Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 05

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When suppliers become the captains: Is Red Bull clipping rivals’ wiiings?

When we think about suppliers and retailers working together, we usually imagine negotiations over things like the price a retailer pays for products, the quantities ordered, or delivery schedules. However, some suppliers do much more than simply supplying products. In fact, suppliers to many supermarkets also advise them on which brands to stock, how much shelf space each brand should get, and which products to promote. In this role, known as a ‘category captain’, a supplier can influence not only its own products but also those of its competitors within a specific category of products.

For example, if Red Bull were acting as a category captain in the energy drinks category for a supermarket like Tesco, it could also advise on where its competitor, Monster Energy, appears on the shelves, or even whether it appears at all!

Sounds problematic? Arrangements like these are an example of vertical relationships between suppliers and retailers, something economists often study. Like other vertical arrangements, such as exclusive dealing, they can have both benefits and drawbacks. For example, while a category captain can result in efficiency gains, allow for a more organised category of products and improve consumer choice, it also raises questions when the supplier giving the advice also competes with the products it is advising on.

That is exactly what the European Commission (EC), the EU’s competition authority, began examining in November 2025, when it opened an investigation into potential anticompetitive conduct by Red Bull.

One of the key concerns is whether Red Bull used its role as a category captain to disadvantage competing energy drink brands.

Category management is common … but novel for enforcement

The practice of appointing a category captain is not new. Many large supermarkets appoint category captains from major consumer goods suppliers. For example, firms such as Kraft Foods and Procter & Gamble have long taken on category management roles in a range of consumer-packaged goods categories.

However, despite how common these arrangements are in retail, this is the first time the EC has formally investigated whether a supplier has misused its category management role to limit or disadvantage competing products, and it has said it will treat the case as a priority.

How Red Bull could be disadvantaging competitors

According to the Commission, Red Bull appears to hold a dominant position in the wholesale supply of branded energy drinks, at least in The Netherlands. In competition policy, a firm which holds a dominant position has a special responsibility to ensure that its actions do not unfairly restrict competition. Regulators are investigating whether the company abused this position by offering financial or non-financial incentives and/or leveraging its role as a category captain to disadvantage competing energy drinks sold in larger can sizes.

At an extreme, a category captain could advise a supermarket to stop selling a competitor’s product entirely, effectively excluding the brand from the shelves and potentially reducing consumer choice.

But there are also more subtle ways Red Bull could disadvantage its competitors. Insights from behavioural economics suggest that the placement of products on shelves can strongly influence what consumers notice and buy. By reducing the visibility of rival energy drinks, for example, products in less prominent locations are less likely to be purchased and are therefore disadvantaged.

These practices matter for consumers as well as competitors. By limiting which products are stocked or how prominently they are displayed, dominant suppliers could reduce choice and potentially keep prices higher.

Growing scrutiny of category management?

Competition authorities seem to be paying closer attention to how suppliers influence the management of product categories in retail stores. In April 2025, the Belgian Competition Authority fined three large pharmaceutical companies more than €11 million for co-ordinating the placement of over-the-counter medicines in pharmacies. The companies had created shelf layouts that favoured their own products, disadvantaged competing brands, and monitored whether pharmacies followed the plans.

Thus far there have not been many European cases related to category management.

Why the Red Bull case matters

The Red Bull investigation is the first EC case focusing specifically on the potential misuse of category management by a dominant supplier. There is currently little guidance on how these arrangements should be assessed under competition law, meaning the case could set an important precedent.

If the Commission concludes that category management was used strategically to disadvantage competitors, Red Bull could be found to have abused its dominant position under EU competition rules. Such a decision could reshape supplier–retailer relationships across Europe.

Articles

Questions

  1. Beyond prices, how might dominant suppliers influencing shelf space affect competition and consumer choice?
  2. How might category captain arrangements affect barriers to entry?
  3. What are the potential efficiencies of supplier-led category management, and what are the possible anti-competitive effects?
  4. What guidelines or safeguards could regulators provide to ensure category captains deliver the potential efficiencies without harming competition?
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Shrinkflation, skimpflation and sneakflation: ways of hiding inflation

Have you noticed that many products in the supermarket seem to be getting smaller or are poorer quality, or that special offers are not as special as they used to be? When you ring customer services, does it seem that you have to wait longer than you used to? Do you now have to pay for extras that used to be free? These are all ways that producers try to pass on cost increases to consumers without rising prices. There are three broad ways in which producers try to hide inflation.

The first is called ‘shrinkflation’. It is defined as having less product in the same package or a smaller package for the same price. For example, reducing the number of chocolates in a tub, reducing the size of a can of beans, jar of coffee or block of butter, reducing the number of sheets in a toilet roll, or the length of a ride in a fairground or portion sizes in a restaurant or takeaway. A 2023 YouGov poll revealed that 75% of UK adults are either ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ concerned about shrinkflation. A similar poll in 2025 showed that this figure had increased to 80%. The product category with the greatest concerns was snack foods (e.g. crisps, confectionery items, nuts, etc.).1

The second form of hidden inflation is called ‘skimpflation’. This is defined as decreasing the quality of a product or service without lowering the price. Examples include cheaper ingredients in food or confectionery, such as using palm oil instead of butter, or reducing the cocoa content in chocolate or the meat content in sausages and pies, or package holidays reducing the quality of meals, or customer service centres or shops reducing the number of staff so that people have to wait longer on the phone or to be served.

The third is called ‘sneakflation’. This is similar to skimpflation but normally refers to reducing what you get when you pay for a service, such as a flight, by now charging for extras, such as luggage or food. Sometimes shrinkflation or skimpflation are seen as subsets of sneakflation.

These practices have had a lot of publicity in recent months, with consumers complaining that they are getting less for their money. Many people see them as a sneaky way of passing on cost increases without raising the price. But the changes are often subtle and difficult for shoppers to spot when they are buying an item. Skimpflation especially is difficult to observe at the time of purchase. It’s only when people consume the product that they think that it doesn’t seem as good as it used to be. Even shrinkflation can be hard to spot if the package size remains the same but there is less in it, such as fewer biscuits in a tin or fewer crisps in a packet. People would have to check the weight or volume, while also knowing what it used to be.

If firms are legitimately passing on costs and are up-front about what they are doing, then most consumers would probably understand it even if they did not like it. It’s when firms do it sneakily that many consumers get upset. Also, firms may do it to increase profit margins – in other words, by reducing the size or quality beyond what is necessary to cover the cost increase.

Does the official rate of inflation take such practices into account?

The answer is that some of the practices are taken into account – especially shrinkflation. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) accounts for shrinkflation by monitoring price changes per unit of weight or volume, rather than just the price. Data collectors track the weight, volume or count of item. When a product’s size is reduced, the ONS records this as a price increase in CPI or CPIH inflation statistics. This is known as a ‘quality adjustment’ process and allows the ONS to isolate price changes from product size changes. As CPI data from the ONS is used by the Bank of England in monitoring its 2% inflation target, it too is incorporating shrinkflation.

ONS quality adjustments are also applied to non-market public services, such as healthcare, education and policing to measure changes in service quality rather than just volume. This allows a more accurate measurement of productivity as it focuses on outcomes and user experience per pound spent rather than just focusing on costs.

Skimpflation is more difficult to monitor. The quality adjustment process may miss some quality changes and hence some skimpflation goes unrecorded. This means that the headline inflation rate might understate the true decline in purchasing power felt by consumers.

How extensive is hidden inflation?

Despite public perception, shrinkflation has a relatively small impact on the headline CPI and CPIH inflation rate in the UK because it is largely confined to certain sectors, such as bread and cereals, personal care products, meat products, and sugar, jams, syrups, chocolate & confectionery. Nevertheless, in these sectors it is particularly prevalent, especially in the packaged foodstuffs and confectionery sector. The latest research by the ONS in 2019 covered the period June 2015 to June 2017 and is shown in the following figure.2

According to research in the USA by Capital One Shopping, some major brands reduced product sizes by over 30% in 2025 without reducing prices, with shrinkflation averaging 14.8% among selected national grocery brands.3 Shrinkflation had been observed by 74% of Americans at their grocery store. Of these, 81% took some kind of action as a result, with 48% abandoning a brand. Nevertheless, across all products, shrinkflation accounts for quite a small percentage of any overall price rises.

A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that shrinkflation accounted for less than 1/10 of a percentage point of the 34.5% increase in overall consumer prices from 2019 to 2024.4 The reason is that the items that were downsized comprised a small percentage of goods and services. Indeed, many goods and services, such as housing, cannot be downsized in the same way that household products can.

Nevertheless, with consumer budgets being squeezed by the inflation that followed the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, hidden inflation has become more prevalent in many countries and an increasing concern of consumers.

References

  1. Shrinkflation concern rises in 2025, but fewer Britons are changing shopping habits

    2. YouGov (15/8/25)

  2. Shrinkflation: How many of our products are getting smaller?

    3. Office for National Statistics (21/1/19)

  3. Shrinkflation Statistics

    4. Capital One Shopping (30/12/25)

  4. What is “Shrinkflation,” And How Has It Affected Grocery Store Items Recently?

    5. U.S. Government Accountability Office (12/8/25)

Videos

Articles

Journal Article

Questions

  1. If shrinkflation, when included in CPI statistics, accounts for such a small percentage of inflation, why are people so concerned about it?
  2. From a company’s perspective, is it a good idea to engage in (a) shrinkflation; (b) skimpflation?
  3. Go round you local supermarket and identify examples of shrinkflation and skimpflation.
  4. How are various EU countries attempting to inform consumers of shrinkflation?
  5. Why is skimpflation often harder to detect than shrinkflation?
  6. Give some other examples of sneakflation in the provision of services.
  7. How could behavioural economists help firms decide whether or how to engage in shrinkflation or skimpflation?
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The 4Ps approach to merger policy in the UK

The approach towards mergers remains the most controversial area of competition policy. Some argue that policy makers in both the UK and EU have been too easily persuaded by the arguments put forward by firms and so have allowed too many mergers to proceed. Others claim that the opposite is true and that merger policy has prohibited mergers that should have been allowed to proceed. This, then, has a negative impact on investment, innovation, productivity and growth.

In recent years there has been more specific criticism of merger policy in the UK. The government has indicated that it wants the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to be less interventionist and take a more pro-growth approach.

In February 2025, in response to this criticism, the CMA launched its new ‘4 Ps’ approach to merger policy: Pace, Predictability, Proportionality and Process. Various changes to the investigation process have been proposed in the past 12 months using this framework.

Pace. The time taken by the CMA to initially assess a merger before deciding whether a Phase 1 investigation is necessary (i.e. the pre-notification procedure) was reduced from 65 to 40 working days. Also, the target to complete straightforward Phase 1 investigations was reduced from 35 to 25 days.

Predictability. The proposed merger guidelines, published in October 2025, provide more detail on (a) what criteria will be used to measure market shares when applying the ‘share of supply test’ (this is where the combined UK market share of two merging businesses is at least 25%, provided one business has a UK turnover of at least £10 million), and (b) the factors that are likely to lead to the competition authorities concluding that one business has gained ‘material influence over another’. Businesses had complained that there was too much uncertainty about the way the share of supply test and material influence were applied. The CMA is also considering greater alignment with other international regulators over decision making rather than its previous policy of acting independently. All these measures should increase the predictability of the investigation process.

Proportionality. Proportionality refers to the objective of addressing any competition issues in merger cases in a way that places the minimum burden on the businesses involved. To improve proportionality, the CMA has indicated that in future cases it will be more willing to use behavioural remedies – requiring firms to take or desist from certain actions. New draft guidelines identify more situations where the use of behavioural remedies may be appropriate. However, they also show that the CMA still views structural remedies (e.g. preventing the merger or requiring firms to demerge or to sell certain assets) as more effective in many situations. Another important measure to improve proportionality is the introduction of a new ‘wait and see’ approach to global mergers. The CMA will now wait to see if the actions taken by other competition authorities in global cases address any concerns in the UK market before deciding whether to launch a review.

Process. To improve the process, the CMA has announced plans to engage with businesses at a much earlier point in the process. For example, it has pledged to share its provisional thinking in the early stages of an investigation by implementing new ‘teach-in’ sessions and having more regular update meetings. Much earlier meetings that focus on possible remedies will also take place. This may make it possible for the CMA to assess the suitability of more complex remedies during a Phase 1 investigation rather than having to wait for a longer and more costly Phase 2 review. Phase 2 reviews will also no longer be managed by panels of independent experts. This role will now be carried out by the internal CMA board.

Some critics argue that the CMA has not fully considered the potential benefits of mergers in many cases. For example, a merger could (a) have procompetitive effects, known as rivalry enhancing efficiencies (REEs) and/or (b) benefits for consumers outside of the relevant market, known as relevant customer benefits (RCBs). In response to this criticism, the CMA is currently reassessing its approach to including evidence on REEs and RCBs.

The CMA is still currently consulting with interested parties about many of these proposed changes. It will be interesting to see what final decisions are made in the next couple of years.

Articles

CMA documentation

Questions

  1. Of all the mergers considered by the CMA in 2024/25, find out what percentage were formally investigated. How many were blocked from taking place? Do you believe that this indicates that merger policy is too weak or too strong?
  2. What three criteria must be met for a business arrangement to be classed as a ‘relevant merger situation’ by the CMA?
  3. Identify some different methods that one business could use to gain material influence over the way another company operates.
  4. Outline the ‘turnover test’, the ‘share of supply test’ and the ‘hybrid test’.
  5. Discuss the potential advantages of using behavioural remedies as opposed to structural remedies in merger cases. Why has the CMA still preferred the use of structural remedies in most situations?
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Age-old problems but new technology: developments in collusion in the algorithmic era

In my previous blog post on this site, I examined how AI-powered pricing tools can act as a ‘double-edged sword’: offering efficiency gains, while also creating opportunities for collusion. I referred to one of the early examples of this, which was the case involving Trod Ltd and GB Eye, where two online poster and frame sellers on Amazon used pricing algorithms to monitor and adjust their prices. However, in this instance there was also an explicit agreement between the firms. As some commentators put it, it was ‘old wine in new bottles‘, meaning a fairly conventional cartel that was simply facilitated through digital tools.

Since then, algorithms have increasingly become part of everyday life and are now embedded in routine business practice.

Some of the effects may have a positive effect on competition. For example, algorithms can help to lower barriers to entry. In some markets, incumbents benefit from long-standing experience, while new firms face significant learning costs and are at a disadvantage. By reducing these learning costs and supporting entry, algorithms could contribute to making collusion harder to sustain.

On the other hand, algorithms could increase the likelihood of collusion. For example, individual algorithms used by competing firms may respond to market conditions in predictable ways, making it easier for firms to collude tacitly over time.

Algorithms can also improve the ability of firms to monitor each other’s prices. This is particularly relevant for multi-product firms. Traditionally, we might expect these markets to be less prone to collusion because co-ordinating across many products is complex. AI can overcome this complexity. In the Sainsbury’s/Asda merger case, for example, the Competition and Markets Authority suggested that the main barrier to reaching and monitoring a pricing agreement was the complexity of pricing across such a wide range of products. However, the CMA also suggested that technological advances could increase its ability to do so in the future.

The ‘hub-and-spoke’ model

One of the other growing concerns is the ability of AI pricing algorithms to facilitate collusion by acting as a ‘hub’ in a ‘hub-and-spoke’ arrangement. In this type of collusion, competing firms (the ‘spokes’) need not communicate directly with one another. Instead, the ‘hub’ helps them to co-ordinate their actions.

While there have been only limited examples of an AI pricing algorithm acting as a hub in practice, what once seemed to be a largely theoretical concern has now become a live enforcement issue.

A very recent example is the RealPage case in the United States. The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust lawsuit against RealPage Inc. in August 2024, alleging that RealPage, acting as the ‘hub’, facilitated collusion between landlords (the ‘spokes’).

RealPage provided pricing software to numerous landlords, including the largest landlord in the USA, which manages around 950 000 rental units across the country. These landlords would normally compete independently in setting rental prices, discounts and lease terms to win consumers. However, by feeding competitively sensitive information that would not usually be shared between rivals into RealPage’s system, the software generated pricing recommendations that, according to the DOJ, led to co-ordinated rent increases across competing apartment complexes.

In the RealPage case, the authorities reported that they had access to internal documents and statements from the parties involved, which helped support their allegations. These included references within RealPage to helping landlords ‘avoid the race to the bottom’ and comments from a landlord describing the software as ‘classic price fixing’.

Evidence in these cases really matters because the standard of proof required to establish a hub-and-spoke arrangement is much higher than for traditional cases of explicit collusion. This is because it can be difficult to distinguish between legitimate and anti-competitive communication between retailers and suppliers. Also, proving ‘anti-competitive intent’ is inherently challenging.

Other competition authorities around the world are also turning their attention to these issues. For example, the European Commission recently announced that a number of investigations into algorithmic pricing are underway, signalling a clear shift toward more active scrutiny. As technology continues to advance, it is clear that algorithmic pricing will remain an area where both firms and authorities must move and adapt quickly.

Articles

Questions

  1. In what ways does the RealPage case differ from the earlier Trod Ltd and GB Eye Ltd case? Consider the roles played by the firms, the nature of the alleged co-ordination, and the extent to which pricing algorithms were used to facilitate the conduct.
  2. How might the use of pricing algorithms affect the likelihood of firms colluding, either explicitly or tacitly? Consider ways that algorithms may make collusion easier to sustain but also ways in which they may reduce its likelihood.
  3. Should firms be held liable for anti-competitive outcomes produced by algorithms that ‘self-learn’, even if they did not intend those outcomes? Explain why or why not.
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Commercial banking: the emerging risks from the shadow-banking sector

Recently, a flurry of bankruptcies among non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) in the USA has drawn attention to the risks associated with alternative credit channels in the shadow-banking sector – lending which is not financed with deposits. There is concern that this could be the start of a wave of bankruptcies among such NBFIs, especially given concerns about a potential downswing in the economic cycle – a time when defaults are more likely.

While providing alternative sources of funding, the opacity of lending in the shadow-banking sector means it is not clear what risks NBFIs face themselves and, more significantly, what risks they pose to the financial system as a whole. There is particular concern about the impact on regulated banks.

Already, JP Morgan Chase in its third quarter earnings report announced a $170m charge stemming from the bankruptcy of Tricolor, which specialised in sub-prime car financing. Mid-sized banks, Western Alliance and Zions Bancorp, have reported losses from loans to a group of distressed real estate funds. This has highlighted the interconnectedness between NBFIs and regulated banking, and the potential for problems in the shadow-banking sector to have a direct impact on mainstream banks.

In this blog, we will trace the secular trends in the financial systems of more advanced economies which have given rise to alternative credit channels and, in turn, to potential banking crises. We will explain the relationship between regulated banks and shadow banks, analysing the risks involved, the potential impact on the financial system and the policy implications.

What are the secular trends in banking?

The traditional model of commercial banking involved taking deposits and using them to finance loans to households and firms. However, cycles of banking crises, regulatory changes and financial innovation over the past 50 years produced new models.

First, banks diversified away from direct lending to providing other banking services – on-balance sheet activities, such as investing in financial securities, and off-balance sheet activities, such as acting as agents in the sale of financial securities.

Second, alternative credit channels based on financial markets have grown in significance.

In the 1980s, international regulations around traditional banking activities – taking deposits and making loans – were being formalised by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) under what became known as the Basel framework (see, for example, Economics section 18.2 or Economics for Business section 28.2). For the first time, this stipulated liquidity and capital requirements for international banks relating to their traditional lending activities. However, at the same time the deregulation of financial markets and financial innovation provided banks with opportunities to derive revenues from a range of other financial services.

After the financial crisis, liquidity and capital requirements for banks were tightened further through the Basel III regulations. Commercial banks had to have even higher levels of capital as a buffer for bad debts associated with direct lending. A higher level of capital to cover potential losses increases the marginal cost of lending, since each pound of additional loan requires additional capital. This reduced the marginal return, and consequently, the incentive to lend directly.

These regulatory developments created an incentive to pursue activities which do not require as much capital, since their marginal cost is lower and potential return is higher. Consequently, banks have placed less emphasis on lending and more on purchasing short-term and long-term financial securities and generating non-interest income from off-balance sheet activities. For instance, research by the Bank of England found that during the 1980s, interest income accounted for more than two-thirds of total income for large international banks. In contemporary times, non-interest income tends to be greater than interest income. Figure 1 illustrates the declining proportion of total assets represented by commercial and consumer loans for all regulated US banks. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

With banks originating less lending, activity has migrated to different avenues in the shadow-banking sector. This sector has always existed, but deregulation and financial innovation created opportunities for the growth of shadow banking – lending which is not financed with deposits. Traditionally, non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs), such as pension funds, hedge funds and insurance companies, use funds from investors to buy securities through financial markets. However, new types of NBFIs have emerged which originate loans themselves, notably private credit institutions. As Figure 2 illustrates, a lot of the expansion in the activities of NBFIs has been the due to increased lending by these institutions (defined as ‘other financial institutions (OFIs)). Note that the NBFI line includes OFIs. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

Since, NBFIs operate outside conventional regulatory frameworks, their credit intermediation and maturity transformation are not subject to the same capital requirements or oversight that banks are. As a result, they do not need to have the same level of capital to insulate against loan losses. Therefore, lending in the shadow-banking sector has a lower marginal cost compared to equivalent lending in the banking sector. Consequently, it generates a higher rate of return. This can explain the large growth in the assets of OFIs illustrated in Figure 2.

Risks in shadow banking

Banking involves trade-offs and this is the case whether the activities happen in the regulated or shadow-banking sector. Increasing lending increases profitability. But as lending continues to increase, at some point the risk-return profile becomes less favourable since institutions are lending to increasingly higher-risk borrowers and for higher-risk projects.

In downturns, when rates of defaults rise, such risks become apparent. Borrowers fail and default, causing significant loan losses for lenders. With lower levels of capital, NBFIs will have a lower buffer to insulate investors from these losses, increasing the likelihood of default.

Is this a problem? Well, for a long-time regulators thought not. It was thought that failures in the shadow-banking sector would have no implications for deposit-holders in regulated banks and the payments mechanism. Unfortunately, current developments in the USA have highlighted that this is unlikely to be the case.

The connections between regulated and shadow banking

The financial system is highly interconnected, and each successive financial crisis has shown that systemic risks lurk in obscure places. On the face of it, NBFIs appear separate from regulated banks. But banks’ new business models have not removed them from the lending channel, merely changed their role. Short-term financing used to be conducted and funded by banks. Now, it is conducted by NBFIs, but still financed by banks. Long-term loan financing is no longer on banks’ balance sheets. However, while the lending is conducted by NBFIs, it is largely funded by banks.

NBFIs cannot be repositories of liquidity. Since they do not have deposits and are not part of the payments system, they have no access to official liquidity backstops. So, they do so indirectly by using deposit-taking banks as liquidity insurance. Banks provide this liquidity in a variety of ways:

  • Investing in the securities issued by private capital funds;
  • Providing bridge financing to credit managers to securitise credit card receivables;
  • Providing prime broker financing to a hedge fund engaged in proprietary trading.

Furthermore, banks have increasingly made loans to NBFIs. Data for US commercial banks lending to the shadow-banking sector are publicly available only since 2015. But, as Figure 3 illustrates, it has seen a steady upward trend with a surge in activity in 2025. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

Banks had an incentive to diversify into these activities since they are a source of revenue requiring less regulatory capital. The model requires risk and return to follow capital out of the banking system into the shadow-banking sector. However, while risky capital and its associated expected return have moved in the shadow-banking system, not all of the liquidity and credit default risk may have done so. Ultimately, some of that risk may be borne by the deposit-holders of the banks.

This is not an issue if banks are fully aware of the risks. However, problems arise when banks do not know the full risks they are taking.

There are reasons why this may be the case. Credit markets involve significant asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. This creates conditions for the classic problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.

Moral hazard is a hidden action problem, whereby borrowers take greater risks because they share the possible downside losses with the lender. Adverse selection is the hidden information problem, whereby lenders do not have full information about the riskiness of borrowers or their activities.

The economics of information suggests that banks exploit scale, scope and learning economies to overcome the costs associated with asymmetric information in lending. However, that applies to direct lending when banks have full information about credit default risk on their loan book. When banks finance lending indirectly through NBFIs, there is an extension of the intermediation chain, and while banks may know the NBFIs, they will have much less information about the risks associated with the lending they are ‘underwriting’. This heightens their problems of asymmetric information associated with credit default risk.

What are the risks at present?

The level of debt in the global economy is at unprecedented levels. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that it rose to $351 trillion dollars in 2024, approximately 235% of weighted global gross domestic product (GDP). It is in this environment that private credit channels through NBFIs have been expanding. With this, it is more likely that NBFIs’ trade-off between credit risk and return has tilted greatly in favour of the former. Some point to the recent collapse of Tricolor and First Brands – both intermediary financing companies funded by private credit – as evidence of elevated levels of risk.

Many are pointing out that the failures observed in the USA so far have a whiff of fraud associated with them, with suggestions of multiple loans being secured against the same working capital. However, such behaviour is symptomatic of ‘late-cycle’ lending, where the incentive to squeeze more profit from lending in a more competitive environment leads to short-cuts – short-cuts that banks, at one stage removed along the intermediation chain, will have less information about.

It is in a downturn that such risks become apparent. Widening credit spreads and the reduced availability of credit causes financial stress for higher-risk borrowers. Inevitably, that higher risk will lead to higher defaults, more provision for loan losses and write-downs in the value of loan assets.

While investors in NBFIs are first in line to bear the losses, they are not the only ones exposed. At moments of stress, the credit lines that banks have provided get drawn and that increases the exposure of banks to the risks associated with NBFIs and whoever they have lent to. As NBFIs fail, the financing provided by banks will not be repaid and they will thus have to absorb losses associated with the lending of the NBFIs. So, while it appears that risk has left the banking system, it hasn’t. Ultimately, the liquidity and credit default risk of the non-bank sector is financed by bank deposits.

Furthermore, the opaqueness of the exposure of banks to risks in the shadow-banking sector may have issues for the wider financial system. In 2008, banks became wary of lending to each other during the financial crisis because they didn’t know the exposure of counterparty institutions to losses from securitised debt instruments. Now, as more and more banks reveal exposures to NBFIs, concerns about the unknown position of other banks may produce a repeat of the credit crunch which occurred then. A seizing up of credit markets will worsen any downturn. However, unlike 2008, the financial resources available to central banks and governments to deal with any consequences are severely limited.

Only time and the path of the US economy will reveal the extent of any contagion related to lending in the shadow-banking sector. However, central banks are already worried about the risks associated with the shadow-banking sector and have been taking steps to identify and ameliorate them. Events in the USA over the past few weeks may accelerate the process and bring more of that lending within the regulatory cordon.

Articles

Academic paper

Data

Questions

  1. Explain why the need to hold more capital raises its cost for banks.
  2. Why does this reduce the lending they undertake?
  3. What is the attraction of ‘off-balance sheet transactions’ for regulated banks?
  4. Analyse the asymmetric information that banks face when providing liquidity to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
  5. Examine the dangers for the financial system associated with regulated banks’ exposure to NBFIs?
  6. Discuss some policy recommendations regarding bank lending to NBFIs.