occur as a result in the over consumption of alcohol? How could a socially efficient price for alcohol be determined?
- Could alcohol consumption be described as a ‘de-merit good’? Explain.
- Rather than targeting the price of alcohol, what other policies could the government introduce to tackle over consumption of alcohol?
- What will determine the number of people travelling across borders within the UK (i.e. from Scotland or Wales to England) to buy cheaper alcoholic drinks?
Mid-December saw a rapid rise in coronavirus cases in London and the South East and parts of eastern and central southern England. This was due to a new strain of Covid, which is more infectious. In response, the UK government introduced a new tier 4 level of restrictions for these areas from 20 December. These amount to a complete lockdown. The devolved administrations also announced lockdowns. In addition, the Christmas relaxation of rules was tightened across the UK. Households (up to three) were only allowed to get together on Christmas day and not the days either side (or one day between 23 and 27 December in the case of Northern Ireland). Tier 4 residents were not allowed to visit other households even on Christmas day.
The lockdowns aimed to slow the spread of the virus and reduce deaths. But this comes at a considerable short-term economic cost, especially to the retail and leisure sectors, which are required to close while the lockdowns remain in force. In taking the decision to introduce these tougher measures, the four administrations had to weigh up the benefits of reduced deaths and illness and pressure on the NHS against the short-term economic damage. As far a long-term economic damage is concerned, this might be even greater if lockdowns were not imposed and the virus spread more rapidly.
In a blog back in September, we examined the use of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) to aid decision-making about such decisions. The following is an updated version of that blog.
The use of cost–benefit analysis
It is commonplace to use cost–benefit analysis (CBA) in assessing public policies, such as whether to build a new hospital, road or rail line. Various attempts in the past few months have been made to use CBA in assessing policies to reduce the spread of the coronavirus. These have involved weighing up the costs and benefits of national or local lockdowns or other containment measures. But, as with other areas where CBA is used, there are serious problems of measuring costs and benefits and assessing risks. This is particularly problematic where human life is involved and where a value has to be attached to a life saved or lost.
The first step in a CBA is to identify the benefits and costs of the policy.
Identifying the benefits and costs of the lockdown
The benefits of the lockdown include lives saved and a reduction in suffering, not only for those who otherwise would have caught the virus but also for their family and friends. It also includes lives saved from other diseases whose treatment would have been put (even more) on hold if the pandemic had been allowed to rage and more people were hospitalised with the virus. In material terms, there is the benefit of saving in healthcare and medicines and the saving of labour resources. Then there are the environmental gains from less traffic and polluting activities.
On the cost side, there is the decline in output from businesses being shut and people being furloughed or not being able to find work. There is also a cost if schools have to close and children’s education is thereby compromised. Then there is the personal cost to people of being confined to home, a cost that could be great for those in cramped living conditions or in abusive relationships. Over the longer term, there is a cost from people becoming deskilled and firms not investing – so-called scarring effects. Here there are the direct effects and the multiplier effects on the rest of the economy.
Estimating uncertain outcomes
It is difficult enough identifying all the costs and benefits, but many occur in the future and here there is the problem of estimating the probability of their occurrence and their likely magnitude. Just how many lives will be saved from the policy and just how much will the economy be affected? Epidemiological and economic models can help, but there is a huge degree of uncertainty over predictions made about the spread of the disease, especially with a new strain of the virus, and the economic effects, especially over the longer term.
One estimate of the number of lives saved was made by Miles et al. in the NIESR paper linked below. A figure of 440 000 was calculated by subtracting the 60 000 actual excess deaths over the period of the first lockdown (March to June 2020) from a figure of 500 000 lives lost which, according to predictions, would have been the consequence of no lockdown. However, the authors acknowledge that this is likely to be a considerable overestimate because:
It does not account for changes in behaviour that would have occurred without the government lockdown; it does not count future higher deaths from side effects of the lockdown (extra cancer deaths for example); and it does not allow for the fact that some of those ‘saved’ deaths may just have been postponed because when restrictions are eased, and in the absence of a vaccine or of widespread immunity, deaths may pick up again.
Some help in estimating likely outcomes from locking down or not locking down the economy can be gained by comparing countries which have taken different approaches. The final article in the first list below compares the approaches in the UK and Sweden. Sweden had much lighter control measures than the UK and did not impose a lockdown. Using comparisons of the two approaches, the authors estimate that some 20 000 lives were saved by the lockdown – considerably less than the 440 000 estimate.
Estimating the value of a human life
To assess whether the saving of 20 000 lives was ‘worth it’, a value would have to be put on a life saved. Although putting a monetary value on a human life may be repugnant to many people, such calculations are made whenever a project is assessed which either saves or costs lives. As we say in the 10th edition of Economics (page 381):
Some people argue ‘You can’t put a price on a human life: life is priceless.’ But just what are they saying here? Are they saying that life has an infinite value? If so, the project must be carried out whatever the costs, and even if other benefits are zero! Clearly, when evaluating lives saved from the project, a value less than infinity must be given.
Other people might argue that human life cannot be treated like other costs and benefits and put into mathematical calculations. But what are these people saying? That the question of lives saved should be excluded from the cost–benefit study? If so, the implication is that life has a zero value! Again this is clearly not the case.
In practice, there are two approaches used to measure the value of a human life.
The first uses the value of a statistical life (VSL). This is based on the amount extra the average person would need to be paid to work in a job where there is a known probability of losing their life. So if people on average needed to be paid an extra £10 000 to work in a job with a 1% chance of losing their life, they would be valuing a life at £1 000 000 (£10 000/0.01). To avoid the obvious problem of young people’s lives being valued the same as old people’s ones, even though a 20 year-old on average will live much longer than a 70 year-old, a more common measure is the value of a statistical life year (VSLY).
A problem with VSL or VSLY measures is that they only take into account the quantity of years of life lost or saved, not the quality.
A second measure rectifies this problem. This is the ‘quality of life adjusted year (QALY)’. This involves giving a value to a year of full health and then reducing it according to how much people’s quality of life is reduced by illness, injury or poverty. The problem with this measure is the moral one that a sick or disabled person’s life is being valued less than the life of a healthy person. But it is usual to make such adjustments when considering medical intervention with limited resources.
One adjustment often made to QALYs or VSLYs is to discount years, so that one year gained would be given the full value and each subsequent year would be discounted by a certain percentage from the previous year – say, 3%. This would give a lower weighting to years in the distant future than years in the near future and hence would reduce the gap in predicted gains from a policy between young and old people.
Cost–effectiveness analysis (CEA)
Even using QALYs, there is still the problem of measuring life and health/sickness. A simpler approach is to use cost–effectiveness analysis (CEA). This takes a social goal, such as reducing the virus production rate (R) below 1 (e.g. to 0.9), and then finding the least-cost way of achieving this. As Mark Carney says in his third Reith Lecture:
As advocated by the economists Nick Stern and Tim Besley, the ideal is to define our core purpose first and then determine the most cost-effective interventions to achieve this goal. Such cost–effectiveness analysis explicitly seeks to achieve society’s values.
Cost–effectiveness analysis can take account of various externalities – as many of the costs will be – by giving them a value. For example, the costs of a lockdown to people in the hospitality sector or to the education of the young could be estimated and included in the costs. The analysis can also take into account issues of fairness by identifying the effects on inequality when certain groups suffer particularly badly from Covid or lockdown policies – groups such as the poor, the elderly and children. Achieving the goal of a specific R for the least cost, including external costs and attaching higher weights on the effects on certain groups then becomes the goal. As Carney says:
R brings public health and economics together. Relaxations of restrictions increase R, with economic, health and social consequences. A strategic approach to Covid is the best combination of policies to achieve the desired level of infection control at minimum economic cost with due respect for inequality, mental health and other social consequences, and calculating those costs then provides guidance when considering different containment strategies. That means paying attention to the impact on measures of fairness, the social returns to education, intergenerational equity and economic dynamism.
Conclusion
Given the uncertainties surrounding the measurement of the number of lives saved and the difficulties of assigning a value to them, and given the difficulties of estimating the economic and social effects of lockdowns, it is not surprising that the conclusions of a cost–benefit analysis, or even a cost–effectiveness analysis of a lockdown will be contentious. But, at least such analysis can help to inform discussion and drive future policy decisions. And a cost–effectiveness analysis can be a practical way of helping politicians reach difficult decisions about life and death and the economy.
Articles (original blog)
- When Does the Cure Become Worse Than the Disease? Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to the Covid-19 Recovery
Journal of Medical Ethics, blog, Derek Soled, Michelle Bayefsky and Rahul Nayak (19/5/20)
- How much did the Covid-19 lockdown really cost the UK?
The Guardian, Larry Elliott (6/9/20)
- The UK lockdown: Balancing costs against benefits
VoxEU, David Miles (13/7/20)
- How Economists Calculate The Costs And Benefits Of COVID-19 Lockdowns
Forbes, Chris Conover (27/3/20)
- Coronavirus Is Giving Cost-Benefit Analysts Fits
Bloomberg, Cass R. Sunstein (12/5/20)
- “Stay at Home, Protect the National Health Service, Save Lives”: a cost benefit analysis of the lockdown in the United Kingdom
Wiley Online Library, David Miles, Mike Stedman and Adrian Heald (13/8/20)
- COVID-19 is Forcing Economists to Rethink the Value of Life
RealClearPolicy, James Broughel (20/8/20)
- A cost–benefit analysis of the COVID-19 disease
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Robert Rowthorn and Jan Maciejowski (28/8/20)
- Living with Covid-19: Balancing Costs against Benefits in the Face of the Virus
National Institute Economic Review, vol. 253, David Miles, Mike Stedman and Adrian Heald (28/7/20)
- How Many Lives Has Lockdown Saved in the UK?
medRxiv, Rickard Nyman and Paul Ormerod (21/8/20)
Articles (additional)
Questions
- What are the arguments for and against putting a monetary value on a life saved?
- Are QALYs the best way of measuring lives saved from a policy such as a lockdown?
- Compare the relative merits of cost–benefit analysis and cost–effectiveness analysis.
- If the outcomes of a lockdown are highly uncertain, does this strengthen or weaken the case for a lockdown? Explain.
- What specific problems are there in estimating the number of lives saved by a lockdown?
- How might the age distribution of people dying from Covid-19 affect the calculation of the cost of these deaths (or the benefits or avoiding them)?
- How might you estimate the costs to people who suffer long-term health effects from having had Covid-19?
- What are the arguments for and against using discounting in estimating future QALYs?
- The Department of Transport currently uses a figure of £1 958 303 (in 2018 prices) for the value of a life saved from a road safety project. Find out how this is figure derived and comment on it. See Box 12.5 in Economics 10th edition and Accident and casualty costs, Tables RAS60001 and RA60003, (Department of Transport, 2019).
It is commonplace to use cost–benefit analysis (CBA) in assessing public policies, such as whether to build a new hospital, road or rail line. Various attempts in the past few months have been made to use CBA in assessing policies to reduce the spread of the coronavirus. These have involved weighing up the costs and benefits of national or local lockdowns or other containment measures. But, as with other areas where CBA is used, there are serious problems of measuring costs and benefits and assessing risks. This is particularly problematic where human life is involved and where a value has to be attached to a life saved or lost.
Take the case of whether the government should have imposed a lockdown: an important question if there were to be a second wave and the government was considering introducing a second lockdown. The first step in a CBA is to identify the benefits and costs of the policy.
Identifying the benefits and costs of the lockdown
The benefits of the lockdown include lives saved and a reduction in suffering, not only for those who otherwise would have caught the virus but also for their family and friends. It also includes lives saved from other diseases whose treatment would have been put (even more) on hold if the pandemic had been allowed to rage and more people were hospitalised with the virus. In material terms, there is the benefit of saving in healthcare and medicines and the saving of labour resources. Then there are the environmental gains from less traffic and polluting activities.
On the cost side, there is the decline in output from businesses being shut and people being furloughed or not being able to find work. There is also a cost from schools being closed and children’s education being compromised. Then there is the personal cost to people of being confined to home, a cost that could be great for those in cramped living conditions or in abusive relationships. Over the longer term, there is a cost from people becoming deskilled and firms not investing – so-called scarring effects. Here there are the direct effects and the multiplier effects on the rest of the economy.
Estimating uncertain outcomes
It is difficult enough identifying all the costs and benefits, but many occur in the future and here there is the problem of estimating the probability of their occurrence and their likely magnitude. Just how many lives will be saved from the policy and just how much will the economy be affected? Epidemiological and economic models can help, but there is a huge degree of uncertainty over predictions made about the spread of the disease and the economic effects, especially over the longer term.
One estimate of the number of lives saved was made by Miles et al. in the NIESR paper linked below. A figure of 440 000 was calculated by subtracting the 60 000 actual excess deaths over the period of the lockdown from a figure of 500 000 lives lost which, according to predictions, would have been the consequence of no lockdown. However, the authors acknowledge that this is likely to be a considerable overestimate because:
It does not account for changes in behaviour that would have occurred without the government lockdown; it does not count future higher deaths from side effects of the lockdown (extra cancer deaths for example); and it does not allow for the fact that some of those ‘saved’ deaths may just have been postponed because when restrictions are eased, and in the absence of a vaccine or of widespread immunity, deaths may pick up again.
Some help in estimating likely outcomes from locking down or not locking down the economy can be gained by comparing countries which have taken different approaches. The final article below compares the approaches in the UK and Sweden. Sweden had much lighter control measures than the UK and did not impose a lockdown. Using comparisons of the two approaches, the authors estimate that some 20 000 lives were saved by the lockdown – considerably less than the 440 000 estimate.
Estimating the value of a human life
To assess whether the saving of 20 000 lives was ‘worth it’, a value would have to be put on a life saved. Although putting a monetary value on a human life may be repugnant to many people, such calculations are made whenever a project is assessed which either saves or costs lives. As we say in the 10th edition of Economics (page 381):
Some people argue ‘You can’t put a price on a human life: life is priceless.’ But just what are they saying here? Are they saying that life has an infinite value? If so, the project must be carried out whatever the costs, and even if other benefits are zero! Clearly, when evaluating lives saved from the project, a value less than infinity must be given.
Other people might argue that human life cannot be treated like other costs and benefits and put into mathematical calculations. But what are these people saying? That the question of lives saved should be excluded from the cost–benefit study? If so, the implication is that life has a zero value! Again this is clearly not the case.
In practice there are two approaches used to measuring the value of a human life.
The first uses the value of a statistical life (VSL). This is based on the amount extra the average person would need to be paid to work in a job where there is a known probability of losing their life. So if people on average needed to be paid an extra £10 000 to work in a job with a 1% chance of losing their life, they would be valuing a life at £1 000 000 (£10 000/0.01). To avoid the obvious problem of young people’s lives being valued the same as old people’s ones, even though a 20 year-old on average will live much longer than a 70 year-old, a more common measure is the value of a statistical life year (VSLY).
A problem with VSL or VSLY measures is that they only take into account the quantity of years of life lost or saved, not the quality.
A second measure rectifies this problem. This is the ‘quality of life adjusted year (QALY)’. This involves giving a value to a year of full health and then reducing it according to how much people’s quality of life is reduced by illness, injury or poverty. The problem with this measure is the moral one that a sick or disabled person’s life is being valued less than the life of a healthy person. But it is usual to make such adjustments when considering medical intervention with limited resources.
One adjustment often made to QALYs or VSLYs is to discount years, so that one year gained would be given the full value and each subsequent year would be discounted by a certain percentage from the previous year – say, 3%. This would give a lower weighting to years in the distant future than years in the near future and hence would reduce the gap in predicted gains from a policy between young and old people.
Conclusion
Given the uncertainties surrounding the measurement of the number of lives saved and the difficulties of assigning a value to them, it is not surprising that the conclusions of a cost–benefit analysis of a lockdown will be contentious. And we have yet to see what the long-term effects on the economy will be. But, at least a cost–benefit analysis of the lockdown can help to inform discussion and help to drive future policy decisions about tackling a second wave, whether internationally, nationally or locally.
Articles
- When Does the Cure Become Worse Than the Disease? Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to the Covid-19 Recovery
Journal of Medical Ethics, blog, Derek Soled, Michelle Bayefsky and Rahul Nayak (19/5/20)
- How much did the Covid-19 lockdown really cost the UK?
The Guardian, Larry Elliott (6/9/20)
- The UK lockdown: Balancing costs against benefits
VoxEU, David Miles (13/7/20)
- How Economists Calculate The Costs And Benefits Of COVID-19 Lockdowns
Forbes, Chris Conover (27/5/20)
- Coronavirus Is Giving Cost-Benefit Analysts Fits
Bloomberg, Cass R. Sunstein (12/5/20)
- “Stay at Home, Protect the National Health Service, Save Lives”: a cost benefit analysis of the lockdown in the United Kingdom
Wiley Online Library, David Miles, Mike Stedman and Adrian Heald (13/8/20)
- COVID-19 is Forcing Economists to Rethink the Value of Life
RealClearPolicy, James Broughel (20/8/20)
- A cost–benefit analysis of the COVID-19 disease
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Robert Rowthorn and Jan Maciejowski (28/8/20)
- Living with Covid-19: Balancing Costs against Benefits in the Face of the Virus
National Institute Economic Review, vol. 253, David Miles, Mike Stedman and Adrian Heald (28/7/20)
- How Many Lives Has Lockdown Saved in the UK?
medRxiv, Rickard Nyman and Paul Ormerod (21/8/20)
Questions
- What are the arguments for and against putting a monetary value on a life saved?
- Are QALYs the best way of measuring lives saved from a policy such as a lockdown?
- If the outcomes of a lockdown are highly uncertain, does this strengthen or weaken the case for a lockdown? Explain.
- What specific problems are there in estimating the number of lives saved by a lockdown?
- How might the age distribution of people dying from Covid-19 affect the calculation of the cost of these deaths (or the benefits or avoiding them)?
- How might you estimate the costs to people who suffer long-term health effects from having had Covid-19?
- What are the arguments for and against using discounting in estimating future QALYs?
- The Department of Transport currently uses a figure of £1 958 303 (in 2018 prices) for the value of a life saved from a road safety project. Find out how this is figure derived and comment on it. See Box 12.5 in Economics 10th edition and Accident and casualty costs, Tables RAS60001 and RA60003, (Department of Transport, 2019).
HS2 has been a controversial topic for some time now. Between the disruption it would cause to countless neighbourhoods and the protests that have emerged and the debate about the cost effectiveness of the project, it’s been in the news a fair amount. The transport network in the UK needs improving, not only for businesses located here, but also to encourage more investment into the country. HS2 is one of the solutions offered.
The latest estimate for the cost of HS2 is over £40 billion. However, many suggest that the benefits HS2 will bring do not cover the full costs. Furthermore, as noted above, other concerns include the disruption that it will bring to countless households who will be living along the proposed routes. Cost benefit analysis have been carried out to determine the viability of the project, but they are invariably difficult to do. As they involve determining all of the private and social costs and benefits and putting a monetary estimate onto them, there will inevitably be factors that are over-looked, under-estimated or over-estimated. The suggestions here are that the costs have been under-estimated and the benefits over-estimated.
In September, KPMG produced a report that estimated the overall benefit to the UK economy would be a boost to growth of 0.8%, which would benefit many businesses and communities. The British Chambers of Commerce said:
Business communities in dozens of cities and towns, from many parts of the UK, remain strongly supportive of HS2.
The railway network is also approaching full capacity and this is one of the reasons why HS2 has been proposed. A government source said:
We need to do something because our railways are nearly full, but the alternative to HS2 is a patch and mend job that would cause 14 years of gridlock, hellish journeys and rail replacement buses … The three main routes to the north would be crippled and the economy would be damaged.
However, this report has faced criticism, in particular because it ignored a variety of supply-side constraints and because they argue it would be more effective to simply update the existing network. 
However, a new government-commissioned report has suggested that this alternative to HS2 would involve 14 years of weekend route closures and much longer journey times. However, those in favour of updating existing routes have said that this new report commissioned by the government is ‘a complete fabrication’. Hilary Wharf of the HS2 Action Alliance commented:
This government-funded report is a complete fabrication. The main alternative to HS2 involves longer trains and reduced first-class capacity to provide more standard class seats…No work is required at Euston to deliver the necessary capacity increase. Work is only required at three locations on the WCML [West Coast Main Line], and this is comparable to the work being carried out on the route at present.
The debate regarding HS2 will continue for the time being and it is just another area that is fuelling the political playing field. Whatever is done, the rail network certainly requires investment, whether it is through HS2 or upgrades to the existing routes. The following reports and articles consider the latest developments and controversy regarding HS2.
Reports
HS2 Cost and Risk model Report: A report to Government by HS2 ltd HS2 Ltd March 2012
High Speed 2 (HS2) Limited: HS2 Regional Economic Impacts KPMG September 2013
Draft Environmental Statement: Phase One: Engine for Growth HS2 May 2013
Updated Economic Case for HS2 HS2 August 2012
Articles
HS2 alternative ‘would mean years of rail disruption’ BBC News (28/10/13)
Alternative to HS2 would see Britain suffer 14 years of rail misery, says Coalition Independent, Nigel Morris (28/10/13)
HS2 alternatives could require 14 years of weekend rail closures The Guardian, Rajeev Syal (28/10/13)
Passengers ‘face 14 years of chaos if HS2 is derailed’: ‘Unattractive’ package of closures would be needed to expand capacity if Labour withdraws support Mail Online, Jason Groves (28/10/13)
HS2: Labour to examine cheaper rival plan The Telegraph, Tim Ross and Andrew Gilligan (27/10/13)
Britain’s railways have become mere outposts of other nations’ empires The Guardian, John Harris (28/10/13)
’Years of delays’ if government backs down on HS2 rail project Financial Times, Kiran Stacey and Brian Gloom (28/10/13)
Questions
- What is a cost-benefit analysis? Explain the steps that are involved in any cost-benefit analysis.
- Conduct a cost-benefit analysis for HS2. Ensure that you differentiate between costs and benefits and between private and social concepts.
- How can we measure the costs and benefits of HS2?
- Explain how HS2 is expected to boost economic growth. Use the AD/AS model to illustrate this.
- To what extent is there likely to be a multiplier effect from HS2? Is it likely to benefit the whole economy or just those areas where the route lies?
- Conduct a cost-benefit analysis for the alternative suggestion. Which do you think is likely to be more feasible? Explain your answer.
- How will improvements to the rail network or the investment of HS2 benefit businesses in the UK economy?
“As snow sweeps the country, the UK has coped in the way it usually does – with surprise, confusion and chaos.” Not only have the transport authorities in many areas struggled to cope, but individuals too have been caught out. Many have rushed to stock up on things such as blankets, fires, de-icing equipment and warming foods.
But why does Britain cope worse than many other countries? Should more resources be diverted into keeping roads, airports and rail lines open? And how have individuals responded? How much have they stocked up on a range of cold-weather items and why? The linked article looks at these issues?
Why can’t the UK deal with snow? EU Infrastructure, Timon Singh (6/1/10)
Questions
- Does it make economic sense for the UK to invest relatively little in snowy-weather infrastructure?
- How should a local authority decide whether or not to (a) buy an additional gritting lorry; (b) increase its stock piles of grit? How would risk attitudes affect the decision?
- Why might a lower proportion of people get to work in the recent snowy weather than in equivalent weather 20 years ago?
- How might you define a ‘thermal elasticity of demand’ for a product, where the determinant of demand is the temperature?
- What factors determine the thermal elasticity of demand for a product? How is the short-term elasticity likely to be different from the longer-term elasticity and why?
- What would you need to include in measuring the full social costs to the economy of the cold spell?
