The recession caused a large rise in unemployment in many countries. In the USA the rise has been particularly steep, where unemployment now stands at 14.5 million, or 9.8% of the labour force. Unemployment has continued to rise despite renewed growth in the US economy, where the latest annual real GDP growth is 2.6% (measured in Q3 2010). The rise in unemployment has been blamed on ‘sticky wages’ – i.e. the reluctance of wage rates to fall.
But are wages genuinely sticky as far as the average worker is concerned? They may be in many specific jobs with specific employers, but many workers made redundant then find work in different jobs at lower rates of pay. For them, their wage has fallen, even if particular jobs are paying the same as before.
So what are the consequences of this? Does the willingness of workers to accept lower paid jobs mean that the labour market is flexible and that people will thus price themselves into work? If so, why is employment still rising? Or does a reduction in real wages for many people dampen spending and hence aggregate demand, thereby reducing the demand for labour? If so, why is GDP rising?
The following articles look at the apparent stickiness of wages and the implications for the labour market and the macroeconomy.
Articles
Downturn’s Ugly Trademark: Steep, Lasting Drop in Wages Wall Street Journal, Sudeep Reddy (11/1/11)
The Causes of Unemployment Seeking Alpha, Brad DeLong (13/1/11)
Sticky, sticky wages The Economist blogs: Free Exchange, R.A. (11/1/11)
The Causes of Unemployment New York Times blogs: Wonkish, Paul Krugman (16/1/11)
America’s union-bashing backlash Guardian, Paul Harris (5/1/11)
Data
Federal Reserve Economic Data: FRED Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (US macroeconomic datasets)
United States GDP Growth Rate Trading Economics
US unemployment statistics Bureau of Labor Statistics
Questions
- Why might nominal wages be sticky downwards in specific jobs in specific companies?
- Why might nominal average wages in the economy not be sticky downwards?
- Why is unemployment rising in the USA?
- Why might there be a problem of hysteresis in the USA that provides an explanation of the reluctance of unemployment to fall?
- Why might a fall in wages end up being contractionary?
- What lessons can be learned from the Great Depression about cures for unemployment?
- How might unemployment be brought down in the USA?
- Why may making wages somewhat more flexible, as opposed to perfectly flexible, not be a good thing?
Here’s an interesting example of oligopoly – one you probably haven’t considered before. It’s the art market. And it’s not just one market, but a whole pyramid of markets. At the bottom are the ‘yearning masses’ of penny-poor artists, from students to those struggling to make a living from their art, with studios in their attic, garden shed or kitchen table. At the top of the pyramid are those very few artists that can earn fantastic sums of money by selling to collectors or top galleries. Then there are all the layers of markets in between, where artists can earn everything from a modest to a reasonable income.
The pyramid is itself depicted as a work of art, which you can see in the linked article below. It’s worth studying this piece of art carefully as well as reading the article.
A guide to the market oligopoly system Reuters, Felix Salmon (28/12/10)
Questions
- Identify the increasing barriers to entry as you work up the art market pyramid.
- Are there any other market imperfections in the art market that you can identify from the diagram?
- What are the key differences between the ‘primary market, tier 1’, the ‘primary market, tier 2’ and ‘the secondary market’?
- Are artists ‘rational maximisers’? If so, what is it they are trying to maximise? If not, why not?
- How would you set about determining the ‘worth’ of a piece of art? How do possible future value of a piece of art determine its present value?
With government cuts and pay freezes, many people are worried about their future. Against this background it’s little wonder that people are growing increasingly resentful about the soaring pay of bankers and other leaders of major companies – especially when they reflect on the behaviour of top bankers who were largely responsible for the recession in the West and the debt problems that resulted. And the gap between those at the top and workers on average pay just goes on widening. As the final article below states:
The boss who sells Cillit Bang got paid a hefty £92.6m last year, while his counterpart who builds executive homes pocketed £38.4m and a top miner took home £27m. These are not figures from some international football league, but the bosses of Britain’s biggest companies, who received an average 55% pay rise in the year to June. A top FTSE 100 boss now earns £4.9m – 88 times the average worker’s pay.
On 9 November 2010, a high pay commission was launched to investigate the yawning pay gap between top executives and those on average incomes.
As the high pay commission, set up by the thinktank Compass and backed by the Joseph Rowntree charitable trust, begins its year-long analysis into the widening gap between the lowest and highest paid, a Compass poll shows that 99% of people believe that top executives are overpaid.
The commision will seek answers to questions such as the following: Why has the gap widened so massively? What is the role of globalisation in the process? Why has competition not worked to compete top pay down? Why don’t company owners impose more restraint on executive pay? Is there a form of collusion to push executive pay ever higher? Are executives worth it?!
Articles
Let’s make CEOs justify their wages Guardian, Martin O’Neill (19/10/10)
FTSE 100 bosses criticised as boardroom pay leaps by 55% Guardian, Simon Goodley and Graeme Wearden (29/10/11)
Investigation launched into soaring executive pay Guardian, Jill Treanor (9/11/10)
Eighty-five per cent of people say top executives ‘should be paid less’ Telegraph, Ian Cowie (9/11/10)
Top executives paid ‘far too much’ Financial Times, Nicholas Timmins (9/11/10)
A mission to the outer limits of pay Financial Times, Andrew Hill and Esther Bintliff (9/11/10) (first part of article)
Sharing the spoils of business fairly Guardian, Deborah Hargreaves (13/11/10)
The High Pay Commission
The High Pay Commission, home page
Questions
- Desribe what has happened to executive pay of the top companies over recent years.
- How are executive pay packages determined?
- How relevant is marginal productivity theory in explaining executive pay?
- What are the incentive effects of having extremely high pay?
- What scope is there for collusion in determining executive pay?
- Why don’t company owners impose more restraint on executive pay?
- What are the social impacts of excessive executive pay?
- What could the government do to address the problem?
What’s going to happen to stock market prices? If we knew that, we could be very rich! Nevertheless, financial analysts constantly try to predict the movements of shares in order to decide when to buy and when to sell. One thing they do is to look at charts of price movements and look for patterns. These ‘chartists’, as they are sometimes called, refer to something known as the ‘death cross’ or ‘dark cross’.
So what is the death cross? Imagine a chart of the movements of share prices, such as the FTSE 100 in the UK or the Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P 500 in the USA. These movements can be shown as a moving average. In other words, for each day you plot the average of the past so many days. Typically, 200-day (sometimes 100-day) and 50-day moving averages are plotted. The 200-day (or 100-day) is taken as the long-term moving average and the 50-day as the short-term moving average. In a falling market, if the short-term moving average crosses below the long-term moving average, this is called the ‘death cross‘ as it signifies growing downward pressure in the market. The fall in the long-term average in these circumstances will indeed lag behind the fall in the short-term moving average.
Markets around the world are experiencing the death cross. So should be be worried? Or is this like looking for patterns in tea leaves, or the stars, and using them to make bogus predictions? So: science or mumbo jumbo?
First the science: the death cross indicates a fall in confidence. And at present, there is much for investors to worry about. Burgeoning debts, austerity measures and fears of a double-dip recession are spooking markets.
Now the mumbo jumbo. Just because markets are falling at the moment, this does not prove that they will go on falling. Markets are often spooked, only to recover when ‘sanity’ returns. People may soon start to believe that a second credit crunch will not return, given all the regulatory and support measures put in place, the huge amount of liquidity waiting to be invested and the support packages from the ECB and IMF for Greece and, potentially, for other eurozone countries having difficulties servicing their debts. In other words, patterns may repeat themselves, but not necessarily. It depends on circumstances.
Articles
Market’s Swoon Prompts Fears Of the Dreaded ‘Death Cross’ CNBC, Jeff Cox (1/7/10)
Death Cross in S&P 500 May Not Lead to Rout: Technical Analysis Bloomberg Businessweek, Alexis Xydias (30/6/10)
Are the markets about to encounter the”Death Cross”? BBC News, Jamie Robertson (1/7/10)
MarketBeat Q&A: Debunking the ‘Death Cross’ Wall Street Journal blogs, Matt Phillips (30/6/10)
Technical analysis and market data
Moving Average Crossovers TradingDay.com, Alan Farley
Death Cross Investopedia
FTSE 100 historical prices Yahoo Finance
S&P 500 historical prices Yahoo Finance
Dow Jones historical prices Yahoo Finance
Questions
- Explain what is meant by the death cross and use a diagram to illustrate it. What is menat by the golden cross. Again, use a diagram to illustrate it.
- Under what circumstances would speculation against stock market price movements be (a) stabilising and (b) destabilising?
- What is the implication for stock market prices of a ‘wall of money’?
- How much faith should be put in chartist explanations of stock market prices? Do criticisms of chartism apply to all time-series analysis that is used for forecasting?
- Look back at newspaper articles from a year ago and see what they were predicting about stock market prices. Have their preductions been borne out? If so, why? If not, why not?
As the news from the Gulf of Mexico goes from very bad to even worse, so BP is increasingly coming under the international spotlight for its approach to risk management and safety. Was it sufficiently cautious? Could the accident on April 20 that killed 11 men and has been gushing some 800,000 gallons per day of crude oil into the sea have been averted? When the consequences of a pipe rupture are so catastrophic, is ‘catastrophic risk’ appropriately priced? As Tony Hayward, BP’s Chief Executive, told the Financial Times (see links below): “It was ‘an entirely fair criticism’ to say the company had not been fully prepared for a deep-water oil leak.”
One insight into BP’s approach to risk has come to light with the leaking of a 2002 memo from BP on how human life ought to be valued in any cost–benefit analysis of a project. As the Chicagoist summarises the memo:
A two page document prepared by risk managers in 2002 titled “Cost benefit analysis of three little pigs” shows the type of thinking BP put into risk assessment. The memo shows, in cartoonish fashion, that blast resistant trailers for BP’s workers weren’t necessary, because the cost was too high. In 2005, a refinery caught fire, killing 15 and injuring 170 people.
So how should catastrophic risk be taken into account? What does a company do when the probability of a disaster is extremely low and yet the costs of such a disaster, were it to occur, are extremely high?
BP’s Shocking Memo The Daily Beast, Rick Outzen (25/5/10)
Old BP document calculates worth of human life with “Three Little Pigs” diagram Yahoo News, Brett Michael Dykes (25/5/10)
Industry can cut accident risks, says BP chief Financial Times, Ed Crooks and Edward Luce (2/6/10)
BP ‘not prepared’ for deep-water spill Financial Times, Ed Crooks (2/6/10)
The BP Oil Spill’s Lessons for Regulation Project Syndicate, Kenneth Rogoff (1/6/10)
US oil firms ‘unprepared’ for major offshore disaster BBC News (15/6/10)
Questions
- What is meant by catastrophic risk?
- Why is it difficult to put an accurate valuation on outcomes with a very low probability of occurrence?
- Explain the table entitled “Cost benefit analysis of three little pigs” in the Rick Outzen blog.
- How should human life be valued?
- What value should be put on a serious injury (of a particular type)?
- Should BP (or any other company, for that matter) ever conduct operations that risk human life? Explain your answer.
- On what basis should BP have decided whether or not to install a $500,000 acoustic trigger that could have shut off the well when the blowout protector failed?
- How is the existence of environmental externalities relevant to BP’s decisions on safety?