Following the controversary over the sale of tickets for popular live events such as Taylor Swift’s Eras tour and the Oasis Live ’25 Tour, the government launched a consultation exercise in January 2025 on the resale of tickets. Titled, ‘putting fans first’, the exercise sought the views of individuals and organisations on a range of policy proposals. One of these was the implementation of a cap on the resale price of tickets.
The government is not only considering whether to implement a cap but also the level at which it might be set. The following question was included in the consultation exercise.
What is the maximum uplift that you think should be applied if ticket resales were to be subject to a price cap? Please state the reason for your selection.
• no uplift at all
• 10% or less
• between 10 and 20%
• between 20 and 30%
• other – please state
Some platforms such as Twickets and Ticketswap already cap resale prices on their platforms at between 5 and 10 per cent above the face value of the ticket. They are, therefore, less likely to be affected by any new price regulation unless the ‘no uplift at all’ option is chosen. On other platforms, such as Viagogo and Stubhub, resellers are free to list tickets at whatever price they choose. This is often referred to as the uncapped market, and tickets for the Oasis tour with a face value of £150 were listed on these websites for £14 000. The implementation of a price cap is likely to have a big impact on this part of the resale market. The chief executive of StubHub stated in June 2025 that the business would probably have to exit the UK if a cap was introduced.
Although many fans dislike the uncapped secondary ticketing market, most economists take a more positive view. They see them as a way of facilitating mutually beneficial trade and helping to reallocate tickets to those with the highest willingness to pay. This reduces levels of allocative inefficiency/deadweight welfare loss in the market.
Economists also tend to argue against the use of price controls in competitive markets because of their negative impact on supply. If price controls reduce the available returns to sellers, they have an incentive to do something else with their time/resources i.e. switch to supplying other goods and services in markets not subject to price controls. This reduces supply in the regulated market and so could have a negative impact on consumer surplus.
What are the issues with the secondary market?
Given the benefits outlined by economists of having an uncapped secondary ticketing, why is the government considering the implementation of a price cap? One potential issue of having an uncapped secondary ticketing market is that developments in technology make it easier for professional resellers to buy very large quantities of tickets. This makes it increasingly difficult for fans who want to attend the event from being able to purchase a ticket.
Reports also suggest that professional resellers use illegal methods to both mass purchase and resell tickets. For example, to overcome any limits on sales imposed by the sellers in the primary market, some use automated software, fake IDs and multiple credit cards. Two people convicted of fraudulent trading in 2024 were found to have bought 47 000 tickets over a 212-year period, using 127 names and 187 different e-mail addresses.
Some resellers have also acted in ways that do not comply with consumer law when advertising tickets for sale. For example, not providing information such as the ticket number and other details about where the seat is located i.e. the block/area and row.
These rent seeking activities by professional resellers could outweigh the positive impact of uncapped secondary market on allocative efficiency.
Implementing a resale price cap would reduce the incentives for professional resellers to purchase large quantities of tickets and engage in these rent-seeking activities. However, in the consultation document the government recognises that the implementation of a resale price cap would be a ‘significant and complex intervention’.
An important implementation issue
To calculate the resale price cap for any live event, the original price of the ticket in the primary market needs to be known. This raises an interesting question – should the cap apply to the initial face value of the ticket or the total price the customer pays?
The face value of the ticket may only represent a proportion of the actual cost of buying a ticket because of the widespread use of drip pricing. This is the practice of applying additional fees as the consumer proceeds through the online purchasing process. These fees can sometimes add around 25 per cent and more to the price of a ticket. In the consultation document, the government suggested that the cap should apply to the face value of the ticket plus all compulsory fees.
One issue raised in the response to the consultation by the Competition and Markets Authority is that these fees are not always made clear by sellers in the primary market in a clear and transparent way. Therefore, for the policy to be effective, primary market sellers would have to make information on both ticket prices and any fees clearly and easily available. Recent changes to the law that prohibit drip pricing might help to address this issue.
The potential impact of a resale price cap on fraud
To avoid the price cap, there is a danger that increasing numbers of buyers and sellers stop using capped secondary ticket platforms, where activity is easier to observe/regulate, and switch to other non-specialist platforms where detection of illegal behaviour and enforcement of consumer law is more difficult. Examples of non-specialist platforms where sales might increasingly take place include Facebook Marketplace, Instagram Shop, X (formerly Twitter) and internet forums. With lower levels of consumer protection and the greater difficulty of detecting illegal behaviour, sales via these non-specialist platforms are more vulnerable to scams and fraud.
When referring to the impact of a resale price cap, the chief executive of StubHub argued that:
It will have a massive negative impact on consumers. It’s not like the demand is going to go away, it’s just going to move somewhere else, and that somewhere else is going to be the black market [where] consumers aren’t protected.
To test the hypothesis that price controls lead to greater incidences of fraud, one study used polling data to compare ticket fraud rates in the UK with Victoria, Australia and Ireland. In 2009, the state government of Victoria made it illegal for tickets to be resold for more than 10 per cent of their face, while the Irish government introduced the Sale of Ticket Act in 2021 that prohibited the resale of tickets above their original price. The study found that the proportion of respondents who reported being victims of ticket fraud over the previous two years was around four times higher in Victoria and Ireland than the UK. The most common sales channel where consumers experienced ticket fraud in all three countries were social media platforms.
Another example of the potential impact of the price cap in Ireland on fraud relates to the first ever regular-season NFL game that is being played in Dublin on 28 September 2025 between the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Minnesota Vikings. The online bank, Revolut, reported an 80 per cent increase in the number of ticket scams when tickets for this game went on sale.
In response to the consultation exercise, the Competition and Markets Authority backed the implementation of a resale price. It will be interesting to see if the government goes through with the measure in the next few months.
Consultation
Articles
Blogs on this site
Questions
- Why might event organisers set ticket prices below the market clearing rate? Illustrate the impact of setting prices below market clearing rates on consumer, producer and total surplus in the primary market for tickets.
- Using a demand and supply diagram, explain how the uncapped secondary ticket market could reduce deadweight welfare loss. Discuss any assumptions you have made about the allocation of tickets among potential buyers in the primary market (i.e. sorting).
- Is it possible for professional resellers to continue making a profit if tickets are sold at market clearing rates in the primary market? Explain your answer.
- Under what circumstances would a maximum price set below the market clearing rate in a competitive market have a negative impact on consumer surplus? Draw a diagram to illustrate your answer.
- Using examples, explain what is meant by ‘rent seeking’ in economic theory.
Outline some of the recent updates to the law on pricing information that businesses must show customers.
- What policies, other than a resale price cap, could the government introduce to try to address some of the issues with the ticketing market for live events?
In an apparent U-turn, the Chancellor, George Osborne, has decided to cap the interest rates and other charges on payday loans and other short-term credit. As we have seen in previous news items, the sky-high interest rates which some of the poorest people in the UK are being forced to pay on these loans have caused outrage in many quarters: see A payday enquiry and Kostas Economides and the Archbishop of Canterbury. Indeed, the payday loan industry has been referred by the OFT to the Competition Commission (CC). The CC is required to report by 26 June 2015, although it will aim to complete the investigation in a shorter period.
It was becoming increasingly clear, however, that the government would not wait until the CC reports. It has been under intense pressure to take action. But the announcement on 25 November 2013 that the government would cap the costs of payday loans took many people by surprise. In fact, the new body, the Financial Conduct Authority, which is due to start regulating the industry in April 2014, only a month ago said that capping was very intrusive, arguing that it could make it harder for many people to borrow and push them into the hands of loan sharks. According to paragraph 6.71 of its consultation paper, Detailed proposals for the FCA regime for consumer credit:
The benefits of a total cost of credit cap has been looked at by the Personal Finance Research Centre at the University of Bristol. This report highlighted that 17 EU member states have some form of price restriction. Their research was ambiguous, on the one hand suggesting possible improved lending criteria and risk assessments. On the other, prices may drift towards a cap, which could lead to prices increasing or lead to a significant reduction in lenders exercising forbearance. Neither of these latter outcomes would be beneficial for consumers. Clearly this is a very intrusive proposition and to ensure we fully understand the implications we have committed to undertake further research once we begin regulating credit firms and therefore have access to regulatory data.
The government announcement has raised questions of how imperfections in markets should be dealt with. Many on the centre right argue that price controls should not be used as they can further distort the market. 
Indeed, the Chancellor has criticised the Labour Party’s proposal to freeze gas and electricity prices for 20 months if it wins the next election, arguing that the energy companies will simply get around the freeze by substantially raising their prices before and after the 20 months.
Instead, those on the centre right argue that intervention should aim to make markets more competitive. In other words, you should attempt not to replace markets, but to make them work better.
So what is the reasoning of the government in capping payday loan charges? Does it feel that, in this case, there is no other way? Or is the reasoning political? Does it feel that this is the most electorally advantageous way of answering the critics of the payday loan industry?
Webcasts and podcasts
Payday Loans To Be Capped By Government Sky News (25/11/13)
New law to cap cost of payday loans BBC News, Robert Hall (25/11/13)
Osborne: ‘Overall cost’ of payday loans to be capped BBC Today Programme (25/11/13)
George Osborne announces cap on payday loan charges amid concerns ITV News (25/11/13)
Articles
UK to cap payday lenders’ interest charges Reuters, Steve Slater, Paul Sandle, Kate Holton and William James (25/11/13)
Capping payday loans: from light touch to strong arm Channel 4 News, Faisal Islam (25/11/13)
Payday loans: New law to cap costs BBC News (25/11/13)
Payday loan ‘risk to mortgage applications’ BBC News (26/11/13)
Q&A: Payday loans BBC News (25/11/13)
George Osborne is playing social democratic catch-up on payday loans The Guardian, Larry Elliott (25/11/13_
Payday loans cap: George Osborne caves in following intervention led by Archbishop of Canterbury Independent, Oliver Wright (25/11/13)
The principle, the practice and the politics of fixing payday loan prices: why? And why now? Conservative Home, Mark Wallace (25/11/13)
George Osborne and the risky politics of chutzpah New Statesman, Rafael Behr (26/11/13)
Chancellor too quick off the mark on payday lending cap The Telegraph, James Quinn (25/11/13)
Crap and courage of convictions: the political problem with Osborne’s payday loan plan Spectator, Isabel Hardman (26/11/13)
Payday loan calculator
Payday loan calculator: how monthly interest can spiral BBC Consumer (7/11/13)
Questions
- What types of market failing exist in the payday loan industry?
- What types of controls of the industry are being proposed by George Osborne?
- What is the experience of Australia in introducing such controls?
- What alternative forms of intervention could be used to tackle the market imperfections in the industry?
- What were the proposals of the FCA? (See paragraph 6.6 in its document, Detailed proposals for the FCA regime for consumer credit.)
- According to a representative example on Wonga’s website, a loan of £150 for 18 days would result in charges of £33.49 (interest of £27.99 and a fee of £5.50). This would equate to an annual APR of 5853%. Explain how this APR is calculated.
- The proposal is to allow a relatively large upfront fee and to cap interest rates at a relatively low level, such as 4% per month, as is the case in Australia. Explain the following comment about this in the Faisal Islam article above: “The upfront fee, in theory, should change the behavioural finance of consumers around taking the loan in the first place (there are ways around this though). So this is an intervention based not on lack of competition, but asymmetries of information in consumer finance.”
- Comment on the following statement by Mark Wallace in the Conservative Home article above: “If overpriced payday loans should be capped, why not overpriced DVDs, sandwiches or, er, energy bills?”
- Compare the relative advantages and disadvantages of George Osborne’s proposal with that of Justin Welby, the Archbishop of Canterbury (see the news item, Kostas Economides and the Archbishop of Canterbury).
A remarkable event took place in Venezuela on Friday 8th November. Soldiers, on the orders of the president, temporarily occupied a chain of shops run by a leading electrical retailer called Dakar. The shops were forced to cut the prices of their electrical appliances and five managers were arrested and accused of ‘hiking up’ prices.
Unsurprisingly, news of these lower prices spread very quickly and long queues rapidly appeared outside the stores as people hoped to buy plasma televisions, fridges and washing machines at bargain prices. On Sunday 9th November, the president, Nicolas Maduro, gave a televised address in which he condemned the owners of the stores and announced that he was going to ask the National Assembly to grant him extra powers so that he could extend price controls to all consumer goods. He stated that he would next turn his attention to stores selling toys, cars, textiles and shoes.
The use of price controls in Venezuela is not new and dates back to 2003 when they were first introduced by the then president Hugo Chavez. Initially the regulations were imposed on various foods and basic goods. For example, by 2009 maximum prices had been set for cooking oil, white rice, sugar, coffee, flour, margarine, pasta and cheese. Businesses often complained that the maximum prices set by the government were below the costs of production. For example after a maximum price of 2.15 Bolivares was placed on a kilo of rice, producers argued that the cost of producing a kilo of rice was 4.41 Bolivares.
The impact of the maximum prices in Venezuela appears to have been exactly what the theories in the economics textbooks would have predicted – shortages, long queues of people waiting outside shops and a flourishing black market. An article on the shortage of toilet rolls has been discussed in a previous article on this news site: Shortages in Venezuela- what’s the solution? However this has not stopped the Venezuelan government extending the scheme and increasing the number of products that have maximum prices imposed on them. In 2011 Hugo Chavez argued that the policy was required because:
The market has…become a perverse mechanism where big monopolies, the big trans-nationals and the bourgeoise dominate and ransack the people.
Economics textbooks often include some analysis of the impact of price ceilings on a competitive market. The effects on consumer surplus, producer surplus and deadweight welfare are usually discussed. However the potential administrative costs are rarely considered. The Venezuelan case helps to illustrate how in practise these costs could be quite significant.
For example, in April 2012 price controls in Venezuela were extended to a range of 19 products including fruit juice, toilet paper, nappies, soap, detergent, deodorant, toothpaste, baby food, floor polish, mineral water and razor blades. This caused a reduction in prices of between 4% and 25%. However this did not simply mean setting 19 different maximum prices because the goods were all sold in different quantities or different package sizes. For example a tube of toothpaste could be purchased in 4 different sizes – 50ml, 75ml, 100ml and 150 ml. Therefore officials had to set 4 different figures. Nappies were sold in 12 different package sizes ranging from10 nappies/packet to78 nappies/packet. Once again this meant that the administrators had to set 10 different maximum prices just for nappies. In total across the 19 products government officials had to set prices for 616 different individual items!! Companies were given just one month to adjust to the new legislation.
Whenever maximum prices are imposed on a competitive market both frustrated buyers and sellers have an incentive to evade them and trade illegally. Therefore the government established a number of organisations in an attempt to make sure the prices were enforced. One agency is called The National Superintendency of Fair Costs and Prices or Sundecop. Officials from this agency were sent out to 82 retail outlets in April 2012 to try to make sure that firms were sticking to the new regulated prices. They also printed and handed out leaflets to the public informing them of the changes. Another agency is called ‘The Institute for the Defense of People’s Access to Goods and Services’ or ‘Indepabis’. This organisation launched a new strategy in June 2012 in order to monitor compliance. This included the creation of a network called the Friends of Indepabis which would act as an information point for members of the public to report illegal pricing. A new complaints phone line was also introduced.
If president Maduro is granted the power to extend maximum prices to all consumer products, then one can only begin to imagine the extra administrative costs involved with implementing the policy.
Venezuelan president Maduro ‘to expand price controls’ BBC News (11/11/13)
Venezuela sends in troops to force electronics chain to charge ‘fair’ prices NBC News (13/11/13)
Venezuela appliances crackdown spurs uncertainty ABC news (13/11/13)
Venezuela’s government seizes electronic goods shops BBC News (9/11/13)
Venezuelan government sends TROOPS into electronics chain to force them to sell goods at a “fair price” DailyMirror (10/11/13)
Shocher: Price Controls Lead to Shortages in Venezuela Free Advice, Robert Murphy (2/10/13)
Venezuelan Government Action against Overpricing Welcomed by Citizens, Manipulated by Media venezuelanalysis (12/11/13).
Questions
- Explain why a maximum price imposed on a competitive market might generate a shortage. Draw a diagram to illustrate and explain your answer.
- Are there any circumstances when a maximum price would not cause a shortage in a competitive market?
- Analyse the impact of a maximum price on consumer surplus, producer surplus and deadweight welfare loss. Assume the market is competitive and clearly state any other assumptions you have made in your analysis. Comment on the impact of the price ceiling on economic efficiency.
- Illustrate and explain what would happen to consumer surplus and deadweight welfare loss if the available goods for sale were only purchased by the consumers with the lowest willingness to pay.
- Why might a maximum price lead to a flourishing black market?
- The former president, Hugo Chavez, argued that the price regulations were required because “big monopolies… ransack the people”. Using economic theory discuss this statement. Examine the impact of a maximum price on a pure monopoly.
No matter the product or service, price is always a key factor and never more so than in tough economic times. In most cases, prices are allowed to be determined by the forces of demand and supply, which gives the equilibrium price. However, in some cases, the government may choose to intervene with a price control, for example rent controls and the national minimum wage. Another market where there is also regulation is the airline industry and the Civil Aviation Authority have recently been criticized by Heathrow Airport for its price control plan.
Whenever we go on holiday, the price we pay for an airline ticket will depend in part on the airport we are taking off from and landing at, as they will charge the airline for landing fees, security, terminals etc. 
Heathrow airport had proposed that annual rises to its tariffs charged to airlines would increase by 4.6% above RPI inflation. However, this plan has been rejected by the CAA, which has said that the annual tariff rise between 2014 and 2018 should not be above the RPI. Though Heathrow are criticizing the CAA about this restriction, it is an improvement from the initial proposal which would have capped price rises at the RPI minus 1.3%.
Controversy has naturally been created, with the CAA arguing that such price controls are needed to keep prices down and thus benefit consumers and retain the competitiveness of Heathrow airport. But, in contrast, Heathrow has argued that such a cap will put its competitive position under pressure and will risk future investment in the UK. But this isn’t the only criticism of the CAA. Airlines aren’t happy with the ruling either, arguing that the CAA has bowed to the pressure of Heathrow. The contrasting positions of the CAA, Heathrow and airlines are evident in the following quotes, firstly from the Chairwoman of the CAA:
The proposals will put an end to over a decade of prices rising faster than inflation at Heathrow. Tackling the upward drift in Heathrow’s prices is essential to safeguard its globally competitive position. The challenge for Heathrow is to maintain high levels of customer service while reducing costs. We are confident this is possible and that our proposals create a positive climate for further capital investment, in the passenger interest.
Secondly, from Heathrow’s Chief Executive:
This proposal is the toughest Heathrow has ever faced. The CAA’s settlement could have serious and far-reaching consequences for passengers and airlines at Heathrow … We want to continue to improve Heathrow for passengers. Instead, the CAA’s proposals risk not only Heathrow’s competitive position but the attractiveness of the UK as a centre for international investment. We will now carefully consider our investment plans before responding fully to the CAA.
And finally from the IAG Chief Executive, who said:
[The CAA] neglected its new primary statutory duty to further the interests of passengers by endorsing a settlement that allows the UK’s monopoly hub to ignore its inefficiencies and over-reward investors by imposing excessive charges … It is a bad day for customers who have been let down by the CAA.
Any price rise from the airports will be passed on to airlines and these in turn will translate into higher prices for customers. However, is there any truth to Heathrow’s claims that investment will be adversely impacted? As costs rise, profit margins and profit will fall, unless the revenue generated can increase. Price controls restrict the amount that prices can rise and thus unless demand increases by a significant margin, profits will decline. With lower profits, there will be less money for investment and arguably the service that customers face will also decline. However, the CAA suggests that Heathrow will be able to cut its costs and thus protect investment into the future, while retaining its competitive position globally by charging lower prices to airlines. This is unlikely to be the end of the journey, but for the moment, the CAA appears to have put its foot down. The following articles consider the battleground between the CAA and Heathrow.
Regulation in the passenger’s interest, support investment and driving competition The Civil Aviation Authority (3/10/13)
Passengers at Heathrow ‘face £1bn fares hike’ Independent, Matthew Beard (4/10/13)
Heathrow airport attacks regulator’s price control plan BBC News (3/10/13)
CAA proposed Heathrow charges rise in line with inflation The Telegraph, Rebecca Clancy (13/10/13)
Passengers face fare increases as Heathrow and Gatwick are allowed to up landing fees Mail Online (3/10/13)
Heathrow and airlines enraged by CAA price proposals The Telegraph, Alistair Osborne (3/10/13)
Heathrow attacks Civil Aviation Authority over airport charges Financial Times, Andrew Parker (3/10/13)
BAA considers life outside Heathrow as CAA backtracks on charges The Guardian, Gwyn Topham (3/10/13)
Heathrow charge plan disappoints all round Wall Street Journal, Peter Evans (3/10/13)
Questions
- What is the role of a regulator?
- Explain how the price control outlined by the CAA will affect Heathrow.
- If Heathrow is unable to cut costs, what is the likely effect? Using a diagram illustrate the impact on profitability if costs (a) can be reduced and (b) cannot be reduced.
- Why are the CAA being criticised by airlines and airports?
- How will customers be affected by Heathrow’s planned price rises and the CAA’s proposal?
- ‘Regulation in the airlines industry is essential to retain competitiveness.’ Evaluate the validity of this statement.
Imagine that the team you support has made the final of a major competition or a your favourite band is playing a live concert this summer. You desperately want a ticket and are willing to pay the advertised price. They go on sale at 9.00am in the morning and you go on-line at 8.59am but unfortunately the webpage will not load. You keep pressing the refresh button but with no success. Eventually, annoyed and frustrated, you give up at 10.00am!
Tickets for sporting, musical or other live shows are initially sold by people who organise the events in two ways. They may choose to sell some or all of the tickets directly to the customer. For example you can buy tickets for a West End show from the box office in the theatre. With some football games it is still possible to buy tickets on the day at the stadium. Another approach is to sell some or all of the tickets via an authorised ticket agent. These businesses are usually members of STAR (The Society of Ticket Agents and Retailers) and the organisers of the sporting, musical or live show provide them with tickets to sell on their behalf. Some of the larger and well known agents such as Ticketmaster, Ticketline and Seetickets usually sell the tickets at face value although some booking fees are often added to the price. This initial sale of tickets by either the event organiser themselves or an agent acting on their behalf is referred to as the primary market.
For example, British Athletics sold all of its 130,000 tickets for its two day Anniversary Games on the 26th and 27th July via its authorised ticket agent in 75 minutes!! However an internet search for this event will quickly reveal that tickets are still available!! Unfortunately in most cases the advertised price will be far greater than the face value of the ticket. How is this possible? The answer is that the internet has helped a thriving secondary market for tickets to develop. The secondary market refers to situations where people who have already purchased tickets through the primary market re-sell them to other members of the public. Prior to the internet the main way of buying a ticket in the secondary market was to visit the venue on the day of the event and hunt for some-one willing to sell. However technology has dramatically reduced these transaction costs and made it much easier for potential buyers and sellers to make an exchange. For example companies such as Viagogo, Seatwave, GetMeIn and Stubhub have created websites that allow members of the public to buy and sell tickets. As Viagogo publish on their webpage:
You are buying tickets from a third party, Viagogo is not the ticket seller. Ticket prices are set by the seller and may be above or below face value.
Why does this secondary market exist? An economist would argue that it can only happen if the quantity of tickets demanded is greater than the quantity of tickets for sale at the price set by the event organiser. If this was not the case then customers would be able to buy tickets through the primary market on the day of the match, concert or show. The puzzle is to explain why prices do not rise in the primary market. If the quantity demanded of any product is greater than the quantity supplied then market forces should put upward pressure on prices. However it would appear that many of the event organisers appear to resist this incentive and consistently set prices below the level that would limit demand to the number of tickets available. This leaves an opportunity for sellers in the secondary market to sell tickets much closer to their market clearing rate. Navin Kekane, the business operations director of Stubhub, stated that
What we do is all about supply and demand, and you can sometimes find tickets at below face value.
Some of these companies in the secondary market have recently established formal partnerships with a number of English Premier League (EPL) football clubs and other major sporting bodies. For example Viagogo have signed deals with 10 EPL clubs while Stubhub have deals with 3 EPL clubs as well as Leicester Tigers and the Lawn Tennis Association.
However some observers have expressed grave reservations about the growth of the secondary market. For example Malcolm Clarke, chairman of the Football Supporters Federation, stated that
At the moment if you are fan trying to sell a spare ticket and are not authorised to do so then you face a criminal conviction, even if you sell at the face value.
But secondary ticketing exchanges, because they are authorised, are allowed to do so. Many clubs grant these agencies the right to allow the re-sale of tickets for their matches at above face value. I don’t think that can be right.
Joe Cohen, the founder of Seatwave counters that
Touts is an emotional, dehumanising word. The reality is that they are just speculators. No one likes speculators until you need something from them.
Some have called for more regulation of the secondary market. For example Sharon Hodgson, Labour MP for Washington and Sunderland West, unsuccessfully tried to get a Private Members Bill through Parliament which would have made it illegal to re-sell tickets for more than 10% above their face value.
Articles
Questions
- Give some potential advantages for a football club or sporting body of using an authorised ticket agent to sell tickets in the primary market.
- Using a demand and supply diagram explain what happens in a market if the price is continually set below its market clearing rate. Illustrate and explain how mutually beneficial trade can take place in the secondary market at prices above those in the primary market.
- Can you explain why it is less likely for a secondary market to exist for cinema tickets than a popular West End show?
- Can you think of any reasons why it might be in the interests of a profit maximising organiser of a sporting or music event to sell tickets below the market clearing rate.
- What non-price methods could be used to allocate tickets for popular events? Consider some of the advantages/disadvantages of using these non-price methods.
- Do you think it is in the interests of society to allow people to re-sell tickets at a price above their face value?
Scams and Scandals: the Great Ticket Rip-Off
