Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 11

It doesn’t seem long ago that we were looking at the prospects of Brazil for hosting the Football World Cup. Now, we turn to the same economy, but this time for the Olympics. It is often the case that hosting big global sporting events can give a boost to the host nation, but is Brazil prepared for it? Did the World Cup bring the expected economic boosts? Some argue that the Olympics is just what Brazil needs, but others suggest it will only worsen the economic situation in the world’s seventh largest economy.

Brazil’s economic performance in the past year was not good. In fact, it was one of the worst performing nations of any major economy, with GDP falling by 3%. This is a very different country from the one that was awarded this biggest of sporting events. Despite these difficult times, Brazil’s government maintains that the country is ready and that the games will be ‘spectacular’.

Key to hosting a sporting event such as the Olympics is the infrastructure investment and as a key component of aggregate demand, this should be a stimulant for growth and job creation. However, with the economy still struggling, many are concerned that the infrastructure won’t be in place in time.

Other benefits from this should be the boost to growth driven by athletes and spectators coming from around the globe, buying tickets, memorabilia, accommodation, food and other items that tourists tend to buy. A multiplier effect should be seen and according to research has the potential to create significant benefits for the whole economy and not just the local regions where events take place. You can look at similar analysis in blogs written about Tokyo: 2020 Tokyo Olympics and London: The London Olympics legacy: a cost–benefit analysis and Does hosting the Olympics Games increase economic growth?

But, is this really likely to happen, especially given the somewhat lacklustre boost that the Brazil World Cup gave to the economy? The following articles consider this.

Rio 2016: Can Games bounce back from Brazil economic woes? BBC News, Bill Wilson (11/03/16)
Does hosting the Olympics actually pay off? It’s the economy, Binyamin Applebaum (5/08/14)
Rio Olympics no help to Brazil economy based on World Cup Bloomberg, Raymond Colitt (16/01/15)
The economic impact of Brazil’s 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics Saxo Group, Trading Floor, Sverrir Sverrisson (27/08/12)
Special Interview: Cost–benefit analysis of hosting the World Cup, Olympics Al Arabiya, Ricardo Guerra (3/7/14)

Questions

  1. How might you carry out a cost–benefit analysis to decide whether to host a big sporting event?
  2. Are there any externalities that might result from hosting the Olympics? How easy is it to estimate their monetary value? Should this be taken into account by a country when making a decision?
  3. Why might there be a boost to aggregate demand prior to the Olympics?
  4. Why might there be a multiplier effect when a nation hosts the Olympics or another sporting event?
  5. Might there be benefits to Brazil’s neighbours from its hosting the Olympics?

On election to office in May 2015, the UK’s Conservative government set new fiscal targets. These were set out in an updated Charter for Budget Responsibility. As Box 12.3 in Essentials of Economics (7th edition) states:

The new fiscal mandate set a target for achieving a surplus on public-sector net borrowing by the end of 2019/20. More controversially, government should then target a surplus in each subsequent year unless real GDP growth falls below 1 per cent … Meanwhile, the revised supplementary target for public-sector debt was for the net debt-to-GDP ratio to fall each year from 2015/16 to 2019/20.

What is more, the Charter requires the government to set a cap on welfare spending over a five-year period. Such spending includes spending on pensions, tax credits, child benefit and unemployment benefit. In July 2015 the Chancellor set this cap at £115bn for 2016/17, a reduction of £12bn.

Whether or not such a tight fiscal target is desirable, the government has been missing the target. In November last year, the Chancellor had to backtrack on his plans to make substantial reductions in tax credits and as a result the welfare cap has been breached, as the following table from page 5 of the December 2015 House of Commons briefing paper shows.

Also, with the slowing of economic growth, the Chancellor has stated that he will miss the requirement for a fall in the net debt-to-GDP ratio unless further cuts in government spending are made, equivalent to 50p in every £100.

But, if the economy is slowing, is it right to cut government expenditure? In other words, should there be some discretion in fiscal policy to respond to economic circumstances? There are two issues here. The first is whether the resulting cut in aggregate demand will be detrimental to growth. The second is who will bear the cost of such cuts. Critics of the government claim that it will largely the poor who will lose if the cuts are made mainly from benefits.

The articles below examine the public finances, the difficulties George Osborne has been facing in sticking to his fiscal mandate and the options open to him.

Articles

Budget 2016: Osborne’s economic fitness regime BBC News, Andy Verity (14/3/16)
Budget 2016: George Osborne fuels speculation of nasty shocks The Guardian, Larry Elliott and Anushka Asthana (14/3/16)

Official publications
Charter for Budget Responsibility: Summer Budget 2015 update HM Treasury (July 2015)
OBR publications, including ‘Economic and fiscal outlook’ and ‘Fiscal sustainability report’ Office for Budget Responsibility

Questions

  1. Outline the main points of the Charter for Budget Responsibility (CBR).
  2. What are the arguments for sticking to fiscal rules, such as those in the CBR?
  3. What are the arguments for using discretion to adjust fiscal policy as economic circumstances change?
  4. Compare the Conservative government’s fiscal mandate with the newly announced approach to fiscal policy of the Labour opposition?
  5. How does the Labour Party’s new approach differ from the Golden Rule followed by Gordon Brown as Chancellor in the Labour government from 1997 to 2007?
  6. What factors will determine whether or not the government will return to meeting the rules set out in the Charter for Budget Responsibility?

Seven years ago (on 5 March 2009), the Bank of England reduced interest rates to a record low of 0.5%. This was in response to a deepening recession. It mirrored action taken by other central banks across the world as they all sought to stimulate their economies, which were reeling from the financial crisis.

Record low interest rates, combined with expansionary fiscal policy, were hoped to be enough to restore rates of growth to levels experienced before the crisis. But they weren’t. One by one countries increased narrow money through bouts of quantitative easing.

But as worries grew about higher government deficits, brought about by the expansionary fiscal policies and by falling tax receipts as incomes and spending fell, so fiscal policy became progressively tighter. Thus more and more emphasis was put on monetary policy as the means of stimulating aggregate demand and boosting economic growth.

Ultra low interest rates and QE were no longer a short-term measure. They persisted as growth rates remained sluggish. The problem was that the higher narrow money supply was not leading to the hoped-for credit creation and growth in consumption and investment. The extra money was being used for buying assets, such as shares and houses, not being spent on goods, services, plant and equipment. The money multiplier fell dramatically in many countries (see chart 1 for the case of the UK: click here for a PowerPoint) and there was virtually no growth in credit creation. Broad money in the UK (M4) has actually fallen since 2008 (see chart 2: click here for a PowerPoint), as it has in various other countries.

Additional monetary measures were put in place, including various schemes to provide money to banks for direct lending to companies or individuals. Central banks increasingly resorted to zero or negative interest rates paid to banks for deposits: see the blog posts Down down deeper and down, or a new Status Quo? and When a piggy bank pays a better rate. But still bank lending has stubbornly failed to take off.

Some indication that the ’emergency’ was coming to an end occurred in December 2015 when the US Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 0.25 percentage points. However, many commentators felt that that was too soon, especially in the light of slowing Chinese economic growth. Indeed, the Chinese authorities themselves have been engaging in a large scale QE programme and other measures to arrest this fall in growth.

Although it cut interest rates in 2009 (to 1% by May 2009), the ECB was more cautious than other central banks in the first few years after 2008 and even raised interest rates in 2011 (to 1.5% by July of that year). However, more recently it has been more aggressive in its monetary policy. It has progressively cut interest rates (see chart 3: click here for a PowerPoint) and announced in January 2015 that it was introducing a programme of QE, involving €60 billion of asset purchases for at least 18 months from March 2015. In December 2015, it announced that it would extend this programme for another six months.

The latest move by the ECB was on March 10, when it took three further sets of measures to boost the flagging eurozone economy. It cut interest rates, including cutting the deposit rate paid to banks from –0.3% to –0.4% and the main refinancing rate from –0.05% to –0%; it increased its monthly quantitative easing from €60 billion to €80 billion; and it announced unlimited four-year loans to banks at near-zero interest rates.

It would seem that the emergency continues!

Articles

QE, inflation and the BoE’s unreliable boyfriend: seven years of record low rates The Guardian, Katie Allen (5/3/16)
The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking and the Future of the Global Economy by Mervyn King – review The Observer, John Kampfner (14/3/16)
How ‘negative interest rates’ marked the end of central bank dominance The Telegraph, Peter Spence (21/2/16)
ECB stimulus surprise sends stock markets sliding BBC News (10/3/16)
5 Takeaways From the ECB Meeting The Wall Street Journal, Paul Hannon (10/3/16)
ECB cuts interest rates to zero amid fears of fresh economic crash The Guardian, Katie Allen and Jill Treanor (10/3/16)
Economists mixed on ECB stimulus CNBC, Elizabeth Schulze (10/3/16)
ECB’s Draghi plays his last card to stave off deflation The Telegraph, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (10/3/16)
ECB cuts rates to new low and expands QE Financial Times, Claire Jones (10/3/16)
Is QE a saviour, necessary evil or the road to perdition? The Telegraph, Roger Bootle (20/3/16)

ECB materials
Monetary policy decisions ECB Press Release (10/3/16)
Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A) ECB Press Conference, Mario Draghi and Vítor Constâncio (10/3/16)
ECB Press Conference webcast ECB, Mario Draghi

Questions

  1. What are meant by narrow and broad money?
  2. What is the relationship between narrow and broad money? What determines the amount that broad money will increase when narrow money increases?
  3. Explain what is meant by (a) the credit multiplier and (b) the money multiplier.
  4. Explain how the process of quantitative easing is supposed to result in an increase in aggregate demand. How reliable is this mechanism?
  5. Find out and explain what happened to the euro/dollar exchange rate when Mario Draghi made the announcement of the ECB’s monetary measures on 10 March.
  6. Is there a conflict for central banks between trying to strengthen banks’ liquidity and reserves and trying to stimulate bank lending? Explain.
  7. Why are “the ECB’s policies likely to destroy half of Germany’s 1500 savings and co-operative banks over the next five years”? (See the Telegraph article.
  8. What are the disadvantages of quantitative easing?
  9. What are the arguments for and against backing up monetary policy with expansionary fiscal policy? Consider different forms that this fiscal policy might take.

In recent months the Chinese central bank (the People’s Bank of China) has taken a number of measures to boost aggregate demand and arrest the slowing economic growth rate. Such measures have included quantitative easing, cuts in interest rates, a devaluation of the yuan and daily injections of liquidity through open-market operations. It has now announced that from 1 March it will reduce the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) for banks by a half percentage point.

The RRR is the percentage of liabilities that banks are required to hold in the form of cash reserves – money that could otherwise have been used for lending. This latest move will bring the compulsory ratio for the larger banks down from 17.5% to 17%. This may sound like only a small reduction, but it will release some ¥650bn to ¥690bn (around $100bn) of reserves that can be used for lending.

The cut from 17.5% to 17% is the fourth this year. Throughout 2014 and 2015 it was stable at 20%.

The hope is that this lending will not only help to boost economic growth but also stimulate demand for the consumption of services. The measure can thus be seen as part of a broader strategy as the authorities seek to re-balance the economy away from its reliance on basic manufacturing towards a more diversified economy. It is also hoped that the extra demand will help to boost jobs and thus provide more opportunities for people laid off from traditional manufacturing industries.

It is expected that further reductions in the RRR will be announced later in the year – perhaps a further 1.5 to 2 percentage points.

But what will be the effect of the releasing of reserves? Will the boost be confined to $100bn or will there be a money multiplier effect? It is certainly hoped by the authorities that this will stimulate the process of credit creation. But how much credit is created depends not just on banks’ willingness to lend, but also on the demand for credit. And that depends very much on expectations about future rates of economic growth.

One issue that concerns both the Chinese and overseas competitors is the effect of the measure on the exchange rate. By increasing the money supply, the measure will put downward pressure on the exchange rate as it will boost the demand for imports.

The Chinese authorities have been intervening in the foreign exchange market to arrest a fall in the yuan (¥) because of worries about capital outflows from China. The yuan was devalued by 2.9% in August 2015 from approximately ¥1 = ¢16.11 to approximately ¥1 = ¢15.64 (see chart) and after a modest rally in November 2015 it began falling again, with the Chinese authorities being unwilling to support it at the November rate. By January 2016, it had fallen a further 2.8% to approximately ¢15.20 (click here for a PowerPoint file of the chart).

But despite the possible downward pressure on the yuan from the cut in the reserve requirement, it will probably put less downward pressure than a cut in interest rates. This is because an interest rate cut has a bigger effect on capital outflows as it directly reduces the return on deposits in China. The central bank had already cut its benchmark 1-year lending rate from 6% to 4.35% between November 2014 and October 2015 and seems reluctant at the current time to cut it further.

China central bank resumes easing cycle to cushion reform pain Reuters, Pete Sweeney (29/2/16)
China cuts reserve requirements for banks to boost economy PressTV (29/2/16)
China Moves to Bolster Lending by Easing Banks’ Reserve Ratio New York Times, Neil Gough (29/2/16)
Economists React: China’s ‘Surprise’ Bank Reserve Cut Wall Street Journal (29/2/16)
China Cuts Banks’ Reserve Requirement Ratio Bloomberg, Enda Curran (29/2/16)
China Reserve-Ratio Cut Signals Growth Is Priority Over Yuan Bloomberg, Andrew Lynch (29/2/16)
China reserve ratio cut not a signal of impending large-scale stimulus: Xinhua Reuters, Samuel Shen and John Ruwitch (2/3/16)
China injects cash to boost growth and counter capital outflows Financial Times, Gabriel Wildau (29/2/16)
China’s Economic Policy Akin To Pushing On A String Seeking Alpha, Bruce Wilds (2/3/16)
China cuts banks’ reserve ratio for fifth time in a year: Why and what’s next Channel NewsAsia, Tang See Kit, (1/3/16)

Questions

  1. Explain what is mean by the required reserve ratio (RRR).
  2. Explain how credit creation takes place.
  3. What will determine the amount of credit creation that will take place as a result of the $100bn of reserves in Chinese banks released for lending by the cut in the RRR from 17.5% to 17%.
  4. What prompted the recent cuts in the RRR?
  5. Why may China’s recent monetary policy measures be like pushing on a string?
  6. Is the reduction in the RRR a purely demand-side measure, or will it have supply-side consequences?
  7. Explain how different types of monetary policy affect the exchange rate.
  8. Should other countries welcome the cut in China’s RRR? Explain.

Deflation is currently a concern in the UK and across Europe. However, relative to Japan, the deflation concern is small. In Japan, deflation has been problematic for more than two decades and this has had significant implications for the Japanese economy.

‘Abenomics’ has been in practice in Japan, as the Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has been trying to reflate the economy. Growth has been improving and the deflation concern appeared to be under control. However, GDP data now shows that the economy is once again declining and so with aggregate demand falling, this pushes down average prices across the economy and so the deflation risk re-emerges. This article from BBC News and another from The Guardian look at the economic policy known as ‘Abenomics’ and how the Japanese economy is faring.

Articles

Off target: Is it the end of ‘Abenomics’ in Japan? BBC News, Rupert Wingfield-Hayes (15/2/16)
Japan’s economy shrinks again as Abenomics is blown off course The Guardian, Justin McCurry (15/2/16)

Previous blogs
Japan’s deflation fears grow (update) (27/2/16)
Riding the Japanese roller coaster (15/2/16)
Japan’s interesting monetary stance as deflation fears grow (14/2/16)
Japan’s arrows missing their target (17/11/14)
Japan’s recovery (3/2/14)
Abenomics – one year on (16/12/13)
Japan’s three arrows (6/6/13)

Questions

  1. What are the key features of Japan’s ‘Abenomics’?
  2. Why is deflation such a concern? Surely falling prices are good for consumers and hence the economy.
  3. How has Japan been trying to reflate its economy and why has this failed?
  4. The yen is getting stronger, but how will this affect the Japanese economy? Use a demand and supply diagram to illustrate what has caused the value of the yen to fall and an aggregate demand and supply diagram to show the impact.
  5. Negative interest rates have been implemented in Japan. What does this mean for savers and borrowers and the economy?
  6. How do you think Japan’s stance on immigration and structural change is affecting its macroeconomy?