The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has been investigating road fuel pricing in the UK. In July 2022, it launched a study into the development of the road-fuel market over recent years. The final report of this study was published in July 2023 and covered the refining, wholesale and retail elements of the market.
In the retail part of the market, the CMA noted some potential causes for concern: retailer fuel margins had increased; there were geographical variations in pricing; filling stations with fewer competitors tended to charge higher prices; retail prices tended to rise rapidly when oil prices increased but fell slowly when oil prices fell (known as ‘rocket and feather’ pricing patterns); motorway service stations charged considerably higher prices than supermarkets or other filling stations.
In response to these findings, the CMA has been publishing an interim report every four months. These reports give average pump prices and margins. They also give relative average pump prices between different types of retailer, and between each of the supermarkets.
The latest interim report was published on 26 July 2024. It reiterated the finding of the 2023 report that the fuel market has become less competitive since 2019. What is more, it continues to be so. In particular, the range of retail prices and the level of retail margins remain high compared to historic levels. The interim report estimates that ‘the increase in retailers’ fuel margins compared to 2019 resulted in increased fuel costs for drivers in 2023 of over £1.6bn’.
Price leadership
Road fuel retailing is an oligopoly, with the major companies being the big supermarkets, the retail arms of oil companies (such as Shell, BP, Esso and Texaco, operating their own filling stations) and a few large specialist companies, such as the Motor Fuel Group (MFG), the EG Group and Rontec, whose filling stations sell one or other of the main brands. But although it is an oligopoly producing a homogeneous product, it is not a cartel (unlike OPEC). Nevertheless, there has been a high degree of tacit collusion in the market with price competition limited to certain rules of behaviour in particular locations. A familiar one is setting prices ending in .9 of a penny (e.g. 142.9p), with the acceptance by competitors that Applegreen will set it ending at .8 of a penny and Asda at .7 of a penny.
One of the main forms of tacit collusion in areas where there are several filling stations is that of price leadership. Asda, and in some areas Morrisons, have been price leaders, setting the lowest price for that area, with other filling stations setting the price at or slightly above that level (e.g. 0.2p, 1.2p or 2.2p higher). Indeed, other major retailers, such as Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Esso and Shell took a relatively passive approach to pricing, unwilling to undercut Asda and accept lower profit margins.
Things changed after 2019. Asda chose to increase its profit margins. In 2022 it did this by reducing prices more slowly than would previously have been the case as wholesale prices fell. In other words, it used price feathering. Other big retailers might have been expected to use the opportunity to undercut Asda. Instead, they decided to increase their own margins by following a similar pricing path. The result was a 6 pence per litre increase in the average supermarket fuel margin from 2019 to 2022.
More recently, Asda has increased its margins more than other major retailers, making it no longer the price leader. The effect has been to put less pressure on other retailers to trim their now higher profit margins.
Remedies
The 2023 CMA report made two specific recommendations to deal with this rise in profit margins.
The first was that the CMA should be given a statutory monitoring function over the fuel market to ‘hold the industry to account’. In May this year, legislation was passed to this effect. This requires the CMA to monitor the industry and report anti-competitive practice to the government.
The second was to introduce a new statutory ‘open data real-time fuel finder scheme’. This would give motorists access to live, station-by-station fuel prices.
Several major retailers already contribute to a voluntary price data sharing scheme. However, this covers only around 40% of UK forecourts. According to the CMA, it ‘falls well short of the comprehensive, real-time, station-by station data needed to empower motorists and drive competition’. The CMA has thus called on the new Labour government to introduce legislation to make its recommended system compulsory. This, it is hoped, would make the retail fuel market much more competitive by improving consumer information about prices at alternative filling stations in their area.
Articles
CMA reports
Questions
- What forms can tacit collusion take?
- Why are fuel prices at motorway service stations so much higher than in towns? What is the relevance of the price elasticity of demand to the answer?
- What are the main findings of the CMA’s July 2024 Interim Report
- What is meant by rocket and feather pricing?
- What recommendations does the CMA make for increasing competition in the retail road fuel market?
- Find out how competitive retail fuel pricing is in two other developed countries. Why are they more or less competitive than the UK?
In an earlier post, Elizabeth looked at oligopolistic competition between supermarkets. Although supermarkets have been accused of tacit price collusion on many occasions in the past, price competition has been growing. And recent developments show that it is likely to get a lot fiercer as the ‘big four’ try to take on the ‘deep discounters’, Aldi and Lidl.
Part of the reason for the growth in price competition has been a change in shopping behaviour. Rather than doing one big shop per week in Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda or Morrisons, many consumers are doing smaller shops as they seek to get more for their money. A pattern is emerging for many consumers who are getting their essentials in Aldi or Lidl, their ‘special’ items in more upmarket shops, such as Waitrose, Marks & Spencer or small high street shops (such as bakers and ethnic food shops) and getting much fewer products from the big four. Other consumers, on limited incomes, who have seen their real incomes fall as prices have risen faster than wages, are doing virtually all their shopping in the deep discounters. As the Guardian article below states:
A steely focus on price and simplicity, against a backdrop of falling living standards that has sharpened customers’ eye for a bargain, has seen the discounter grab market share from competitors and transform what we expect from our weekly shop.
The result is that the big four are seeing their market share falling, as the chart shows. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) In the past year, Tesco’s market share has fallen from 29.9% to 28.1%, Asda’s from 17.8% to 16.3%, Sainsbury’s from 16.9% to 16.2% and Morrisons’ from 11.7% to 11.0%. By contrast, Aldi’s has risen from 3.9% to 5.4% and Lidl’s from 3.1% to 4.0%, while Waitrose’s has also risen, from 4.7% to 4.9%. And it’s not just market share that has been falling for the big four. Profits have also fallen, as have share prices. Sales revenues in the four weeks to 13 September are down 1.6% on the same period a year ago; sales volumes are down 1.9%.
But can the big four take on the discounters at their own game? Morrison’s has just announced a form of price match scheme called ‘Match & More’. If a shopper finds that a comparable grocery shop is cheaper in not only Tesco, Sainsbury’s or Asda, but also in Aldi or Lidl, then ‘Match & More users will automatically get the difference back in points on their card. Shoppers also will be able to collect extra points on hundreds of featured products and fuel’. When the difference has risen to a total £5 (5000 points), the shopper will get a £5 voucher at the till. The idea is to encourage customers to stay loyal to Morrisons.
But what if Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury’s do the same? What will be the impact on their prices and profits. Will there be a race to the bottom in prices, or will they be able to keep prices higher than the deep discounters, hoping that many customers will not cash in their vouchers?
But if effectively the big four felt forced to cut their prices to match Aldi and Lidl, could they afford to do so? This depends on their comparative average costs. At first sight, it might be thought that the big four could succeed in profitably matching the discounters, thereby clawing back market share. After all, they are much bigger and it might be thought that they would benefit from greater economies of scale and hence lower costs.
But it is not as simple as this. The discounters have lower costs than the big four. Their shops are typically in areas where rents or land prices are lower; their shops are smaller; they carry many fewer lines and thus gain economies of scale on each line; they have a much higher proportion of own-brand products; products are displayed in the boxes they come in, thus saving on the staff costs of unpacking them and placing them on shelves; they buy what is cheapest and thus do not always display the same brands.
So is Morrison’s a wise strategy? Will other supermarkets be forced to follow? Is there a prisoners’ dilemma here and, if so, is there any form of collusion in which the big four can engage which is not illegal? Can the big four differentiate themselves from the discounters and the up-market supermarkets in ways that will attract back customers?
It is worrying times for the big four.
Articles
- Heavy Discounters Up Pressure On The UK’s Big Four Supermarkets
Alliance News, Rowena Harris-Doughty (3/6/14)
- Tesco loses more market share as supermarket sector slows to record low
CITY A.M., Catherine Neilan (23/9/14)
- Record low for grocery market growth as inflation disappears
Kantar World Panel, Fraser McKevitt (23/9/14)
- How Aldi’s price plan shook up Tesco, Morrison’s, Asda and Sainsbury’s
The Guardian, Sarah Butler (29/9/14)
- Sainsbury’s shares drop 7% on falling sales report
BBC News (1/10/14)
- Sainsbury results: the reaction
Food Manufacture, Mike Stones (3/10/14)
- Morrisons Becomes First Of Big Four Grocers To Price Match Aldi, Lidl
Alliance News, Rowena Harris-Doughty (2/10/14)
- UK: Morrisons Takes On Discounters With Price Match Card
KamCity (3/10/14)
- Morrisons to match the prices of Aldi and Lidl
The Telegraph, Graham Ruddick (2/10/14)
- Three reasons why Morrisons price-matching Aldi and Lidl is not a ‘gamechanger’
The Telegraph, Graham Ruddick (2/10/14)
Questions
- Would it be possible for the big four to price match the deep discounters?
- What is meant by the prisoners’ dilemma? In what ways are the big four in a prisoners’ dilemma situation?
- Assume that you had to advise Tesco on it strategy? What advise would you give it and why?
- Assume that two firms, M and A, are playing the following ‘game’: firm M pledges to match firm A’s prices; and firm A pledges to sell at 2% below M’s price. What will be the outcome of this game?
- Is Morrisons wise to adopt its ‘Match & More’ strategy?
- Why is it difficult for Morrisons to make a like-for-like comparison with Aldi and Lidl in its ‘Match & More’ strategy?
- Why may Aldi and Lidl benefit from Morrisons’ strategy?
Families in the UK seemed to have been squeezed in all areas. With incomes flat, inflation rising, petrol and bills high, there seems to be a never ending cycle of price rises without the corresponding increase in incomes. This has been confirmed by the latest figures released from the big six energy companies, whose profit margins have risen from £15 per customer in June to £125 per customer per year. This is assuming that prices remain the same for the coming year.
The regulator, Ofgem has said that profit margins will fall by next year and that they are ensuring that price comparisons between the big energy companies become much easier to allow consumers to shop around. It is a competitive market and yet due to tariffs being so complicated to understand, many consumers are simply unable to determine which company is offering them the best deal. There is certainly not perfect knowledge in this market. Tim Yeo, the Chair of the Energy and Climate Change Committee said the profit margins were:
‘Evidence of absolutely crass behaviour by the energy companies, with a jump in prices announced in the last few months ahead of what will be a winter in which most families face their highest ever electricity and gas bills’
Ofgem will publish proposals later this year with suggestions of how to make the market more competitive. We have already seen in the blog “An energetic escape?” how Ofgem is hoping to reduce the power of the big six by forcing them to auction off some of the electricity they generate. The aim is to free up the market and allow more firms to enter. With the winter fast approaching and based on the past 2 years of snow and cold weather, it is no wonder that households are concerned with finding the best deals in a bid to reduce just one of their bills. The following articles consider this issue.
Energy price hikes see profits soar The Press Association (14/10/11)
Energy suppliers’ profit margins eight times higher, says regulator Ofgem Telegraph (14/10/11)
Energy firms’ profit margins soar, Ofgem says BBC News (14/10/11)
Energy firms’ profits per customer rise 733%, says Ofgem Guardian, Dan Milmo and Lisa Bachelor (14/10/11)
Regulator proposes radical change to energy market Associated Press (14/10/11)
Energy bills face overhaul in first wave of reform Reuters, Paul Hoskins (14/10/11)
Ofgem tells energy companies to simplify tariffs Financial Times, Michael Kavanagh (14/10/11)
You can’t shop around in an oligopoly Financial Times, William Murray (13/10/11)
Questions
- What type of market structure best describes the energy market?
- Of the actions being taken by Ofgem, which do you think will have the largest effect on competition in the market?
- Are there any other reforms you think would be beneficial for competition?
- Why is transparency so important in a market?
- What barriers to entry are there for potential competitors in the energy market?
- Why do you think profit margins are so high in this sector?
The outbreak of E. Coli has already cost lives, but it is also costing livelihoods of farmers who rely on producing and selling agricultural produce. Immediately following the outbreak in Germany, the blame was put on Spanish producers of cucumbers, which lead to the destruction of tens of thousands of kilos of fresh produce, costing Spain an estimated £177m per week in sales. Although Spain is not the source of the outbreak, the problem has not disappeared and will now affect the whole of Europe: at least until the source is identified. Countries such as Spain, France and Germany are big exporters to Russia and these countries are likely to take a big hit with the Russian health service banning imports of EU vegetables. The impact of this action (together with other countries implementing similar strategies) has not only affected agricultural producers, but is also having wider impacts on other sectors, including transportation. If no-one wants to buy the products, there’s very little use for the companies and indeed drivers to deliver them.
The Spanish economy will be looking for compensation from Germany for the losses they incurred, when sales of fruit and vegetables practically ceased following Germany’s initial accusation. As the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero said:
“We acted as we had to, and we are going to get reparations and the return of Spanish products to their rightful place. … I believe that any other interpretation or any effort to politicise the huge mistake made by the German authorities is totally unfair.”
The effects of this outbreak have spread to UK supermarkets and producers. The former have reported a slight drop in sales of fruit and vegetables, but have not taken this opportunity to drop the prices paid to British growers, which is particularly important for cucumber producers, given the high production costs. Sarah Pettitt of the National Farmers Union said she was ‘extremely encouraged to hear that the major supermarkets … are not using this unfortunate situation as an excuse to drop prices to British growers.’ In fact some believe that the outbreak could be good for UK producers, as consumers increasingly turn to home-produced products. While the source of the outbreak remains unknown, so does the future of agricultural producers throughout Europe, as well as all those that have any dependence on this huge industry.
E. Coli outbreak: UK cases rise to 11 BBC News (4/6/11)
E coli source hunted as growers fear sales slump Guardian, Robin McKie (4/6/11)
Farmers reel as outbreak hits demand Financial Times, Matt Steinglass and Victor Mallet (3/6/11)
Spain seeks compensation for E. Coli blame BBC News (3/6/11)
E.Coli: Economic impact on the agriculture industry BBC News, Richard Anderson (3/6/11)
Spain says Germany mulls EU aid over cucumber slur Associated Press (3/6/11)
Rose Prince: Cucumbers, diet and Prof Moth Telegraph, Rose Prince (4/6/11)
Questions
- Why have cucumber producers been experiencing falling profit margins in recent years?
- Could the outbreak of E Coli bring any benefits to the UK economy?
- What are the costs and benefits to Russian consumers and producers from the protectionists measures that have been imposed on EU imports of fruit and vegetables?
- Which sectors within the European market are likely to experience the biggest problems?
- Explain why the Chairman of the National Farmers Union was ‘encouraged to hear that the major supermarkets … are not using this unfortunate situation as an excuse to drop prices to British growers’. Why would supermarkets have an incentive to do this?