Category: Economics for Business: Ch 07

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Artificial intelligence in pricing: a double-edged sword?

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming the way we live and work, with many of us knowingly or unknowingly using some form of AI daily. Businesses are also adopting AI in increasingly innovative ways. One example of this is the use of pricing algorithms, which use large datasets on market conditions to set prices.

While these tools can drive innovation and efficiency, they can also raise significant competition concerns. Subsequently, competition authorities around the world are dedicating efforts to understanding how businesses are using AI and, importantly, the potential risks its use may pose to competition.

How AI pricing tools can enhance competition

The use of AI pricing tools offers some clear potential efficiencies for firms, with the potential to reduce costs that can potentially translate into lower prices for consumers.

Take, for instance, industries with highly fluctuating demand, such as airlines or hotels. Algorithms can enable businesses to monitor demand and supply in real time and respond more quickly, which could help firms to respond more effectively to changing consumer preferences. Similarly, in industries which have extensive product ranges, like supermarkets, algorithms can significantly reduce costs and save resources that are usually required to manage pricing strategies across a large range of products.

Furthermore, as pricing algorithms can monitor competitors’ prices, firms can more quickly respond to their rivals. This could promote competition by helping prices to reach the competitive level more quickly, to the benefit of consumers.

How AI pricing tools can undermine competition

However, some of the very features that make algorithms effective can also facilitate anti-competitive behaviour that can harm consumers. In economic terms, collusion occurs when firms co-ordinate their actions to reduce competition, often leading to higher prices. This can happen both explicitly or implicitly. Explicit collusion, commonly referred to as illegal cartels, involves firms agreeing to co-ordinate their prices instead of competing. On the other hand, tacit collusion occurs when firms’ pricing strategies are aligned without a formal agreement.

The ability for these algorithms to monitor competitors’ prices and react to changes quickly could work to facilitate collusion, by learning to avoid price wars to maximise long-term profits. This could result in harm to consumers through sustained higher prices.

Furthermore, there may be additional risks if competitors use the same algorithmic software to set prices. This can facilitate the sharing of confidential information (such as pricing strategies) and, as the algorithms may be able to predict the response of their competitors, can facilitate co-ordination to achieve higher prices to the detriment of consumers.

This situation may resemble what is known as a ‘hub and spoke’ cartel, in which competing firms (the ‘spokes’) use the assistance of another firm at a different level of the supply chain (e.g. a buyer or supplier that acts as a ‘hub’) to help them co-ordinate their actions. In this case, a shared artificial pricing tool can act as the ‘hub’ to enable co-ordination amongst the firms, even without any direct communication between the firms.

In 2015 the CMA investigated a cartel involving two companies, Trod Limited and GB Eye Limited, which were selling posters and frames through Amazon (see linked CMA Press release below). These firms used pricing algorithms, similar to those described above, to monitor and adjust their prices, ensuring that neither undercut the other. In this case, there was also an explicit agreement between the two firms to carry out this strategy.

What does this mean for competition policy?

Detecting collusion has always been a significant challenge for the competition authorities, especially when no formal agreement exists between firms. The adoption of algorithmic pricing adds another layer of complexity to detection of cartels and could raise questions about accountability when algorithms inadvertently facilitate collusion.

In the posters and frames case, the CMA was able to act because one of the firms involved reported the cartel itself. Authorities like the CMA depend heavily on the firms involved to ‘whistle blow’ and report cartel involvement. They incentivise firms to do this through leniency policies that can offer firms reduced penalties or even complete immunity if they provide evidence and co-operate with the investigation. For example, GB eye reported the cartel to the CMA and therefore, under the CMA’s leniency policy, was not fined.

But it’s not all doom and gloom for competition authorities. Developments in Artificial Intelligence could also open doors to improved detection tools, which may have come a long way since the discussion in a blog on this topic several years ago. Competition Authorities around the world are working diligently to expand their understanding of AI and develop effective regulations for these rapidly evolving markets.

Articles

Questions

  1. In what types of markets might it be more likely that artificial intelligence can facilitate collusion?
  2. How could AI pricing tools impact the factors that make collusion more or less sustainable in a market?
  3. What can competition authorities do to prevent AI-assisted collusion taking place?
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The economics of ‘greeniums’ in sustainable finance: doing good has a price

Sustainability has become one of the most pressing issues facing society. Patterns of human production and consumption have become unsustainable. On the environmental front, climate change, land-use change, biodiversity loss and depletion of natural resource are destabilising the Earth’s eco-system.

Furthermore, data on poverty, hunger and lack of healthcare show that many people live below minimum social standards. This has led to greater emphasis being placed on sustainable development: ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (The Brundtland Report, 1987: Ch.2, para. 1).

The financial system has an important role to play in channelling capital in a more sustainable way. Since current models of finance do not consider the welfare of future generations in investment decisions, sustainable finance has been developed to analyse how investment and lending decisions can manage the trade-off inherent in sustainable development: sacrificing return today to enhance the welfare of future generations.

However, some commentators argue that such trade-offs are not required. They suggest that investors can ‘do well by doing good’. In this blog, I will use ‘green’ bonds (debt instruments which finance projects or activities with positive environmental and social impacts) to explain the economics underpinning sustainable finance and show that doing good has a price that sustainable investors need to be prepared to pay.

I will analyse why investors might not be doing so and point to changes which may be required to ensure financial markets channel capital in a way consistent with sustainable development.

The growth of sustainable finance

Sustainable finance has grown rapidly over the past decade as concerns about climate change have intensified. A significant element of this growth has been in global debt markets.

Figure 1 illustrates the rapid growth in the issuance of sustainability-linked debt instruments since 2012. While issuance fell in 2022 due to concerns about rising inflation and interest rates reducing the real return of fixed-income debt securities, it rebounded in 2023 and is on course for record levels in 2024. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

Green bonds are an asset class within sustainability-linked debt. Such bonds focus on financing projects or activities with positive environmental and social impacts. They are typically classified as ‘use-of-proceeds’ or asset-linked bonds, meaning that the proceeds raised from their issuance are earmarked for green projects, such as renewable energy, clean transportation, and sustainable agriculture. Such bonds should be attractive to investors who want a financial return but also want to finance investments with a positive environmental and/or social impact.

One common complaint from commentators and investors is the ‘greenium’ – the price premium investors pay for green bonds over conventional ones. This premium reduces the borrowing costs of the issuers (the ‘counterparties’) compared to those of conventional counterparties. This produces a yield advantage for issuers of green bonds (price and yield have a negative relationship), reducing their borrowing costs compared to issuers of conventional bonds.

An analysis by Amundi in 2023 using data from Bloomberg estimated that the average difference in yield in developed markets was –2.2 basis points (–0.022 percentage points) and the average in emerging markets was –5.6 basis points (–0.056 percentage points). Commentators and investors suggest that the premium is a scarcity issue and once there are sufficient green bonds, the premium over non-sustainable bonds should disappear.

However, from an economics perspective, such interpretations of the greenium ignore some fundamentals of economic valuation and the incentives and penalties through which financial markets will help facilitate more sustainable development. Without the price premium, investors could buy sustainable debt at the same price as unsustainable debt, earn the same financial return (yield) but also achieve environmental and social benefits for future generations too. Re-read that sentence and if it sounds too good to be true, it’s because it is too good to be true.

‘There is no such thing as a free lunch’

In theory, markets are institutional arrangements where demand and supply decisions produce price signals which show where resources are used most productively. Financial markets involve the allocation of financial capital. Traditional economic models of finance ignore sustainability when appraising investment decisions around the allocation of capital. Consequently, such allocations do not tend to be consistent with sustainable development.

In contrast, economic models of sustainable finance do incorporate such impacts of investment decisions and they will be reflected in the valuation, and hence pricing, of financial instruments. Investors, responding to the pricing signals will reallocate capital in a more sustainable manner.

Let’s trace the process. In models of sustainable finance, financial instruments such as green bonds funding investments with positive environmental impacts (such as renewable energy) should be valued more, while instruments funding investments with negative environmental impacts (such as fossil fuels) should be valued less. The prices of the green bonds financing renewable energy projects should rise while the prices of conventional bonds financing fossil-fuel companies should fall.

As this happens, the yield on the green bonds falls, lowering the cost of capital for renewable-energy projects, while yields on the bonds financing fossil-fuel projects rise, ceteris paribus. As with any market, these differential prices act as signals as to where resources should be allocated. In this case, the signals should result in an allocation consistent with sustainable development.

The fundamental point in this economic valuation is that sustainable investors should accept a trade-off. They should pay a premium and receive a lower rate of financial return (yield) for green bonds compared to conventional ones. The difference in price (the greenium), and hence yield, represents the return investors are prepared to sacrifice to improve future generations’ welfare. Investors cannot expect to have the additional welfare benefit for future generations reflected in the return they receive today. That would be double counting. The benefit will accrue to future generations.

A neat way to trace the sacrifice sustainable investors are prepared to make in order to enhance the welfare of future generations is to plot the differences in yields between green bonds and their comparable conventional counterparts. The German government has issued a series of ‘twin’ bonds in recent years. These twins are identical in every respect (coupon, face value, credit risk) except that the proceeds from one will be used for ‘green’ projects only.

Figure 2 shows the difference in yields on a ‘green bond’ and its conventional counterpart, both maturing on 15/8/2050, between June 2021 and July 2024. The yield on the green bond is lower – on average about 2.2 basis points (0.022 percentage points) over the period. This represents the sacrifice in financial return that investors are prepared to trade off for higher environmental and social welfare in the future. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

The yield spread fluctuates through time, reflecting changing perceptions of environmental concerns and hence the changing value that sustainable investors attach to future generations. The spread tends to widen when there are heightened environmental concerns and to narrow when such concerns are not in the news. For example, the spread on the twin German bonds reached a maximum of 0.045 percentage points in November 2021. This coincided with the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow. The spread has narrowed significantly since early 2022 as rising interest rates and falling real rates of return on bonds in the near-term seem to have dominated investors’ concerns.

These data suggest that, rather than being too large, the greeniums are too small. The spreads suggest that markets in debt instruments do not seem to attach much value to future generations. The valuation, price and yield of green bonds are not significantly different from their conventional counterparts. This narrow gap indicates insufficient reward for better sustainability impact and little penalty for worse sustainability impact.

This pattern is repeated across financial markets and does not seem to be stimulating the necessary investment to achieve sustainable development. An estimate of the scale of the deficit in green financing is provided by Bloomberg NEF (2024). While global spending on the green energy transition reached $1.8 trillion in 2023, Bloomberg estimates that $4.8 trillion needs to be invested every year for the remainder of this decade if the world is to remain on track under the ‘net zero’ scenario. Investors do not seem to be prepared to accept the trade-off needed to provide the necessary funds.

Can financial markets deliver sustainable development?

Ultimately, the hope is that all financial instruments will be sustainable. In order to achieve that, access to finance would require all investors to incorporate the welfare of future generations in their investment decisions and accept sacrificing sufficient short-term financial return to ensure long-term sustainable development. Unfortunately, the pricing of green bonds suggests that investors are not prepared to accept the trade-off. This restricts the ability of financial markets to deliver an allocation of resources consistent with sustainable development.

There are several reasons why financial markets may not be valuing the welfare of future generations fully.

  • Bounded rationality means that it is difficult for sustainable investors to assign precise values to future and distant benefits.
  • There are no standardised sustainability metrics available. This produces great uncertainty in the valuation of future welfare.
  • Investors also exhibit cognitive biases, which means they may not value the welfare of future generations properly. These include present bias (favouring immediate rewards) and hyperbolic discounting (valuing the near future more than the distant future).
  • Economic models of financial valuation use discount rates to assess the value of future benefits. Higher discount rates reduce the perceived value of benefits occurring in the distant future. As a result, long-term impacts (such as environmental conservation) may be undervalued.
  • There may be large numbers of investors who are only interested in financial returns and so do not consider the welfare of future generations in their investment decisions.

Consequently, investors need to be educated about the extent of trade-offs required to achieve the necessary investments in sustainable development. Furthermore, practical models which better reflect the welfare of future generations in investment decisions need to be employed. However, challenges persist in fully accounting for future generations and it may need regulatory frameworks to provide appropriate incentives for effective sustainable investment.

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Report

Data

Questions

  1. Using demand and supply analysis, illustrate and explain the impact of sustainable investing on the markets for (i) green bonds and (ii) conventional bonds. Highlight how this should produce an allocation of finance capital consistent with sustainable development.
  2. Research the yields on the twin bonds issued by Germany since this blog was published. Can you identify any association between heightened environmental concerns and the spread between the ‘green’ and conventional bond?
  3. Analyse the issues which prevent financial markets from producing the pricing signals which produce an allocation of resources consistent with sustainable development.
  4. Research some potential regulatory policies which may provide appropriate incentives for sustainable investment.
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Vetting vets

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is proposing to launch a formal Market Investigation into anti-competitive practices in the UK’s £2bn veterinary industry (for pets rather than farm animals or horses). This follows a preliminary investigation which received 56 000 responses from pet owners and vet professionals. These responses reported huge rises in bills for treatment and medicines and corresponding rises in the cost of pet insurance.

At the same time there has been a large increase in concentration in the industry. In 2013, independent vet practices accounted for 89% of the market; today, they account for only around 40%. Over the past 10 years, some 1500 of the UK’s 5000 vet practices had been acquired by six of the largest corporate groups. In many parts of the country, competition is weak; in others, it is non-existent, with just one of these large companies having a monopoly of veterinary services.

This market power has given rise to a number of issues. The CMA identifies the following:

  • Of those practices checked, over 80% had no pricing information online, even for the most basic services. This makes is hard for pet owners to make decisions on treatment.
  • Pet owners potentially overpay for medicines, many of which can be bought online or over the counter in pharmacies at much lower prices, with the pet owners merely needing to know the correct dosage. When medicines require a prescription, often it is not made clear to the owners that they can take a prescription elsewhere, and owners end up paying high prices to buy medicines directly from the vet practice.
  • Even when there are several vet practices in a local area, they are often owned by the same company and hence there is no price competition. The corporate group often retains the original independent name when it acquires the practice and thus is is not clear to pet owners that ownership has changed. They may think there is local competition when there is not.
  • Often the corporate group provides the out-of-hours service, which tends to charge very high prices for emergency services. If there is initially an independent out-of-hours service provider, it may be driven out of business by the corporate owner of day-time services only referring pet owners to its own out-of-hours service.
  • The corporate owners may similarly provide other services, such as specialist referral centres, diagnostic labs, animal hospitals and crematoria. By referring pets only to those services owned by itself, this crowds out independents and provides a barrier to the entry of new independents into these parts of the industry.
  • Large corporate groups have the incentive to act in ways which may further reduce competition and choice and drive up their profits. They may, for example, invest in advanced equipment, allowing them to provide more sophisticated but high-cost treatment. Simpler, lower-cost treatments may not be offered to pet owners.
  • The higher prices in the industry have led to large rises in the cost of pet insurance. These higher insurance costs are made worse by vets steering owners with pet insurance to choosing more expensive treatments for their pets than those without insurance. The Association of British Insurers notes that there has been a large rise in claims attributable to an increasing provision of higher-cost treatments.
  • The industry suffers from acute staff shortages, which cuts down on the availability of services and allows practices to push up prices.
  • Regulation by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) is weak in the area of competition and pricing.

The CMA’s formal investigation will examine the structure of the veterinary industry and the behaviour of the firms in the industry. As the CMA states:

In a well-functioning market, we would expect a range of suppliers to be able to inform consumers of their services and, in turn, consumers would act on the information they receive.

Market failures in the veterinary industry

The CMA’s concerns suggest that the market is not sufficiently competitive, with vet companies holding significant market power. This leads to higher prices for a range of vet services. However, the CMA’s analysis suggests that market failures in the industry extend beyond the simple question of market power and lack of competition.

A crucial market failure is asymmetry of information. The veterinary companies have much better information than pet owners. This is a classic principal–agent problem. The agent, in this case the vet (or vet company), has much better information than the principal, in this case the pet owner. This information can be used to the interests of the vet company, with pet owners being persuaded to purchase more extensive and expensive treatments than they might otherwise choose if they were better informed.

The principal–agent problem also arises in the context of the dependant nature of pets. They are the ones receiving the treatment and, in this context, are the principals. Their owners are the ones acquiring the treatment for them and hence are the pets’ agents. The question is whether the owners will always do the best thing for their pets. This raises philosophical questions of animal rights and whether owners should be required to protect the interests of their pets.

Another information issue is the short-term perspective of many pet owners. They may purchase a young and healthy pet and assume that it will remain so. However, as the pet gets older, it is likely to face increasing health issues, with correspondingly increasing vet bills. But many owners do not consider such future bills when they purchase the pet. They suffer from what behavioural economists call ‘irrational exuberance’. Such exuberance may also occur when the owner of a sick pet is offered expensive treatment. They may over-optimistically assume that the treatment will be totally successful and that their pet will not need further treatment.

Vets cite another information asymmetry. This concerns the costs they face in providing treatment. Many owners are unaware of these costs – costs that include rent, business rates, heating and lighting, staff costs, equipment costs, consumables (such as syringes, dressings, surgical gowns, antiseptic and gloves), VAT, and so on. Many of these costs have risen substantially in recent months and are reflected in the prices pet owners are charged. With people experiencing free health care for themselves from the NHS (or other national provider), this may make them feel that the price of pet health care is excessive.

Then there is the issue of inequality. Pets provide great benefits to many owners and contribute to owners’ well-being. If people on low incomes cannot afford high vet bills, they may either have to forgo having a pet, with the benefits it brings, or incur high vet bills that they ill afford or simply go without treatment for their pets.

Finally, there are the external costs that arise when people abandon their pets with various health conditions. This has been a growing problem, with many people buying pets during lockdown when they worked from home, only to abandon them later when they have had to go back to the office or other workplace. The costs of treating or putting down such pets are born by charities or local authorities.

The CMA is consulting on its proposal to begin a formal Market Investigation. This closes on 11 April. If, in the light of its consultation, the Market Investigation goes ahead, the CMA will later report on its findings and may require the veterinary industry to adopt various measures. These could require vet groups to provide better information to owners, including what lower-cost treatments are available. But given the oligopolistic nature of the industry, it is unlikely to lead to significant reductions in vets bills.

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CMA documents

Questions

  1. How would you establish whether there is an abuse of market power in the veterinary industry?
  2. Explain what is meant by the principal–agent problem. Give some other examples both in economic and non-economic relationships.
  3. What market advantages do large vet companies have over independent vet practices?
  4. How might pet insurance lead to (a) adverse selection; (b) moral hazard? Explain. How might (i) insurance companies and (ii) vets help to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard?
  5. Find out what powers the CMA has to enforce its rulings.
  6. Search for vet prices and compare the prices charged by at least three vet practices. How would you account for the differences or similarities in prices?
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A body blow to Body Shop?

On 12 February, it was announced that The Body Shop UK was entering administration. With 199 shops across the country, if this leads to the collapse of the business, some 2000 jobs will be lost. The business has been struggling since 2020 and poor sales this last Christmas led the new owners, the pan-European alternative investment firm, Aurelius, to appoint administrators.

This could potentially begin an insolvency process that could result in the closure of some or all of the shops. This would spell the end of an iconic brand that, since its founding in 1976, has been associated with natural, ethically sourced and environmentally friendly products. Aurelius has already sold The Body Shop business in most of mainland Europe and in parts of Asia to an unnamed buyer. It is unclear what will happen to the approximately 2800 stores and 8000 employees in 70 countries outside the UK.

Origins of The Body Shop1

The Body Shop was founded in 1976 and shot to fame in the 1980s. It stood for environmental awareness and an ethical approach to business. But its success had as much to do with what it sold as what it stood for. It sold natural cosmetics – Raspberry Ripple Bathing Bubbles and Camomile Shampoo – products that proved immensely popular with consumers.

Its profits increased from a little over £1m in 1985 (€1.7m) to approximately £65m (€77.5m) in 2012. Although profits then slipped, falling to €65.3m in 2014 and €54.8m in 2015, its profit growth in new markets over that same period was 12.4%.

Sales revenue, meanwhile, grew even more dramatically, from £4.9m in 1985 to approximately €967.2m in 2015. By 2015, Body Shop International had over 3100 stores, operating in 61 countries.

What made this success so remarkable is that The Body Shop did virtually no advertising. Its promotion stemmed largely from the activities and environmental campaigning of its founder, Anita Roddick, and the company’s uncompromising claim that it sold only ‘green’ products and conducted its business operations with high ethical standards. It actively supported green causes such as saving whales and protecting rainforests, and it refused to allow its products to be tested on animals. Perhaps most surprising in the world of big business at the time was its high-profile initiative ‘trade not aid’, whereby it claimed to pay ‘fair’ prices for its ingredients, especially those supplied by people in developing countries who were open to exploitation by large companies.

The growth strategy of The Body Shop focused upon developing a distinctive and highly innovative product range, and at the same time identifying these products with major social issues of the day, such as the environment and animal rights.

Its initial expansion was based on a process of franchising, where individuals opened Body Shops which were then supplied by the company with its range of just 19 products. Then, in 1984 the company went public. Following its flotation, the share price rose from just 5p to a high of 370p in 1992.

In the 1990s, however, sales growth was less rapid. By 1998, earnings had collapsed by 90% and the share price fell to 117p. Shareholders forced Anita Roddick to step down as Chief Executive, but for a while she and her husband remained as co-chairs. In 2002, they stepped down as co-chairs, by which time profits had fallen to £20.4m. In 2003 she was awarded in knighthood and became Dame Anita Roddick. Sales then grew rapidly from 2004 to 2006 from €553m to €709m.

Acquisition of The Body Shop by L’Oréal

A dramatic event, however, occurred in 2006 when The Body Shop was sold to the French cosmetics giant, L’Oréal, which was 26% owned by Nestlé, The event resulted in the magazine Ethical Consumer downgrading The Body Shop’s ethical rating from 11 out of 20 to a mere 2.5 and calling for a boycott of the company. Three weeks after the sale, the daily BrandIndex recorded an 11 point drop in The Body Shop’s consumer satisfaction rating from 25 to 14.

There were several reasons for this. L’Oréal’s animal-testing policies conflicted with those of The Body Shop and L’Oréal was accused of being involved in price-fixing with other French perfume houses. L’Oréal’s part-owner, Nestlé, was also subject to various criticisms for ethical misconduct, including promoting formula milk rather than breast milk to mothers with babies in developing countries and using slave labour in cocoa farms in West Africa.

Anita Roddick, however, believed that, by taking over The Body Shop, L’Oréal would develop a more ethical approach to business. Indeed, it did publicly recognise that it needed to develop its ethical and environmental policies.

L’Oréal adopted a new Code of Business Ethics in 2007 and gained some external accreditation for its approach to sustainability and ethics. It was ranked as one of the world’s 100 most ethical companies by Ethisphere in 2007 and, in 2016, it was again part of this list for the seventh time.

L’Oréal set itself three targets as part of its environmental strategy (2005–15), including a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, water consumption and waste per finished product unit. It made a donation of $1.2m to the US Environment Protection Agency to help bring an end to animal testing and, in March 2013, it announced a ‘total ban on the sale in Europe of any cosmetic product that was tested on animals or containing an ingredient that was tested on animals after this date.’ It also promised that ‘By 2020, we will innovate so that 100% of products have an environmental or social benefit.’

Sadly, Anita Roddick died in 2007 and so was not able to witness these changes.

L’Oréal also looked to inject greater finance into the company aimed at improving the marketing of products. In autumn 2006 a transactional website was launched and there have been larger press marketing campaigns. Profits continued to rise in 2006 and 2007, but fell back quite dramatically from €64m in 2007 to €36m in 2008 as recession hit the high streets. They fell by a further 8% in 2009, but significant growth was seen in the following three years: 2010, up 20.3% to €65.3m; 2011, up 4.3% to €68.1m; 2012, up 13.8% to €77.5m.

From L’Oréal to Natura to Aurelius to ?

From 2013, the financial performance of The Body Shop deteriorated. Profits fell by 38% in 2016 to just €34m, with sales falling by 5%. In June 2017, L’Oréal announced that it had agreed to sell The Body Shop for €1bn (£877m) to Natura Cosmeticos, the largest Brazilian cosmetics business. Natura was awarded ‘B Corp’ status in 2014 as it met certain standards for environmental performance, accountability and transparency. In 2019, The Body Shop was separately certified as a B Corp.

Initial indications for The Body Shop under its new owners seemed good, with net revenue rising by 36% in 2018 and 6.3% in 2019. 2020 saw strong growth in sales, with a rise in online sales more than offsetting the effect of store closures during the pandemic. Its market share peaked in 2020 at 1.4%. However, with the cost-of-living crisis following the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many consumers switched to cheaper brands and cheaper outlets, such as Boots and Superdrug, sacrificing environmental and ethical concerns in favour of value for money. As a result, The Body Shop’s market share fell, dropping to 0.8% in 2022 and not picking up in 2023.

This prompted Natura to sell the business to Aurelius. Aurelius hoped to revitalise The Body Shop by promoting its core values and through partnerships or concessions with major retailers, such as John Lewis or Next. However, as we saw above, after a poor Christmas and a weaker capital base and higher cost commitments than initially thought by Aurelius, the new owner filed to put The Body Shop into administration.

What will come of the administration process remains to be seen. Perhaps some of the more profitable stores will be saved; perhaps there will be an expansion of the online business; perhaps partnerships will be sought with major retailers. We shall see.

1 Some of this section is based on Case Study 9.3 from Economics (11th edition).

Videos

Articles

Questions

  1. What assumptions did The Body Shop made about the ‘rational consumer’?
  2. How would you describe the aims of The Body Shop (a) in the early days under Anita Roddick; (b) under L’Oréal; (c) under Aurelius?
  3. How has The Body Shop’s economic performance been affected by its attitudes towards ethical issues?
  4. What has Lush done right that The Body Shop has not?
  5. What will the administrators seek to do?
  6. Find out what has happened to The Body Shop outlets in mainland Europe?
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Unlocking happiness: how jobs shape young lives in developing nations

Have you ever wondered how your job affects your happiness? We all know that not all jobs are created equal. Some are awesome, while others … not so much. Well, it turns out that employment status and the type of work you do can have a big impact on how you feel – especially in developing countries where labour markets are usually tighter and switching between jobs can be more difficult.

A recent study by Carmichael, Darko and Vasilakos (2021) uses survey data from Ethiopia, Peru, India and Vietnam to answer this very question. The study found that the quality of work is a big deal when it comes to how young people feel. Not all jobs are ‘good jobs’ that automatically make you feel great. Although your wellbeing is likely to be higher when you’re in employment than when you’re not, there are certain job attributes that can push that ‘employment premium’ up or down. This is especially important to understand in countries like many in sub-Saharan Africa, where there aren’t many formal jobs, and people often end up overqualified for what they do.

What job attributes lead to higher wellbeing?

What then are the job attributes that are correlated with higher levels of wellbeing? The first is money: Okay, we know money can’t buy happiness, but it can certainly make life easier. We were therefore hardly surprised to find a positive and statistically significant association between hourly earnings and wellbeing.

We were also not surprised to find that a ‘poor working environment’ has a strong and highly significant negative effect on wellbeing.

Finally, feeling proud of your work is also found to be a strongly significant determinant of your wellbeing. After all, people tend to excel in things they like doing, which is probably part of the ‘transmission mechanism’ between ‘work pride’ and ‘subjective wellbeing’.

Which one of these attributes did you think had the greatest effect on wellbeing? Let me guess, many of you will say ‘earnings’. But then you would be wrong. Earnings were indeed positively associated with wellbeing and statistically significant at just about the 10% level, whereas work pride was very strongly statistically significant at the 1% level and had an effect on wellbeing that was four times greater than hourly earnings.

Putting yourself in a poor working environment on the other hand would reduce your wellbeing by almost twice as much as the earnings coefficient.

Policy implications

What does all this mean for policy-makers? If we want to make life better for young people in low-income countries, we need to tackle the problems from multiple angles.

First, young people need to be helped to get the skills they need for the job market. This can be done through things like training programmes and apprenticeships. However, not all of these programmes are created equal. Some have great results, and others not so much.

But that’s not the whole story. In many countries, there’s a massive informal job market. It’s a place where people work but often don’t have the rights or protections that formal employees do. So, even if young people get trained, they might not find the ‘good’ jobs they’re hoping for.

Changes also need to be made on a much bigger scale. This often includes decentralising public investment to include rural areas, improving infrastructure, and encouraging private investment. Strengthening labour market rules and social protection can help too, by making sure that work is safe and fair.

In a nutshell, where you work and what kind of work you do can make a big difference to how you feel.

Conclusions

If policy-makers want to help young people in low-income countries, they need both to give them the skills they require and to create better job opportunities. But policy-makers also need to make bigger changes to the way things work, like boosting production and making sure jobs are safe and fair.

In the end, it’s about making life better for young people around the world. Let’s keep working on it!

Articles

Questions

  1. How does the quality of work impact the happiness and wellbeing of young people in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), and why is this significant in the context of job opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa?
  2. What are some potential solutions and strategies discussed in the article for improving the wellbeing of young people in LMICs, particularly in the context of employment and job opportunities?
  3. Have you ever experienced a job that significantly (positively or negatively) impacted your wellbeing or happiness? Reflect on your experience and how it influenced your overall life satisfaction?
  4. How is AI likely to affect the wellbeing of young professional workers?
  5. How is the pandemic likely to have affected job satisfaction?