Tag: leniency

Price fixing agreements between firms are one of the most serious breaches of competition law. Therefore, if detected, the firms involved face substantial fines (see here for an example), plus there is also the potential for jail sentences and director disqualification for participants. However, due to their secretive nature and the need for hard evidence of communication between firms, it is difficult for competition authorities to detect cartel activity.

In order to assist detection, competition authorities offer leniency programmes that guarantee full immunity from fines to the first participant to come forward and blow the whistle on the cartel. This has become a key way in which competition authorities detect cartels. Recently, competition authorities have introduced a number of new tools to try to enhance cartel detection.

First, the European Commission launched an online tool to make it easier for cartels to be reported to them. This tool allows anonymous two-way communication in the form of text messages between a whistle blower and the Commission. The Commissioner in charge of competition policy, Margrethe Vestager, stated that:

If people are concerned by business practices that they think are wrong, they can help put things right. Inside knowledge can be a powerful tool to help the Commission uncover cartels and other anti-competitive practices. With our new tool it is possible to provide information, while maintaining anonymity. Information can contribute to the success of our investigations quickly and more efficiently to the benefit of consumers and the EU’s economy as a whole.

Second, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has launched an online and social media campaign to raise awareness of what is illegal under competition law and to encourage illegal activity to be reported to them. The CMA stated that:

Cartels are both harmful and illegal, and the consequences of breaking the law are extremely serious. That is why we are launching this campaign – to help people understand what cartel activity looks like and how to report it so we can take action.

This campaign is on the back of the CMA’s own research which found that less that 25% of the businesses they surveyed believed that they knew competition law well. Furthermore, the CMA is now offering a reward of up to £100,000 and guaranteed anonymity to individuals who provide them with information.

It will be fascinating to see the extent to which these new tools are used and whether they aid the competition authorities in detecting and prosecuting cartel behaviour.


CMA launches crackdown on cartels as illegal activity rises The Telegraph, Bradley Gerrard (20/03/17)
European Commission launches new anonymous whistleblower tool, but who would use it? Competition Policy Blog, Andreas Stephan (21/03/17)
CMA launches campaign to crackdown on cartels Insider Media Limited, Karishma Patel (21/03/17)


  1. Why do you think leniency programmes are a key way in which competition authorities detect cartels?
  2. Who do you think is most likely to blow the whistle on a cartel (see the article above by A.Stephan)?
  3. Why is it worrying that so few businesses appear to know competition law well?
  4. Which of the two tools do you think is most likely to enhance cartel detection? Explain why.

Last week, the European Commission imposed a record fine of almost €1.5b on a group of firms found to have been involved in price fixing. Between 1996 and 2006 these firms fixed world-wide prices of cathode ray tubes which are used to make TV screens and computer monitors.

The firms involved in fixing the prices in one or both of these markets included household names such as Samsung, Panasonic, Toshiba and Philips. As these tubes accounted for over half the price of a screen this clearly had a significant knock-on effect on the amount final consumers paid. The European competition agency only discovered the cartel when it was informed that it had been in operation by Chunghwa, a Taiwanese company that had also been involved. Therefore, under the Commission’s leniency policy Chunghwa was granted full immunity from the fines.

The cartel members held frequent meetings in cities across Europe and Asia. The top level meetings were known as ‘green meetings’ as they were often followed by a round of golf. Interestingly, this is not the first time the game of golf has featured in an international cartel. In the famous lysine cartel an informant working for the FBI used the quality of the golf courses to convince the cartel members to meet in Hawaii, where the FBI had the jurisdiction to secretly record the meeting as evidence.

The screen tube cartel is one of the most highly organised cartels the European Commission has ever detected. Different prices were even fixed for individual TV and computer manufacturers. Furthermore, compliance with the cartel agreement was strictly monitored with plant visits to audit how much firms were producing. The cartel was also clearly very aware that it was breaking the law and that information needed to be concealed as some of the documents discovered stated that they should be destroyed after they had been read. One document even said that:

“Everybody is requested to keep it as secret as it would be serious damage if it is open to customers or European Commission.”

Another interesting feature of the cartel is that it occurred at a time when the technology was being replaced by LCD and plasma screens. Therefore, the cartel appears to have been partly motivated by a desire to mitigate the negative impact the declining market would have on the firms involved.

According to the Independent newspaper:

“Philips said it would challenge what it called a disproportionate and unjustified penalty. Panasonic and Toshiba are also considering legal challenges. Samsung reserved its comment.

TV makers in record 1.47bn-euro fine BBC News (05/12/12)
TV computer makers fined $1.93 billion for price fixing Corporate Crime Reporter (05/12/12)
European antitrust fines: a new wave of deterrence? EurActiv, Mario Mariniello (11/12/12)


  1. What is the impact of a successful cartel on economic welfare?
  2. Describe the impact declining demand has on firms in a competitive market.
  3. Why might it have been necessary for the cartel to charge different prices to individual TV and computer manufacturers?
  4. Why would the cartel need to audit how much members are producing?
  5. Why do competition authorities offer immunity to firms that inform them about cartel behaviour?
  6. Based on the evidence in the articles, do you think the firms involved have grounds to appeal the fines imposed?