Most football fans will probably never have heard of an organisation called FIFPro but, if it is successful, the labour market for football players could change quite radically.
FIFPro represents over 65,000 players from around the world. It is effectively an international trade union whose main objective is to promote the interests and defend the rights of professional football players. Its president, Philippe Piat, has recently announced that the organisation will challenge the way the current transfer system operates and is prepared to take its case to the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.
FIFPro’s argument is that players are being exploited under the current system. This may seem difficult to believe in the week when Luis Suarez signed a new four-and-a-half-year contract at Liverpool with earnings of £200,000 per week. However, referring to the transfer system, Piat stated that:
These legal and monetary shackles binding footballers to their current clubs can no longer be accepted and upheld. Football players are workers and only when they are able to enjoy the rights enshrined in law and enjoyed by all other workers, will Fifpro be satisfied.
In order to understand this argument, it is important to understand how the transfer system has evolved and how it now operates.
When the Football Association (FA) first accepted professionalism in 1885 it introduced a registration system. Before this reform it was possible for players to play for different teams each week. The new system meant that players had to register with a club at the beginning of each season. If a player was not registered with a team he was not allowed to play. He could only change team mid-season if his current club and the FA agreed to the transfer of his registration details to a different team. However, a player was free at the beginning of each season to register with a different team. Therefore there were no constraints on his mobility between teams from one season to another.
Significant changes were made to the system in 1893 when the retain-and-transfer system was first introduced. The new scheme allowed teams to keep retaining players they had initially registered for another year. This effectively meant that when a player was signed by a team he was tied to that team for as long as they wanted him. The mobility between clubs from one season to another had been removed. This gave the clubs significant monopsony power in the labour market. If a player wanted to change teams, he had to make a transfer request but the team was under no obligation to put him on the transfer list and allow him to move. Teams could decide to put players on a transfer list and would only allow them to leave if an agreeable level of compensation (a transfer fee) was offered by another team. A maximum wage of £4 per week was also introduced in 1901.
The system was periodically challenged and a number of minor changes were made. In particular, the conditions under which a player could be retained by a club were gradually altered. Originally a player could be retained by a club even if his contract was not renewed. Effectively a team could stop a player moving to another club by holding onto his registration without having to pay him. This was changed so that a minimum wage had to be paid to a player if he was to be retained by the team that held his registration.
The first major change to the system came in 1963 from a player called George Eastham. In 1959 he failed to sign a new contract with Newcastle United and made a transfer request which the club promptly rejected. Although they did eventually allow him to leave and join Arsenal, he still took his case to the High Court and the judge concluded that the retain-and-transfer system was an unreasonable restraint of trade. Following this judgment the system was amended so that, in order to retain a player, a club would have to offer the player a new contract with terms and conditions which were at least as good as the previous one. If this was done, then a player could be retained by a club and his registration would only be released if an acceptable transfer fee was offered by another team.
Perhaps the biggest change to the system was made in 2001 following the famous Bosman ruling. Jean-Marc Bosman had wanted to move to the French side Dunkirk, but FC Liege, the club that held his registration, demanded a transfer fee that Dunkirk were unwilling to pay. Bosman took his case to the European Court of Justice and in 1995 a decision was made that the system was in breach of European Union law on the free movement of people. Following this ruling, an informal agreement was reached between the European Commission, FIFA and UEFA. From 2001 players over the age of 23 were free to leave their clubs once their contracts had expired. Transfer fees no longer needed to be paid for players who had reached the end of their contracts.
Although the ease with which players can change teams has significantly improved over the past 50 years, they still face constraints on their labour mobility that are unusual for employees. Most workers simply have to give a period of notice in order to change employer. These vary between jobs but are not usually longer than 3 months. FIFPro’s argument is that professional football players should have these same rights. This would allow Luis Suarez to leave Liverpool at any point in the next four and a half years without any transfer fee having to be agreed. He would simply have a serve out a short period
of notice and then he would be free to join any other club. Under the current system he would have to wait four and a half years until the
end of his contract before he could leave without a transfer fee having
to be paid.
Whenever the transfer system has been challenged the football authorities have always used the same defence – sport is different from other industries because of the importance of maintaining an appropriate level of competitive balance. It is argued that the ease with which players can change clubs needs to be restricted in order for this level to be maintained. Ultimately a judgment will have to be made between this argument and the principle of freedom of movement.
Explain why the marginal revenue product of footballers is so much higher than it is for people in most other jobs. What impact do you think technology has had on the marginal revenue product of footballers over the past 20 years?
Draw a diagram to illustrate how the wage rate for footballers would be determined if the labour market was perfectly competitive.
What is monopsony? Explain how the retain-and-transfer system could give football clubs monopsony power in the labour market.
Draw a diagram to illustrate the impact of monopsony on wages and employment in the labour market for professional footballers.
Explain how limiting the mobility of players might help to maintain the level of competitive balance in a league.
If the proposals by FIFPro were accepted, what impact do you think it will have on players’ wages?
Imagine if none of the clubs in the English Premier League (EPL) or English Football League (EFL) had junior or youth teams. Instead envisage a situation where all of the talented young footballers in the country go to college or university to develop their skills. Then once a year there is a big televised event where each of the clubs in the EPL and EFL take it in turns to choose which young college/university players they would like to recruit.
Strange as it sounds to football fans in Europe this is exactly what happens in American Football in the USA. It is called the NFL draft and this year’s event took place over three days between 25th and 27th April at Radio City Music Hall in New York. There was greater interest in Britain than usual in this year’s event because of the involvement of 24 year old Menelik Watson who was born and raised in Manchester. Although originally a basketball player, coaches spotted his potential to play American football in the NFL and two years ago he obtained a place at Florida State University.
The NFL draft has seven rounds. Each of the 32 teams has the right to choose one player in each round. An important design issue for any draft system is how to determine the running order in which the teams make their choices. Obviously all 32 teams would like to get the first chance at recruiting the most talented of all the college players. The NFL’s solution to this allocation problem is an interesting one. The team with the worst playing record from the previous season gets the first choice in each round. In the 2012-13 season this happened to be the Kansas City Chiefs who played 16 games and only won 2 of them. The second choice in each round goes to the team with the 2nd worst playing record from the previous season and so on. The final choice in each round goes to the previous year’s Super Bowl champions who in the 2012–13 were the Baltimore Ravens. Another interesting characteristic of the system is the ability of teams to trade draft choices. For example in 2013 the Oakland Raiders traded their choice in the first round (which was the 3rd choice overall) with the Miami Dolphins for their choices in both the first and second round (12th and 42nd choice overall).
What is the rationale for having a draft system? It was first introduced in February 1936 and many commentators have argued that it has been a key factor which has helped to maintain competitive balance in sport. The man behind the idea, Bert Bell of the Philadelphia Eagles, argued that without this type of system the sport would be dominated by the 4 richest teams. He stated that:
Every year, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Four teams control the championship. Because they are successful, they keep attracting the best college players in the open market, which makes them more successful.
Some evidence for the success of the scheme is that in the last 15 years the Super Bowl has been won by 10 different teams. However in 1934, just before the scheme was proposed, there was another major issue for team owners. The Brooklyn Dodgers and the Philadelphia Eagles had become involved in a bidding war for a very talented young player called Stan Kostka. Brooklyn won the battle but had to pay him a salary of $5,000 – the same amount that was paid to the star player in the league. Some people have argued that the real purpose of the draft scheme was to limit the pay of young players by effectively reducing any competitive bidding for their services. Once drafted, a player is expected to join the team who selected him. There may be some protracted negotiations over his final salary and bonuses but the only option open to him if an agreement breaks down is to re-enter the draft the following year. This effectively gives the teams monopsony power which may enable them to restrict players pay to below that of their marginal revenue product. For example although Andrew Luck, the first choice draft pick in 2012, reportedly earns just over $20million from his 4 year contract with the Indianapolis Colts some commentators have argued that his true market value is over $100 million.
The good news for Menelik Watson was that he was finally drafted by the Oakland Raiders and was the 42nd overall player chosen in the draft process. This is the highest choice ever made by a team in the NFL for a player born and brought up in Britain. The final outcome for the league as a whole can be seen on the NFL website.
There is a growing consensus amongst the political parties in the UK that something needs to be done to end the huge pay rises of senior executives. According to the High Pay Commission, directors of FTSE 100 companies saw their remuneration packages rise by 49% in 2010. Average private-sector employees’ pay, by contrast, rose by a mere 2.7% (below the CPI rate of inflation for 2010 of 3.3% and well below the RPI inflation rate of 4.6%), with many people’s wages remaining frozen, especially in the public sector. (See Directing directors’ pay.) In 1979 the top 0.1% took home 1.3% of GDP; today the figure is 7%.
But agreeing that something needs to be done, does not mean that the parties agree on what to do. The Prime Minister, reflecting the views of Conservative ministers, has called for binding shareholder votes on top executives’ pay. The Liberal Democrats go further and are urging remuneration committees to be opened up to independent figures who would guard against the cosy arrangement whereby company heads set each other’s pay. The Labour Party is calling for worker representation on remuneration committees, simplifying remuneration packages into salary and just one performance-related element, and publishing tables of how much more bosses earn than various other groups of employees in the company.
So what measures are likely to be the most successful in reining in executive pay and what are the drawbacks of each measure? The following articles consider the problem and the proposals.
Over recent years, labour markets have become more flexible. Both firms and workers have been much more adaptable to changing market conditions.
This has been illustrated by responses to the 2008/9 recession and the minimal recovery since then. Many firms have seen a drop in demand for their products and have responded by producing less. But this has not necessarily meant laying off workers. But why not? The following include some of the reasons:
• greater flexibility in hours worked: thus hours can be reduced; • reduction in real wages because of wages not keeping up with inflation; • many workers receiving part of their income in the form of profit sharing: when profits fall, employees’ income automatically falls; • a general reduction in unionisation in the private sector; • in firms where workers are still unionised, unions and management increasingly seeing themselves to be on the ‘same side’: thus unions more willing to explore flexibility; • less support from state if people are unemployed; • greater flexibility from the use of temporary or agency staff: these can be reduced in a recession, thus helping to protect the jobs of established workers.
The following podcast looks at this growing flexibility and why it has helped to restrict the rise in unemployment.
Distinguish between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the labour market? How has the relationship between the two groups changed in recent years?
Distinguish between functional, numerical and financial flexibility of firms? (See Box 9.8 in Economics (7th ed), Web Case 6.2 in Essentials of Economics (5th ed), section 18.7 in Economics for Business (5th ed) or section 8.5 in Economics and the Business Environment (3rd ed).)
Examine the effects of wage rises being less than the rate of inflation on the profit-maximising number of full-time equivalent people employed. How is this influenced by the rate of increase in the price of other inputs and the ability of the firm to raise prices in line with inflation?
Should firms be required by law to allow workers to demand flexible working conditions? What forms might such flexibility take?
The east African countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been operating with a common external tariff for some time. The East African Community (EAC), as it is known, came into force in 2000. Initially it had just three members, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; the other two countries joined in 2007. As the Community’s site says:
The EAC aims at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in, among others, political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit. To this extent the EAC countries established a Customs Union in 2005 and are working towards the establishment of a Common Market in 2010, subsequently a Monetary Union by 2012 and ultimately a Political Federation of the East African States.
This Common Market came into force on 1 July 2010, with free movement of labour being instituted between the five countries. The plan is also to do away with all internal barriers to trade, although it may take up to five years before this is completed.
The following articles and videos look at this significant opening up of trade in east Africa and at people’s reactions to it. Will all five countries gain equally? Or will some gain at the others’ expense?