Category: Economics for Business: Ch 14

Officials of the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) of UEFA met on Tuesday 15th April and Wednesday 16th April to decide the fate of a number of European clubs. The job of the CFCB is to implement UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) are said to be nervously awaiting the outcome of these meetings.

UEFA’s FFP rules apply to teams who want to play in either the Champions League or the Europa League. In order to be eligible to compete in these competitions teams not only have to perform well in their domestic league they also have to obtain a license from UEFA. The application process normally takes place midway through the current season for entry into either the Champions League or Europa League for the following season.

UEFA’s FFP rules cover a broad range of issues such as requirements for clubs to pay taxes, transfer fees and players’ wages on time in order to receive a license. However it is the ‘Break Even’ requirement that has caught the attention of a number of economists. This provision limits the size of the financial losses that team can incur before they become subject to sanctions from UEFA. Some of the stated aims of the policy are to:

– Introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances
– Encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues
– Encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football
– Protect the long term viability and sustainability of European club football.

The Royal Economic Society held a special session on the potential impact of the ‘Break Even’ requirement at its annual conference in April of this year.

One key way in which the UEFA rules differ from the rules imposed in the Championship in England is that the financial performance of the clubs is judged over a 2/3 year period rather than just one. The initial assessment period is over 2 seasons – 2011-12 to 2012-13. After this the monitoring period is over 3 seasons. Teams can make an initial loss of €5 million in total over the first two year period but this can increase to a maximum permitted loss €45 million over the two years – approximately £37 million – if the team’s owner is willing to fund this loss out of their own money. Certain categories of expenditure are exempt such as the cost of building a new stadium/stand or spending on youth development and the local community.

Manchester City made a total financial loss of £149 million over the last two seasons, far in excess of the permitted £37million, but these losses are falling which may count in their favour. They made losses of £97.9 million in 2012 and £51.6 million in 2013. Also some of the club’s expenditure will have been on some of the exempted categories so that the actual losses subject to FFP will be lower. Chelsea made a profit of £1.4million in 2011-12 and a loss of £49.4million in 2012-13. Although the losses over the two seasons were greater than £37 million, once adjustments were made for exempted expenditures the club was within the maximum permitted loss so was not subject to a full investigation.

In order to implement its FFP regulations UEFA created the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB). The CFCB has two departments – an investigatory chamber and an adjudicatory chamber. The investigatory chamber does the bulk of the work by investigating the accounts of all the 237 clubs that play in UEFA competitions. It was initially reported that the accounts of 76 clubs were being investigated in some detail because it was thought that they might have failed to meet FFP guidelines. However after further investigations in February it was reported that this number had fallen to below 20 teams. The investigatory panel met on Tuesday 15th April and Wednesday 16th April in order to make its final decisions which will be announced May 5th. The body can choose from one of the four following options in each case:

– Dismiss the case
– Agree a settlement with the club – effectively putting it on probation
– Reprimand and fine the club up to €100,000
– Refer the club to the CFCB adjudicatory chamber

The last option is the most serious as the adjudicatory chamber has the power to issue more serious penalties such as

– A deduction of points from the group stages of UEFA competitions.
– Withholding of revenues from UEFA competitions.
– Restrictions on the number of players that a club can register for participation in UEFA competitions.
– Disqualification from future UEFA competitions.

One issue that concerned UEFA was the possibility that very wealthy team owners might try to artificially inflate the revenues their club’s generate so as to circumvent the rules and make it look as if the team was meeting the FFP guidelines. In particular deals might be struck between other organisations that the club owner has an interest in and the football club at rates far in excess of the normal market level. For example some concerns have been expressed about the nature of the back-dated sponsorship deal of £167 million/year signed by PSG with the Qatar Tourism Authority. PSG are owned by Qatar Sport Investment which itself is a joint venture between the Qatari government and the Qatari Olympic Committee. The CFCB have said that they will analyse these types of deals and adjust club accounts if necessary so that they reflect true market rates.

May 5th could prove to be a very significant day for some of the biggest and most wealthy clubs in Europe.

Webcast

The Economics of “Financial Fair Play” (FFP) in European Soccer (EJ Special Session) Royal Economic Society (7/4/14)

Articles

UEFA probes ‘fewer than 20’ clubs over financial fair play rules Sky Sports, (14/4/14)
Manchester City confident of satisfying Uefa financial fair play rules The Guardian (15/4/14)
Uefa’s Financial Fair Play rules explained The Telegraph (15/4/14)
Man City sweating over sanctions as UEFA prepare to rule over excessive spending Daily Mail (15/4/14)
How Bosman’s lawyer is plotting another football revolution BBC Sport (2/10/13)
Manchester City await fate as Uefa’s financial rules kick in BBC Sport (16/4/14)
Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain face financial fair play fate The Guardian (14/4/14) .

Questions

  1. In standard economic theory it is assumed that both consumers and producers act rationally. What precisely does this mean?
  2. One of the stated aims of UEFA FFP is to ‘introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances’. Why might the owners of a football club act in an irrational way?
  3. Consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of assessing the financial performance of a team over 3 years as opposed to 1 year.
  4. One of the major arguments made against the UEFA FFP rules is that they will lead to a ‘fossilisation’ of the existing market i.e. the current top clubs are more likely to maintain their leadership. Explain the logic of this argument in more detail.
  5. Which of the possible sanctions for breaking FFP regulations do you think would hit the clubs the hardest in terms of the revenue they would lose? i.e. Which of the sanctions would they most like to avoid?

As Leicester City celebrated promotion to the English Premier League (EPL) last Saturday (5th April) it also became the first club in England that will probably have to pay a new Financial Fair Play (FFP) Tax. This tax is not paid to the government, but is effectively a fine imposed by the English Football League (EFL) on teams who break FFP regulations.

On Tuesday 8th April 2014 representatives from all the Championship clubs met with officials from the English Football League (EFL) in order to discuss the implementation of FFP. It had been reported in February that a number of teams were unhappy about the implementation of the FFP rules and were threatening to take legal action against the league. Unsurprisingly, one of these clubs was rumoured to be Leicester City.

In April 2012, 21 out of the 24 clubs in the Championship agreed on a set of new FFP regulations. These rules place a limit on the size of any financial losses that a team can incur in a given season before punishments, such as a tax, are imposed on them. The English Football League (EFL) stated that the aim of the FFP regulations was to

reduce the levels of losses being incurred at some clubs and, over time, establish a league of financially self-sustaining professional football clubs.

Under the agreed set of rules, all teams in the Championship have to provide a set of annual accounts by 1st December for the previous season: i.e. the first reporting period was in December 2012, when clubs had to submit accounts for 2011–12. No penalties were applied for the first two reporting periods as teams were given time to adjust to the new FFP framework. However sanctions come into effect for the 2013–14 season.

For the 2013–14 season the FFP rules set a threshold of £3 million as the size of the pre-tax financial losses that a team can incur before having to face any sanctions. If a team incurs a pre-tax loss of greater than £3 million but less than £8 million then punishments from the league can be avoided if the team’s owner invests enough money into the club so that the loss is effectively limited to £3 million: i.e. if the club reports a loss of £7 million then the owner would have to invest a minimum of £4 million of his/her own cash to avoid any sanctions.

The club is not allowed to finance the loss by borrowing or adding to the level of the team’s debt. If the owner cannot/refuses to make the investment or the pre-tax loss is greater than £8 million then the team is subject to one of two possible sanctions depending on whether it is promoted or not.

First, if the club is not promoted to the EPL, then it is subject to a transfer ban from the 1st January 2015: i.e. it will be unable to sign new players at the start of the transfer window. The ban remains in place until the club is able to submit financial information that clearly shows that it is meeting the FFP guidelines.

Second, if the club is promoted to the EPL then instead of a transfer embargo it has to pay the FFP Tax. The amount of tax the firm has to pay to the league depends on the size of the financial loss it has incurred. The larger the loss, the greater the tax it has to pay. The marginal rate of tax also increases with the size of the loss.

In order to help illustrate how the tax works it is useful to take a simple example. Leicester city reported a pre-tax loss of £34 million in 2012–13. If the club managed to reduce its pre-tax losses to £15 million in 2013–14 then, given its promotion, it would be subject to the tax. If we also assume that the owners are willing and able to invest £5 million of their own money into the club then the rate of tax the team would have to pay is based on the size of its losses over £8 million in the following way:

1% on losses between £8,000,001 and £8,100,000
20% on losses between £8,100,001 and £8,500,000
40% on losses between £8,500,001 and £9,000,000
60% on losses between £9,000,001 and £13,000,000
80% on losses between £13,000,001 and £18,000,000
100% on any losses over £18,000,000

Therefore with a loss of £15 million the FFP tax that Leicester would have to pay is £4,281,000 (£1,000 + £80,000 + £200,000 + £2.4million + £1.6million). If the club instead made a pre-tax financial loss of £30,000 in the 2013–14 season, then the FFP tax it would have to pay increases to £18,681,000 (£1,000 + £80,000 + £200,000 + £2.4million + £4 million + £12 million).

It was originally agreed that the revenue generated from the FFP tax would be shared equally by the teams in the Championship who managed to meet the FFP regulations. However the EPL objected to this provision and the money will now be donated to charity by the EFL.

Based on the financial results reported in 2012–13, about half the clubs in the Championship would be subject to either a transfer ban or FFP tax in January 2015. It was reported in the press in February that a number of clubs had instructed the solicitors, Brabners, to write to the EFL threatening legal action.

One particular concern was the ability of the clubs in the Championship subject to FFP rules to compete with teams relegated from the EPL. When the original FFP regulations were agreed, the teams relegated from the EPL received parachute payments of £48 million over a 4-year period. Following the record-breaking TV deal to broadcast EPL games, the payments were increased to £59 million for the 2013–14 season.

Following the meeting on Tuesday 8th April a spokesman from the EFL said

Considerable progress was achieved on potential improvements to the current regulations following a constructive debate between the clubs.

It will be interesting to see what changes are finally agreed and the implications they will have for the competitive balance of the league.

Articles

Why Championship clubs are crying foul over financial fair play The Guardian (26/2/14)
Wage bills result in big losses at Leicester City and Nottingham Forest The Guardian (5/3/14)
Financial fair play: Championship clubs make progress on talks BBC Sport (10/4/14)
Financial Fair Play in the Football League The Football League (25/4/12)
Loss leaders – Financial Fair Play Rules When Saturday Comes (25/4/12)
Richard Scudamore: financial fair play rules unsustainable in present form The Guardian (14/3/14)

Questions

  1. To what extent do you think that the implementation of the FFP regulations will either increase or decrease the competitive balance of the Championship?
  2. An article in the magazine ‘When Saturday Comes’ made the following statement “Last season’s champions, QPR, lost £25.4m and would have been handed a ‘tax’ of at least £17.4m based on 2013-14 thresholds”. Explain why this statement is not accurate. What mistake has the author made when trying to calculate the level of FFP tax payable?
  3. Nottingham Forest reported pre-tax financial losses of £17 million in 2012-13. If they made the same losses in 2013-14 and were promoted to the EPL, calculate how much FFP tax they would have to pay under current regulations.
  4. To what extent do you think that the money generated by the FFP tax should be equally distributed between the teams in the Championship who meet the FFP regulations.
  5. Why do you think team owners might need regulations to restrict the level of losses that they can make. Why might sport be different from other sectors?

Globalisation has led to an increasingly interdependent world, with companies based in one country often dependent on a market abroad. In recent years, it is the rapid growth of countries like China that has led to growth in the size of the markets for many products. With incomes rising in emerging countries, demand for many products has been growing, but in the past year, the trend for Prada has ended and seems to be reversing.

As the market in China matures and growth of demand in Europe slows, Prada has seen its shares fall by the largest margin since June last year.

Prada is a well-known luxury brand. The products it sells are relatively expensive and hence its products are likely to have an income elasticity of demand well above +1. With changes in China and Europe, Prada expects its growth in sales to January 2015 will be ‘low single-digit’ – less than the 7% figure recorded for the last financial year.

This lower growth in same-store sales is likely to continue the following year as well. Add on to this the lower-than-expected profits, which missed analysts’ forecasts, and you have a prime example of a brand that is suffering because of its customer base and the economic times.

Prada isn’t alone in suffering from economic conditions and, relative to its European counterparts, is expected to have higher growth in sales and profits in the next 12 months – at 11.5% and 14.8% respectively. This is according to a survey by Thomson Reuters.

Prada has exploited high demand by Chinese consumers, but has recently been affected by the strength of the euro. A strong euro means that the Italian-based Prada is struggling with exports, which only adds to its problems. As economic growth picks up in China and as other emerging economies begin to experience more rapid economic growth, the fortunes of this luxury-retailer may change once more. However, with volatile economic times still around in many countries, the future of many retailers selling high-end products to higher income customers will remain uncertain. The following articles consider the fortunes of Prada.

Prada shares fall sharply after China luxury warning BBC News (3/4/14)
Prada falls after forecasting slowing luxury sales growth Bloomberg, Andrew Roberts and Vinicy Chan (3/4/14)
Prada profits squeezed by weakness in Europe and crackdown in China The Guardian (2/4/14)
Prada bets on men to accelerate sales growth Reuters, Isla Binnie (2/4/14)
Prada misses full year profit forecast Independent, Laura Chesters (2/4/14)

Questions

  1. How can we define a luxury product?
  2. Explain the main factors which have led to a decline in the demand for Prada products over the past 12 months.
  3. Using a diagram, illustrate what is meant by a strong euro and how this affects export demand.
  4. What business strategies are Prada expected to adopt to reverse their fortunes?
  5. Using a diagram, explain the factors that have caused Prada share prices to decline.

Facebook has announced that it’s purchasing the messaging company WhatsApp. It is paying $19 billion in cash and shares, a sum that dwarfs other acquisitions of start-up companies in the app market. But what are the reasons for the acquisition and how will it affect users?

WhatsApp was founded less than five years ago and has seen massive growth and now has some 450 million active users, 70% of whom use it daily. This compares with Twitter’s 240 million users. An average of one million new users are signing up to WhatsApp each day. As the Wall Street Journal article, linked below, states:

Even by the get-big-fast standards of Silicon Valley, WhatsApp’s story is remarkable. The company, founded in 2009 by Ukrainian Jan Koum and American Brian Acton, reached 450 million users faster than any company in history, wrote Jim Goetz, a partner at investor Sequoia Capital.

Facebook had fewer than 150 million users after its fourth year, one third that of WhatsApp in the same time period.

Yet, despite its large user base, WhatsApp has just 55 employees, including 32 engineers.

For the user, WhatsApp offers a cheap service (free for the first year and just a 99¢ annual fee thereafter). There are no charges for sending or receiving text, pictures and videos. It operates on all mobile systems and carries no ads. It also offers privacy – once sent, messages are deleted from the company’s servers and are thus not available to government and other agencies trying to track people.

With 450 million current active users, this means that revenue next year will not be much in excess of $450 million. Thus it would seem that unless Facebook changes WhatsApp’s charging system or allows advertising (which it says it won’t) or sees massive further growth, there must have been reasons other than simple extra revenue for the acquisition.

Other possible reasons are investigated in the videos and articles below. One is to restrict competition which threatens Facebook’s own share of the messaging market: competition that has seen young people move away from Facebook, which they see is becoming more of a social media platform for families and all generations, not just for the young.

Videos and podcasts

Facebook pays billions for WhatsApp Messenger smartphone service Deutsche Welle, Manuel Özcerkes (19/2/14)
Facebook’s WhatsApp buy no bargain Reuters, Peter Thal Larsen (20/2/14)
Facebook Agrees To Buy WhatsApp For $19bn Sky News, Greg Milam (20/2/14)
Facebook Eliminates Competitor With WhatsApp Bloomberg TV, Om Malik, David Kirkpatrick and Paul Kedrosky (20/2/14)
Why WhatsApp Makes Perfect Sense for Facebook Bloomberg TV, Om Malik, David Kirkpatrick and Paul Kedrosky (20/2/14)
Facebook buying WhatsApp for $19bn BBC News, Mike Butcher (20/2/14)
Is Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp a desperate move? CNBC News, Rob Enderle (19/2/14)
Facebook’s $19bn WhatsApp deal ‘unjustifiable’ BBC Today Programme, Larry Magid (20/2/14)

Articles

Facebook to buy WhatsApp for $19 billion in deal shocker ReutersGerry Shih and Sarah McBride (20/2/14)
Facebook to Pay $19 Billion for WhatsApp Wall Street Journal, Reed Albergotti, Douglas MacMillan and Evelyn M. Rusli (19/2/14)
Facebook to buy WhatsApp for $19bn The Telegraph, Katherine Rushton (19/2/14)
Facebook buys WhatsApp: Mark Zuckerberg explains why The Telegraph (19/2/14)
WhatsApp deal: for Mark Zuckerberg $19bn is cheap to nullify the threat posed by messaging application The Telegraph, Katherine Rushton (20/2/14)
Why did Facebook buy WhatsApp? TechRadar, Matt Swider (20/2/14)
What is WhatsApp? What has Facebook got for $19bn? The Guardian, Alex Hern (20/2/14)
Facebook to buy messaging app WhatsApp for $19bn BBC News (20/2/14)
WhatsApp – is it worth it? BBC News, Rory Cellan-Jones (20/2/14)
Facebook buys WhatsApp: what the analysts say The Telegraph (19/2/14)
Facebook ‘dead and buried’ as teenagers switch to WhatsApp and Snapchat – because they don’t want mum and dad to see their embarrassing pictures Mail Online (27/12/13)
Facebook and WhatsApp: Getting the messages The Economist (22/2/14)

Questions

  1. Are Facebook and WhatsApp substitutes or complements, or neither?
  2. What does Facebook stand to gain from the acquisition of WhatsApp? Is the deal a largely defensive one for Facebook?
  3. Has Facebook paid too much for WhatsApp? What information would help you answer this question?
  4. Would it be a good idea for Facebook to build in the WhatsApp functionality into the main Facebook platform or would it be better to keep the two products separate by keeping WhatsApp as a self contained company?
  5. What effects will the acquisition have on competition in the social media and messaging market? Is this good for the user?
  6. Will the deal attract the attention of Federal competition regulators in the USA? If so, why; if not, why not?
  7. What are the implications for Google and Twitter?
  8. Find out and explain what happened to the Facebook share price after the acquisition was announced.

A constant feature of the UK economy (and of many other Western economies) has been record low interest rates. Since March 2009, Bank Rate has stood at 0.5%. Interest rates have traditionally been used to keep inflation on target, but more recently their objective has been to stimulate growth. However, have these low interest rates had a negative effect on the business environment?

Interest rates are a powerful tool of monetary policy and by affecting many of the components of aggregate demand, economic growth can be stimulated. This low-interest rate environment is an effective tool to stimulate consumer spending, as it keeps borrowing costs low and in particular can keep mortgage repayments down. However, this policy has been criticised for the harm it has been doing to savers – after all, money in the bank will not earn an individual any money with interest rates at 0.5%! Furthermore, there is now a concern that such low interest rates have led to ‘zombie companies’ and they are restricting the growth potential and recovery of the economy.

A report by the Adam Smith Institute suggests that these ‘zombie companies’ have emerged in part by the low-interest environment and are continuing to absorb resources, which could otherwise be re-allocated to companies with more potential, productivity and a greater contribution to the economic recovery. During a recession, there will undoubtedly be many business closures, as aggregate demand falls, sales and profits decline until eventually the business becomes unviable and loans cannot be repaid. Given the depth and duration of the recent recessionary period, the number of business closures should have been very large. However, the total number appears to be relatively low – around 2% or 100,000 and the report suggests that the low interest rates have helped to ‘protect’ them.

Low interest rates have enabled businesses to meet their debt repayments more easily and with some banks being unwilling to admit to ‘bad loans’, businesses have benefited from loans being extended or ‘rolled over’. This has enabled them to survive for longer and as the report suggests, may be preventing a full recovery. The report’s author, Tom Papworth said:

Low interest rates and bank forbearance represent a vast and badly targeted attempt to avoid dealing with the recession. Rather than solving our current crisis, they risk dooming the UK to a decade of stagnation … We tend to see zombies as slow-moving and faintly laughable works of fiction. Economically, zombies are quite real and hugely damaging, and governments and entrepreneurs cannot simply walk away.

The problem they create is that resources are invested into these companies – labour, capital, innovation. This creates an opportunity cost – the resources may be more productive if invested into new companies, with greater productive potential. The criticism is that the competitiveness of the economy is being undermined by the continued presence of such companies and that this in turn is holding the UK economy back. Perhaps the interest rate rise that may happen this time next year may be what is needed to encourage the re-allocation of capital. However, a 0.5 percentage point rise in interest rates would hardly be the end of the world for some of these companies. Perhaps a more focused approach looking at restructuring is the key to their survival and the allocation of resources to their most productive use. The following articles and the report itself consider the case of the trading dead.

Report
The Trading Dead The Adam Smith Institute, Tom Papworth November 2013

Articles
Zombie firms threaten UK’s economic recovery, says thinktank The Guardian, Gyyn Topam (18/11/13)
Zombie companies ‘probably have no long term future’ BBC News (18/11/13)
Rate rise set to put stake through heart of zombie companies Financial Times, Brian Groom (14/11/13)
Why we can still save the zombie firms hindering the UK economic rival City A.M., Henry Jackson (18/11/13)
Breathing new life into zombies The Telegraph, Rachel Bridge (9/11/13)

Questions

  1. Which components of aggregate demand are affected (and how) by low interest rates?
  2. Why do low interest rates offer ‘protection’ to vulnerable businesses?
  3. How is the reallocation of resources relevant in the case of zombie companies?
  4. If interest rates were to increase, how would this affect the debts of vulnerable businesses? Would a small rate irse be sufficient and effective?
  5. What suggestions does the report give for zombie companies to survive and become more productive?
  6. Is there evidence of zombie companies in other parts of the world?