Pubs are closing down in the UK at the rate of 29 per week. The total number has fallen from 67,000 in 1982 to approximately 52,000 this year. In response to this decline the government has recently announced some changes to the way the relationship between pub owners and their tenants are regulated.

The ownership of pubs in the UK changed dramatically after a report on the beer market was published by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) in 1989. When this investigation took place over 75% of the beer in the UK was produced by the six largest brewing businesses (Bass, Allied Lyons, Grand Metropolitan, Whitbread, Scottish and Newcastle, Courage) which owned over half the pubs. The nature of the relationship between these breweries and the landlords of the pubs they owned caused the greatest concerns.

Some pubs are run as managed houses. In this type of business relationship the person who manages and runs the pub (the publican) is a direct employee of the brewery. However, in many instances this is not the case. Instead they are independent entrepreneurs who enter into a tenancy agreement with the owner of the pub. In other words they rent the pub from the brewery and have some freedom over the way it is run including the setting of prices.

These arrangements have proved to be very controversial because of one particular aspect of many of the tenancy agreements – the exclusive supply contract. Known as the ‘tied lease model’, ‘beer tie’ or ‘wet rent’, it significantly reduces the freedom of publicans to run the business, as they have to purchase almost all their beverages from the brewery that owns the pub.

The MMC report in 1989 concluded that a significant reason for the increasing real price of beer was the market power exerted by the brewers through the tied lease model. It recommended that the number of pubs owned and operated by the brewers should be substantially reduced. Known as the ‘Beer Orders’, the brewers responded by gradually selling off 14,000 pubs. They also eventually sold the breweries to international rivals and companies such as Whitbread and Bass moved into the retail, leisure and hotel sectors. Whitbread currently owns Costa, Brewers Fayre and Premier Inn hotels while Bass, renamed Intercontinental Hotels Groups, owns both Crown Plaza and Holiday Inn hotels.

The beer tie between the pubs and the big national breweries might have disappeared but the tied lease arrangement still exists. Instead of being tied to national brewers, many publicans are tied to either smaller regional breweries, such as Everards and Adnams, or another type of business – the pub company known as ‘pubcos’. Some of the larger pubcos include Enterprise Inns, Punch Taverns, Mitchells&Butlers and JD Weatherspoon. They negotiate deals with the breweries and then supply the beer to their pubs.

In 2014, The British Beer and Pub Association estimated that two-fifths of pubs in the UK were owned by pubcos, while another fifth were owned by regional breweries. In 2013, The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills estimated that 48 per cent of pubs in the UK had landlords who were tied to either a regional brewer or a pub company.

The ownership of pubs may have changed radically over the past 20 years but the tied lease system continues to be extremely controversial. The main argument against the system is that it leads to tied publicans having to pay significantly above free market prices for their beer. The pubcos accept this claim but maintain that, in return for being in a tied lease, the publican pays a lower rent and receives business support services.

Parliament passed the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act in March 2015 (see Part 4). This included provisions for the introduction of:

  a statutory Pubs Code to govern the relationship between the businesses that own the pubs and their tenants;
a new independent Adjudicator to enforce the code;
a Market Rent Only (MRO) option.

In October 2015 the government announced some proposals for how the MRO option could be implemented as part of its consultation process with the industry. These include giving the tied publican the right to ask for a rent assessment every five years or whenever the owner of the pub significantly changes the beer prices it charges the tenant. As part of this rent assessment the publican can take the option to switch to an MRO contract. This gives them the freedom to purchase beer from any supplier rather than being tied to those supplied by the owner of the pub.

Enterprise Inns, the largest pubco, operates nearly all of its pubs on the tied lease model. In response to the changes proposed by the Government, the company has announced plans significantly to increase the number of its directly managed pubs from just 16 to 800.

Could the tied lease system finally be about to end?

Articles

Enterprise Inns to grow pub numbers after death of the ‘beer tie’ The Telegraph, Ben Martin, and Peter Spence (12/05/15)
What is the ‘beer tie’ The Telegraph, Denise Roland (19/11/14)
Q&A: Calling time on the beer tie BBC News, Katie Hope (19/11/14)
Chin chin! Fair deal for pub tenants under a new beer tie crackdown City AM, Suzie Neuwirth (29/10/15)
Industry Reacts to New Statutory Pubs Code Eat Out, Nathan Pearce (29/10/15)
What does new pub code mean for the leased pubs? Burton Mail, Andrew Musgrove (04/11/15)

Questions

  1. What has happened to the big six national brewers which once dominated the beer industry in the UK?
  2. What factors have caused the decline in the number of pubs?
  3. Using a diagram, illustrate the impact that the market power of the pubcos might have on the prices paid by publicans in a tied lease.
  4. Discuss some of the potential advantages of the tied lease model.
  5. The global brewers and pubcos might create a situation where market power exists in successive stages of the vertical supply chain. Analyse some of the potential implications of this structure and discuss the concept of double marginalisation.

After two weeks of negotiations between the 195 countries attending the COP21 climate change conference in Paris, a deal has been reached on tackling climate change. Although the deal still has to be ratified by countries, this is a major step forward in limiting global warming. Before it can formally come into force, it must have been ratified by at least 55 countries, accounting for at least 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions.

The deal goes much further than previous agreements and includes the following:

  • A limit on the increase in global temperatures to ‘well below’ 2°C above pre-industrial levels and efforts pursued to limit it to 1.5°C.
  • A recognition that the pledges already made ahead of the conference by 186 countries and incorporated into the agreement are insufficient and will only limit global temperature rise to 2.7°C at best.
  • Countries to update their emissions reductions commitments every five years – the first being in 2020. Such revised commitments should then be legally binding.
  • A global ‘stocktake’ in 2023, and every five years thereafter, to monitor countries’ progress in meeting their commitments and to encourage them to make deeper cuts in emissions to reach the 1.5°C goal. This requires a process of measurement and verification of countries’ emissions.
  • To reach a peak in greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and then to begin reducing them and to achieve a balance between sources and sinks of greenhouse gases (i.e. zero net emissions) in the second half of this century.
  • Developed countries to provide the poorest developing countries with $100bn per year by 2020 to help them reduce emissions. This was agreed in Copenhagen, but will now be continued from 2020 to 2025, and by 2025 a new goal above $100bn per year will be agreed.
  • The development of market mechanisms that would award tradable credits for green projects and emissions reductions.
  • A recognition that the ‘loss and damage’ associated with climate-related disasters can be serious for many vulnerable developing countries (such as low-lying island states) and that this may require compensation. However, there is no legal liability on developed countries to provide such compensation.

Perhaps the major achievement at the conference was a universal recognition that the problem of global warming is serious and that action needs to be taken. Mutual self interest was the driving force in reaching the agreement, and although it is less binding on countries than many would have liked, it does mark a significant step forward in tackling climate change.

But why did the conference not go further? Why, if there was general agreement that global warming should be tackled and that global temperature rise should ideally be capped at 1.5°C, was there not a binding agreement on each country to apply this cap?

There are two reasons.

First, it is very difficult to predict the exact relationship, including its timing, between emissions and global temperature rise. Even if you could make limits to emissions binding, you could not make global temperature rise binding.

Second, even if there is general agreement about how much emissions should be reduced, there is no general agreement on the distribution of these reductions. Many countries want to do less themselves and others to do more. More specifically, poor countries want rich countries to do all the cutting while many continue to build more coal-fired power stations to provide the electricity to power economic development. The rich countries want the developing countries, especially the larger ones, such as China, India and Brazil to reduce their emissions, or at least the growth in their emissions.

Then there is the difference between what countries vaguely pledge at a global conference and what they actually do domestically. Many developed countries are keen to take advantage of currently cheap fossil fuels to power economic growth. They are also still investing in alternative sources of fossil fuels, such as through fracking.

As we said in the previous blog, game theory can shed some useful insights into the nature and outcome of climate negotiations. ‘The global optimum may be for a strong agreement, binding on all countries. The Nash equilibrium, however, may be a situation where countries push for their own interests at the expense of others, with the final agreement being much more minimalistic.’

‘Minimalistic’ may be too strong a description of the outcomes of the Paris conference. But they could have been stronger. Nevertheless, judged by the outcomes of previous climate conferences, the deal could still be described as ‘historic’.

Videos

With landmark climate accord, world marks turn from fossil fuels Reuters (13/12/15)
COP21 climate change summit reaches deal in Paris BBC News (13/12/15)
COP21: Paris climate deal is ‘best chance to save planet’ BBC News (13/12/15)
COP21: Climate change deal’s winners and losers BBC News, Matt McGrath (13/12/15)
The Five Key Decisions Made in the UN Climate Deal in Paris Bloomberg, video: Nathaniel Bullard; article: Ewa Krukowska and Alex Morales (12/12/15)
The key factors in getting a deal in Paris BBC News on YouTube, Tom Burke (13/12/15)

Articles

COP21 agreement: All you need to know about Paris climate change deal Hindustan Times, Chetan Chauhan (13/12/15)
COP21: Paris agreement formally adopted Financial Times, Pilita Clark and Michael Stothard (12/12/15)
Let’s hail the Paris climate change agreement and get to work Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs (12/12/15)
COP21: Public-private collaboration key to climate targets Financial Times, Nicholas Stern (13/12/15)
Paris climate change agreement: the deal at a glance The Telegraph, Emily Gosden (12/12/15)
Climate Accord Is a Healing Step, if Not a Cure New York Times, Justin Gillis (12/12/15)
Paris Agreement Ushers in End of the Fossil Fuel Era Slate, Eric Holthaus (12/12/15)
Paris Agreement: the reaction Business Green, James Murray and Jessica Shankleman (12/12/15)
World’s First Global Deal to Combat Climate Change Adopted in Paris Scientific American, David Biello (12/12/15)
COP21: Paris climate deal ‘our best chance to save the planet’, says Obama Independent, Tom Bawden (13/12/15)
Grand promises of Paris climate deal undermined by squalid retrenchments The Guardian, George Monbiot (12/12/15)
Paris Agreement on climate change: the good, the bad, and the ugly The Conversation, Henrik Selin and Adil Najam (14/12/15)
COP21: James Hansen, the father of climate change awareness, claims Paris agreement is a ‘fraud’ Independent, Caroline Mortimer (14/12/15)
Paris climate agreement: More hot air won’t save us from oblivion Sydney Morning Herald, Peter Hartcher (15/12/15)

Draft Agreement

Adoption of the Paris Agreement United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (12/12/15)

Questions

  1. Could the market ever lead to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions? Explain.
  2. What are the main strengths and weaknesses of the Paris agreement?
  3. Is it in rich countries’ interests to help poorer countries to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions?
  4. How might countries reduce the production of fossil fuels? Are they likely to want to do this? Explain.
  5. Is a ‘cap and trade’ (tradable permits) system (a) an effective means of reducing emissions; (b) an efficient system?
  6. What is the best way of financing investment in renewable energy?

As we saw in the blog post Down down deeper and down, or a new Status Quo?, for many countries there is now a negative rate of interest on bank deposits in the central bank. In other words, banks are being charged to keep liquidity in central banks. Indeed, in some countries the central bank even provides liquidity to banks at negative rates. In other words, banks are paid to borrow!

But, by definition, holding cash (in a safe or under the mattress) pays a zero interest rate. So why would people save in a bank at negative interest rates if they could get a zero rate simply by holding cash? And why would banks not borrow money from the central bank, if borrowing rates are negative, hold it as cash and earn the interest from the central bank?

These questions are addressed in the article below from The Economist. It argues that to swap reserves for cash is costly to banks and that this cost is likely to exceed the interest they have to pay. In other words, there is not a zero bound to central bank interest rates, either for deposits or for the provision of liquidity; and this reflects rational behaviour.

But does the same apply to individuals? Would it not be rational for banks to charge customers to deposit money (a negative interest rate)? Indeed, there is already a form of negative interest rate on many current accounts; i.e. the monthly or annual charge to keep the account open. But would it also make sense for banks to offer negative interest rates on loans? In other words, would it ever make sense for banks to pay people to borrow?

Read the folowing article and then try answering the questions.

Article

Bankers v mattresses The Economist (28/11.15)

Central bank repo rates/base rates
Central banks – summary of current interest rates global-rates.com
Worldwide Central Bank Rates CentralBankRates

Questions

  1. What is a central bank’s ‘repo rate’. Is it the same as (a) its overnight lending rate; (b) its discount rate?
  2. Why are the Swedish and Swiss central banks charging negative interest rates when lending money to banks?
  3. What effect are such negative rates likely to have on (a) banks’ cash holdings; (b) banks’ lending to customers?
  4. Why are many central banks (including the ECB) charging banks to deposit money with them? Why do banks continue to make such deposits when interest rates are negative?
  5. Would banks ever lend to customers at negative rates of interest? Explain why or why not.
  6. Would banks ever offer negative rates of interest on savings accounts? Explain why or why not.
  7. How do expectations about exchange rate movements affect banks willingness to hold deposits with the central bank?
  8. What are the arguments for and against abolishing cash altogether?

Are emerging markets about to experience a credit crunch? Slowing growth in China and other emerging market economies (EMEs) does not bode well. Nor does the prospect of rising interest rates in the USA and the resulting increase in the costs of servicing the high levels of dollar-denominated debt in many such countries.

According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (see also), the stock of dollar-denominated debt in emerging market economies has doubled since 2009 and this makes them vulnerable to tighter US monetary policy.

Weaker financial market conditions combined with an increased sensitivity to US rates may heighten the risk of negative spillovers to EMEs when US policy is normalised. …

Despite low interest rates, rising debt levels have pushed debt service ratios for households and firms above their long-run averages, particularly since 2013, signalling increased risks of financial crises in EMEs.

But there is another perspective. Many emerging economies are pursuing looser monetary policy and this, combined with tighter US monetary policy, is causing their exchange rates against the dollar to depreciate, thereby increasing their export competitiveness. At the same time, more rapid growth in the USA and some EU countries, should also help to stimulate demand for their exports.

Also, in recent years there has been a large growth in trade between emerging economies – so-called ‘South–South trade’. Exports from developing countries to other developing countries has grown from 38% of developing countries’ exports in 1995 to over 52% in 2015. With technological catch-up taking place in many of these economies and with lower labour and land costs, their prospects look bright for economic growth over the longer term.

These two different perspectives are taken in the following two articles from the Telegraph. The first looks at the BIS’s analysis of growing debt and the possibility of a credit crunch. The second, while acknowledging the current weakness of many emerging economies, looks at the prospects for improving growth over the coming years.

Articles

‘Uneasy’ market calm masks debt timebomb, BIS warns The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (6/12/15)
Why emerging markets will rise from gloom to boom The Telegraph, Liam Halligan (5/12/15)

Questions

  1. How does an improving US economy impact on emerging market economies?
  2. Will the impact of US monetary policy on exchange rates be adverse or advantageous for emerging market economies?
  3. What forms does dollar-denominated debt take in emerging economies?
  4. Why has south–south trade grown in recent years? Is it consistent with the law of comparative advantage?
  5. Why is growth likely to be higher in emerging economies than in developed economies in the coming years?

The Federal Reserve chair, Janet Yellen, has been giving strong signals recently that the US central bank will probably raise interest rates at its December 16 meeting or, if not then, early in 2016. ‘Ongoing gains in the labor market’ she said, ‘coupled with my judgement that longer-term inflation expectations remain reasonably well anchored, serve to bolster my confidence in a return of inflation to 2%.’ This, as for many other central banks, is the target rate of inflation.

In anticipation of a rise in US interest rates, the dollar has been appreciating. Its (nominal) exchange rate index has risen by 24% since April 2014 (see chart below).

In the light of the sluggish eurozone economy, the ECB president, Mario Draghi, has been taking a very different stance. He has indicated that he stands ready to cut interest rates further and increase quantitative easing. At the meeting on 3 December, the ECB did just that. It announced a further cut in the deposit rate, from –0.2 to –0.3 and an extension of the €60 billion per month QE programme from September 2016 to March 2017 (bringing the total by that time to €1.5 trillion – up from €1.1 trillion by September 2016).

Stock market investors had been expecting more, including an increase in the level of monthly asset purchases above €60 billion. Consequently stock markets fell. Both the German DAX and the French CAC 40 stock market indices fell by 3.6%. The euro also appreciated against the dollar by 2.7% on the day of the announcement. Nevertheless, since April 2014, the euro exchange rate index has fallen by 13%. Against the US dollar, the euro has depreciated by a massive 31%.

So what will be the consequences of the very different monetary policies being pursued by the Fed and the ECB? Are they simply the desirable responses to a lack of convergence of the economic performance of the US and eurozone economies? In other words, will they help to bring greater convergence between the two economies?

Or will the desirable effects of convergence be offset by other undesirable effects for the USA and the eurozone and also for the rest of the world?

Will huge amounts of dollar-denominated debt held by many emerging economies make it harder to service these debts with an appreciating dollar?
How much will US exporters suffer from the dollar’s rise and what will the US authorities do about it?
Will currency volatility lead to currency wars and, if so, what will be their economic effects?
Will the time lags involved in the effects of the continuing programme of QE in the eurozone eventually lead to overheating? Already euro money supply is rising, on both narrow and broad measures.

The following articles address these issues.

Articles

The Fed and the ECB: when monetary policy diverges The Guardian, Mohamed El-Erian (2/12/15)
European stocks slide after ECB dashes hopes of major QE expansion The Guardian, Heather Stewart and Graeme Wearden (3/12/15)
Mario Draghi riles Germany with QE overkill The Telegraph, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (3/12/15)
How the eurozone missed its shot at a recovery The Telegraph, Peter Spence (3/12/15)
Yellen Signals Economy Nearly Ready for First Interest-Rate Hike Bloomberg, Christopher Condon (3/12/15)

Exchange rate data
Effective exchange rate indices Bank for International Settlements
Exchange rates Bank of England

Questions

  1. What would be the beneficial effects to the US and eurozone economies of their respective monetary policies?
  2. Explain the exchange rate movements that have taken place between the euro and the dollar over the past 19 months. How do these relate to the various parts of the balance of payments accounts of the two economies?
  3. Is it possible for the USA to halt the rise in the dollar while at the same time raising interest rates? Explain.
  4. Why are some members of the ECB (e.g. the German and Dutch) against expanding QE? Assess their arguments.
  5. What will be the impact of US and eurozone monetary policies on emerging economies?
  6. What will be the impact of US and eurozone monetary policies on the UK?
  7. Why did the euro appreciate after the Mario Draghi’s press statement on 3 December? What has happened to the dollar/euro exchange rate since and why?