We have covered the issue of bank bonuses in previous blogs. See for example: Banking on bonuses? Not for much longer (November 2009); “We want our money back and we’re going to get it” (President Obama) (January 2010); and Payback time (Updated April 2010). But the issue has not been resolved. Despite public outrage around the world over the behaviour of banks that caused the credit crunch and about banks having to be bailed out with ‘taxpayers money’ and, as a result, people facing tax rises and cuts in public-sector services and jobs, bankers’ pay and bonuses are soaring once more. The individuals who caused the global economic crisis seem immune to the effects of their actions. But are things about to change?
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has confirmed tough new guidelines on bank bonuses applying to all banks operating in the EU. The CEBS’s prime purpose in recommending restricting bonuses is to reduce the incentive for excessive and dangerous risk taking. As it states in paragraph 1 of the Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices:
Whilst institutions’ remuneration policies were not the direct cause of this crisis, their drawbacks, nonetheless, contributed to its gravity and scale. It was generally recognized that excessive remuneration in the financial sector fuelled a risk appetite that was disproportionate to the loss-absorption capacity of institutions and of the financial sector as a whole.
The guidelines include deferring 40–60% of bonuses for three to five years; paying a maximum of 50% of bonuses in cash (the remainder having to be in shares); setting a maximum bonus level as a percentage of an individual’s basic pay; appointing remuneration committees that are truly independent; publishing the pay and bonuses of all senior managers and ‘risk takers’. Although they are only recommendations, it is expected that bank regulators across the EU will implement them in full.
So will they be effective in curbing the pay and bonuses of top bank staff? Will they curb excessive risk taking? Or will banks simply find ways around the regulations? The following articles discuss these issues
Articles
Bankers’ bonuses to face strict limits in Europe BBC News, Hugh Pym (10/12/10)
Bankers’ bonuses to face strict limits in Europe BBC News (10/12/10)
Europe set to link banking bonuses to basic salaries The Telegraph, Louise Armitstead (10/12/10)
Some bankers may escape EU cash bonus limit moneycontrol.com (India) (11/12/10)
Banks to sidestep bonus crackdown by raising salaries Guardian, Jill Treanor (10/12/10)
Bonuses: When bank jobs pay Guardian (11/12/10)
Bank bonuses (portal page) Financial Times
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
CEBS home page
CEBS has today published its Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (CP42) CEBS news release (10/12/10)
Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (10/12/10)
Questions
- What are main objectives of the CEBS guidelines?
- Assess the arguments used by the banking industry in criticising the guidelines.
- In what ways can the banks get around these new regulations (assuming the guidelines are accepted by EU banking regulators)?
- What conditions would have to met for a remuneration committee to be truly independent?
- How likely is it that countries outside the EU will adopt similar regulations? How could they be persuaded to do so?
You will probably have come across the concept of consumer sovereignty. In the mythical world of perfect markets, producers are at the beck and call of consumers. Firms that are not responsive to consumer demand go out of business. In other words, in order to survive they have to respond to any shifts in consumer demand. These in turn can be the result of changes in tastes, changes in income, changes in the prices of other goods, and so on.
Of course, the real world is not perfect, but it is still often assumed that consumers are powerful in influencing what firms sell and at what prices. Well, firms would much rather be in a position of manipulating consumer tastes and hence the huge amounts spent on advertising and marketing.
And it doesn’t end there. Firms use many pricing practices which, to put it mildly, try to confuse consumers or lure them into buying things by making them think they are getting something much cheaper than they really are. Take the case of airline tickets. Some budget airlines offer tickets at extremely low prices, such as 99p. But if you select such a flight, by the time you get to the final screen where taxes, charges, supplements, luggage, etc. are added, the price could exceed £100! And ask yourself this, when you buy something with 20% off, or when you buy ‘three for the price of two’ how rational was your decision? Did you really want the product? Was the offer really ‘genuine’?
The Office of Fair Trading has recently completed two investigations into pricing. As it stated 14 months ago when the investigations were launched:
The first, into online targeting of advertising and prices will cover behavioural advertising and customised pricing, where prices are individually tailored using information collected about a consumer’s internet use. It is expected that this study will be completed by spring 2010.
The second, into advertising of prices, will consider various pricing practices which may potentially mislead consumers. The study will look in particular, but not exclusively, at how these practices are used online.
The following articles look at some of the practices that firms use to drive sales – practices that deliberately attempt to manipulate the consumer. The assumption of ‘perfect knowledge’ by consumers may be a long way from the truth.
Articles
Shoppers lose out on ‘billions’ because of ‘deceitful’ marketing The Telegraph, Harry Wallop (2/12/10)
OFT warns retailers about ‘misleading’ price offers BBC News (2/12/10)
OFT cracks down on price gimmicks Guardian, Rebecca Smithers (2/12/10)
We’re all gulled by special offers BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (2/12/10)
OFT publications
OFT warning on misleading pricing practices, OFT Press Release 124/10 (2/12/10)
OFT launches market studies into advertising and pricing practices, OFT Press Release 126/09 (15/10/09)
Advertising of Prices, Office of Fair Trading, OFT1291 (December 2010)
Advertising of Prices, Office of Fair Trading, project page
Advertising of Prices Study Overview, Office of Fair Trading, video
Questions
- Explain each of the different types of pricing practice investigated by the OFT.
- Which of the pricing practices are the most misleading for customers?
- What is meant by ‘invisible price increases’? How can they be used to mislead the consumer?
- Why do certain pricing practices make it hard for the Office for National Statistics to work out the rate of inflation?
- Explain the new framework the OFT is adopting for ‘prioritising enforcement action’.
- If we end up buying something that we didn’t really intend to buy, does this mean that we were being irrational?
- Is advertising generally in or against the interest of consumers? Explain your answer
A two-week international climate change summit opened in Cancún, Mexico, on 29 November. But will the talks make any progress in tackling global warming? Will mechanisms be put in place to ensure that the previously agreed ceiling of 2°C warming is met?
After the largely unsuccessfuly talks in Copenhagen a year ago, hopes are not high. But a likely rise in global temperatures of considerably more than 2°C could have disasterous global consequences. Indeed, new evidence suggests that even a ceiling of 2°C may be too high and that, as temperatures rise towards that level, domino effects will start that may become virtually unstoppable. As Andrew Sims in the Guardian article notes:
This is the problem. Once the planet warms to the point where environmental changes that further add to warming feed off each other, it becomes almost meaningless to specify just how much warmer the planet may get. You’ve toppled the first domino and it becomes virtually impossible to stop the following chain of events. Honestly, nobody really knows exactly where that will end, but they do know it will end very, very badly.
The following podcasts and articles look at the importance of reaching international agreement but the difficulties of doing so.
Podcasts and webcasts
Post-Copenhagen, a Cancun compromise? Reuters (30/11/10)
Climate change ‘Dragons’ Den’: What are the options? BBC News, Roger Harrabin (29/11/10)
Cancun climate change summit seeks new emissions deal BBC News, David Shukman (3/12/10)
Can nudge theory change our habits? BBC News, Claudia Hammond (29/11/10)
Articles
Cancún climate change conference 2010 Guardian, (portal)
Q&A: Cancún COP16 climate talks Guardian, Shiona Tregaskis (8/10/10)
72 months and counting … Guardian, Andrew Simms (1/12/10)
Cancún climate talks: In search of the holy grail of climate change policy Guardian, Michael Jacobs (29/11/10)
Cancún and the new economics of climate change Guardian, Kevin Gallagher and Frank Ackerman (30/11/10)
Facing the consequences The Economist (25/11/10)
UN climate talks low on expectation BBC News, Richard Black (29/11/10)
Expect little from Cancun talks The Star (Malaysia), Martin Khor (29/11/10)
Don’t let us down: UN climate change talks in Cancun Independent, Jonathan Owen and Matt Chorley (28/11/10)
Cancun and Climate: Government Won’t Act, But Business Will Time Magazine: The Curious Capitalist, Zachary Karabell (28/11/10)
At Global Climate Change Talks, an Answer Grows Right Outside Huffington Post, Luis Ubiñas (29/11/10)
Cancun climate change talks: ‘last chance’ in the snakepit The Telegraph, Geoffrey Lean (29/11/10)
Climate Change Talks Must Deliver After Record Weather Year Scoop (New Zealand), Oxfam (29/11/10)
World climate talks kick off in Cancun DW-World, Amanda Price and Axel Rowohlt (29/11/10)
On international equity weights and national decision making on climate change Vox, David Anthoff and Richard S J Tol (29/11/10)
Climate treaties all bluster, no bite The Age, Dan Cass (10/12/10)
Conference website
UNFCCC COP16/CMP6: Mexico 2010 Official site
Questions
- What would count as a ‘successful’ outcome of the climate change talks? Why might politicians interpret this differently from economists?
- What can governments do to internalise the externalities of greenhouse gas emissions?
- What insights can game theory provide into the difficulties of reaching binding climate change agreements?
- What are likely to be the most effective mechanisms for getting people to adapt their behaviour?
- Can nudge theory be used to change our habits towards the environment?
- Explain the use of equity weights in judging the effects of climate change. Are they a practical way forward in devising environmental policy?
In the post of the 17th November, Greece 2: This time it’s Ireland, we looked at the problems of the Irish economy in servicing its debts and whether it would need a bailout. Well, despite protesting that such a bailout would not be necessary, in the end events overtook the Irish government. International loss of confidence forced the government to accept a bailout package. After a weekend of talks, a deal was reached on 28 November between the Irish government, the ECB, the IMF, the European Commission and individual governments.
The deal involves loans totalling €85 billion. Of this, €35 billion will go towards supporting the Irish banking system. The remaining €50 billion will go to supporting government spending. The loans will carry an average interest rate of 5.8%, which is more than the 5.2% on the bailout loans to Greece, but considerably below the rates that Ireland would have to pay on the open market. Being loans, rather than grants, they only delay the problems of dealing with Ireland’s large debt, which has been rising rapidly and is predicted to be around 80% of GDP for 2010 (see Annex Table 62 in OECD Economic Outlook Statistical Annex). They thus provide Ireland with liquidity while it implements policies to reduce its debt.
Ireland itself has contributed €17.5 billion to the loan fund; of the rest, €22.5 billion will come from the IMF, while the European Union and bilateral European lenders, including the UK, Sweden and Denmark, have pledged a total of €45.0 billion, including £3.25 billion from the UK.
One of the main purposes of the loans is to reduce the likelihood of speculation against other relatively highly indebted countries in the EU, such as Portugal, Spain and Italy. The hope is that, by granting Ireland loans, the message would be that similar support would be made available to other countries as necessary. ‘Contagion’ would thereby be halted.
Podcasts and webcasts
Ireland’s €85bn bailout is best deal available, says PM Guardian webcast (29/11/10)
Interview with Jim O’Neill BBC News (29/11/10)
Irish deal ‘better than market rate’BBC Today Programme, Ajai Chopra (29/11/10)
Ireland bailout ‘doesn’t stop pressure building’ BBC Today Programme, Tony Creszenzi and Brian Hayes (29/11/10)
Articles
EU/IMF Irish bailout – the details FT Alphaville, Neil Hume (28/11/10)
Ireland rescue is not a game changer Financial Times, Mohamed El-Erian (29/11/10)
IMF insists Ireland got a ‘good deal’ Irish Times (29/11/10)
Can the eurozone afford its banks? BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (29/11/10)
Irish bailout leaves markets nervous for good reason CNN Business 360, Peter Morici (30/11/10)
Eurozone debt crisis deepens Times of Malta (30/11/10)
Will the Irish crisis spread to Italy? Vox, Paolo Manasse and Giulio Trigilia (29/11/10)
Questions
- Distinguish between liquidity and solvency solutions to sovereign debt problems.
- Is Ireland’s debt problem purely a sovereign one? Explain.
- What will determine whether the bailout for Ireland will halt contagion to other countries?
- Why might the implementation of an austerity package make the sovereign debt problem worse in the short to medium run?
- Will the Irish crisis spread to Italy?
The Paris Club is the name given to the grouping of 19 rich countries which meets in Paris monthly to consider the cancellation or rescheduling of official loans to poor countries (see Sloman Economics 7th edition, pages 784–5). For many of the 40 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), this debt relief has been substantial, with 36 of the HIPCs receiving full or partial cancellation of their debts (see Sloman Economics7th edition, pages 788–90).
On 17 November it was the turn of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Paris Club cancelled 97.6% of the debt owed to its members by the DRC – $7.35 billion. As the Paris Club press statement says:
The representatives of the Paris Club creditor countries and Brazil met with the representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 17 November 2010 and agreed on a reduction of the debt following the DRC having reached its Completion Point under the enhanced initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (enhanced HIPC Initiative) on 1 July 2010.
As a contribution to restoring the DRC’s debt sustainability, the Paris Club creditors will provide a cancellation of USD 7350 million, fulfilling all their commitments under the enhanced HIPC initiative.
However, the Paris Club did have some reservations. These are explored in the articles below.
Articles
Paris Club cancels more than half of DR Congo’s debt International Business Times, Palash R. Ghosh (19/11/10)
Creditors agree Congo debt write-off, flag worries Reuters, Brian Love and Katrina Manson (18/11/10)
Paris Club and Brazil Cancel $7.35 Billion of Congo’s Debt Bloomberg Businessweek, Michael J. Kavanagh (18/11/10)
DR Congo gets US$ 7bn debt cancellation afrol News (18/11/10)
Paris Club Press Release
DRC Paris Club (17/11/10)
Questions
- Explain the process whereby HIPCs receive debt relief.
- What were the reservations expressed by the Paris Club in granting debt relief to the DRC?
- To what extent is there a moral hazard in granting debt relief? Explain.
- What can Paris Club members do to reduce the moral hazard?
- Find out what other debt relief has been given by the Paris Club to HIPCs over the past few months and whether concerns were expressed in those cases.