Tag: pricing

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming the way we live and work, with many of us knowingly or unknowingly using some form of AI daily. Businesses are also adopting AI in increasingly innovative ways. One example of this is the use of pricing algorithms, which use large datasets on market conditions to set prices.

While these tools can drive innovation and efficiency, they can also raise significant competition concerns. Subsequently, competition authorities around the world are dedicating efforts to understanding how businesses are using AI and, importantly, the potential risks its use may pose to competition.

How AI pricing tools can enhance competition

The use of AI pricing tools offers some clear potential efficiencies for firms, with the potential to reduce costs that can potentially translate into lower prices for consumers.

Take, for instance, industries with highly fluctuating demand, such as airlines or hotels. Algorithms can enable businesses to monitor demand and supply in real time and respond more quickly, which could help firms to respond more effectively to changing consumer preferences. Similarly, in industries which have extensive product ranges, like supermarkets, algorithms can significantly reduce costs and save resources that are usually required to manage pricing strategies across a large range of products.

Furthermore, as pricing algorithms can monitor competitors’ prices, firms can more quickly respond to their rivals. This could promote competition by helping prices to reach the competitive level more quickly, to the benefit of consumers.

How AI pricing tools can undermine competition

However, some of the very features that make algorithms effective can also facilitate anti-competitive behaviour that can harm consumers. In economic terms, collusion occurs when firms co-ordinate their actions to reduce competition, often leading to higher prices. This can happen both explicitly or implicitly. Explicit collusion, commonly referred to as illegal cartels, involves firms agreeing to co-ordinate their prices instead of competing. On the other hand, tacit collusion occurs when firms’ pricing strategies are aligned without a formal agreement.

The ability for these algorithms to monitor competitors’ prices and react to changes quickly could work to facilitate collusion, by learning to avoid price wars to maximise long-term profits. This could result in harm to consumers through sustained higher prices.

Furthermore, there may be additional risks if competitors use the same algorithmic software to set prices. This can facilitate the sharing of confidential information (such as pricing strategies) and, as the algorithms may be able to predict the response of their competitors, can facilitate co-ordination to achieve higher prices to the detriment of consumers.

This situation may resemble what is known as a ‘hub and spoke’ cartel, in which competing firms (the ‘spokes’) use the assistance of another firm at a different level of the supply chain (e.g. a buyer or supplier that acts as a ‘hub’) to help them co-ordinate their actions. In this case, a shared artificial pricing tool can act as the ‘hub’ to enable co-ordination amongst the firms, even without any direct communication between the firms.

In 2015 the CMA investigated a cartel involving two companies, Trod Limited and GB Eye Limited, which were selling posters and frames through Amazon (see linked CMA Press release below). These firms used pricing algorithms, similar to those described above, to monitor and adjust their prices, ensuring that neither undercut the other. In this case, there was also an explicit agreement between the two firms to carry out this strategy.

What does this mean for competition policy?

Detecting collusion has always been a significant challenge for the competition authorities, especially when no formal agreement exists between firms. The adoption of algorithmic pricing adds another layer of complexity to detection of cartels and could raise questions about accountability when algorithms inadvertently facilitate collusion.

In the posters and frames case, the CMA was able to act because one of the firms involved reported the cartel itself. Authorities like the CMA depend heavily on the firms involved to ‘whistle blow’ and report cartel involvement. They incentivise firms to do this through leniency policies that can offer firms reduced penalties or even complete immunity if they provide evidence and co-operate with the investigation. For example, GB eye reported the cartel to the CMA and therefore, under the CMA’s leniency policy, was not fined.

But it’s not all doom and gloom for competition authorities. Developments in Artificial Intelligence could also open doors to improved detection tools, which may have come a long way since the discussion in a blog on this topic several years ago. Competition Authorities around the world are working diligently to expand their understanding of AI and develop effective regulations for these rapidly evolving markets.

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Questions

  1. In what types of markets might it be more likely that artificial intelligence can facilitate collusion?
  2. How could AI pricing tools impact the factors that make collusion more or less sustainable in a market?
  3. What can competition authorities do to prevent AI-assisted collusion taking place?

In many countries, train fares at peak times are higher than at off-peak times. This is an example of third-degree price discrimination. Assuming that peak-time travellers generally have a lower price elasticity of demand, the policy allows train companies to increase revenue and profit.

If the sole purpose of ticket sales were to maximise profits, the policy would make sense. Assuming that higher peak-time fares were carefully set, although the number travelling would be somewhat reduced, this would be more than compensated for by the higher revenue per passenger.

But there are external benefits from train travel. Compared with travel by car, there are lower carbon emissions per person travelling. Also, train travel helps to reduce road congestion. To the extent that higher peak-time fares encourage people to travel by car instead, there will be resulting environmental and congestion externalities.

The Scottish experiment with abolishing higher peak-time fares

In October 2023, the Scottish government introduced a pilot scheme abolishing peak-time fares, so that tickets were the same price at any time of the day. The idea was to encourage people, especially commuters, to adopt more sustainable means of transport. Although the price elasticity of demand for commuting is very low, the hope was that the cross-price elasticity between cars and trains would be sufficiently high to encourage many people to switch from driving to taking the train.

One concern with scrapping peak-time fares is that trains would not have the capacity to cope with the extra passengers. Indeed, one of the arguments for higher peak-time fares is to smooth out the flow of passengers during the day, encouraging those with flexibility of when to travel to use the cheaper and less crowded off-peak trains.

This may well apply to certain parts of the UK, but in the case of Scotland it was felt that there would be the capacity to cope with the extra demand at peak time. Also, in a post-COVID world, with more people working flexibly, there was less need for many people to travel at peak times than previously.

Reinstatement of peak-time fares in Scotland

It was with some dismay, therefore, especially by commuters and environmentalists, when the Scottish government decided to end the pilot at the beginning of October 2024 and reinstate peak-time fares – in many cases at nearly double the off-peak rates. For example, the return fare between Glasgow and Edinburgh rose from £16.20 to £31.40 at peak times.

The Scottish government justified the decision by claiming that passenger numbers had risen by only 6.8%, when, to be self-financing, an increase of 10% would have been required. But this begs the question of whether it was necessary to be self-financing when the justification was partly environmental. Also, the 6.8% figure is based on a number of assumptions that could be challenged (see The Conversation article linked below). A longer pilot would have helped to clarify demand.

Other schemes

A number of countries have introduced schemes to encourage greater use of the railways or other forms of public transport. One of these is the flat fare for local journeys. Provided that this is lower than previously, it can encourage people to use public transport and leave their car at home. Also, its simplicity is also likely to be attractive to passengers. For example, in England bus fares are capped at £2. Currently, the scheme is set to run until 31 December 2024.

Another scheme is the subscription model, whereby people pay a flat fee per month (or week or year, or other time period) for train or bus travel or both. Germany, for example, has a flat-rate €49 per month ‘Deutschland-Ticket‘ (rising to €58 per month in January 2025). This ticket provides unlimited access to local and regional public transport in Germany, including trains, buses, trams, metros and ferries (but not long-distance trains). This zero marginal fare cost of a journey encourages passengers to use public transport. The only marginal costs they will face will be ancillary costs, such as getting to and from the train station or bus stop and having to travel at a specific time.

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Questions

  1. Identify the arguments for and against having higher rail fares at peak times than at off-peak times
  2. Why might it be a good idea to scrap higher peak-time fares in some parts of a country but not in others?
  3. Provide a critique of the Scottish government’s arguments for reintroducing higher peak-time fares.
  4. With reference to The Conversation article, why is it difficult to determine the effect on demand of the Scottish pilot of scrapping peak-time fares?
  5. What are the arguments for and against the German scheme of having a €49 per month public transport pass for local and regional transport with no further cost per journey? Should it be extended to long-distance trains and coaches?
  6. In England there is a flat £2 single fare for buses. Would it be a good idea to make bus travel completely free?

Coffee prices have been soaring in recent months. This applies to the prices of both coffee beans on international markets, coffee in supermarkets and coffee in coffee shops. In this blog we examine the causes and what is likely to happen over the coming months.

As we shall see, demand and supply analysis provides a powerful explanation of what has been happening in the various sectors of the industry and the likely future path of prices.

The coffee industry

The cultivating, processing and retailing of coffee is big business. It is the second most widely traded commodity after oil and around 2.5 billion cups are consumed worldwide on a daily basis. In the UK nearly 100 million cups of coffee a day are drunk, with coffee consumers spending around £4 billion per year on sit-down and takeaway coffees and on coffee bought in supermarkets and other shops for making at home. The average takeaway coffee costs around £3.40 per cup with speciality coffees costing more.

Global production in the coffee year 2023/24 was 178 million 60 kg bags (10.7 million tonnes) and the annual income of the whole sector exceeds $200 billion. Around 25 million farmers spread across 50 countries harvest coffee. The majority of these farms are small and family run. Some 100 million families worldwide depend on coffee for their living.

Brazil is by far the biggest producer and accounts for nearly 40% of the market. A good or poor harvest in Brazil can have a significant impact on prices. Vietnam and Columbia are the second and third biggest producers respectively and, with Brazil, account for over 60% of global production.

Coffee prices are extremely volatile – more so than production, which does, nevertheless, fluctuate with the harvest. Figure 1 shows global coffee production and prices since 1996. The price is the International Coffee Organization’s composite indicator price (I-CIP) in US cents per pound (lb). It is a weighted average of four prices: Colombian milds (Arabica), Other milds (Arabica), Brazilian naturals (mainly Arabica) and Robusta. Production is measured in 60 kilo bags.

Case Study 2.3 on the student website for Economics 11th edition, looks at the various events that caused the fluctuations in prices and supply illustrated in Figure 1 (click here for a PowerPoint). In this blog we focus on recent events.

Why are coffee prices rising?

In early October 2023, the ICO composite indicator price (I-CIP), was $1.46 per lb. By 28 August, it had reached $2.54 – a rise of 74%. Colombian milds (high-quality Arabica) had risen from $1.79 per lb to $2.78 – a rise of 55%. Robusta coffee is normally cheaper than Arabica. It is mainly used in instant coffee and for espressos. As the price of Arabica rose, so there was some substitution, with Robusta coffees being added to blends. But as this process took place, so the gap between the Arabica and Robusta prices narrowed. Robusta prices rose from $1.14 in early October 2023 to £2.36 in late August – a rise of 107%. These prices are illustrated in Figure 2 (click here for a PowerPoint).

This dramatic rise in prices is the result of a number of factors.

Supply-side factors.  The first is poor harvests, which will affect future supply. Frosts in Brazil have affected Arabica production. Also, droughts – partly the result of climate change – have affected harvests in major Robusta-producing countries, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. With the extra demand from the substitution for Arabica, this has pushed up Robusta prices as shown in Figure 2. Another supply-side issue concerns the increasingly vulnerability of coffee crops to diseases, such as coffee rust, and pests. Both reduce yields and quality.

As prices have risen, so this has led to speculative buying of coffee futures by hedge funds and coffee companies. This has driven up futures prices, which will then have a knock-on effect on spot (current) prices as roasters attempt to build coffee stocks to beat the higher prices.

There have also been supply-chain problems. Attacks on shipping by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea have forced ships to take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Again, this has particularly affected the supply of Robusta, largely grown in Asia and East Africa.

New EU regulation banning the import of coffee grown in areas of cleared rainforest will further reduce supply when it comes into force in 2025, or at least divert it away from the EU – a major coffee-consuming region.

Demand-side factors.  On the demand side, the rise of the coffee culture and a switch in demand from tea to coffee has led to a steady growth in demand. Growth in the coffee culture has been particularly high in Asian markets as rapid urbanistion, a growing middle class and changing lifestyles drive greater coffee consumption and greater use of coffee shops. This has more than offset a slight decline in coffee shop sales in the USA. In the UK, the number of coffee shops has risen steadily. In 2023, there were 3000 cafés, coffee chains and other venues serving coffee, of which 9885 were branded coffee shop outlets, such as Costa, Caffè Nero and Starbucks. Sales in such coffee chains rose by 11.9% in 2023. Similar patterns can be observed in other countries, all helping to drive a rise in demand.

But although demand for coffee in coffee shops is growing, the rise in the price of coffee beans should have only a modest effect on the price of a cup of coffee. The cost of coffee beans purchased by a coffee shop accounts for only around 10% of the price of a cup. To take account of the costs to the supplier (roasting, distribution costs, overheads, etc), this price paid by the coffee shop/chain is some 5 times the cost of unroasted coffee beans on international markets. In other words, the international price of coffee beans accounts for only around 2% of the cost of a cup of coffee in a coffee shop.

Higher coffee-shop prices are thus mainly the result of other factors. These include roasting and other supplier costs, rising wages, rents, business rates, other ingredients such as milk and sugar, coffee machines, takeaway cups, heating, lighting, repairs and maintenance and profit. The high inflation over the past two years, with several of these costs being particularly affected, has been the major driver of price increases in coffee shops.

The future

The rise in demand and prices over the years has led to an increase in supply as more coffee bushes are planted. As Figure 1 shows, world supply increased from 87 million in 1995/6 to 178 million 60 kilo bags in 2023/4 – a rise of 105%. The current high prices may stimulate farmers to plant more. But as it can take four years for coffee plants to reach maturity, it may take time for supply to respond. Later on, a glut might even develop! This would be a case of the famous cobweb model (see Case Study 3.13 on the Essentials of Economics 9th edition student website).

Nevertheless, climate change is making coffee production more vulnerable and demand is likely to continue to outstrip supply. Much of the land currently used to produce Arabica will no longer be suitable in a couple of decades. New strains of bean may be developed that are more hardy, such as variants of the more robust Robusta beans. Whether this will allow supply to keep up with demand remains to be seen.

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Data

Questions

  1. Use a demand and supply diagram to compare the coffee market in August 2024 with that in October 2023.
  2. How is the price elasticity of demand relevant to determining the size of price fluctuations in response to fluctuations in the supply of coffee? Demonstrate this with a supply and demand diagram.
  3. How has speculation affected coffee prices?
  4. What are ‘coffee futures’? How do futures prices relate to spot prices?
  5. What is likely to happen to coffee prices in the coming months? Explain.
  6. Why have Robusta prices risen by a larger percentage than Arabica prices? Is this trend likely to continue?
  7. Look at the price of Colombian Arabica coffee in your local supermarket. Work out what the price would be per lb and convert it to US dollars. How does this retail price compare with the current international price for Colombian milds and what accounts for the difference? (For current information on Colombian milds, see the third data link above.)
  8. Distinguish between the fixed and variable costs of an independent coffee shop. How should the coffee shop set its prices in relation to these costs and to demand?

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is proposing to launch a formal Market Investigation into anti-competitive practices in the UK’s £2bn veterinary industry (for pets rather than farm animals or horses). This follows a preliminary investigation which received 56 000 responses from pet owners and vet professionals. These responses reported huge rises in bills for treatment and medicines and corresponding rises in the cost of pet insurance.

At the same time there has been a large increase in concentration in the industry. In 2013, independent vet practices accounted for 89% of the market; today, they account for only around 40%. Over the past 10 years, some 1500 of the UK’s 5000 vet practices had been acquired by six of the largest corporate groups. In many parts of the country, competition is weak; in others, it is non-existent, with just one of these large companies having a monopoly of veterinary services.

This market power has given rise to a number of issues. The CMA identifies the following:

  • Of those practices checked, over 80% had no pricing information online, even for the most basic services. This makes is hard for pet owners to make decisions on treatment.
  • Pet owners potentially overpay for medicines, many of which can be bought online or over the counter in pharmacies at much lower prices, with the pet owners merely needing to know the correct dosage. When medicines require a prescription, often it is not made clear to the owners that they can take a prescription elsewhere, and owners end up paying high prices to buy medicines directly from the vet practice.
  • Even when there are several vet practices in a local area, they are often owned by the same company and hence there is no price competition. The corporate group often retains the original independent name when it acquires the practice and thus is is not clear to pet owners that ownership has changed. They may think there is local competition when there is not.
  • Often the corporate group provides the out-of-hours service, which tends to charge very high prices for emergency services. If there is initially an independent out-of-hours service provider, it may be driven out of business by the corporate owner of day-time services only referring pet owners to its own out-of-hours service.
  • The corporate owners may similarly provide other services, such as specialist referral centres, diagnostic labs, animal hospitals and crematoria. By referring pets only to those services owned by itself, this crowds out independents and provides a barrier to the entry of new independents into these parts of the industry.
  • Large corporate groups have the incentive to act in ways which may further reduce competition and choice and drive up their profits. They may, for example, invest in advanced equipment, allowing them to provide more sophisticated but high-cost treatment. Simpler, lower-cost treatments may not be offered to pet owners.
  • The higher prices in the industry have led to large rises in the cost of pet insurance. These higher insurance costs are made worse by vets steering owners with pet insurance to choosing more expensive treatments for their pets than those without insurance. The Association of British Insurers notes that there has been a large rise in claims attributable to an increasing provision of higher-cost treatments.
  • The industry suffers from acute staff shortages, which cuts down on the availability of services and allows practices to push up prices.
  • Regulation by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) is weak in the area of competition and pricing.

The CMA’s formal investigation will examine the structure of the veterinary industry and the behaviour of the firms in the industry. As the CMA states:

In a well-functioning market, we would expect a range of suppliers to be able to inform consumers of their services and, in turn, consumers would act on the information they receive.

Market failures in the veterinary industry

The CMA’s concerns suggest that the market is not sufficiently competitive, with vet companies holding significant market power. This leads to higher prices for a range of vet services. However, the CMA’s analysis suggests that market failures in the industry extend beyond the simple question of market power and lack of competition.

A crucial market failure is asymmetry of information. The veterinary companies have much better information than pet owners. This is a classic principal–agent problem. The agent, in this case the vet (or vet company), has much better information than the principal, in this case the pet owner. This information can be used to the interests of the vet company, with pet owners being persuaded to purchase more extensive and expensive treatments than they might otherwise choose if they were better informed.

The principal–agent problem also arises in the context of the dependant nature of pets. They are the ones receiving the treatment and, in this context, are the principals. Their owners are the ones acquiring the treatment for them and hence are the pets’ agents. The question is whether the owners will always do the best thing for their pets. This raises philosophical questions of animal rights and whether owners should be required to protect the interests of their pets.

Another information issue is the short-term perspective of many pet owners. They may purchase a young and healthy pet and assume that it will remain so. However, as the pet gets older, it is likely to face increasing health issues, with correspondingly increasing vet bills. But many owners do not consider such future bills when they purchase the pet. They suffer from what behavioural economists call ‘irrational exuberance’. Such exuberance may also occur when the owner of a sick pet is offered expensive treatment. They may over-optimistically assume that the treatment will be totally successful and that their pet will not need further treatment.

Vets cite another information asymmetry. This concerns the costs they face in providing treatment. Many owners are unaware of these costs – costs that include rent, business rates, heating and lighting, staff costs, equipment costs, consumables (such as syringes, dressings, surgical gowns, antiseptic and gloves), VAT, and so on. Many of these costs have risen substantially in recent months and are reflected in the prices pet owners are charged. With people experiencing free health care for themselves from the NHS (or other national provider), this may make them feel that the price of pet health care is excessive.

Then there is the issue of inequality. Pets provide great benefits to many owners and contribute to owners’ well-being. If people on low incomes cannot afford high vet bills, they may either have to forgo having a pet, with the benefits it brings, or incur high vet bills that they ill afford or simply go without treatment for their pets.

Finally, there are the external costs that arise when people abandon their pets with various health conditions. This has been a growing problem, with many people buying pets during lockdown when they worked from home, only to abandon them later when they have had to go back to the office or other workplace. The costs of treating or putting down such pets are born by charities or local authorities.

The CMA is consulting on its proposal to begin a formal Market Investigation. This closes on 11 April. If, in the light of its consultation, the Market Investigation goes ahead, the CMA will later report on its findings and may require the veterinary industry to adopt various measures. These could require vet groups to provide better information to owners, including what lower-cost treatments are available. But given the oligopolistic nature of the industry, it is unlikely to lead to significant reductions in vets bills.

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CMA documents

Questions

  1. How would you establish whether there is an abuse of market power in the veterinary industry?
  2. Explain what is meant by the principal–agent problem. Give some other examples both in economic and non-economic relationships.
  3. What market advantages do large vet companies have over independent vet practices?
  4. How might pet insurance lead to (a) adverse selection; (b) moral hazard? Explain. How might (i) insurance companies and (ii) vets help to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard?
  5. Find out what powers the CMA has to enforce its rulings.
  6. Search for vet prices and compare the prices charged by at least three vet practices. How would you account for the differences or similarities in prices?

In September 2023, the Stonegate Group, the largest pub company in the UK with around 4,500 premises, announced that it was going to start increasing the pint of beer by 20p during busy periods. There was an immediate backlash on social media with many customers calling on people to boycott Stonegate’s pubs such as the Slug & Lettuce and Yates.

This announcement is an example of dynamic pricing, where firms with market power adjust prices relatively quickly in response to changing market conditions: i.e. to changes in demand and supply.

Traditionally, prices set by firms in most retail markets have been less flexible. They may eventually adjust to changing market conditions, but this could take weeks or even months. If a product proves to be popular on a particular day or time, firms have typically left the price unchanged with the item selling out and customers facing empty shelves. If the product is unpopular, then the firm is left with unsold stock.

One business that makes extensive use of dynamic pricing is Amazon. Prices for popular items on Amazon Marketplace change every 10 minutes and can fluctuate by more than 20 per cent in just one hour.

Conditions for dynamic pricing to operate

The Amazon example helps to illustrate the conditions that must be in place for a firm to implement dynamic pricing successfully. These include:

  • The capacity to collect and process large amounts of accurate real-time data on the demand for and supply of particular items i.e. the number of sales or the interest in the product.
  • The ability to adjust prices in a timely manner in response to changing market conditions indicated by the data.
  • Effectively communicating the potential advantages of the pricing strategy to consumers.

Consumer attitudes

The last point is an interesting one. As the Stonegate example illustrates, consumers tend to dislike dynamic pricing, especially when price rises reflect increases in demand. A previous article on this website discussed the unpopularity of dynamic pricing amongst fans in the ticket market for live musical events.

The precise reason for the increase in demand, can also have an impact on consumer attitudes. For example, following a mass shooting at a subway station in New York in April 2022, the authorities shut down the underground system. This led to a surge in demand for taxis and this was picked up by the algorithm/software used by Uber’s dynamic pricing system. Fares for Uber cars began to rise rapidly, and people started to post complaints on social media. Uber responded by disabling the dynamic pricing system and capping prices across the city. It also announced that it would refund customers who were charged higher prices after the subway system shut down.

There is a danger for businesses that if they fail to communicate the policy effectively, annoyed customers may respond by shopping elsewhere. However, if it is implemented successfully then it can help businesses to increase their revenue and may also have some advantages for consumers.

The growing popularity of dynamic pricing

It has been widely used in airline and hotel industries for many years. Robert Cross, who chairs a revenue management company predicts that ‘It will eventually be everywhere’.

More businesses in the UK appear to be using dynamic pricing. In a consumer confidence survey undertaken for Barclays in September 2023, 47 per cent of the respondents had noticed more examples of companies raising prices for goods/services in response to higher demand at peak times.

It has traditionally been more difficult for bricks-and-mortar retailers to implement dynamic pricing because of the costs of continually changing prices (so-called ‘menu costs’). However, this might change with the increasing use of electronic shelf labels.

It will be interesting to see if dynamic pricing becomes more widespread in the future or whether opposition from consumers limits its use.

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Questions

  1. Explain the difference between surge and dynamic pricing.
  2. Using a diagram, explain how dynamic pricing can increase a firm’s revenue.
  3. Discuss both the advantages and disadvantages for consumers of firms using dynamic pricing.
  4. How might dynamic pricing influence consumer behaviour if it alters their expectations about future price changes.
  5. There is some evidence that the use of dynamic pricing is less unpopular amongst 18–24-year-olds than other age groups. Suggest some possible reasons why this might be the case.
  6. Using the concept of loss aversion, consider some different ways that a business could present a new dynamic pricing policy to its customers.