Tag: Vodafone

In September 2023, UK mobile phone network operators Vodafone and Three (owned by CK Hutchinson) announced their intention to merge. At the time, in terms of total revenue from the supply of mobile phone services to consumers, Vodafone and Three had market shares of 23% and 12%, respectively.

In addition to Vodaphone and Three, there are two other major network operators – the BT Group (BT & EE) and Virgin-media 02, with market shares of around 31% and 23%, respectively, with other operators having a combined market share of 12%. As we shall see below, these other operators use one of the four major networks. Therefore, the merged entity of Vodafone-Three would become the market leader with a share of around 35% and there would only be three major network operators competing in the UK.

Not surprisingly, the UK competition agency, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), decided to conduct a detailed investigation into whether the merger would harm competition. However, in early December 2024 the CMA announced its decision to allow the merger to go ahead, subject to several important commitments by the merging parties.

CMA’s phase 1 findings

The CMAs phase 1 investigation raised several concerns with the merger (see fifth CMA link below).

First, it was worried that retail and business customers would have to pay higher prices for mobile services after the merger.

Second, in addition to the four mobile network operators, the UK market is served by a number of mobile ‘virtual’ network operators (MVNOs), for example Sky Mobile and Lyca Mobile. As we saw above, these suppliers account for around 12% of the consumer retail market. The MVNOs do not own their own networks and instead agree wholesale terms with one of the network operators to access their network and supply their own retail mobile services. The CMA was concerned that since the merger would reduce the number of networks competing to host these MVNOs from four to three, it would result in MVNOs paying higher wholesale access prices.

Vodafone and Three did not offer any remedies to the CMA to address these competition concerns. Consequently, the CMA referred the case to phase 2 for a more thorough investigation.

CMA’s phase 2 findings

The CMA’s analysis in phase 2 confirmed its earlier concerns (see linked report below). It was still worried that because the merged entity would become the largest network operator, retail customers would face higher prices or get a poorer service – for example, a reduced data allowance in their contract. In addition, the CMA remained concerned that the MVNOs would be negatively impacted and that this would lessen their ability to offer the best deals to retail customers.

However, during the phase 2 investigation, the merging parties put forward various efficiency justifications for the merger. They argued that the merger would provide them with much needed scale and investment capacity to improve their network and roll-out 5G technology. The CMA recognised these claims but questioned the merging parties’ incentives to go through with the investment once the merger was approved. Furthermore, it was concerned that if they did invest, this would be funded by raising the prices charged to consumers.

As a result, the CMA only agreed to allow the merger once Vodafone and Three accepted remedies that would address these concerns.

The remedies necessary for the merger to proceed

First, the merged entity must cap a range of tariffs and data plans it offers in the retail market for three years.

Second, again for three years, it must commit to maintain the wholesale contract terms it offers to MNVOs.

Finally, over the next eight years, the merged entity must deliver the network upgrade plans that it claimed the merger would allow. The CMA believes that in the long run this network development would significantly boost competition between the three remaining mobile network operators.

The acceptance of remedies of this nature was unusual for the CMA. Typically, like other competition agencies, the CMA has favoured divestment remedies in which the merging parties are required to sell-off some of the assets or capacity acquired. In contrast, the remedies in the Vodafone-Three deal impact on the merging parties’ behaviour.

One clear disadvantage of such remedies is that they require the merged firm’s actions to be monitored, in this case for eight years, to make sure it adheres to the agreed behaviour. One reason why the CMA may have been willing to accept this is that the communications industries regulator, OFCOM, will be able to assist with this monitoring.

It was also surprising that the CMA was willing to allow the number of network operators to decrease to three. Previously, there had been a perception that it was important to maintain four networks. This was certainly the view in 2016 when Three’s attempted merger with O2 was prohibited. This decision was made by the European Commission (EC). However, the CMA raised serious concerns to the EC and when the merging parties offered behavioural remedies argued that these were:

materially deficient as they will not lead to the creation of a fourth Mobile Network Operator (MNO) capable of competing effectively and in the long-term with the remaining three MNOs such that it would stem the loss of competition caused by the merger.

Why has the authorities’ attitude towards the merger changed?

So why has there been a change of stance in this latest attempted merger in the mobile phone sector?

One explanation is that the market has fundamentally changed over time. The margins for network operators have declined, network usage has grown and there has been a lack of investment in expensive 5G technology. This would certainly fit with the CMA’s desire to use the remedies to facilitate network investment.

A second possible explanation is that the CMA has recently faced criticism from UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer (see third Guardian article below). In a speech at the International Investment Summit in London in October 2024, he said that

We will rip out the bureaucracy that blocks investment and we will make sure that every regulator in this country take growth as seriously as this room does.

In response to this, the CMA has indicated that in 2025 it will review its approach to mergers, ensuring that only truly problematic mergers don’t proceed, and reconsider when behavioural remedies may be appropriate (see final CMA link below).

The CMA’s decision in the Vodafone-Three case certainly demonstrates that it is now willing to accept behavioural remedies when there is a regulator in place to support the subsequent monitoring.

It will be interesting to see how this merger affects competition in the mobile phone market and, more generally, whether the CMA starts to implement behavioural remedies more widely, especially in markets where it would have to do all the subsequent monitoring.

Articles

CMA reports, etc

Questions

  1. Why is it beneficial to have MVNOs in the market for mobile phone services?
  2. Why is it important that MVNOs have a choice of mobile networks to supply their retail mobile services?
  3. How do you think the other mobile network operators will react to the Vodafone-Three merger?
  4. Compare the relative benefits of blocking a merger with requiring merging companies to adopt certain remedies.

Vodafone has offered to purchase Cable & Wireless Worldwide (C&WW), with Vodafone paying 38p per share, making this deal worth £1.044bn.

This deal, however, was rejected by C&WW’s largest shareholder, Orbis, within hours, as the price was not high enough, despite the 38p per share offer representing a 92% premium to the level of C&WW’s share price before the bid interest emerged in February. A spokesperson for Orbis said:

‘Although we believe the C&WW management team has handled the bid process responsibly, we have declined to give an irrevocable undertaking or letter of intent to the support the transaction.’

However, with the only other interested party, Tata Communications withdrawing, Vodafone was the only remaining bidder. As such, many suggest that this deal is a good one for the struggling business, despite Orbis’ claim that it under-values the business.

Adding a UK fixed-line cable to Vodafone’s business will increase its capacity, which is much needed at this moment in time with the added demand for mobile data from increased Smartphone usage. Cost savings are also expected from this merger, as the company will no longer have to pay to other companies to lease its fixed-line capacity.

The bid from Vodafone did help C&WW’s trading performance, which had been worsening for some time and so some shareholders will be glad of the bid. Its shares were up following this deal and it went to the top of the FTSE250. Vodafone will also benefit, as this merger would make it the second largest combined fixed and mobile line operator in the UK.

The trends of these two companies in recent years have been very much in contrast. C&WW had been the larger of the two firms up until 1999, yet the price Vodafone would now pay for the company represents a mere 1% of its current market value. The following articles consider this merger.

Vodafone bids for Cable and Wireless: The end of the line The Economist (24/4/12)
Questor shares tip: Vodafone deal looks goodThe Telegraph, Garry White(23/4/12)
Vodafone puts paid to once-revered C&WW Financial Times, Daniel Thomas (23/4/12)
Top CWW shareholder rejects sale to Vodafone Independent, Gideon Spanier (24/4/12)
CWW accepting Vodafone’s £1bn bid is a good call The Telegraph, Alistair Osborne (23/4/12)
Vodafone agrees £1bn deal for Cable & Wireless Worldwide Guardian, Julia Kollewe and Juliette Garside (23/4/12)
Vodafone agrees £1bn takeover of C&W Worldwide BBC News (23/4/12)

Questions

  1. Into which market structure would you place the above industry? Explain your answer.
  2. Which factors have caused C&WW’s worsening position? In each case, explain whether they are internal or external influences.
  3. What type of merger is that between C&WW and Vodafone?
  4. Explain some of the motives behind this merger.
  5. Which factors have caused these two companies to have such different trading performances in the last 15 years?
  6. Why was the announcement of the bid followed by better share prices for C&WW?
  7. Is there any reason why the competition authorities should be concerned about this merger?