One of the key areas discussed in the election was welfare and in particular what to do about those who remain long term dependent on welfare. How can the UK government encourage people back to work? A key issue is the poverty trap: some people are simply better off living on benefits than they are getting a job. Here, we’re talking about the marginal-tax-plus-lost-benefit rate. When you start earning, you get taxed, pay national insurance contributions and lose some of your benefits. All this leads to a situation where work doesn’t pay.
In a paper ‘Escaping the Poverty Trap’ by Lawrence Kay, he considered how much better off people are moving from different benefits into work, taking into account the high costs of actually finding a job and then starting work. He found that after 16 hours of work, someone on Job-seekers’ allowance would be £15.07 poorer and someone on Employment and Support Allowance would be £39.35 worse off. In many cases, people were facing a marginal effective tax rate in excess of 100%. Given this, it’s hardly surprising that Lawrence Kay found that ‘Long term welfare claims have been Britain’s blight for many years’.
However, the Coalition has plans to change this and make sure that those in work are paid more and are better off than those on benefits. By making working life a more attractive option, this should encourage those for whom work doesn’t pay to enter the labour force. This will obviously benefit them, increase the potential output of the economy (hence growth) and improve net taxes, as tax revenue rises and benefits expenditure falls. While this may not lead to tax cuts for those in work (as benefits spending falls), it may mean that more tax revenue is devoted to areas such as health and education or that the government can close the budget deficit.
The ‘universal credit’ aims to simplify the current system and make work pay, by re-introducing a culture of work in households. There is also a plan to place sanctions on those turning down work and place a cap on benefits to any single family. There was also be tax changes aimed at helping those moving into work keep more of their money, thereby removing, or at least reducing, the poverty trap. However, some families will lose out – as the IFS noted, any reform ‘creates winners and losers’. However, the reforms are a step in the right direction. As David Cameron said:
“I think that will, over time, solve the whole poverty trap issue that has bedeviled governments of all colours.”
The Labour party does back some of the changes, but questions whether there is enough help for people finding work. Another issue that must be considered is while it is undoubtedly a good plan to encourage more people to move into work and off benefits, which jobs will they move into? With unemployment still high, now is not exactly the best time to be looking for a job. However, whatever the state of the economy, providing incentives for people to move from benefits into work is definitely a good plan, but of course the methods used will be under constant scrutiny.
Articles
Iain Duncan Smith sets out Welfare Reform Bill plans BBC News (17/2/11)
Bill ditches housing benefit cut The Press Association (17/2/11)
Life on benefits is no longer an option Mail Online, James Chapman (17/2/11)
Universal Credit welfare switch ‘to hit 1.4m homes’ BBC News (12/1/11)
Nick Clegg blocks housing benefit cut for jobless Guardian, Patrick Wintour (17/2/11)
It’s time to end this addiction to benefits Telegraph (17/2/11)
Report
Escaping the Poverty Trap Policy Exchange, Lawrence Kay 2010
Questions
- What is the poverty trap? Which factors make it worse?
- Why does the poverty trap act as a labour supply disincentive for those on benefits?
- If taxes of those in work have to be increased, what happens to their incentive to work more hours? Think about the income and substitution effects of a real wage change.
- Why is it that working may not pay?
- How does the Universal Credit aim to alleviate the poverty trap? Who are likely to be the winners and losers from the government’s proposed welfare reforms?
- What is a marginal-tax-plus-lost-benefit rate? How do you calculate it?
- Are there any other policies that could also reduce the poverty trap? How effective are they likely to be?
We have covered the issue of bank bonuses in previous blogs. See for example: Banking on bonuses? Not for much longer (November 2009); “We want our money back and we’re going to get it” (President Obama) (January 2010); and Payback time (Updated April 2010). But the issue has not been resolved. Despite public outrage around the world over the behaviour of banks that caused the credit crunch and about banks having to be bailed out with ‘taxpayers money’ and, as a result, people facing tax rises and cuts in public-sector services and jobs, bankers’ pay and bonuses are soaring once more. The individuals who caused the global economic crisis seem immune to the effects of their actions. But are things about to change?
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has confirmed tough new guidelines on bank bonuses applying to all banks operating in the EU. The CEBS’s prime purpose in recommending restricting bonuses is to reduce the incentive for excessive and dangerous risk taking. As it states in paragraph 1 of the Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices:
Whilst institutions’ remuneration policies were not the direct cause of this crisis, their drawbacks, nonetheless, contributed to its gravity and scale. It was generally recognized that excessive remuneration in the financial sector fuelled a risk appetite that was disproportionate to the loss-absorption capacity of institutions and of the financial sector as a whole.
The guidelines include deferring 40–60% of bonuses for three to five years; paying a maximum of 50% of bonuses in cash (the remainder having to be in shares); setting a maximum bonus level as a percentage of an individual’s basic pay; appointing remuneration committees that are truly independent; publishing the pay and bonuses of all senior managers and ‘risk takers’. Although they are only recommendations, it is expected that bank regulators across the EU will implement them in full.
So will they be effective in curbing the pay and bonuses of top bank staff? Will they curb excessive risk taking? Or will banks simply find ways around the regulations? The following articles discuss these issues
Articles
Bankers’ bonuses to face strict limits in Europe BBC News, Hugh Pym (10/12/10)
Bankers’ bonuses to face strict limits in Europe BBC News (10/12/10)
Europe set to link banking bonuses to basic salaries The Telegraph, Louise Armitstead (10/12/10)
Some bankers may escape EU cash bonus limit moneycontrol.com (India) (11/12/10)
Banks to sidestep bonus crackdown by raising salaries Guardian, Jill Treanor (10/12/10)
Bonuses: When bank jobs pay Guardian (11/12/10)
Bank bonuses (portal page) Financial Times
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
CEBS home page
CEBS has today published its Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (CP42) CEBS news release (10/12/10)
Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (10/12/10)
Questions
- What are main objectives of the CEBS guidelines?
- Assess the arguments used by the banking industry in criticising the guidelines.
- In what ways can the banks get around these new regulations (assuming the guidelines are accepted by EU banking regulators)?
- What conditions would have to met for a remuneration committee to be truly independent?
- How likely is it that countries outside the EU will adopt similar regulations? How could they be persuaded to do so?
A two-week international climate change summit opened in Cancún, Mexico, on 29 November. But will the talks make any progress in tackling global warming? Will mechanisms be put in place to ensure that the previously agreed ceiling of 2°C warming is met?
After the largely unsuccessfuly talks in Copenhagen a year ago, hopes are not high. But a likely rise in global temperatures of considerably more than 2°C could have disasterous global consequences. Indeed, new evidence suggests that even a ceiling of 2°C may be too high and that, as temperatures rise towards that level, domino effects will start that may become virtually unstoppable. As Andrew Sims in the Guardian article notes:
This is the problem. Once the planet warms to the point where environmental changes that further add to warming feed off each other, it becomes almost meaningless to specify just how much warmer the planet may get. You’ve toppled the first domino and it becomes virtually impossible to stop the following chain of events. Honestly, nobody really knows exactly where that will end, but they do know it will end very, very badly.
The following podcasts and articles look at the importance of reaching international agreement but the difficulties of doing so.
Podcasts and webcasts
Post-Copenhagen, a Cancun compromise? Reuters (30/11/10)
Climate change ‘Dragons’ Den’: What are the options? BBC News, Roger Harrabin (29/11/10)
Cancun climate change summit seeks new emissions deal BBC News, David Shukman (3/12/10)
Can nudge theory change our habits? BBC News, Claudia Hammond (29/11/10)
Articles
Cancún climate change conference 2010 Guardian, (portal)
Q&A: Cancún COP16 climate talks Guardian, Shiona Tregaskis (8/10/10)
72 months and counting … Guardian, Andrew Simms (1/12/10)
Cancún climate talks: In search of the holy grail of climate change policy Guardian, Michael Jacobs (29/11/10)
Cancún and the new economics of climate change Guardian, Kevin Gallagher and Frank Ackerman (30/11/10)
Facing the consequences The Economist (25/11/10)
UN climate talks low on expectation BBC News, Richard Black (29/11/10)
Expect little from Cancun talks The Star (Malaysia), Martin Khor (29/11/10)
Don’t let us down: UN climate change talks in Cancun Independent, Jonathan Owen and Matt Chorley (28/11/10)
Cancun and Climate: Government Won’t Act, But Business Will Time Magazine: The Curious Capitalist, Zachary Karabell (28/11/10)
At Global Climate Change Talks, an Answer Grows Right Outside Huffington Post, Luis Ubiñas (29/11/10)
Cancun climate change talks: ‘last chance’ in the snakepit The Telegraph, Geoffrey Lean (29/11/10)
Climate Change Talks Must Deliver After Record Weather Year Scoop (New Zealand), Oxfam (29/11/10)
World climate talks kick off in Cancun DW-World, Amanda Price and Axel Rowohlt (29/11/10)
On international equity weights and national decision making on climate change Vox, David Anthoff and Richard S J Tol (29/11/10)
Climate treaties all bluster, no bite The Age, Dan Cass (10/12/10)
Conference website
UNFCCC COP16/CMP6: Mexico 2010 Official site
Questions
- What would count as a ‘successful’ outcome of the climate change talks? Why might politicians interpret this differently from economists?
- What can governments do to internalise the externalities of greenhouse gas emissions?
- What insights can game theory provide into the difficulties of reaching binding climate change agreements?
- What are likely to be the most effective mechanisms for getting people to adapt their behaviour?
- Can nudge theory be used to change our habits towards the environment?
- Explain the use of equity weights in judging the effects of climate change. Are they a practical way forward in devising environmental policy?
With government cuts and pay freezes, many people are worried about their future. Against this background it’s little wonder that people are growing increasingly resentful about the soaring pay of bankers and other leaders of major companies – especially when they reflect on the behaviour of top bankers who were largely responsible for the recession in the West and the debt problems that resulted. And the gap between those at the top and workers on average pay just goes on widening. As the final article below states:
The boss who sells Cillit Bang got paid a hefty £92.6m last year, while his counterpart who builds executive homes pocketed £38.4m and a top miner took home £27m. These are not figures from some international football league, but the bosses of Britain’s biggest companies, who received an average 55% pay rise in the year to June. A top FTSE 100 boss now earns £4.9m – 88 times the average worker’s pay.
On 9 November 2010, a high pay commission was launched to investigate the yawning pay gap between top executives and those on average incomes.
As the high pay commission, set up by the thinktank Compass and backed by the Joseph Rowntree charitable trust, begins its year-long analysis into the widening gap between the lowest and highest paid, a Compass poll shows that 99% of people believe that top executives are overpaid.
The commision will seek answers to questions such as the following: Why has the gap widened so massively? What is the role of globalisation in the process? Why has competition not worked to compete top pay down? Why don’t company owners impose more restraint on executive pay? Is there a form of collusion to push executive pay ever higher? Are executives worth it?!
Articles
Let’s make CEOs justify their wages Guardian, Martin O’Neill (19/10/10)
FTSE 100 bosses criticised as boardroom pay leaps by 55% Guardian, Simon Goodley and Graeme Wearden (29/10/11)
Investigation launched into soaring executive pay Guardian, Jill Treanor (9/11/10)
Eighty-five per cent of people say top executives ‘should be paid less’ Telegraph, Ian Cowie (9/11/10)
Top executives paid ‘far too much’ Financial Times, Nicholas Timmins (9/11/10)
A mission to the outer limits of pay Financial Times, Andrew Hill and Esther Bintliff (9/11/10) (first part of article)
Sharing the spoils of business fairly Guardian, Deborah Hargreaves (13/11/10)
The High Pay Commission
The High Pay Commission, home page
Questions
- Desribe what has happened to executive pay of the top companies over recent years.
- How are executive pay packages determined?
- How relevant is marginal productivity theory in explaining executive pay?
- What are the incentive effects of having extremely high pay?
- What scope is there for collusion in determining executive pay?
- Why don’t company owners impose more restraint on executive pay?
- What are the social impacts of excessive executive pay?
- What could the government do to address the problem?
Student fees are set to rise to between £6000 and £9000 per year from 2012 (see Will students be Browned off?. But I’m sure you know that already! Not surprisingly, there has been considerable debate about the effects on student debt and whether potential students will be put off from applying to university. But there is another issue, explored in the article below. This is the question of the ‘marketisation’ of higher education.
With the exception of the STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and maths) universities will no longer receive any teaching subsidy from the government. Teaching will have to be funded from student fees. This means that provision will depend on supply and demand. If there is a high demand for certain courses, then the courses will be financially viable for universities. If not, they will have to close (unless the university chooses to cross-subsidise them from other profitable courses).
This might be fine if the market for university places were perfectly competitive and if questions of inequality of access were fully taken into account. But the higher education market is not perfect. The article looks at some of these imperfections and why, therefore, a pure market system will fail to achieve the optimum allocation of university places.
Browne’s Gamble London Review of Books, Stefan Collini (4/11/10)
Questions
- What information failures are there in the market for higher education places?
- What externalities are involved in higher education and will this lead to an over or underprovision of higher education in a pure market system?
- Apart from externalities and information asymmetries, what other market failures apply to the market for student places in HE?
- What are the arguments for subsidising non-STEM subjects (as well as STEM ones)? Should these subsidies vary from course to course and from university to university?
- What is the best way of tackling the problem of unequal access to higher education?