The Clean Energy Bill has been on the agenda for some time and not just in the UK. With climate change an ever growing global concern, investment in other cleaner energy sources has been essential. However, when it comes to investment in wind farms, developers have faced significant opposition. The balancing act for the government appears to be generating sufficient investment in wind farms, while minimising the negative externalities.
The phrase often thrown around with regards to wind farms, seems to be ‘not in my backyard’. That is, people recognise the need for them, but don’t want them to be built in the local areas. The reason is to do with the negative externalities. Not only are the wind farms several metres high and wide, creating a blight on the landscape, but they also create a noise, both of which impose a third party effect on the local communities. These factors, amongst others, have led to numerous protests whenever a new wind farm is suggested. The problem has been that with such challenging targets for energy, wind farms are essential and thus government regulation has been able to over-ride the protests of local communities.
However, planning guidance in the UK will now be changed to give local opposition the ability to override national energy targets. In some sense, more weight is being given to the negative externalities associated with a new wind farm. This doesn’t mean that the government is unwilling to let investment in wind farms stop. Instead, incentives are being used to try to encourage local communities to accept new wind farms. While acknowledging the existence of negative externalities, the government is perhaps trying to put a value on them. The benefits offered to local communities by developers will increase by a factor of five, thus aiming to compensate those affected accordingly. Unsurprisingly, there have been mixed opinions, summed up by Maria McCaffery, the Chief Executive of trade association RenewableUK:
Maria McCaffery, chief executive of trade association RenewableUK, said the proposals would signal the end of many planned developments and that was “disappointing”.
Developing wind farms requires a significant amount of investment to be made upfront. Adding to this cost, by following the government’s advice that we should pay substantially more into community funds for future projects, will unfortunately make some planned wind energy developments uneconomic in England.
That said, we recognise the need to ensure good practice across the industry and will continue to work with government and local authorities to benefit communities right across the country which are hosting our clean energy future.
The improved benefits package by the energy industry is expected to be in place towards the end of the year. The idea is that with greater use of wind farms, energy bills can be subsidised, thereby reducing the cost of living. Investment in wind farms (on-shore and off-shore) is essential. Current energy sources are non-renewable and as such new energy sources must be developed. However, many are focused on the short term cost and not the long term benefit that such investment will bring. The public appears to be in favour of investment in new energy sources, especially with the prospect of subsidised energy bills – but this positive outlook soon turns into protest when the developers pick ‘your back yard’ as the next site. The following articles consider this issue.
Residents to get more say over wind farms The Guardian, Fiona Harvey and Peter Walker (6/6/13)
Local communities offered more say over wind farms BBC News (6/6/13)
Locals to get veto power over wind farms The Telegraph, Robert Winnett (6/6/13)
Wind farms are a ‘complete scam’, claims the Environment Secretary who says turbines are causing ‘huge unhappiness’ Mail Online, Matt Chorley (7/6/13)
New planning guidance will make it harder to build wind farms Financial Times, Jim Pickard, Pilita Clark and Elizabeth Rigby (6/6/13)
Will more power to nimbys be the death of wind farms? Channel 4 News (6/6/13)
Locals given more ground to block wind farms Independent, Tom Bawden (6/6/13)
Questions
- What are the negative externalities associated with wind farms?
- Conduct a cost-benefit analysis as to whether a wind farm should be constructed in your local area. Which factors have you given greatest weight to?
- In question 2 above, were you concerned about the Pareto criterion or the Hicks-Kaldor criterion?
- If local communities can be compensated sufficiently, should wind farms go ahead?
- If the added cost to the development of wind farms means that some will no longer go ahead, is this efficient?
- Why is there a need to invest in new energy sources?
- To what extent is climate change a global problem requiring international (and not national) solution?
Since coming to office in December 2012, Shinzo Abe’s government has been determined to revive the Japanese economy. For the past 20 years, Japan’s growth has averaged only 0.8% per annum. This compares with 1.3% for Germany, 2.3% for the UK, 2.6% for the USA, 4.9% for South Korea and 10.4% for China.
Japanese real GDP per capita was only 14.5% higher in 2012 than 20 years earlier. This compares with figures for Germany, the UK, the USA, South Korea and China of 27%, 45%, 34%, 126% and 497% respectively.
So what has the Japanese government done to boost both short-term and long-term growth after years of stagnation? There are ‘three arrows’ to the policy, targeted at reviving and sustaining economic growth.
The first arrow is monetary policy. The Bank of Japan has engaged in extensive quantitative easing through bond purchases in order to drive down the exchange rate (see A J-curve for Japan?), stimulate expenditure and increase the rate of inflation. A target inflation rate of 2% has been set by the Bank of Japan. Part of the problem for the Japanese economy over the years has been stagnant or falling prices. Japanese consumers have got used to waiting to spend in the hope of being able to buy at lower prices. Similarly, Japanese businesses have often delayed stock purchase. By committing to bond purchases of whatever amount is necessary to achieve the 2% inflation target, the central bank hopes to break this cycle and encourage people to buy now rather than later.
The second arrow is fiscal policy. Despite having the highest debt to GDP ratio in the developed world, Japan is embarking on a large-scale programme of infrastructure investment and other public works. The package is worth over $100bn. The expansionary fiscal policy is accompanied by a longer-term plan for fiscal consolidation as economic growth picks up. In the short term, Japan should have no difficulty in financing the higher deficit, given that most of the borrowing is internal and denominated in yen.
The third arrow is supply-side policy. On 5 June, Shinzo Abe unveiled a series of goals his government would like to achieve in order to boost capacity and productivity. These include increasing private-sector investment (both domestic and inward), infrastructure expenditure (both private and public), increasing farmland, encouraging more women to work by improving day-care facilities for children, and deregulation of both goods, capital and labour markets. The prime minister, however, did not give details of the measures that would be introduced to achieve these objectives. More details will be announced in mid-June.
The following videos and articles look at the three arrows of Abenomics and the effects they are having on confidence and attitudes as well as on expenditure, output and the exchange rate. They also look at the crucial third arrow: at whether supply-side reforms will be enough to achieve a sustained increase in economic growth.
Videos
Abenomics an uncertain future for most Financial Times on YouTube, Ben McLannahan (30/5/13)
Assessing Abenomics NHK World (3/6/13)
Adam Posen on Abenomics NHK World (30/5/13)
Japanese concerned over ‘Abenomics’ AlJazeera on YouTube (30/5/13)
Abenomics – the cure for deflation? BBC News, Rupert Wingfield-Hayes (10/5/13)
Japan PM’s economic speech ‘short on detail’ BBC News, Rupert Wingfield Hayes (5/6/13)
Pretty Positive on Abenomics Bloomberg, Jan Hatzius, Goldman Sachs (5/6/13)
Why Abenomics is Bonkers: Pro CNBC, Graeme Maxton, (27/5/13)
‘Abe’nomics Not About BOJ Printing Money Bloomberg, Derek Halpenny (31/5/13)
Abenomics Aims `Third Arrow’ at Business Rules Bloomberg, Willie Pesek (5/6/13)
Analysis on Abe’s Growth Plan NHK World (5/6/13)
Articles
Will three arrows find their target? On Line Opinion, Andrew Leigh (6/6/13)
Japan Fires ‘Third Arrow,’ but Will It Work? CNBC, Dhara Ranasinghe (5/6/13)
Japan’s ‘3 Arrows’ May Run Into German Wall CNBC, Michael Ivanovitch (19/5/13)
Japan’s recovery – the power of Abe’s three arrows Commonwealth Bank, Australia, Melanie Timbrell (31/5/13)
So Far, the Battery Charger Is Working in Japan The New York Times, Jeff Sommer (18/5/13)
Abenomics Could Light A Fire Under The Japan Trade Again Business Insider, Matthew Boesler (4/6/13)
Japan’s New Prime Minister Unveils The ‘Most Important’ Plank Of Abenomics Business Insider (5/6/13)
Japan PM pledges to boost incomes by 30% Channel NewsAsia (5/6/13)
Abe’s growth strategy disappoints economists, investors The Asahi Shimbun (6/6/13)
Abenomics Won’t Be ’Magic Bullet’ for Japan, Says Johnson of MIT Bloomberg, Cordell Eddings (5/6/13)
Too soon to call time on Abenomics BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (19/6/13)
Abenomics: The objectives and the risks BBC News, Puneet Pal Singh (19/7/13)
Data
World Economic Outlook Database IMF
Bank of Japan Statistics Bank of Japan
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OECD
Country statistical profile: Japan 2013 OECD
Questions
- Demonstrate on (a) an aggregate demand and supply diagram and (b) a Keynesian 45° line diagram the effects of the three arrows (assuming they are successful) in meeting their objectives.
- What will determine the effectiveness of the first two arrows in boosting short-term economic growth?
- Would you characterise the policies of the third arrow as interventionist or market-orientated, or as a mixture? Explain.
- What are the dangers in ‘Abenomics’?
- Find out what has been happening to Japanese bond rates. What are the implications of this for monetary policy?
- What are the ‘markets telling Abe’?
- In what ways will expectations influence the effectiveness of Abenomics?
Here are a series of videos examining the case for and against austerity policy. Is such policy necessary to re-balance countries’ economies and retain or regain the confidence of investors? Or does such policy harm not just short-run growth but long-run growth too? Does it reduce investment and thereby aggregate supply?
These videos follow on from the news item Keynes versus the Classics: a new version of an old story. In the first video, Mark Blyth, author of Austerity: the History of a Dangerous Idea, argues that austerity policy has not worked and never can. George Osborne, by contrast, argues that although it has been a ‘hard road to recovery’, austerity policy is working.
International bodies take a more nuanced stand. The IMF, while supporting the objective of reducing the government deficit, argues that the pace of the cuts in the UK should be slowed until more robust growth returns. The OECD, in examining the global economy, is more supportive of countries maintaining the pace of deficit reduction, but argues that the ECB needs to take stronger monetary measures to boost bank lending in the eurozone.
With austerity having increasingly alarming effects on unemployment and social cohesion, especially within certain eurozone countries, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, it is not surprising that there are growing demands for rethinking macroeconomic policy.
There is general agreement that more needs to be done to promote economic growth, and a growing consensus that an increase in infrastructure expenditure is desirable. But whether such expenditure should be financed by increased borrowing (with the extra deficit being reduced subsequently as a result of the extra growth), or whether it should be financed by reductions in expenditure elsewhere, is a continuing focus of debate.
Austerity: the History of a Dangerous Idea The Guardian, Mark Blyth (27/5/13) (see also)
IMF: UK austerity will be a ‘drag on growth’ BBC News. Hugh Pym (22/5/13)
George Osborne: ‘Hard road to recovery for UK economy’ BBC News (22/5/13)
Economy and austerity BBC News, Sajid Javid and Stephen Timms (1/5/13)
IMF’s Olivier Blanchard urges UK austerity rethink BBC News (16/4/13)
OECD ‘supportive of Osborne austerity plans’ BBC news (29/5/13)
Stimulus vs. austerity measures in EU CNN, Mohamed El-Erian (29/5/13)
‘No time to wobble’ on deficit reduction YouTube, Sir Roger Carr (CBI president) (16/5/13)
Deficit-Cutting: Not If, But When Wall Street Journal Live, David Wessel (8/5/13)
Questions
- What are the arguments for maintaining a policy of deficit reduction through tight fiscal policy?
- What are the three principles put forward by Mark Blyth for designing an appropriate macroeconomic policy?
- How does the fallacy of composition relate to the effects of all countries pursuing austerity policy simultaneously?
- Is the IMF for or against austerity? Explain.
- Assess the policies advocated by the OECD to stimulate economic growth in the eurozone.
The Competition Commission (CC) recently completed their provisional investigation into the cement and concrete market in Great Britain (press release). They concluded that coordination between the main cement producers is resulting in high prices.
In contrast, to illegal cartels (see for example the recent post on this site), the firms in this market are not accused of doing anything illegal. Instead, the CC’s concern is with tacit collusion. Here, no illegal communication between firms takes place, firms simply do not compete intensely due to a mutual understanding that high prices are collectively beneficial.
Economic theory suggests that one key factor that facilitates tacit coordination is a low number of firms in the market. The UK cement market certainly meets this criteria as it is an oligopoly with just three main players plus a new entrant. The CC concluded that:
In a highly concentrated market where the product doesn’t vary, the established producers know too much about each other’s businesses and have concentrated on retaining their respective market shares rather than competing to the full.
They estimate that this cost consumers over £180m in a 3 year period.
Whilst tacit collusion is not illegal, competition authorities can try to prevent it from arising by intervening in mergers that they believe will make it more likely. In fact, the new entrant to the cement market came about due to sales required by the CC before they would allow a joint-venture between two of the main players to go ahead. Clearly the CC’s recent findings suggest that this intervention was not sufficient to ensure intense competition in the market. However, an additional tool available to the authorities in the UK is to be able to remedy harm to competition undercovered as a result of an investigation into the market. In some cases this may even involve breaking-up firms in the market (see for example the decision to force BAA to sell several airports).
When deciding on how to remedy the problem in the cement market, the CC will be keen to avoid the past mistakes of their Danish counterparts. In a famous case, in 1993 the Danish authorities attempted to increase competition in the concrete market by publishing individual sellers’ prices. The idea was that this would stimulate competition by encouraging buyers to shop around. However, evidence published here suggests that this in fact increased prices by around 15%! Why? The paper examines possible explanations and concludes that the information published by the competition authorities helped firms to monitor each others behaviour and therefore facilitated tacit coordination in the market. This is entirely consistent with economic theory which shows that another key factor which facilitates tacit coordination is market transparency.
The CC suggest that such monitoring is also possible in the GB market:
Established information channels such as price announcement letters can signal their plans, and tit-for-tat behaviour and cross-sales can be used to prevent or retaliate against any moves to disturb the overall balance between the different players in this market.
According to the above press release, the remedies the CC are considering include: the sale of capacity or plants by the leading players in the market, creation of buying groups, prohibition on price announcements and restrictions on the publication of industry level data. This suggests that the CC are well aware that reducing market transparency can play a key role in preventing coordination. It will be fascinating to, first, see what the CC opt for, then, what impact this has on competition in the industry.
Articles
Same product, same price? Competition in the UK Global Cement (22/05/13)
Competition Commission uncovers `serious problems’ in cement market Graham Huband, The Courier (22/05/13)
Competition Commission call for cement sell-off Mark Leftley, London Evening Standard (21/05/13)
Competition Commission documents
CC looks to break open cement market Competition Commission Press Release (21/5/13)
Aggregates, cement and ready-mix concrete market investigation Competition Commission core documents (various dates)
Questions
- Explain tacit collusion using a Prisoner’s dilemma game.
- Is cement the type of product where we might expect coordination to be most likely?
- Why is cement an important market in the UK economy?
- The first article above suggests that most of the management team at the new entrant came from the other main players in the market. Do you think this may significantly affect the likelihood of tacit collusion?
- Evaluate the pros and cons of the alternative remedies the CC are considering.
At a cost of €1 trillion to EU states, tax evasion is undoubtedly an area in need of attention. With government finances in deficit across the world, part of the gap could be plugged by preventing tax revenues from going unpaid. Well-known companies and individuals have been accused of tax evasion (and avoidance), but part of the problem is the existence of countries that make such activities possible.
Tax havens not only offer favourable tax rates, but also have in place regulations that prevent the effective exchange of information. That is, they are able to keep the identity and income information of depositors a private affair and are not required to share that information with other governments. This means that other tax authorities are unable to demand the tax revenue from income earned, when it is held in some of these countries. This can deprive the government’s coffers of substantial amounts of money.
In 2000, the OECD produced a report naming so-called ‘uncooperative tax havens’, including Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein and Liberia. Since then, all nations on this list have pledged their cooperation and been removed and in a recent step, Andorra has announced a proposal to implement its first ever income tax. This move is partly in response to pressures from EU governments to tackle tax evasion. Furthermore, talks between the finance ministers of tax havens, such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein have been agreed with the aim of improving the flow of bank account information and thus combating tax evasion. The Council of the European Union said:
The decision represents an important step in the EU’s efforts to clamp down on tax evasion and tax fraud”
Countries, such as Switzerland (a non-EU member) are likely to find requests for information difficult to ignore, if they want to have access to EU financial markets. However, any concessions on information provision will come at a significant cost for a country that has long regarded its banking secrecy as an ‘honourable policy.
Reforming policy on tax havens is essential, not only to help tackle tax evasion and thus government deficits, but also to generate investment into countries that don’t offer such favourable tax rates. Investors naturally want to invest in those countries with low tax rates and as such, could it be that countries like the UK suffer from a loss of investment and that the only way to encourage it is to offer similarly low tax rates? International agreement is certainly needed to tackle the worldwide issue of tax evasion and at the moment, it seems as though pressure is building on secretive countries. The following articles consider this controversial issue.
Clock ticks on Swiss banking secrecy BBC News, Imogen Foulkes (21/5/13)
Andorra bows to EU pressure to introduce income tax The Telegraph, Fiona Govan (2/6/13)
Andorra to introduce income tax for first time BBC News (2/6/13)
Andorra to introduce income tax for the first time Economy Watch (3/6/13)
Swiss have no choice but to bow to US ultimatum – Ackermann Reuters, Katharina Bart> (3/6/13)
Austria out front as EU zeroes in on tax evasion The Budapest Times (29/5/13)
EU to start talks with non-EU countries on tax evasion BBC News (14/5/13)
Questions
- What is tax evasion?
- Using game theory, explain why an international agreement on tax evasion might be needed?
- When an income tax is imposed in Andorra, what will be the impact on government revenues?
- How might the labour supply incentive change once an income tax is imposed?
- How do tax havens affect investment in other countries?
- Is there an argument that countries such as the UK should cut its tax rates to encourage investment?
