On 21 March, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, delivered the 2012 Budget for the UK. The details of the tax and benefit changes can be found in the Budget Report, with the Treasury’s summary of the tax changes here.
One of the key elements in the Budget was the reduction in the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45% from April 2013. The Chancellor argued that the introduction of the 50% rate in 2010 had raised very little extra tax revenue. Partly this was the result of people managing their tax affairs so that they could bring forward income to the year before the 50% rate was introduced – a practice known as forestalling. People are likely to do the reverse with the latest tax change and delay receiving income until next year. For details of the effects of forestalling, see the Office for Budget Responsibility’s Economic and fiscal outlook charts and tables Box 4.2a.
But part of the reason for the 50% tax rate raising relatively little has been the effect on incentives. A rise in the top rate of income tax can encourage people to move from the country – or move their incomes; it may discourage top earners from working more; it may encourage people to engage in various tax avoidance schemes; it may encourage people to evade taxes by not declaring all their income.
The effect of a rise (or fall) in the marginal income tax rate (t) on taxable income is given by the taxable income elasticity (TIE). This is defined as the proportionate change in taxable income (Y) divided by the proportionate change in the net-of-income-tax rate (r) (where r = 100 – t: i.e. the percentage of an extra pound that is not paid in income tax, but is retained by the taxpayer for spending or saving). TEI is thus ΔY/Y ÷ Δr/r. The larger the disincentive effect of raising taxes, the more will taxable income fall and hence the higher will be the value of TIE.
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in 2010 based its calculations on a TIE of 0.35 for the rise in the top marginal rate of income tax from 40% to 50%. This means that for each 1% fall in the net-of-income-tax rate, taxable income would fall by 0.35%. With a TIE of 0.35, the OBR calculated that the new top rate would bring an extra £2.9bn per year by 2011-12 (after allowing for any temporary residual effects of forestalling). However, the OBR now believes that the TIE is significantly higher and that the 50% rate will bring only an extra £0.7bn in 2011/12.
In its analysis of the effects of a cut in the top rate from 50% to 45%, the OBR has assumed a TIE of 0.45.
Turning to the costing of the move to 45 per cent, measured against our baseline that reflects the new information on the 50 per cent yield, we have endorsed as reasonable and central the Government’s estimate that the underlying cost would be around £0.1 billion in 2013-14, based on an assumed TIE of 0.45. The figure is as low as this because a TIE of 0.45 implies that the revenue-maximising additional tax rate is around 48 per cent. Moving from just above to just below this rate would therefore have very little revenue impact. Moving the additional rate back to 40 per cent would take it further below the revenue maximising rate and would thus be more expensive at roughly an additional £600 million. But for the reasons set out above we would again emphasise the huge uncertainties here.
Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2012 (p110)
The government’s arguments for reducing the top tax rate, therefore, are that it will have little effect on tax revenue, but would have a significant effect in encouraging inward investment, discouraging emigration of high earners and encouraging high earners to work more.
Articles
Rich tax cuts offset by changes to relief Financial Times, Vanessa Houlder (21/3/12)
Budget 2012: A big debate about small numbers (cont’d) BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (21/3/12)
Budget 2012: End of 50p tax, but 45p rate here to stay The Telegraph, Robert Winnett (21/3/12)
Budget 2012: Top income tax rate ‘won’t go any lower than 45p’ This is Money, Tim Shipman (22/3/12)
Why is tax avoidance a reason for letting people off tax? New Statesman, Alex Hern (22/3/12)
Study: Millionaires Don’t Flee States Due To Tax Hikes Think Progress, Pat Garofalo (22/3/12)
Laffer Curve Fun, with a side serving of nepotism Mark Wadsworth blog (22/3/12)
Budget 2012: are we really all in this together? Guardian, Polly Curtis (21/3/12)
Did the 50p tax rate really raise less than £1 billion in 2010/11? Touch Stone, Howard Reed (22/3/12)
45p: Power beats evidence Stumbling and Mumbling, Chris Dillow (22/3/12)
Reports, documents and presentations
Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2012 OBR
Budget 2012 HM Treasury (21/3/12)
Budget 2012 IFS (March 2012)
The Exchequer effect of the 50 per cent additional rate of income tax HMRC (March 2012)
Can More Revenue be Raised by Increasing Income Tax Rates for the Very Rich? IFS, Mike Brewer and James Browne (2009)
The 50p income tax rate IFS, James Browne (March 2012)
Questions
- What are the arguments for and against reducing the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45%? Do the same arguments apply to a further reduction to 40%?
- According to the OBR, at what top tax rate is the top of the Laffer curve?
- Why are the OBR’s calculations subject to considerable possible error?
- Why might a fall in the top tax rate from 50% to 40% not exactly reverse all the effects of an earlier rise in the top tax rate from 40% to 50%? In other words, why may the effects not be symmetrical?
- Distinguish between the income and substitution effects of a change in income tax rates. Which is assumed to be larger by the OBR in the case of reducing the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45%? Explain.
Through new legislation, the Ministry of Justice is aiming to make ‘offenders … take personal responsibility for their crimes’. The idea is to cut the wages of prisoners who work in communities, with the objective of raising £1m a year for victim support services. Any prisoner earning above £20 a week after tax, national insurance, child support payments etc, will face a 40% deduction in their pay. The money raised will be used to ‘repair the damage done by crime’ and begin to remove the burden from the general taxpayer. Critics, however, argue that this legislation will create a disincentive effect and discourage prisoners to work in the community before their release. It may also create additional bureaucracy for the external firms that employ them and at the end of the day may not even affect most prisoners, as many receive earnings, after all deductions, below £20 and so would not be liable. The following articles consider this policy.
Prisoners’ wages docked to fund victim support Associated Press (26/9/11)
Prisoners’ wages to help crime victims BBC News (26/9/11)
Prisoners to pay victims of crime The Press Association (26/9/11)
Victims handed £1m as prisoners suffer wage cut Independent, Nigel Morris (26/9/11)
Questions
- To what extent do you think the above policy is (a) equitable and (b) efficient?
- What might be the adverse effects of such legislation, from the point of view of both prisoners and the firms that employ them?
- What are the income and substitution effects in the context of a worker’s decision to work more or less hours?
- Using indifference analysis, explain how a fall in the prisoners’ net pay (due to this latest deduction) might have an impact on their desire to work more or less.
- Using your analysis from the previous question, explain the importance of the income and substitution effects.
Taxes are a key element in redistributive policies: taxes on the rich can be spent on benefits to the poor. The more progressive the taxes (i.e. the more steeply they rise with rising incomes), the bigger will be the redistributive effect and hence the more equal will post-tax incomes be.
But high and steeply progressive taxes can act as a disincentive to work longer, or to go for promotion or to move to a better paid job. High corporate taxes and income taxes can act as disincentive to inward investment and may encourage a ‘brain drain’ and capital flight with people and capital leaving the country for lower tax regimes abroad.
Raising taxes has two effects. First there is the substitution effect: people may work less and substitute it with leisure – after all, work is now less rewarding. People may also substitute working abroad for working at home. But the second effect works in the opposite direction. This is the income effect. As taxes are raised and people’s take-home pay is thereby reduced, they may feel the need to work longer hours or try harder for promotion in order to make up the lost income and maintain their living standards. Thus the effect of higher taxes is not clear-cut. It is an empirical question of which of the two effects is the stronger.
One important determinant of the effects of different tax rates is their relative position compared with other countries. Another is the international mobility of labour and capital. The greater the mobility, the greater the elasticity of supply with respect to changes in tax rates.
The following report and articles look at relative tax rates between different countries and the effects on output and factor movements
Articles
Wide tax gaps among countries, UHY study finds UHY International, Press Release (10/6/11)
Britain’s most talent workers flee to avoid high tax rates The Telegraph, Myra Butterworth (13/6/11)
UK tax rate ‘one of the highest’ Belfast Telegraph (13/6/11)
Data
Tax Rates Around the World – Comparison UHY Worldwide-tax.com
Effects of taxes and benefits on household income National Statistics
(see especially Data: The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 2009/10)
Questions
- Why may relative income tax rates between countries give only a partial picture of the international competitiveness of these countries? What else would need to be taken into account?
- Does making taxes more steeply progressive necessarily act as a disincentive to output? Explain.
- What factors are likely to determine the relative size of the income and substitution effects of tax changes?
- How progressive are income taxes in the UK compared with other countries? Give examples.
- What externalities (positive and negative) might result from steeply progressive income tax rates?
- What determines the international elasticity of supply of labour?
- What is the Laffer curve? How will the shape of the Laffer curve be affected by the international mobility of labour and international tax rates?
As the new tax year begins, many changes are taking place. In order to cut the large budget deficit, sacrifices have to be made by all. The tax and benefit changes could make households worse off by some £2bn this year – definitely not good news for those households already feeling the squeeze. However, the Coalition say that the poorest households will be made better off relative to the rich.
Personal allowance is increasing by £1,000, which is expected to benefit £800,000 people who will no longer pay any tax. At the same time, the 40% tax bracket is being reduced from £43,875 to £42,475, which will bring another 750,000 people into this higher tax bracket, bringing in much needed revenue for the government. Employee’s national insurance contributions will rise by 1% and according to Credit Action, this will leave households £200 worse off per year. Benefits do rise with inflation, but they are to be indexed against the CPI rather than the RPI. The RPI is usually higher and hence benefits will not increase by as much, again leaving some people worse off. Child benefit will be frozen for all and will then be removed for higher rate tax payers from 2013. According to the Treasury, it is the top 10% of households who will lose the most from these needed changes. However, as Justine Greening, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said:
‘Labour left behind a complete mess with no plan to deal with it, apart from to run up more debts for the next generation to pay off.’
In order to cut the deficit, which stands at an estimated £146bn, spending must fall and tax revenue for the government must rise. The government argues that if cuts are not made today, even higher cuts will be necessary in the future and this will harm the poorest even more. Whilst the Treasury have accepted that there was a ‘marginal loss’ across the population, it is the highest earning households that will suffer the most.
Wednesday of woe as the taxman bites: Changes could leave you £600 worse off Daily Mail, Becky Barrow (6/4/11)
Benefit cuts: Labour warns of ‘Black Wednesday’ BBC News (6/4/11)
Tax and benefit changes: row over financial impact BBC News (6/4/11)
Black Wednesday will hig millions in tax changes and cuts Metro, John Higginson (5/4/11)
Taxman to take extra £750 from families this year Scotsman, Tom Peterkin and Jeff Salway (6/4/11)
Tax and welfare changes will hit women and children hardest, says Ed Balls Guardian, Helene Mullholland, Polly Curtis and Larry Elliott (6/4/11)
Black Wednesday for millions of British families Telegraph (6/4/11)
Majority of households ‘better off’ The Press Association (6/4/11)
Questions
- Where does the term ‘Black Wednesday’ come from?
- What is the likely impact of the 1% rise in NICs? Think about the income and substitution effects. Can you illustrate the effect using indifference analysis?
- Why are Labour arguing that women and children will be hit the hardest and the coalition arguing that it is the highest income households who will lose the most? Can both parties be right?
- What are the arguments (a) for and (b) against bringing in tax and benefit changes today rather than in a few years?
- How might these changes affect the economic recovery?
- Is it equitable that child benefit should eventually be removed from those paying the higher rates of income tax?
- Why has the government indexed benefit payments to rise in line with the CPI rather than the RPI?
The pensions problems facing many of the developed world are well documented and are largely caused by changing demographics, including rising life expectancy, more people in education, retiring earlier and the ‘baby boomers’ nearing or entering retirement. All of this has contributed to unsustainable pension systems and hence a need for reform. The latest review is by Lord Hutton and looks at public-sector pensions. It makes a number of recommendations about reform. The main thing to come out of the report is that public-sector workers will have to pay larger contributions. work for longer and may receive less in their pension.
Many public-sector pensions have been based on a final salary scheme, which gives workers an extremely generous pension on retirement. The proposal is to change these to career average pensions, which will reduce the generosity for some and hence play a role in reducing the pension deficit. He suggests that public-sector retirement age should be increased in line with the state pension age, which will simultaneously increase the number of workers and hence output, but also reduce the number of years spent in retirement and hence reduce pension payments.
The government will now consider the recommendations laid out in the Hutton Review, but will need to bear in mind potential reactions by the unions, which have already hinted at strike action if the proposals go ahead. As the TUC general secretary, Brendan Barber, said:
‘Public-sector workers are already suffering a wage freeze, job losses and high inflation. They are now desperately worried that they will no longer be able to afford their pension contributions, and will have to opt out.’
With such concern about these proposals, and yet an unarguable case for pension reform, this is certainly an area where we will undoubtedly see significant media coverage.
Articles
Hutton reveals his pension plan – and is blasted by unions Guardian, Polly Curtis (10/3/11)
Pensions anger from unions following Hutton review (including video) BBC News (10/3/11)
High-wire act fails to balance public and private Financial Times, Nicholas Timmins (10/3/11)
A fairer pension deal that is long overdue Telegraph (10/3/11)
Hutton: This changes the basis on which I accepted the job, says teacher Guardian, Jessica Shepherd and Jill Insley (10/3/11)
No winners over public sector pensions if ministers or unions rush to battle Guardian, Polly Toynbee (10/3/11)
Career-average pensions: How do they work? BBC News, Ian Pollock (10/3/11)
Hutton pensions review: Q&A Telegraph, Harry Wallop (10/3/11)
Tackling the intractable The Economist (10/3/11)
Trade unions: pension reforms are unfair and misguided Guardian, James Meikle (10/3/11)
Report
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Final Report Pensions Commission, Lord Hutton, HM Treasury, March 2010
Independent Public Service Pensions Commission: Interim Report Pensions Commission, Lord Hutton October 2010
Questions
- Identify the main causes of the pensions problem. Explain how each issue has added to the pensions deficit.
- To what extent is it equitable that public sector workers should pay more in contributions and retire at the same age as the state pension age?
- Who will benefit the most from a change from final-salary to career average schemes?
- How might higher contributions affect the incentive to work? What could we see happen to labour supply? Think about both income and substitution effects.
- What are the union’s main arguments against the proposals? To what extent Is striking likely to solve the problem?
On 21 March, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, delivered the 2012 Budget for the UK. The details of the tax and benefit changes can be found in the Budget Report, with the Treasury’s summary of the tax changes here.