Category: Economics: Ch 19

Since March 2009, the Bank of England has engaged in a process of quantitative easing (QE). Over the period to January 2010 the Bank of England injected £200 billion of new money into the economy by purchasing assets from the private sector, mainly government bonds. The assets were purchased with new money, which enters the economy as credits to the accounts of those selling the assets to the Bank of England. This increase in narrow money (the monetary base) is then able to form the basis of credit creation, allowing broad money (M4) to increase by a multiple of the increased monetary base. In other words, injecting £200 billion allows M4 to increase by considerably more.

But just how much more will M4 rise? How big is the money multiplier? This depends on the demand for loans from banks, which in turn depends on the confidence of business and households. With the recovery only just beginning, demand is still very dampened. Credit creation also depends on the willingess of banks to lend. But this too has been dampened by banks’ desire to increase liquidity and expand their capital base in the wake of the credit crunch.

Not surprisingly, the growth in M4 has been sluggish. Between March and Decmber 2009, narrow money (notes, coin and banks’ reserve balances in the Bank of England) grew from £91bn to £203bn (an increase of 123%). M4, however, grew from £2011bn to £2048bn: an increase of only 1.8%. In fact, in December it fell back from £2069bn in November.

Despite the continued sluggishness of the economy, at its February meeting the Bank of England announced an end to further quantitiative easing – at least for the time being. Although Bank Rate would be kept on hold at 0.5%, there would be no further injections of money. Part of the reason for this is that there is still considerable scope for a growth in broad money on the basis of the narrow money already created. If QE were to continue, there could be excessive broad money in a few months’ time and that could push inflation well above target. As it is, rising costs have already pushed inflation above the 2% target (see Too much of a push from costs but no pull from demand).

So will this be an end to quantitative easing? The following articles explore the question.

Bank of England halts quantitative easing Guardian, Ashley Seager (4/2/10)
Bank calls time on quantitative easing (including video) Telegraph, Edmund Conway (5/2/10)
Bank of England’s time-out for quantitative easing plan BBC News (4/2/10)
Shifting goalposts keep final score in question Financial Times, Chris Giles and Jessica Winch (5/2/10)
Bank halts QE at £200bn despite ‘sluggish’ recovery Independent, Sean O’Grady (5/2/10)
Easy does it: No further QE BBC News blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (4/2/10)
Leading article: Easing off – but only for now Independent (5/2/10)
Not easy Times Online (5/2/10)
Quantitative easing: What the economists say Guardian (4/2/10)

Questions

  1. Explain how quantitative easing works?
  2. What determines the rate of growth of M4?
  3. Why has the Bank of England decided to call a halt to quantiative easing – at least for the time being?
  4. What is the transmission mechanism whereby an increase in the monetary base affects real GDP?
  5. What role does the exchange rate play in the transmission mechanism?
  6. Why is it difficult to predict the effect of an increase in the monetary base on real GDP?
  7. What will determine whether or not the Bank of England will raise interest rates in a few months’ time?

It’s not just the roads in the UK that were frozen, as the Bank of England unsurprisingly decided to keep interest rates frozen at 0.5%. Furthermore, many economists do not expect to see interest rates increase for some time. Roger Bootle has predicted that rates could stay low for up to 5 years and this will contribute to a continuing weak pound and spell further trouble for importers and their customers.

The Bank of England also left its money-creation programme of ‘quantitative easing’ unchanged, but next month it will have to decide whether to extend quantitative easing beyond the limits of £200 billion that it set back in November.

Whilst we are supposedly beginning our economic recovery – with 2009 quarter 4 figures showing the first rise in output since the first quarter of 2008 – its strength remains questionable. Indeed, the rise in output in the last three months of 2009 was a mere 0.1%. So how important are interest rates in helping to sustain the recovery? Can they really pull us out of the recession by remaining at just 0.5%? Read the articles below which look at freezing interest rates and quantitative easing.

FTSE unaffected by interest rate decision In the News (7/1/10)
Freeze on UK interest rates BBC News (7/1/10)
Bank of England may raise interest rates as soon as March, leading economist predicts Telegraph (7/1/10)
Interest rates and quantitative easing on hold Guardian, Larry Elliott (7/1/10)
Bank of England extends quantitative easing by £25bn – but is it enough? Guardian, Larry Elliott (5/11/10)
Questions for QE BBC News blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (7/1/10)
Interest rates could stay low for 5 years, says Bootle BBC News (7/1/10)

Questions

  1. How do low interest rates contribute to a weak pound? How does this affect exporters and importers?
  2. What is quantitative easing? Should the QE programme be extended? What are the arguments for and against this in terms of economic recovery and public debt?
  3. How much of an impact do you think the recession will have on government policy over the next few months?
  4. Explain the transmission mechanisms by which changes in interest rates affect the goods market.
  5. If the Bank of England were not independent, what do you think would be happening to interest rates?

Most businesses have suffered over the past year or so. Profits and sales have fallen, as the UK (and global) economy suffered from a recession that’s seen UK interest rates at 0.5%, unemployment rising and public debt at unprecedented levels. Christmas trading always sees a boost in sales and that’s just what’s happened for many businesses. Shoppers have responded to the doom and gloom of the past year by spending and making up for a hard year. Phrases such as “I decided to treat myself” became common on the news as reporters travelled to shopping centres across the UK. However, shops such as M&S and Next have warned that attempts by the government to reduce the public deficit could derail the consumer recovery.

These positive stories, whilst true, are a useful tool to help boost consumer confidence and keep expectations positive for the coming months. However, there are warnings that these figures shouldn’t be taken out of context. The economy is still in trouble and public debt has reached almost 60% of GDP. With cuts in government spending and rises in taxation expected, how much confidence should be taken from these positive signs in the retail sector? Only time will tell.

Online powers Shop Direct sales Financial Times, Esther Bintliff (6/1/10)
Poundland, House of Fraser and Co-op see sales rise BBC News (11/1/10)
Links of London see buoyant festive sales Telegraph, James Hall (5/1/10)
John Lewis reports bumper Christmas trading Retail Week, Jennifer Creevy (5/1/10)
New Look expects to build on strong Christmas London Evening Standard (7/1/10)
Christmas trade booming in City Star News Group, Alex de Vos (7/1/10)
Record trading for Cash Generator Manchester Evening News (7/1/10)
Sainsbury’s hails ‘strong’ Christmas trading BBC News (7/1/10)
Cautious M&S reports strong Christmas trade Times Online, Marcus Leroux and Robert Lindsay (6/1/10)
Asda reports ‘solid’ Christmas trading Guardian (6/1/10)

Questions

  1. Why are expectations important for the future of the British economy? Are the expectations rational or adaptive or a combination of the two?
  2. Are high Christmas sales really a sign that the economy is recovering? Discuss both sides of the argument. Will high sales now have an adverse effect on future trade in the UK?
  3. How will expected cuts in government spending affect sales in the retail sector?
  4. Tax rises are a possibility. How will this affect consumers and sales in the coming year? Think about the circular flow of income.
  5. If interest rates are increased in the coming months, trace through the likely effects in the goods market.

No, I’m not talking about the UK suffering from snow and becoming a land of ice! Towards the end of 2008, Icelandic banks hit the headlines and for all the wrong reasons. Icelandic banks were key lenders to some of the key businesses and entrepreneurs in the UK and an online bank held the accounts of over 150,000 Brits. The Icelandic government tried to rescue their banking sector, but with little success and we saw it collapse, sending shockwaves through UK banks. The UK economy lost millions and this contributed to the worsening financial system within our shores.

Iceland’s President has been under serious pressure, from the UK and Dutch governments on one side and from the Icelandic people on the other. A quarter of voters in Iceland have signed a petition against plans to repay money lost by foreigners when an Icelandic online bank collapsed. When the Icesave scheme collapsed in 2008, British and Dutch savers lost approximately £3.4bn (€3.8bn). Although they were compensated by the British and Dutch governments, this still meant that the taxpayers in these countries were owed the money by Iceland.

Iceland’s Parliament approved the plans to reimburse the money, but the people are encouraging their President to veto the bill. They argue that repaying this money will cost the Icelandic taxpayers: the compensation is some 12,000 euros for each of Iceland’s residents. Campaigners say that the Icelandic people are being forced to pay for the mistakes of the banks. Whilst UK taxpayers lost out, the Icelandic people’s arguments have something of a déjà-vu about them: after all it wasn’t long ago that the UK people were asking why we should have to suffer from higher taxes and future cuts in government spending to bail out the banks, when it wasn’t our fault that they collapsed in the first place. The following articles consider this issue.

Icelandic bank with British savers’ money enters crisis talks Telegraph, Rowena Mason (4/10/08)
Town Hall’s £830m Iceland shortfall This is Money, Daniel Martin (6/1/10)
Iceland leader vetoes bank repayments bill BBC News (5/1/10)
iIceland blocks repayment of £2.3bn to Britain Times Online, Robert Lindsay (5/1/10)
Iceland petition against pay-out over Icesave collapse BBC News (2/1/10)
Iceland’s President under pressure over Icesave Telegraph, Angela Monaghan (3/1/10)
Peston’s Picks: We’re all Icelanders now BBC News (7/1/10)
Iceland President says country will pay UK government BBC News (7/1/10)

Questions

  1. For the Icelandic people, what are the arguments (a) for and (b) against repaying money owed to the UK and the Netherlands?
  2. For the British and Dutch people, what are the arguments (a) for and (b) against repayment?
  3. How will this repayment (or lack thereof) affect the recovery of the British economy?
  4. Will the repayment of this money adversely affect the Icelandic economy? Explain your answer. Think about tax cuts and the effect on consumer incomes.
  5. Why is this a key example of international policy interdependence?

Should economists have foreseen the credit crunch? A few were warning of an overheated world economy with excessive credit and risk taking. Most economists prior to 2007/8, however, were predicting a continuation of steady economic growth. Inflation targeting, fiscal rules and increasingly flexible markets were the ingredients of this continuing prosperity. And then the crash happened!

So why did so few people see the downturn coming? Were the models used by economists fundamentally flawed, or was it simply a question of poor assumptions or poor data? Do we need a new way of modelling the economy, or is it simply a question of updating theories from the past? Should, for example, models become much more Keynesian? Should we abandon the new classical approach of assuming that markets are essentially good at pricing in risk and that herd behaviour will not be seriously destabilising?

The following podcast looks at these issues. “Aditya Chakrabortty’s joined in the studio by the Guardian’s economics editor Larry Elliott, as well as Roger Bootle, the managing director of Capital Economics, and political economist and John Maynard Keynes biographer Robert Skidelsky. Also in the podcast, we hear from Nobel prize-winning economist, Elinor Ostrom, Freakonomics author Steven Levitt, and UN advisor and developmental economist Daniel Gay.”

The Business: A crisis of economics Guardian podcast (25/11/09)

See also the following news items from the Sloman Economics news site:
Keynes is dead; long live Keynes (3/10/09)
Learning from history (3/10/09)
Macroeconomics – Crisis or what? (6/8/09)
The changing battle grounds of economics (27/7/09)
Repeat of the Great Depression – or learning the lessons from the past? (23/6/09)
Animal spirits (30/4/09)
Keynes – do we need him more than ever? (26/10/08)

Questions

  1. Why did most economists fail to predict the credit crunch and subsequent recession? Was it a problem with the models that were used or the data that was put into these models, or both?
  2. What was the Washington consensus? To what extent did this consensus contribute to the current recession?
  3. What is meant by systemic risk? How does this influence the usefulness of ‘micro’ financial models?
  4. What particular market failures were responsible for the credit crunch?
  5. What is meant by ‘rational behaviour’? Is it reasonable to assume that people are rational?
  6. Is macroeconomics too theoretical or too mathematical (or both)? If you think it is, how can macroeconomics be reformed to improve its explanatory and predictive power?
  7. Does a ‘really good economist’ need to have a good grounding in a range of social sciences and in economic history?