The instability of the economy was clearly demonstrated by the events of the late 2000s. Economists have devoted considerable energies to understanding the determinants of the business cycle. Increasing attention is focused on the role that credit cycles play in contributing to or exacerbating cycles. Therefore, data on lending by banks is followed keenly by policymakers who wish to avoid the repeat of the pace of growth in credit seen in the period preceding the financial crisis. Interestingly, the latest data from the Bank of England show that lending by financial institutions to households (net of repayments) rose in July to its highest level since November 2009.
The idea of credit cycles is not new. But, the financial crisis of the late 2000s has helped to reignite analysis and interest. Many economists have revisited the work of Hyman Minsky (1919–1996), an American economist, who argued that financial cycles are an inherent part of the economic cycle and contribute to fluctuations in real GDP. Notably, he argued that credit extended to households and businesses is pro-cyclical so that flows of credit extended by banks are larger when the growth of the economy’s output is stronger. Since credit flows are dependent on the phase of the business cycle, they are said to be endogenous to the path of output. The key point here is that there is an inherent mechanism within the economy which is potentially destabilising.
Banks, it is argued, may use the growth of the economy’s output as an indicator of the riskiness of its lending. Households and businesses may undertake a similar assessment. After a period of sustained growth banks and investors become more confident about the future path of the economy and, consequently, in the returns of assets. This means that there is a role for psychology in understanding the business cycle.
If we look at the chart, this period of heightened confidence may correspond with the period starting from the late 1990s. Between 1998 and 2007 the average monthly net flow of credit to private non-financial corporations and households was £9.4 billion. In other words, households and businesses were acquiring a staggering £9.4 billion of additional debt from banks each month. But, this was as high as £14.0 billion per month in 2007. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
What helped to fuel the impact of heightened confidence on credit provision was financial innovation. In particular, the bundling of assets, such as mortgages, to form financial instruments which could then be purchased by investors helped to provide financial institutions with further funds for lending. This is the process of securitisation. The result was that during the 2000s as households and businesses began to acquire larger debts their financial well-being became increasingly stretched. This was hastened by central banks raising interest rates. The intention was to dampen the rising rate of inflation, partly attributable to rising global commodity prices, such as oil. Suddenly, euphoria was replaced with pessimism.
Some argue that a Minsky moment had occurred. Many countries then witnessed a balance sheet recession. As individual households and businesses try and improve their own financial well-being they collectively contribute to its worsening. For instance, large-scale attempts to sell assets, such as shares or property, only help to cause their value to decline.
A global response to the events of the financial crisis has been for policy-makers to pay more attention to the aggregate level of credit provision. The chart shows that lending in 2014 is more robust than it has been form some time. Across the first seven months of 2014 the average monthly net flow of credit extended by banks to households and businesses (private non-financial corporations) has been £2.2 billion.
However, the 2014-rebound of credit is wholly attributable to lending to households. Net lending to households has averaged £2.7 billion per month while businesses have been repaying credit to banks to the tune of £437 million per month – something that businesses have collectively done in each year from 2009. While net lending to households remains considerably lower than pre-financial crisis levels, it will be something that policymakers will be watching very closely. This, in turn, means that they will be paying particular interest to the housing and mortgage markets.
Articles
Appetite for loans picks up again, say major banks BBC News (23/9/14)
Business lending by UK banks is down by £941m Herald Scotland, Ian McConnell (27/8/14)
How bank lending fell by £365 BILLION in five years… much to the delight of controversial payday loan firms Mail, Louise Eccles (7/09/14)
U.K.’s Big Banks Cut Lending by $595 Billion, KPMG Says Bloomberg, Richard Partington (8/9/14)
UK banks’ home loan approvals fall to 12-month low – BBA Reuters, Andy Bruce and Tom Heneghan (23/9/14)
Data
Bankstats (Monetary and Financial Statistics) – Latest Tables Bank of England
Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England
Questions
- What is meant by the term the business cycle?
- What does it mean for the determinants of the business cycle to be endogenous? What about if they are exogenous?
- Outline the ways in which the financial system can impact on the spending behaviour of households. Repeat the exercise for businesses.
- How might uncertainty affect spending and saving by households and businesses?
- What does it mean if bank lending is pro-cyclical?
- Why might lending be pro-cyclical?
- How might the differential between borrowing and saving interest rates vary over the business cycle?
- Explain what you understand by net lending to households or firms. How does net lending affect their stock of debt?
The spectre of deflation haunts the eurozone economy. Inflation in the 12 months to May 2014 was 0.5%, down from 0.7% to April and well below the target of 2% (see). Price deflation can result in deflation of the whole economy. With the prospect of falling prices, many consumers put off spending, hoping to buy things later at a lower price. This delay in spending deflates aggregate demand and can result in a decline in growth or even negative growth: hardly a welcome prospect as the eurozone still struggles to recover from the long period of recession or sluggish growth that followed the 2007–8 financial crisis.
The ECB is well aware of the problem. Its President, Mario Draghi, has stated on several occasions that the central bank will do whatever it takes to ward off deflation and stimulate recovery. At its monthly meeting on 5 June, the ECB Council acted. It took the following measures (see Mario Draghi’s press conference and the press release):
• The main refinancing rate it charges banks on reverse repos (when using open-market operations) was cut from 0.25% to 0.15%.
• The rate it pays banks for depositing money in the ECB was cut from 0% to –0.1%. In other words, banks would be charged for ‘parking’ money with the ECB rather than lending it.
• It will provide targeted lending to banks (targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs)), initially of 7% of the total amount of each banks’ loans to the non-financial private sector within the eurozone. This will be provided in two equal amounts, in September and December 2014. These extra loans will be for bank lending to businesses and households (other than for house purchase). The total amount will be some €400 billion. Substantial additional lending will be made available quarterly from March 2016 to June 2016.
• It will make preparations for an asset purchase scheme. Unlike that in the UK, which involves the purchase of government bonds, this will involve the purchase of assets which involve claims on private-sector (non-financial) institutions. Depending on financing arrangements, this could amount to quantitative easing.
• It will suspend sterilising the extra liquidity that has been injected under the Securities Markets Programme (operated from May 2010 to September 2012), which involved purchasing eurozone countries’ existing bonds on the secondary market. In other words it will stop preventing the securities that have been purchased from increasing money supply. This therefore, for the first time, represents a genuine form of quantitative easing.
The question is whether the measures will be enough to stimulate the eurozone economy, prevent deflation and bring inflation back to around 2%. The measures are potentially significant, especially the prospect of quantitative easing – a policy pursued by other main central banks, such as the Fed, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan. A lot depends on what the ECB does over the coming months.
The following articles consider the ECB’s policy. The first ones were published before the announcement and look at alternatives open to the ECB. The others look at the actual decisions and assess how successful they are likely to be.
Articles published before the announcement
Mario Draghi faces moment of truth as man with power to steady eurozone The Observer, Larry Elliott (1/6/14)
What the ECB will do in June? Draghi spells it out The Economist (26/5/14)
Draghi as Committed as a Central Banker Gets, as Economists Await ECB Stimulus Bloomberg, Alessandro Speciale and Andre Tartar (19/5/14)
ECB’s credit and credibility test BBC News, Robert Peston (2/6/14)
90 ECB decamps to debate monetary fixes Financial Times, Claire Jones (25/5/14)
Speech
Monetary policy in a prolonged period of low inflation ECB, Mario Draghi (26/5/14)
Articles published after the announcement
ECB launches €400bn scheme, seeks to force bank lending Irish Independent (5/6/14)
The ECB’s toolbox BBC News, Linda Yueh (5/6/14)
ECB’s justified action will help but is no panacea for eurozone deflationary ills The Guardian, Larry Elliott (5/6/14)
Why Negative Rates Won’t Work In The Eurozone Forbes, Frances Coppola (4/6/14)
Germany’s fear of QE is what’s stopping us from cracking open the Cava The Telegraph, Roger Bootle (8/6/14)
Data
Euro area economic and financial data ECB
Questions
- Why has the eurozone experienced falling inflation and a growing prospect of negative inflation?
- Explain how the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) worked (check it out on the ECB site). What countries’ bonds were purchased and why?
- What is meant by sterilisation? Why did the ECB sterilise the effects of the assets purchased under the SMP?
- If it is practical for the ECB to set a negative interest rate on the deposit facility for banks, would it be practical to set a negative interest rate for the main refinancing operations or the marginal lending facility? Explain.
- Why has the ECB, up to now, been unwilling to engage in quantitative easing? What has changed?
- Why may the introduction of a negative interest rate on bank deposits in the ECB have only a very small effect on bank lending?
- How much is broad money supply growing in the eurozone? Is this enough or too much? Explain.
- What else could the ECB have done to ward off deflation? Should the ECB have adopted these measures?
There has been an interesting debate recently about whether the austerity policies being pursued in the UK are the correct ones. What would have happened if the government had pursued a more expansionary policy? Would the increase in borrowing, at least in the short term, have triggered a financial crisis?
Without austerity policies, would the eurozone crisis have led to a collapse in investor confidence in the UK, especially if Greece had been forced out of the euro?
On the one side, Kenneth Rogoff argues that increasing the UK’s budget deficit would have been dangerous and could have led to a flight from the pound. Generally, but with some reservations, he supports the fiscal policies that have been pursued by the Coalition.
I am certainly not arguing that the UK or other advanced countries handled the post-crisis period perfectly. There should have been more infrastructure spending, even more aggressive monetary policy and probably more ruthless bank restructuring. But there has to be a balance between stimulus and stability. To assume we always knew things would calm down, and to retrospectively calibrate policy advice accordingly, is absurd
Paul Krugman and Simon Wren-Lewis challenge Rogoff’s arguments. Paul Krugman uses a version of the IS-LM model to analyse the effect of a loss of international confidence in the UK following problems in the eurozone and worries about excessive UK borrowing.
In the model, the LM curve (labelled MP in Krugman’s diagrams) illustrates the effect of an increase in real GDP on interest rates with a particular monetary policy (e.g. an inflation target or a Taylor rule, 
which involves a mix of two policy objectives: an inflation target and real GDP). As GDP rises, putting upward pressure on inflation, so the central bank will raise interest rates. Hence, like the traditional LM curve, the monetary-policy related LM curve will slope upwards, as shown in the diagram.
Initial equilibrium GDP is Y0. The rate of interest is at the minimum level, r0 (i.e. the rate of 0.5% that the Monetary Policy Committee has set since January 2009). This, in the model, is the liquidity trap, where any increase in money supply (a rightward shift in the LM curve) will have no effect on interest rates or GDP.
In Rogoff’s analysis of a crisis triggered by excessive borrowing and problems in the eurozone, the IS curve will shift to the left (as illustrated by curve IS1) as capital flows from the UK and confidence collapses. Real GDP will fall to Y1. This will be the outcome of fiscal expansion in the world of the early 2010s.
Krugman argues that the opposite will occur. The outflow of capital will drive down the exchange rate. This will lead to an increase in exports and a decrease in imports. Aggregate demand thus rises and the IS curve will shift to the right (e.g. to IS2 in the diagram. Real GDP will rise (e.g. to Y2 in the diagram). If the rise in aggregate demand is sufficient, the economy will rise out of the liquidity trap and interest rates will rise (e.g. to r2 in the diagram).
Not surprisingly, Rogoff challenges this analysis, as you will see if you read his second paper below. He doesn’t criticise the model per se, but challenges Krugman’s assumptions. For example, a depreciation of sterling by some 20% since 2008 doesn’t seem to have had a major effect in stimulating exports (see the chart in the news item, A balancing act). And exports could well have declined if the eurozone economy had collapsed, given that exports to the eurozone account for around 44% of total UK exports.
Rogoff’s assumptions in turn can be challenged. Simon Wren-Lewis argues that, provided a credible long-term plan for deficit reduction is in place, maintaining a fiscal stimulus in the short run, to keep the recovery going that was beginning to emerge in 2010, would help to increase investor confidence, not undermine it. And, with a policy of quantitative easing, which involves the Bank of England buying central government debt, there is no problem of a lack of demand for UK gilts by the private sector.
What is clear from this debate is the willingness of both sides to accept points made by the other. It is an extremely civilised debate. In fact, it could be seen as a model of how academic debate should be conducted. There is none of the ‘shouting’ that has charaterised much of the pro- and anti-austerity lobbying since the financial crisis burst onto the world stage.
Britain should not take its credit status for granted Scholars at Harvard from Financial Times, Kenneth Rogoff (3/10/13)
Ken Rogoff on UK austerity mainly macro, Simon Wren-Lewis (3/10/13)
Phantom Crises (Wonkish) The Conscience of a Liberal, Paul Krugman (3/10/13)
Three Wrongs do not make a Right Scholars at Harvard from Financial Times, Kenneth Rogoff (7/10/13)
Is George Osborne really a hero of global finance? The Guardian, Robert Skidelsky (24/10/13)
Questions
- Explain how the policy-dependent LM curve illustrated in the diagram is derived.
- What would cause the policy-dependent LM curve to shift?
- Explain what is meant by the ‘liquidity trap’. Why does being in a liquidity trap make monetary policy ineffective?
- How would you determine whether or not the UK is currently in a liquidity trap?
- How is the level of (a) public-sector debt and (b) private sector debt owed overseas likely to affect the confidence of investors concerning the effects of an expansionary fiscal policy?
- Compare the UK’s total external debt with that of other countries (see the following tables from Principal Global Indicators, hosted by the IMF: External debt and Short-term external debt).
- What insurance policy (if any) does the UK have to protect against market panic about the viability of UK debt?
- What areas of agreement are there between Rogoff on the one side and Krugman and Wren-Lewis on the other?
As we saw in the news item The difficult exit from cheap money, central banks around the world have been operating an extremely loose monetary policy since the beginning of 2009. Their interest rates have been close to zero and trillions of dollars of extra money has been injected into the world economy through various programmes of quantitative easing.
For the past few months the Federal Reserve has been purchasing bonds under its most recent programme dubbed QE3, and thereby increasing narrow money, by $85 billion per month. Since the start of its QE programme in 2009, it has pumped around $2.8 trillion of extra money into the US and world economies. This huge increase in money supply has boosted the demand for assets worldwide and world stock markets have risen. Much of the money has flowed into developing countries, such as India, and has acted as a boost to their economies.
Once the US economy is growing strongly again, the aim is to taper off, and ultimately end or even reverse, the QE programme. It was expected that the Fed would decide to start this tapering off process at its meeting on 18 September – perhaps reducing bond purchases initially by some $10 billion. (Note that this would still be an increase in money supply, just a slightly smaller one.) Over the past few days, US bond prices have been falling (and yields increasing) in anticipation of such a move.
As it turned out, the Fed decided to delay tapering off. It will continue with its assets purchase programme of $85 billion per month for the time being. The reason given was that the US economy was still too fragile and needed the monthly injections of money to stay at the current level.
Normally it might be expected that the announcement of a more fragile recovery would cause the US stock market, and others worldwide, to fall. In fact the opposite occurred, with investors relieved that the extra money, which allows extra asset purchases, would continue at the same rate.
But this then raises the question of just what will be the effect when tapering off does actually occur. Will stock markets then go into a tailspin? Or will they merely stop rising so fast. That depends very much on the role of speculation.
Webcasts
Bernanke’s Own Words on Asset Purchases, Economy Bloomberg (18/9/13)
Bernanke: Fed to delay bond tapering PBS Newshour on YouTube (full speech plus questions) (18/9/13)
No tapering announced by Fed CNBC on Yahoo Finance (18/9/113)
The impact of US stimulus moves at home and abroad BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (18/9/13)
Is the upturn reaching Americans? BBC World, Stephanie Flanders (17/9/13)
Shares hit high as Federal Reserve maintains stimulus BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (18/9/13)
US Fed decision to delay tapering was a relief ET Now (India), Bimal Jalan (19/9/13)
Articles
Federal Reserve surprises markets by delaying QE tapering The Telegraph, Katherine Rushton (18/9/13)
Federal Reserve delays QE tapering: the full statement The Telegraph (18/9/13)
Q&A: What is tapering? BBC News (18/9/13)
Fed delay is no reason to celebrate The Guardian, Larry Elliott (19/9/13)
Federal Reserve tapering decision has baffled the markets The Guardian, Larry Elliott (19/9/13)
Taper tiger The Economist (21/9/13)
Everything You Need to Know About the Fed’s Decision Not to Taper QE3 The Atlantic, Matthew O’Brien (18/9/13)
Fed’s dovish turn leaves Wall Street economists mulling taper timing: poll Reuters, Chris Reese (18/9/13)
Good news and bad news from the Fed BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (19/9/13)
Is the Fed frightened of its shadow? BBC News, Robert Peston (19/9/13)
The Federal Reserve and Janet Yellen face a tough task with insufficient tools The Guardian, Mohamed A. El-Erian (14/10/13)
Questions
- Why might a slowing down in the increase in US money supply cause asset prices to fall, rather than merely to rise less quickly?
- Why has the US QE programme led to a rise in asset prices overseas?
- Distinguish between stabilising and destabilising speculation. Which type of speculation has been occurring as a result of the US QE programme?
- How has QE affected unemployment in the UK and USA? How is the participation rate and the flexibility of labour markets relevant to the answer?
- Explain the following two statements by Stephanie Flanders and Robert Peston respectively. “The market conditions argument has a circularity to it: talk of tapering leads to higher market rates, which in turn puts the taper itself on hold.” “The Fed simply hinting that less money would be created, means that there will be no reduction in the amount of money created (for now at least).”
- Why have US long-term interest rates, including mortgage rates, risen since May of this year?
- What impact have higher US long-term interest rates had on economies in the developing world? Explain.
On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the USA, filed for bankruptcy. Although the credit crisis had been building since mid 2007, the demise of Lehmans was a pivotal event in the unfolding of the financial crisis and the subsequent severe recession in most developed economies. Banks were no longer seen as safe and huge amounts of government money had to be poured into banks to shore up their capital and prevent further bankruptcies. Partial nationalisation seemed the only way of rescuing several banks and with it the global financial system.
A deep and prolonged recession followed (see Chart 1: click here for a PowerPoint). In response, governments pursued expansionary fiscal policies – at least until worries about rising government deficits and debt caused a lurch to austerity policies. And central banks pursued policies of near zero interest rates and subsequently of quantitative easing. But all the time debate was taking place about how to reform banking to prevent similar crises occurring in the future.
Solutions have included reform of the Basel banking regulations to ensure greater capital adequacy. 
The Basel III regulations (see Chart 2) demand considerably higher capital ratios than the previous Basel II regulations.
Other solutions have included proposals to break up banks. Indeed, just this week, the Lloyds Banking Group has hived off 631 of its branches (one sixth of the total) into a newly reformed TSB. Another proposal is to ring-fence the retail side of banks from their riskier investment divisions. In both cases the aim has been to avoid the scenario where banks are seen as too big to fail and can thus rely on governments to bail them out if they run into difficulties. Such reliance can make banks much more willing to take excessive risks. Further details of the new systems now in place are given in the Robert Peston article below.
But many critics maintain that not nearly enough has been done. Claims include:
• The Basel III rules are not tough enough and banks are still being required to hold too little capital.
• Rewards to senior bankers and traders are still excessive.
• The culture of banking, as a result, is still too risk loving in banks’ trading arms, even though they are now much more cautious about lending to firms and individuals.
• This caution has meant a continuing of the credit crunch for many small businesses.
• Higher capital adequacy ratios have reduced bank lending and have thus had a dampening effect on the real economy.
• The so-called ring-fences may not be sufficient to insulate retail banking from problems in banks’ investment divisions.
• Banks are not being required to hold sufficient liquidity to allow them to meet customers’ demands for cash in all scenarios.
• Banks’ reliance on each other still leaves a systemic risk for the banking system as a whole.
• Fading memories of the crisis are causing urgency to tackle its underlying problems to diminish.
• Problems may be brewing in less regulated parts of the banking world, such as the growing banking sector in China.
The following articles look at the lessons of the banking crisis – those that have been learned and those that have not. They look at the measures put in place and assess whether they are sufficient.
Lehman Brothers collapse, five years on: ‘We had almost no control’ The Guardian, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (13/9/13)
Lehman Brothers collapse: five years on, we’re still feeling the shockwaves The Guardian, Larry Elliott (13/9/13)
Five years after Lehman, could a collapse happen all over again? The Observer, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (15/9/13)
Five years after Lehman, all tickety-boo? BBC News, Robert Peston (9/9/13)
What have we learned from the bank crash? Independent, Yalman Onaran, Michael J Moore and Max Abelson (14/9/13)
We’ve let a good financial crisis go to waste since Lehman Brothers collapsed The Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (12/9/13)
The Lehman legacy: Lessons learned? The Economist (9/9/13)
The dangers of debt: Lending weight The Economist (14/9/13)
The Lehman anniversary: Five years in charts The Economist (14/9/13)
Questions
- Why did Lehman Brothers collapse?
- Explain the role of the US sub-prime mortgage market in the global financial crisis of 2007/8.
- In the context of banking, what is meant by (a) capital adequacy; (b) risk-based capital adequacy ratios; (c) leverage; (d) leverage ratios?
- Explain the Basel III rules on (a) risk-based capital adequacy (see the textbook and the chart above); (b) non-risk-based leverage (introduced in 2013: see here for details).
- Explain and comment on the following statement by Adair Turner: ‘We created an over-leveraged financial system and an over-leveraged real economy. We created a system such that even if the direct cost of bank rescue was zero, the impact of their near-failure on the economy was vast.’
- Under what circumstances might the global financial system face a similar crisis to that of 2007/8 at some point in the future?
- Why is there an underlying conflict between increasing banks’ required capital adequacy and ensuring a sufficient supply of credit to consumers and business? What multiplier effects are likely to occur from an increase in the capital adequacy ratio?
The instability of the economy was clearly demonstrated by the events of the late 2000s. Economists have devoted considerable energies to understanding the determinants of the business cycle. Increasing attention is focused on the role that credit cycles play in contributing to or exacerbating cycles. Therefore, data on lending by banks is followed keenly by policymakers who wish to avoid the repeat of the pace of growth in credit seen in the period preceding the financial crisis. Interestingly, the latest data from the Bank of England show that lending by financial institutions to households (net of repayments) rose in July to its highest level since November 2009.
