Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 06

Fuel prices at German petrol stations fluctuate wildly – by up to €0.14 per day. They are also often changed several times per day. In morning rush hours, when demand is less elastic, prices may shoot up, only to drop again once people are at work.

But is this a sign of healthy competition? Critics claim the opposite: that it’s a sign of the oligopoly power of the oil companies. More than two-thirds of Germany’s petrol stations are franchises of five big oil companies: BP/Aral, Esso, Jet, Shell and Total. These five companies directly control the prices at the pumps. According to the Der Spiegel article below, oil companies:

have sophisticated computer systems that allow them to precisely control, right down to the minute, when they increase their prices nationwide, and by how many cents. The prices are not set by the individual franchise holders. Instead, they are centrally controlled – for example, in the town of Bochum, at the headquarters of Aral, a BP subsidiary that is the market leader in Germany.

The price manager merely presses a button and price signs immediately change at all 2,391 Aral service stations in Germany. All filling stations are electronically linked with Bochum via a dedicated network called Rosi. After each price increase, they watch closely to see how the competition reacts and whether they follow suit.

… If the competitor’s prices are significantly cheaper, the Aral franchise holder can, with the help of Rosi, apply for permission to reduce the prices again.

Not only do the oil companies control the prices at the pumps, but they observe closely, via their franchise holders, the actions of their rivals, and then respond in ways which critics claim is collusive rather than competitive. The problem has become worse with the introduction of incentives to the franchise owners of additional commission if they exceed the price of their competitors within the local area. This has the effect of ratcheting prices up.

The sophisticated pricing strategies, with prices adjusted frequently according to price elasticity of demand, are making it very hard for independent operators to compete.

In response, the German Cartel Office has launched an investigation into the oil companies and in particular into the issues of collusion and frequent price changes and how these impact on independent operators.

German anti-trust authority probes alleged fuel cartel Deutsche Welle (4/4/12)
German antitrust watchdog to probe oil majors-paper Reuters, Ludwig Burger (3/4/12)
Oil giants probed over claims they rigged petrol prices in Germany The Telegraph, Nathalie Thomas (4/4/12)
BP, Exxon, Esso, Jet, Shell and Total in Germany Price Fix Probe International Business Times (9/4/12)
German cartel office probes petrol company pricing MarketWatch (4/4/12)
Kartellverfahren gegen fünf Mineralölkonzerne (in German) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Helmut Bünder and Manfred Schäfers (4/4/12)
Crazy gas prices driving German consumers mad msnbc, Andy Eckardt (3/4/12)
Big Oil’s Strategy for Jacking Up Gas Prices Der Spiegel, Alexander Jung and Alexander Neubacher (5/4/12)

Questions

  1. What the features of the German road fuel oligopoly?
  2. Why does the price elasticity of demand for petrol and diesel vary with the time of day? Is it likely to vary from one week to another and, if so, why?
  3. In what ways have the actions of the big five oil companies been against the interests of the independent petrol station operators?
  4. Consider the alternatives open to the German Federal Cartel Office for making the market more competitive.
  5. Would it be a good idea for the big five German companies to be forced to adopt the Western Australian system of price changes?

With the financial crisis came accusations towards the banking sector that they had taken on too many bad risks. Banks were lending money on more and more risky ventures and this in part led to the credit crunch. Since then, bank lending has fallen and banks have been less and less willing to take on risky investments.

Small businesses tend to fall (rightly or wrongly) into the category of high risk and it is this sector in particular that is finding itself struggling to make much needed investments. All businesses require loans for investments and improvements and if the banking sector is unable or unwilling to lend then these improvements cannot take place.

Quantitative easing has been a key response across the world to the credit crisis to encourage banks to begin lending to each other and to customers. A new government backed scheme worth £20bn aims to increase bank lending to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). By guaranteeing £20bn of the participating banks’ own borrowing, lenders will be able to borrow more cheaply than normal. As the banks (so far including Barclays, Santander, RBS and Lloyds Banking Group) can borrow at a cheaper rate, they will therefore be able to pass this on to the businesses they lend to. Under this National Loan Guarantee Scheme (NLGS), businesses will be able to borrow at interests rates that are 1 percentage point lower than those outside the scheme. £5bn will initially be made available with subsequent installments each of £5bn to come later.

With the Budget looming, the Chancellor is keen to show that the government is delivering on its promise to give smaller businesses access to finance at lower interest rates. If this initiative does indeed stimulate higher lending, it may be a much needed boost for the economy’s faltering economic growth. Criticisms have been leveled at the scheme, saying that although it is a step in the right direction, it can by no means be assumed that it will be sufficient to solve all the problems. In particular, the NLGS is unlikely to provide much help for those small businesses that can’t get finance in the first place, irrespective of the cost of the borrowing. Furthermore some banks, notably HSBC, have chosen not to participate in the scheme, due to it not being commercially viable. The overall effect of this scheme will take some time be seen, but if it is effective, it could give the economy and the small business sector a much needed boost.

Banks to join credit-easing scheme Associated Press (20/3/12)
Credit easing: small businesses to get £20bn of guaranteed cheap loans Telegraph, Harry Wilson (20/3/12)
Bank lending scheme targets small businesses BBC News (20/3/12)
Move over Merlin, credit easing has arrived Independent, Ben Chu (20/3/12)
Credit easing injects £20bn into small firms Sky News (20/3/12)
UK launches small firm loan scheme, critics want more Reuters, Fiona Shaikh (20/3/12)
Osborne’s big plan: £20bn for small businesses Independent, Andrew Grice and Ben Chu (20/3/12)
George Osborne launches new scheme to boost lending to businesses Guardian, Larry Elliott (20/3/12)

Questions

  1. What is credit easing? Has the government’s previous credit easing had the intended effect?
  2. Why are small and medium sized enterprises normally seen as risky investments?
  3. Briefly explain the thinking behind this National Loan Guarantee Scheme.
  4. What are the criticisms currently levelled at this scheme? To what extent are they justified?
  5. Why has HSBC said that the scheme is not commercially viable for the bank?
  6. Explain why this scheme could provide a stimulus to the UK economy.

Is Google’s Android catching up with Apple’s iOS in the market for apps? With Android tablets and smartphones taking an ever larger proportion of the market, you would expect so. In the third quarter of 2011, 53% of smartphone shipments used Google’s Android system, compared with only 15% with iOS.

However, Apple is still ahead of Google in the share of apps downloads. To date, there have been 18 billion downloads from the iOS App Store for iPhone, iPad and iPod Touchs compared with 10 billion downloads of Android apps. But Android downloads are growing faster and are set to overtake those of iOS apps in the coming months. This should be boosted with the new Ice Cream Sandwich Android operating system.

But what about revenues earned from downloads? Here the picture is very different. Android Marketplace has earned around $330 million gross revenue for paid apps. Apple’s App Store, by contrast, has earned over 15 times as much: nearly $5000 million. The reason is that 99% of Android apps are free; the figure for App Store apps is 86%. But why is this so and how can Android earn revenues from its apps? And how can app developers earn revenues from the Android market? The following articles look at the economics of apps.

Android Vs. iPhone: The Economics Of Apps Financial Edge, Manish Sahajwani (6/1/12)
Google has an Amazon problem MSN Money, Jim J. Jubak (25/1/12)
Android and the economics of apps BBC News, Rory Cellan-Jones (7/12/11)
Apple Getting Best Of The Android Vs. iPhone Economics Forbes, Manish Sahajwani (6/1/12)
Fragmentation Is Not The End of Android cek.log, Charlie Kindel (14/1/12)

Questions

  1. Why are most Android apps free to download?
  2. What is the business model for (a) developing and (b) offering Android apps?
  3. How can money be made from free apps?
  4. What are the long-term strengths and weaknesses in Apple’s apps business model?
  5. Assess Amazon’s business model for apps for Kindle users.

Every firm has been hit by the recession and for most, it’s been bad news. However, the latest firm to file for bankruptcy is an interesting case, as the causes extend well beyond a weak economy. The company in question? Eastman Kodak. Renowned for inventing the hand-held camera and being the market leader, selling 90% of photographic film and 85% of all cameras in the USA in 1976, the company has since seen a large change in its fortunes.

Massive competition has emerged from all over the globe and the company has seemed to lag behind the digital revolution. Arguably, unwilling to take risks and making some strategic errors, Kodak saw its stock tumble from $94 in 1997 to under $1 per share in 2012. Since 2004, Kodak has only seen one profitable year. With massive competitors in the world of digital photography, the market has become a highly competitive one. As Rupert Goodwins, the editor of technology website ZDNet said:Kodak made all its money from selling film, then the digital camera came along and now no-one’s buying film. It’s not like they didn’t see it coming. Kodak hesitated because they didn’t want to eviscerate their business.

By filing for bankruptcy, Kodak is protected and its operations will continue for the time being, perhaps giving the company time to have a rethink and a reorganization. Eastman Kodak has previously tried to take a new direction and has been moving away from film and towards its printer, software and packing businesses. The problem is that these markets already have some very strong competitors: Hewlett Packard, Canon and Epson. It’s a difficult job to break into this market and gain market share.

The future of the company is very much in the balance and as reorganization of its operations looks inevitable, so does a loss of jobs. Thank goodness it only employs some 19,000 workers and not the 145,000 it did back in its day. Bankruptcy will certainly keep the creditors at bay for the time being, but it is by no means a long term solution to the company’s ailing profits. The following articles consider this ‘Kodak moment’.

Eastman Kodak files for bankruptcy protection BBC News (19/1/12)
Eastman Kodak files for bankruptcy The Christian Science Monitor, Ben Dobbin (19/1/12)
Kodak: From Brownie and roll film to digital disaster BBC News, James Cowling (19/1/12)
Kodak files for bankruptcy CNN Money, Aaron Smith and Hibah Yousuf (19/1/12)
Photography pioneer Kodak files for bankruptcy Reuters, Jonathan Stempel (19/1/12)
Kodak: 30 fascinating facts The Telegraph, Matthew Sparkes (19/1/12)
Kodak: why the moment has oassed Guardian, Simon Waldman (19/1/12)

Questions

  1. Using the product life cycle, explain where Kodak currently lies.
  2. To what extent are Kodak’s current problems related to the obsolescence of their products and not the recession?
  3. What strategic errors have Kodak made?
  4. What has caused Kodak’s collapse in share prices and profitability?
  5. Why is Eastman Kodak finding it difficult to gain market share in other markets, such as printing?
  6. What options are open to Kodak for the future if it is to become profitable once more?

In many parts of the UK, bus services are run by a single operator. In other parts, it is little different, with the main operator facing competition on only a very limited number of routes. Over the whole of England, Scotland and Wales there are 1245 bus operators, but the ‘big five’ (Arriva, FirstGroup, Go-Ahead, National Express and Stagecoach) carry some 70% of passengers. Generally these five companies do not compete with each other, but, instead, operate as monopolies, or near monopolies, in their own specific areas. On average, the largest operator in an urban area runs 69% of local bus services.

Given this lack of competition and potential abuse of monopoly power, the Office of Fair Trading referred local bus services in Great Briatin (excluding London) to the Competition Commission (CC) in January 2010. The CC has just published its final report. Paragraph 5 of the summary to the report states:

We concluded that there were four features of local bus markets which mean that effective head-to-head competition is uncommon and which limit the effectiveness of potential competition and new entry. These features are the existence of: high levels of concentration; barriers to entry and expansion; customer conduct in deciding which bus to catch; and operator conduct by which operators avoid competing with other operators in ‘Core Territories’ (certain parts of an operator’s network which it regards as its ‘own’ territory) leading to geographic market segregation.

And paragraph 8 states:

We decided on a package of remedies with three main elements to address the AECs [adverse effects on competition] that we found. First, the remedies include market-opening measures to reduce barriers to entry and expansion, thereby reducing market concentration and providing an environment in which competition is likely to be sustained. By reducing barriers to entry and expansion, we also expect it to become harder for operators to sustain a coordinated outcome. Second, the remedies include measures to promote competition in relation to the tendering of contracts for supported services. Third, we made recommendations about the wider policy and regulatory environment, including emphasizing compliance with and effective enforcement of competition law.

The following articles look at the findings of the report and at the potential for improving the service to passengers, in terms of quality, frequency and price.

Articles
Competition regulator outlines bus market shake-up The Telegraph (20/12/11)
Bus market not competitive, Competition Commission says BBC News (20/12/11)
Passengers ‘need more bus rivalry’ Press Association (20/12/11)

Competition Commission publications
CC sets out Future Destination for Bus Market Competition Commission News Release (20/12/11)
Bus Market Inquiry: Final Report, Case Studies and Appendices Competition Commission (20/12/11)
Local Bus Services: Accompanying Documents Competition Commission (20/12/11)

Questions

  1. What are the barriers to entry in the market for local bus services?
  2. In what circumstances are local bus services a natural monopoly? Is this generally the case?
  3. In a non-regulated bus market, how could established operators use predatory pricing to drive out new entrants?
  4. How may offering reductions for return tickets reduce competition on routes where there is a large operator and one or more smaller ones?
  5. What practices can established large operators use to drive out smaller competitors?
  6. Go through the four reasons given by the CC why head-to-head competition in local bus markets is uncommon and in each case consider what remedies could be adopted by the regulator or by local authorities.
  7. Which of the remedies proposed by the CC involve encouraging more competition and which involve tighter regulation?