The IMF has just published its six-monthly World Economic Outlook. It expects world aggregate demand and growth to remain subdued. A combination of worries about the effects of Brexit and slower-than-expected growth in the USA has led the IMF to revise its forecasts for growth for both 2016 and 2017 downward by 0.1 percentage points compared with its April 2016 forecast. To quote the summary of the report:
Global growth is projected to slow to 3.1 percent in 2016 before recovering to 3.4 percent in 2017. The forecast, revised down by 0.1 percentage point for 2016 and 2017 relative to April, reflects a more subdued outlook for advanced economies following the June UK vote in favour of leaving the European Union (Brexit) and weaker-than-expected growth in the United States. These developments have put further downward pressure on global interest rates, as monetary policy is now expected to remain accommodative for longer.
Although the market reaction to the Brexit shock was reassuringly orderly, the ultimate impact remains very unclear, as the fate of institutional and trade arrangements between the United Kingdom and the European Union is uncertain.
The IMF is pessimistic about the outlook for advanced countries.
It identifies political uncertainty and concerns about immigration and integration resulting in a rise in demands for populist, inward-looking policies as the major risk factors.
It is more optimistic about growth prospect for some emerging market economies, especially in Asia, but sees a sharp slowdown in other developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and in countries generally which rely on commodity exports during a period of lower commodity prices.
With little scope for further easing of monetary policy, the IMF recommends the increased use of fiscal policies:
Accommodative monetary policy alone cannot lift demand sufficiently, and fiscal support — calibrated to the amount of space available and oriented toward policies that protect the vulnerable and lift medium-term growth prospects — therefore remains essential for generating momentum and avoiding a lasting downshift in medium-term inflation expectations.
These fiscal policies should be accompanied by supply-side policies focused on structural reforms that can offset waning potential economic growth. These should include efforts to “boost labour force participation, improve the matching process in labour markets, and promote investment in research and development and innovation.”
Articles
IMF Sees Subdued Global Growth, Warns Economic Stagnation Could Fuel Protectionist Calls IMF News (4/10/16)
The World Economy: Moving Sideways IMF blog, Maurice Obstfeld (4/10/16)
The biggest threats facing the global economy in eight charts The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (4/10/16)
IMF and World Bank launch defence of open markets and free trade The Guardian, Larry Elliott (6/10/16)
IMF warns of financial stability risks BBC News, Andrew Walker (5/10/16)
Backlash to World Economic Order Clouds Outlook at IMF Talks Bloomberg, Rich Miller, Saleha Mohsin and Malcolm Scott (4/10/16)
IMF lowers growth forecast for US and other advanced economies Financial Times, Shawn Donnan (4/10/16)
Seven key points from the IMF’s latest global health check Financial TImes, Mehreen Khan (4/10/16)
Latest IMF forecast paints a bleak picture for global growth The Conversation, Geraint Johnes (5/10/16)
IMF Report, Videos and Data
World Economic Outlook, October 2016 IMF (4/10/16)
Press Conference on the Analytical Chapters IMF (27/9/16)
IMF Chief Economist Maurice Obstfeld explains the outlook for the global economy IMF Video (4/10/16)
Fiscal Policy in the New Normal IMF Video (6/10/16)
CNN Debate on the Global Economy IMF Video (6/10/16)
World Economic Outlook Database IMF (October 2016)
Questions
- Why is the IMF forecasting lower growth than in did in its April 2016 report?
- How much credibility should be put on IMF and other forecasts of global economic growth?
- Look at IMF forecasts for 2015 made in 2013 and 2012 for at least 2 macroeconomic indicators. How accurate were they? Explain the inaccuracies.
- What are the benefits and limitations of using fiscal policy to raise global economic growth?
- What are the main factors determining a country’s long-term rate of economic growth?
- Why is there growing mistrust of free trade in many countries? Is such mistrust justified?
The Bank of England has responded to forecasts of a dramatic slowdown in the UK economy in the wake of the Brexit vote. On 4th August, it announced a substantial easing of monetary policy, but still left room for further easing later.
Its new measures are based on the forecasts in its latest 3-monthly Inflation Report. Compared with the May forecasts, the Report predicts that, even with the new measures, aggregate demand growth will slow dramatically. As a result, over the next two years cumulative GDP growth will be 2.5% lower than it would have been with a Remain vote and unemployment will rise from 4.9% to around 5.5%.
What is more, the slower growth in aggregate demand will impact on aggregate supply. As the Governor said in his
opening remarks at the Inflation Report press conference:
“The weakness in demand will itself weigh on supply as a period of low investment restrains growth in the capital stock and productivity.
There could also be more direct implications for supply from the decision to leave the European Union. The UK’s trading relationships are likely to change, but precisely how will be unclear for some time. If companies are uncertain about the future impact of this on their businesses, they could delay decisions about building supply capacity or entering new markets.”
Three main measures were announced.
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A cut in Bank Rate from 0.5% to 0.25%. This is the first time Bank Rate has been changed since March 2009. The Bank hopes that banks will pass this on to customers in terms of lower borrowing rates. |
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A new ‘Term Funding Scheme (TFS)’. “Compared to the old Funding for Lending Scheme, the TFS is a pure monetary policy instrument that is likely to be more stimulative pound-for-pound.” The scheme makes £100bn of central bank reserves available as loans to banks and building societies. These will be at ultra-low interest rates to enable banks to pass on the new lower Bank Rate to customers in all forms of lending. What is more, banks will be charged a penalty if they do not lend this money. |
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An expansion of the quantitative easing programme beyond the previous £375 billion of gilt (government bond) purchases. This will consist of an extra £60bn of gilt purchases and the purchase of up to £10bn of UK corporate bonds. |
The Bank recognises that there is a limit to what monetary policy can do and that there is also a role to play for fiscal policy. The new Chancellor, Philip Hammond, is considering what fiscal measures can be taken, including spending on infrastructure projects. These are likely to have relative high multiplier effects and would also increase aggregate supply at the same time. But we will have to wait for the Autumn Statement to see what measures will be taken.
But despite the limits to monetary policy, there is more the Bank of England could do. It already recognises that there may have to be a further cut in Bank Rate, perhaps to 0.1% or even to 0% (the ECB has a 0% rate). There could also be additional quantitative easing or additional term funding to banks.
Some economists argue that the Bank should go further still and, in conjunction with the Treasury, provide new money directly to fund infrastructure spending or tax cuts, or even as cash handouts to households. This extra money provided to the government would not increase government borrowing.
We discussed the use of this version of ‘helicopter money’ in the blogs, A flawed model of monetary policy, Global warning and People’s quantitative easing. Some of the articles below also consider the potential for this type of monetary policy. In a letter to The Guardian 35 economists advocate:
A fiscal stimulus financed by central bank money creation [which] could be used to fund essential investment in infrastructure projects – boosting the incomes of businesses and households, and increasing the public sector’s productive assets in the process. Alternatively, the money could be used to fund either a tax cut or direct cash transfers to households, resulting in an immediate increase of household disposable incomes.
Webcasts and podcasts
Inflation Report Press Conference Bank of England, Mark Carney (4/8/16)
Bank spells out chance of further rate cut this year BBC Radio 4 Today Programme, Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England (5/8/16)
Broadbent Ready to Back Another BOE Rate Cut Amid Slowdown Bloomberg, Chris Wyllie (5/8/16)
What’s Top of Mind? ‘Helicopter Money’ Goldman Sachs Macroeconomic Insights, Allison Nathan (April 2016)
Articles
Bank of England measures
Interest rate cut: What did the Bank of England announce today and how will it affect you? Independent, Ben Chu (5/8/16)
This is the Bank of England’s all-action response to Brexit The Guardian, Larry Elliott (4/8/16)
Bank of England unveils four-pronged stimulus package in bid to avoid Brexit recession The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (4/8/16)
Record-breaking Bank of England Financial Times, Robin Wigglesworth (4/8/16)
The Bank of England has delivered – now for a fiscal response Financial Times (4/8/16)
Bank of England Cuts Interest Rate to Historic Low, Citing Economic Pressures New York Times, Chad Bray (4/8/16)
Sledgehammer? This is more like the small tool to fix a fence The Telegraph, Andrew Sentance (5/8/16)
All eyes are on Hammond as Bank runs low on options The Telegraph, Tom Stevenson (6/8/16)
Bank of England’s stimulus package has bought the chancellor some time The Guardian, Larry Elliott (7/8/16)
Helicopter money
A post-Brexit economic policy reset for the UK is essential Guardian letters, 35 economists (3/8/16)
Cash handouts are best way to boost British growth, say economists The Guardian, Larry Elliott (4/8/16)
Helicopter money: if not now, when? Financial Times, Martin Sandbu (2/8/16)
The helicopters fly on for now, but one day they will crash The Telegraph, Tom Stevenson (23/7/16)
Is the concept of ‘helicopter money’ set for a resurgence? The Conversation, Phil Lewis (2/8/16)
Helicopter money talk takes flight as Bank of Japan runs out of runway Reuters, Stanley White (30/7/16)
Helicopters 101: your guide to monetary financing Deutsche Bank Research, George Saravelos, Daniel Brehon and Robin Winkler (15/4/16)
Helicopter money is back in the air The Guardian, Robert Skidelsky (22/9/16)
Bank of England publications
Inflation Report, August 2016 Bank of England (4/8/16)
Inflation Report Press Conference: Opening Remarks by the Governor Bank of England, Mark Carney (4/8/16)
Inflation Report Q&A Bank of England Press Conference (4/8/16)
Inflation Report, August 2016: Landing page Bank of England (4/8/16)
Questions
- Find out the details of the previous Funding for Lending (FLS) scheme. How does the new Term Funding Scheme (TFS) differ from it? Why does the Bank of England feel that TFS is likely to be more effective than FLS in expanding lending?
- What is the transmission mechanism between asset purchases and real aggregate demand?
- What factors determine the level of borrowing in the economy? How is cutting Bank Rate from 0.5% to 0.25% likely to affect borrowing?
- If the Bank of England’s latest forecast is for a significant reduction in economic growth from its previous forecast, why did the Bank not introduce stronger measures, such as larger asset purchases or a cut in Bank Rate to 0.1%?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of helicopter money in the current circumstances? If helicopter money were used, would it be better to use it for funding public-sector infrastructure projects or for cash handouts to households, either directly or in the form of tax cuts?
- How does the Bank of England’s measures of 4 August compare with those announced by the Japanese central bank on 29 July?
- What effects can changes in aggregate demand have on aggregate supply?
- What supply-side policies could the government adopt to back up monetary and fiscal policy? Are the there lessons here from the Japanese government’s ‘three arrows’?
The Brexit vote has caused shockwaves throughout European economies. But there is a potentially larger economic and political problem facing the EU and the eurozone more specifically. And that is the state of the Italian banking system and the Italian economy.
Italy is the third largest economy in the eurozone after Germany and France. Any serious economic weaknesses could have profound consequences for the rest of the eurozone and beyond.
At 135% of GDP, Italy’s public-sector debt is one the highest in the world; its banks are undercapitalised with a high proportion of bad debt; and it is still struggling to recover from the crisis of 2008–9. The Economist article elaborates:
The adult employment rate is lower than in any EU country bar Greece. The economy has been moribund for years, suffocated by over-regulation and feeble productivity. Amid stagnation and deflation, Italy’s banks are in deep trouble, burdened by some €360 billion of souring loans, the equivalent of a fifth of the country’s GDP. Collectively they have provisioned for only 45% of that amount. At best, Italy’s weak banks will throttle the country’s growth; at worst, some will go bust.
Since 2007, the economy has shrunk by 10%. And potential output has fallen too, as firms have closed. Unemployment is over 11%, with youth unemployment around 40%.
Things seem to be coming to a head. As confidence in the Italian banking system plummets, the Italian government would like to bail out the banks to try to restore confidence and encourage deposits and lending. But under new eurozone rules designed to protect taxpayers, it requires that the first line of support should be from bondholders. Such support is known as a ‘bail-in’.
If bondholders were large institutional investors, this might not be such a problem, but a significant proportion of bank bonds in Italy are held by small investors, encouraged to do so by tax relief. Bailing in the banks by requiring bondholders to bear significant losses in the value of their bonds could undermine the savings of many Italians and cause them severe hardship, especially those who had saved for their retirement.
So what is the solution? Italian banks need recapitalising to restore confidence and prevent a more serious crisis. However, there is limited scope for bailing in, unless small investors can be protected. And eurozone rules provide little scope for government funding for the banks. These rules should be relaxed under extreme circumstances. At the same time, policy needs to focus on making Italian banking more efficient.
Meanwhile, the IMF is forecasting that Italian economic growth will be less than 1% this year and little better in 2017. Part of the problem, claims the IMF, is the Brexit vote. This has heightened financial market volatility and increasead the risks for Italy with its fragile banking system. But the problems of the Italian economy run deeper and will require various supply-side policies to tackle low productivity, corruption, public-sector inefficiency and a financial system not fit for purpose. What the mix of these policies should be – whether market based or interventionist – is not just a question of effectiveness, but of political viability and democratic support.
Articles
The Italian Job The Economist (9/7/16)
IMF warns Italy of two-decade-long recessionThe Guardian, Larry Elliott (11/7/16)
Italy economy: IMF says country has ‘two lost decades’ of growth BBC News (12/7/16)
What’s the problem with Italian banks? BBC News, Andrew Walker (10/7/16)
Why Italy’s banking crisis will shake the eurozone to its core The Telegraph, Tim Wallace Szu Ping Chan (16/8/16)
If You Thought Brexit Was Bad Wait Until The Italian Banks All Go Bust Forbes, Tim Worstall (17/7/16)
In the euro zone’s latest crisis, Italy is torn between saving the banks or saving its people Quartz, Cassie Werber (13/7/16)
Why Italy could be the next European country to face an economic crisis Vox, Timothy B. Lee (8/7/16)
Forget Brexit, Quitaly is Europe’s next worry The Guardian, Larry Elliott (26/7/16)
Report
Italy IMF Country Report No. 16/222 (July 2016)
Data
Economic Outlook OECD (June 2016) (select ‘By country’ from the left-hand panel and then choose ‘Italy’ from the pull-down menu and choose appropriate time series)
Questions
- Can changes in aggregate demand have supply-side consequences? Explain.
- Explain why there may be a downward spiral of asset sales by banks.
- How might the principle of bail-ins for undercapitalised Italian banks be pursued without being at the expense of the small saver?
- What lessons are there from Japan’s ‘three arrows’ for Italy? Does being in the eurozone constrain Italy’s ability to adopt any or all of these three categories of policy?
- Why may the Brexit vote have more serious consequences for Italy than many other European economies?
- Find out what reforms have already been adopted or are being pursued by the Italian government. How successful are they likely to be in increasing Italian growth and productivity?
- What external factors are currently (a) favourable, (b) unfavourable to improving Italian growth and productivity?
What have been, and will be, the monetary and fiscal responses to the Brexit vote in the referendum of 23 June 2016? This question has been addressed in speeches by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, and by George Osborne, Chancellor the Exchequer. Both recognise that the vote will cause a negative shock to the economy, which will require some stimulus to aggregate demand to avoid a recession, or at least minimise its depth.
Mark Carney stated that:
The Bank of England stands ready to provide more than £250bn of additional funds through its normal facilities. The Bank of England is also able to provide substantial liquidity in foreign currency, if required.
In the coming weeks, the Bank will assess economic conditions and will consider any additional policy responses.
This could mean that at its the next meeting, scheduled for 13/14 July, the Monetary Policy Committee will consider reducing Bank Rate from its current level of 0.5% and introducing further quantitative easing.
In a speech on 30 June, he went further:
I can assure you that in the coming months the Bank can be expected to take whatever action is needed to support growth subject to inflation being projected to return to the target over an appropriate horizon, and inflation expectations remaining well anchored.
Then in a speech on 5 July, introducing the latest Financial Stability Report, he said that the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee is lowering the required capital ratio of banks, thereby freeing up capital for lending to customers. The part being lowered is the ‘countercyclical capital buffer’ – the element that can be varied according to the state of the economy. Mark Carney said:
The FPC is today reducing the countercyclical capital buffer on banks’ UK exposures from 0.5% to 0% with immediate effect. This is a major change. It means that three quarters of UK banks, accounting for 90% of the stock of UK lending, will immediately have greater flexibility to supply credit to UK households and firms.
Specifically, the FPC’s action immediately reduces regulatory capital buffers by £5.7 billion and therefore raises banks’ capacity to lend to UK businesses and households by up to £150 billion. For comparison, last year with a fully functioning banking system and one of the fastest growing economies in the G7, total net lending in the UK was £60 billion.
Thus although there may be changes to interest rates and narrow money in response to economic reactions to the Brexit vote, the monetary policy framework remains unchanged. This is to achieve a target rate of CPI inflation of 2% at the 24-month time horizon.
But what of fiscal policy?
In its Charter for Budget Responsibility, updated in the Summer 2015 Budget, the government states its Fiscal Mandate:
3.2 In normal times, once a headline surplus has been achieved, the Treasury’s mandate for fiscal policy is:
• a target for a surplus on public-sector net borrowing in each subsequent year.
3.3 For the period outside normal times from 2015-16, the Treasury’s mandate for fiscal policy is:
• a target for a surplus on public-sector net borrowing by the end of 2019-20.
3.4 For this period until 2019-20, the Treasury’s mandate for fiscal policy is supplemented by:
• a target for public-sector net debt as a percentage of GDP to be falling in each year.
The target of a PSNB surplus by 2019-20 has been the cornerstone of recent fiscal policy. In order to stick to it, the Chancellor warned before the referendum that a slowdown in the economy as a result of a Brexit vote would force him to introduce an emergency Budget, which would involve cuts in government expenditure and increases in taxes.
However, since the vote he is now saying that the slowdown would force him to extend the time for reaching a surplus beyond 2019-20 to avoid dampening the economy further. But does this mean he is abandoning his fiscal target and resorting to discretionary expansionary fiscal policy?
George Osborne’s answer to this question is no. He argues that extending the deadline for a surplus is consistent with paragraph 3.5 of the Charter, which reads:
3.5 These targets apply unless and until the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) assess, as part of their economic and fiscal forecast, that there is a significant negative shock to the UK. A significant negative shock is defined as real GDP growth of less than 1% on a rolling 4 quarter-on-4 quarter basis. If the OBR assess that a significant negative shock:
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occurred in the most recent 4 quarter period; |
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is occurring at the time the assessment is being made; or |
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will occur during the forecast period |
then:
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if the normal times surplus rule in 3.2 is in force, the target for a surplus each year is suspended (regardless of future data revisions). The Treasury must set out a plan to return to surplus. This plan must include appropriate fiscal targets, which will be assessed by the OBR. The plan, including fiscal targets, must be presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Parliament at or before the first financial report after the shock. The new fiscal targets must be approved by a vote in the House of Commons. |
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if the shock occurs outside normal times, the Treasury will review the appropriateness of its fiscal targets for the period until the public finances return to surplus. Any changes to the targets must be approved by a vote in the House of Commons. |
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once the budget is in surplus, the target set out in 3.2 above applies. |
In other words, if the OBR forecasts that the Brexit vote will result in GDP growing by less than 1%, the Chancellor can delay reaching the surplus and thus not have to introduce tougher austerity measures. This, in effect, is what he is now saying and maintaining that, because of paragraph 3.5, it does not break the Fiscal Mandate. The nature of the next Budget, probably in the autumn, will depend on OBR forecasts.
A few days later, George Osborne announced that he plans to cut corporation tax from the current 20% to less than 15% – below the rate of 17% previously scheduled for 2019-20. His aim is not just to stimulate the economy, but to attract inward investment, as the rate would below that of any major economy and close the rate of 12.5% in Ireland. His hope would also be to halt the outflow of investment as companies seek to relocate in the EU.
Videos and podcasts
Statement from the Governor of the Bank of England following the EU referendum result Bank of England (24/6/16)
Uncertainty, the economy and policy – speech by Mark Carney Bank of England (30/6/16)
Introduction to Financial Stability Report, July 2016 Bank of England (5/7/16)
Osborne: Life will not be ‘economically rosy’ outside EU BBC News (28/6/16)
Osborne takes ‘realistic’ view over surplus target BBC News (1/7/16)
Why has George Osborne abandoned a key economic target? BBC News (1/7/16)
Articles
Mark Carney says Bank of England ready to inject £250bn into economy to keep UK afloat after EU referendum Independent, Zlata Rodionova (24/6/16)
Carney Signals Rate Cuts as Brexit Chaos Engulfs Political Class Bloomberg, Scott Hamilton (30/6/16)
Bank of England hints at UK interest rate cuts over coming months to ease Brexit woes International Business Times, Gaurav Sharma (30/6/16)
Carney prepares for ‘economic post-traumatic stress’ Financial Times, Emily Cadman (30/6/16)
Bank of England warns Brexit risks beginning to crystallise BBC News (5/7/16)
Bank of England tells banks to cut buffer to boost lending Financial Times, Caroline Binham and Chris Giles (5/7/16)
George Osborne puts corporation tax cut at heart of Brexit recovery plan Financial Times (3/7/16)
George Osborne corporation tax cut is the wrong way to start EU negotiations, former WTO boss says Independent, Hazel Sheffield (5/7/16)
George Osborne abandons 2020 UK surplus target Financial Times, Emily Cadman and Gemma Tetlow (1/7/16)
George Osborne scraps 2020 budget surplus plan The Guardian, Jill Treanor and Katie Allen (1/7/16)
Osborne abandons 2020 budget surplus target BBC News (1/7/16)
Brexit and the easing of austerity BBC News, Kamal Ahmed (1/7/16)
Osborne Follows Carney in Signaling Stimulus After Brexit Bloomberg, Simon Kennedy (1/7/16)
Questions
- Explain the measures taken by the Bank of England directly after the Brexit vote.
- What will determine whether the Bank of England engages in further quantitative easing beyond the current £385bn of asset purchases?
- How does monetary policy easing (or the expectation of it) affect the exchange rate? Explain.
- How effective is monetary policy for expanding aggregate demand? Is it more or less effective than using monetary policy to reduce aggregate demand?
- Explain what is meant by (a) capital adequacy ratios (tier 1 and tier 2); (b) countercyclical buffers. (See, for example, Economics 9th edition, page 533–7 and Figure 16.2))
- To what extent does increasing the supply of credit result in that credit being taken up by businesses and consumers?
- Distinguish between rules-based and discretionary fiscal policy. How would you describe paragraph 3.5 in the Charter for Budget Responsibility?
- Would you describe George Osborne’s proposed fiscal measures as expansionary or merely as less contractionary?
- Why is the WTO unhappy with George Osborne’s proposals about corporation tax?
- What is the Nash equilibrium of countries seeking to undercut each other’s corporation tax rates?
In the blog post, Global warning, we looked at the use of unconventional macroeconomic policies to deal with the slow pace of economic growth around the world. One of the articles was by Nouriel Roubini. In the linked article below, he argues that slow economic growth may be the new global norm.
At the centre of the problem is a fall in the rate of potential economic growth. This has been caused by a lack of investment, which has slowed the pace of innovation and the growth in labour productivity.
The lack of investment, in turn, has been caused by a lack of spending by both households and governments. What is the point in investing in new capacity, argue firms, if they already have spare capacity?
Low consumer spending is partly the result of a redistribution of income from low- and middle-income households (who have a high marginal propensity to consume) to high-income households and corporations (who have a low mpc). Low spending is also the result of both consumers and governments attempting to reduce their levels of debt by cutting back spending.
Low growth leads to hysteresis – the process whereby low actual growth leads to low potential growth. The reason is that the unemployed become deskilled and the lack of investment by firms reduces the innovation that is necessary to embed new technologies.
Read Roubini’s analysis and consider the policy implications.
Article
Has the global economic growth malaise become the ‘new normal’? The Guardian, Nouriel Roubini (2/5/16)
Questions
- Explain what is meant by ‘hysteresis’ and how the concept is relevant in explaining low global economic growth.
- Why has there been a reduction in the marginal propensity to consume in recent years? What is the implication of this for the multiplier and economic recovery?
- Explain what Roubini means by ‘a painful de-leveraging process’. What are the implications of this process?
- How important are structural reforms and what forms could these take? Why has there been a reluctance for governments to institute such reforms?
- ‘Asymmetric adjustment between debtor and creditor economies has also undermined growth.’ Explain what Roubini means by this.
- Why are governments reluctant to use fiscal policy to boost both actual and potential economic growth?
- What feasible policy measures could be taken to boost actual and potential economic growth?