Tag: incentives

At the end of two weeks of often acrimonious wrangling between representatives from 193 countries, an agreement – of sorts – was reached at the climate change summit in Copenhagen. What was this agreement? It was an ‘accord’ brokered by the USA, China, India, Brazil and South Africa.

This Copenhagen Accord contains three elements. The first is a recognition of the need to prevent global temperatures rising by more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The second is a commitment by developed countries to give $30bn of aid between 2010 and 2012 to developing countries for investment in green technology and to mitigate the effects of climate change. In addition, a goal was set of providing $100bn a year by 2020. The third is for rich countries to give pledges on emissions reductions and for developing countries to give pledges on reducing emissions increases. Developed countries’ pledges will be scrutinised by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, while developing countries will merely be required to submit reports on their progress in meeting their pledges.

But this is only an accord. It has no legal status and was merely ‘recognised’ by the countries at the conference. What is more, the target of limiting temperature rises to 2C does not contain a date by which temperature rises should peak. Also, as countries are not required to submit targets for emissions until February 2010, it is not clear how these targets will be kept low enough to meet the temperature target and there is no identification of penalites that would apply to countries not meeting their pledges.

Not surprisingly, reactions around the world have been mixed. The following podcasts and articles look at these reactions and at the economic mechanisms that will be required to meet the 2C limit

Podcasts and videos

Recriminations after Copenhagen summit (video) BBC News, David Loyn (21/12/09)
Copenhagen special: Climate change talks end in failure Guardian podcast (19/12/09)
Where do we go after Copenhagen? BBC Today Programme (21/12/09)

Articles

What was agreed and left unfinished in U.N. climate deal Reuters of India Factbox (20/12/09)
Copenhagen deal: Key points BBC News (19/12/09)
Copenhagen deal reaction in quotes BBC News (19/12/09)
Copenhagen climate summit fails green investors BBC News, Damian Kahya (22/12/09)
Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal? BBC News (22/12/09)
Copenhagen climate accord: Key issues BBC News (19/12/09)
Harrabin’s Notes: After Copenhagen BBC News, Roger Harrabin (19/12/09)
Copenhagen climate conference: Who is going to save the planet now? Telegraph, Louise Gray (21/12/09)
Copenhagen’s One Real Accomplishment: Getting Some Money Flowing New York Times, James Kanter (20/12/09)
Copenhagen climate summit: plan for EU to police countries’ emissions (including video) Telegraph, James Kirkup, and Louise Gray (19/12/09)
The road from Copenhagen Guardian, Ed Miliband (UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change) (20/12/09)
Carbon Prices Tumble After ‘Modest’ Climate Deal Bloomberg, Mathew Carr and Ewa Krukowska (21/12/09)
Copenhagen deal causes EU carbon price fall BBC News (21/12/09)
Have the hopes of environmentalists been dashed? Financial Times, Clive Cookson (21/12/09)
EU reflects on climate ‘disaster’ Financial Times, Joshua Chaffinin (22/12/09)
China not to blame on climate China Daily, Zhang Jin (23/12/09)
Selling a low-carbon life just got harder Times Online, Jonathon Porritt (21/12/09)
Better than nothing The Economist (19/12/09)
Copenhagen has given us the chance to face climate change with honesty Observer, James Hansen (27/12/09)

Questions

  1. What incentives exist for countries to agree to tough pledges to reduce emissions?
  2. Was the very limited nature of the Copenhagen Accord a Nash equilibrium? Explain.
  3. Is the carbon price a good indicator of the effectiveness of measures to curb emissions?
  4. Must any agreement have verifiable targets for each country of the world if it is to be successful in curbing carbon emissions?
  5. Is a cap-and-trade system the best means of achieving emissions reductions? Explain.

The New Economic Foundation (NEF) is “an independent think-and-do tank that inspires and demonstrates real economic well-being.” It aims “to improve quality of life by promoting innovative solutions that challenge mainstream thinking on economic, environmental and social issues. We work in partnership and put people and the planet first.” It has just published a study into pay, A Bit Rich: Calculating the real value to society of different professions (see link below). This argues that narrow notions of productivity, whilst having some relation to pay, are a poor way of judging the worth of particular jobs to society.

“In this report NEF … takes a new approach to looking at the value of work. We go beyond how much different professions are paid to look at what they contribute to society. We use some of the principles and valuation techniques of Social Return on Investment analysis to quantify the social, environmental and economic value that these roles produce – or in some cases undermine.

Our report tells the story of six different jobs. We have chosen jobs from across the private and public sectors and deliberately chosen ones that illustrate the problem. Three are low paid – a hospital cleaner, a recycling plant worker and a childcare worker. The others are highly paid – a City banker, an advertising executive and a tax accountant. We recognise that our incentives are created by the institutions and systems around us. It is not our intention therefore, to target the individuals that do these jobs but rather to examine the professions themselves.”

So, to what extent do rates of pay reflect the ‘true value’ of what is being created? How could we establish this ‘true value’? Does pay even reflect marginal productivity in the narrow private sense? The report and the articles look at these issues.

A Bit Rich New Economics Foundation (14/12/09), (see also)
Top bankers destroy value, study claims Financial Times, Chris Giles (14/12/09)
Hospital cleaners ‘worth more to society than bankers Telegraph, James Hall (14/12/09)
Cleaners ‘worth more to society’ than bankers – study BBC News, Martin Shankleman (14/12/09)
Cleaners worth more to society than bankers, says thinktank Guardian (14/12/09)
Hospital cleaners ‘of more value to society than bankers’ Scotsman, Alan Jones (14/12/09)
Bankers and accountants a drain on the state, says think-tank Management Today (14/12/09)
Are cleaners worth more than bankers? BBC World Service (14/12/09)

Questions

  1. What is meant by the marginal productivity theory of wage determination? Does the NEF study undermine this theory? Explain.
  2. Why are elite bankers, tax accountants and advertising executives paid so much more than hospital cleaners, waste recycling workers and childcare workers?
  3. “Until the prices of goods and services reflect the true costs of their production, incentives will be misaligned. This means damaging activities will be relatively cheap and profitable, while positive activities will be discouraged.” Explain this statement and whether you agree with it.
  4. To what extent can the misalignment of pay and social worth be explained by externalities?
  5. What is the basis for arguing that tax accountants and City bankers have negative social worth? Do you agree? Explain.
  6. What would happen if hospital cleaners were give a pay rise and bankers given a pay cut so that cleaners ended up with a higher pay than bankers?
  7. In the light of the NEF study, what policies should the government adopt toward pay inequality?

In these news blogs, we’ve considered a Tobin tax on a number of occasions: see A Tobin tax – to be or not to be? and Tobin’s nice little earner. On 10 December 2009, the Treasury published a discussion document, Risk, reward and responsibility: the financial sector and society. This, amongst other things, considers the case for a financial transactions tax – a form of Tobin tax. As Box 4.A on page 35 states:

“James Tobin’s original proposal for a transaction tax was to tax foreign exchange transactions. The purpose of the tax was to tackle excessive exchange rate fluctuation and speculation on currency flows, as Tobin felt that short-term movements in capital flows could severely limit the ability of governments and central banks to follow appropriate domestic policies for their economies.

However, the recent crisis has shown that there is considerable risk inherent in other financial markets. In some of these markets trading volumes have also grown enormously compared to the value of underlying assets. As set out above, instability may result from these markets due to the complex nature of counterparty networks and a lack of transparency, and the transmission of financial shocks through the system.

Recent attention has therefore focused on a broader tax on financial transactions – potentially, this would include trading in a wide range of instruments, currently traded both on and off-exchange.”

The goverment in the UK has recently taken one step in increasing taxes on the financial sector. In its 2009 pre-Budget report, delivered on 9 December (see Cutting the deficit and tackling the recession. Incompatible goals?), a new tax on bank bonuses was imposed. The rate is 50% on bonuses over £25,000. Since then a similar tax has been imposed in France and Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said that she found it a ‘charming idea’, although probably not practical under German law. She did support, however, the use of a Tobin tax on financial transactions, similar to the one being considered in the UK. Such a tax, to be effective, would ideally have to be imposed worldwide, but at least by a large number of countries.

So is the case for a Tobin tax gathering momentum? The following video podcast considers the tax’s aims, effectiveness and practicality – as do the articles.

Video podcast
Radical Tobin Tax proposal could go mainstream BBC Newsnight, Paul Mason (10/12/09)

Articles
Now’s the time for a Tobin tax Guardian, George Irvin (11/12/09)
EU leaders urge IMF to consider Tobin tax Financial Times, Tony Barber and George Parker (11/12/09)
We can always get to Utopia – even from here Irish Times, Paul Gillespie (12/12/09)
HM Treasury makes case for Tobin tax City A.M., Julia Kollewe (11/12/09)
The Tobin Tax – a brief history Telegraph (8/11/09)
European Union presses IMF to consider Tobin tax Telegraph (11/12/09)

Questions

  1. How do current proposals for a Tobin tax differ from Tobin’s original proposals (see Sloman and Wride, Economics 7th edition, pages 756–8 or Sloman and Hinde, Economics for Business 4th edition, pages 743–5)?
  2. Explain how a Tobin tax could be used to reduce destabilising speculation without preventing markets moving to longer-term equilibria.
  3. How might the use of a Tobin tax on financial transactions help to curb some of the ‘excessive rewards’ made from financial dealing?
  4. Examine the advantages and disadvantages of using a Tobin tax on financial transactions. How might the disadvantages be reduced?
  5. What considerations would need to be taken into account in setting the rate for a Tobin tax on financial transactions?

In the run-up to the United Nations climate Change conference in Copenhagen from 7 to 18 December, many countries have been setting out their preliminary positions. The conference aims to set the terms for the agreement that will succeed the Kyoto Protocol in 2012.

Senior scientists, economists and politicians have been warning about the dire necessity of reaching a comprehensive agreement. One such economist is Sir Nicholas Stern. He argues that the EU should impose a unilateral cut in greenhouse gas emissions of 30% from 1990 levels by 2020, irrespective of the any agreement in Copenhagen. The EU has pledged to increase its targeted cut from 20% to 30% only if substantive progress is made at the talks.

Other countries have set out their preliminary positions. China has offered to reduce its carbon intensity by 40% (i.e. the proportion of carbon emissions to GDP); the USA has offered to reduce emissions by 17% by 2020 compared with 2005 levels; and India has offered to reduce its carbon intensity by 24% over the same period.

However, as the Washington Post article below states, “During a weekend meeting, India, along with China, Brazil, South Africa and Sudan, decided it would not agree to legally binding emission cuts, international verification of reductions without foreign funding and technology, and imposition of trade barriers in the name of climate change.”

Meanwhile the news from Australia has come as a blow to those seeking to extend tradable permit schemes around the world. The Australian senate has rejected a bill to set up an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), designed to cut Australia’s carbon emissions by up to 25% below 2000 levels by 2020.

Copenhagen climate talks: Main issues Independent (30/11/09)
Factfile on UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen talks Independent (30/11/09)
Copenhagen summit: Is there any real chance of averting the climate crisis? Observer, James Hansen (29/11/09)
A heated debate Economist (26/11/09)
Getting warmer Economist (3/12/09)
Is it worth it? Economist (3/12/09)
Good policy, and bad Economist (3/12/09)
The Carbon Economy Economist (3/12/09)
Copenhagen climate summit: 50/50 chance of stopping catastrophe, Lord Stern says Telegraph (1/12/09)
UK Economist: Climate Skeptics are Confused U.S.News, Meera Selva (1/12/09)
Growing Scientific Consensus on Climate Change Ahead of Copenhagen Conference Voice of America, Michael Bowman (1/12/09)
EU ‘should cut emissions by 30%’ BBC News, Roger Harrabin (1/12/09)
Stern says Copenhagen could still save world Environmental Data Interactive Exchange (1/12/09)
Moves by U.S., China induce India to do its bit on climate Washington Post, Rama Lakshmi (2/12/09)
Why do climate deniers hold sway in Australia? Guardian, Fred Pearce (1/12/09)
Australian Senate defeats carbon trading bill Guardian, Toni O’Loughlin (2/12/09)
Failed CPRS ‘may lead to better plan’ Sydney Morning Herald (2/12/09)
Australia carbon laws fail, election possible Reuters, Rob Taylor (2/12/09)
Australian Senate rejects Kevin Rudd’s climate plan BBC News (2/12/09)

The following is the official conference site:
United Nations Climate Change Conference Dec 7–Dec 18 2009

Questions

  1. Why cannot tackling global warming be left totally to the market?
  2. To what extent can the market provide part of the solution to global warming?
  3. How can a cap-and-trade system (i.e. tradable permits) be used to achieve (a) emissions reductions; (b) an efficient way of achieving such reductions?
  4. Why could the atmosphere be described as a ‘global commons’? Does it have either or both of the features of non-excludability and non-rivalry (which are both features of a public good)?
  5. To what extent are climate change talks a prisoner’s dilemma game? How may the Nash equilibrium of no deal, or an unenforceable deal, be avoided?

On 26 November, the water industry regulator, Ofwat, published its decisions on the price caps that will apply to all the 21 water companies covering 23 areas in England and Wales from 2010 to 2015. Despite calling for average cuts of £14 in draft proposals released back in July, Ofwat is now requiring an average cut of just £3. This still means that average water prices will be some 10 per cent lower than those sought by the water companies. Note that all these figures are in real terms: i.e. after taking inflation (or deflation) into account.

But while customers in some areas will see their bills frozen in real terms, or even significantly cut, others will see a rise in theirs. The average price change varies from a fall of 7 per cent in Wales, East Anglia and Portsmouth to a rise of 13 per cent in Essex and Suffolk. There is also variation within regions, depending on factors such as whether or not you have a water meter. Thus, in the South West, customers without a meter could see a rise in bills of 29 per cent.

Not surprisingly, Ofwat’s decisions have received mixed reactions. The water companies claim that the price cap is too high to allow them to make the necessary investment in water infrastructure, such as replacing old pipes to cut down on leakages. Water customers, on the other hand, claim that Ofwat has been ‘captured’ by the industry and, as a result, has been much too lenient.

So who is right? And is the current system of 23 separate regional monopolies, regulated through price cap regulation, the best way of structuring and running the water industry? The following articles and videos look at the issues

Ofwat delivers flat bills for customers Ofwat news release (26/11/09)
Ofwat Publishes Its Decisions Regarding The Prices To Be Charged By Water And Sewerage Companies eGov Monitor (26/11/09)
Water prices to remain flat Financial Times, William MacNamara (26/11/09)
Water bills in England and Wales to be cut (including video) BBC News (26/11/09)
Water price cuts ‘could stop leak programmes’ BBC Today Programme (26/11/09)
The Big Question: Should water bills be going down even further than they are? Independent, Martin Hickman (27/11/09)
Water boys the winners with Ofwat? Independent, James Moore (27/11/09)
Households face higher than expected water bills Telegraph, Myra Butterworth (26/11/09)
There’s trouble in the pipeline as Ofwat boss fails to spot the cracks Telegraph, Damian Reece (27/11/09)
Water bills set to drop by only £3 a year Guardian, Tim Webb (26/11/09)
Regulator must find better way to fix water prices Guardian, Nils Pratley (26/11/09)
Water regulator bows to lobbying on bill price cuts (including video) Times Online, Peter Stiff (26/11/09)
Ofwat ruling on water bills will hit millions of unmetered homes Times Online, Robin Pagnamenta (27/11/09)
Water company shares buoyant after Ofwat ruling Guardian, Market Forces blog, Nick Fletcher (26/11/09)
Severn Trent leads water company shares higher after regulator’s review Telegraph (26/11/09)

The full report can be accessed from the Ofwat site at:
Final determinations on price limits Ofwat (26/11/09)

Questions

  1. Is price cap regulation of the RPI–X variety the best form of regulation? Explain with reference to both incentives and the issue of uncertainty.
  2. Explain whether water companies are natural monopolies.
  3. To what extent can competition be introduced into privatised utility industries as an alternative to regulation? Is increased competition a practical alternative to price cap regulation in the water industry?
  4. What are the arguments for and against installing water meters in each home so that people pay per litre used rather than paying a flat charge depending on the property value?
  5. Explain what is meant by ‘regulatory capture’. Is there evidence of regulatory capture in the water industry? Consider with respect to the November 26 ruling.