Over the past 13 years of the Labour government, the incomes of the richest 1 per cent in the UK have grown substantially faster than that of other income groups, as they also did under the previous Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997. But, thanks to complex redistributive policies, including tax credits, the rise in relative poverty that occurred in the 1980s and 90s has been arrested. With the exception of the top 1 per cent, disposable income growth has been similar across the income groups.
As Larry Elliott, the Guardian’s Economics editor argues:
During the Thatcher-Major years, real incomes for the richest fifth of the population rose fastest, averaging growth of about 2.5% a year. The next richest quintile did a little less well, the middle 20% a bit less well still, and so on all the way down to the poorest 20% of the population, which saw the smallest real income gains of less than 1% a year.
Under Labour, the very high rewards secured by the top 1% of earners has obscured an even distribution of real income growth across the five quintiles.
The new coalition government maintains that anti-poverty policies have failed:
… Iain Duncan Smith, the work and pensions secretary, made a statement trashing Labour’s record: “Vast sums of money have been poured into the benefits system over the last decade in an attempt to address poverty, but today’s statistics clearly show that this approach has failed. Little progress has been made in tackling child poverty, society is more unequal than 50 years ago and there are more working age people living in poverty than ever before.
A new approach is needed which addresses the drivers behind poverty and actually improves the outcomes of the millions of adults and children trapped in poverty.”
The following articles explore what has been happening to inequality and poverty and look at the policies proposed by the coalition government. The data on inequality are also given, along with commentary on them by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
Articles
Labour’s poverty record may be flawed, but the damage was done by the Tories Guardian, Larry Elliott (24/5/10)
The distribution of income: For richer, for poorer Guardian editorial (24/5/10)
What the poverty figures show Guardian Joe Public blog, Julia Unwin (chief executive of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation) (21/5/10)
Data and reports
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 1994/95-2008/09 Department for Work and Pensions(19/5/10)
Households Below Average Income (pdf file) National Statistics, First Release (20/5/10)
Effects of taxes and benefits on household income Office for National Statistics (see also, especially Tables 26 and 27)
Poverty and inequality in the UK: 2010 Institute for Fiscal Studies
A range of poverty data The Poverty Site
Questions
- What has happened to the distribution of original, gross, disposable and post-tax income distribution (a) by percentage shares of quintile groups of income; (b) in terms of gini coefficients? (See the “Effects of taxes and benefits on household income” reference above.)
- Why is income inequality likely to increase unless strong redistributive policies are pursued by the government?
- What are ‘the drivers behind poverty’?
- To what extent is there a trade-off between economic growth and redistributing incomes from rich to poor?
- Why is it argued that in an increasingly interdependent world, senior executives have to be paid extremely high salaries and be given very large bonuses in order for a company to recruit sufficiently talented people and yet wages have to be kept low to allow goods to remain competitive?
- Why was income much more equally distributed in the 1960s and 70s than it is today?
- What redistributive policies is the new coalition government in the UK pursuing? What factors will determine their success?
The EU competition acuthorities have just fined ten producers of memory chips a total of €331 million for operating a cartel. One of the ten, Micron, will pay no fine because it blew the whistle on the other nine. They, in turn, have had their fines reduced by 10% for co-operating with the authorities. According to the EU Press Release:
The overall cartel was in operation between 1 July 1998 and 15 June 2002. It involved a network of contacts and sharing of secret information, mostly on a bilateral basis, through which they coordinated the price levels and quotations for DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memory), sold to major PC or server original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the EEA.
“This first settlement decision is another milestone in the Commission’s anti-cartel enforcement. By acknowledging their participation in a cartel the companies have allowed the Commission to bring this long-running investigation to a close and to free up resources to investigate other suspected cartels. As the procedure is applied to new cases it is expected to speed up investigations significantly”, said Commission Vice President and Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia.
Articles
Chipmakers to pay fines of €330m over cartel Financial Times, Nikki Tait (20/5/10)
Chipmakers fined by EU for price-fixing BBC News (19/5/10)
European Commission douments and findings
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels Europa Press Release (3/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels – frequently asked questions Europa Memo (30/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission fines DRAM producers € 331 million for price cartel; reaches first settlement in a cartel case Europa Press Release (19/5/10)
Antitrust: Commission adopts first cartel settlement decision – questions & answers Europa Memo (19/5/10)
Questions
- Explain how the new fast-track cartel settlement procedure works.
- Are the incentives built into the procedure appropriate for reducing oligopolistic collusion?
- Are the any reasons why the chip cartel might have been in consumers’ interests?
- Why does EU competition legislation apply in this case given than all but one of the companies are non-EU businesses?
The happiness literature has established that, in the developed countries, increasing affluence has not increased well-being in recent decades. We seek an explanation for this in terms of conspicuous consumption, a phenomenon originally identified by Veblen.
This is from the abstract of an article in the Economic Journal, ‘Well-being and Affluence in the Presence of a Veblen Good’ by B. Curtis Eaton and Mukesh Eswaran. The authors argue that while increased affluence of the rich may bring a small amount of extra benefit to them, it actually reduces the well-being of others who crave after things that they cannot afford. As the first article below states:
[The authors] believe their work shows that as a nation becomes wealthier, consumption shifts increasingly to buying status symbols with no intrinsic value – such as lavish jewellery, designer clothes and luxury cars. But they warn: “These goods represent a ‘zero-sum game’ for society: they satisfy the owners, making them appear wealthy, but everyone else is left feeling worse off.”
… There is another downside. As people yearn for more status symbols they have less time or inclination for helping others. This, the authors argue, damages “community and trust”, which are vital to an economy because they ensure the smooth running of society.
But do the super wealthy generate more jobs and more prosperity? Do we need to pay vast salaries and bonuses as incentives for executives to take risks: to invest in new products and processes, and drive technological advance and productivity increases? According to the second article, ‘Too few of the world’s billionaires can claim to be honest-to-God productive entrepreneurs who have enlarged the economic pie by dint of hard work, imagination, risk taking and innovation – although thankfully a useful proportion do populate the list.’
So is the ever widening gap between rich and poor necessary if the economy is to grow? Or is it something of very little value to society, except, perhaps, for the super rich themselves?
Articles
More money makes society miserable, warns report The Observer, Jamie Doward (14/3/10)
Don’t celebrate these billionaires, be horrified by their existence The Observer, Will Hutton (14/3/10)
Data
For the latest Guardian survey of executive pay, see: Executive pay survey, 2009
For data on UK incomes and income distribution, see: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) Office for National Statistics
For data on the distribution of wealth in the UK, see Distribution of Personal Wealth HM Revenue and Customs
Questions
- Explain what is meant by a ‘Veblen good’.
- What is meant by the diminishing marginal utility of income? What implications does this have for the effects of income distribution and redistribution on social well-being?
- Why may a rise in GDP make society worse off if it is accompanied by growing inequality?
- To what extent can marginal productivity theory explain the salaries and other rewards of the wealthy?
- Using the data below, examine the extent to which the gap between rich and poor is growing.
- Explain why increasing conspicuous consumption by the wealthy might be a zero-sum game for society or even a negative-sum game.
- What factors cause a rise in productivity?
- How might greater entrepreneurship be encouraged in the UK?
For many people, internet access is something we take for granted and if you can’t afford to connect, you might be seen to be in relative poverty. Whilst you can afford food, clothes, housing etc, other goods and services are increasingly being seen as necessities. Everyone should be able to afford a mobile phone, a television, the internet. These are all factors that contribute towards a feeling of social inclusion, which is something the government has promoted since its election in 1997.
Although internet access is the norm for most people, in the UK our internet speeds are actually significantly slower than those in other industrialised countries. All this could be about to change, with Labour’s proposal for a 50p monthly tax on households’ landlines to fund super-fast broadband across the country. However, this plan has been condemned by some influential MPs, who argue that the tax is regressive.
“We believe that a 50 pence levy placed on fixed telecommunication lines is an ill-directed charge. It will place a disproportionate cost on a majority who will not, or are unable to, reap the benefits of that charge.”
More important, they argue, is to make sure that everyone has internet access, rather than that everyone has fast access, which is not needed at the moment. When there is a demand for high-speed access from the masses, the market will provide it. However, the government argues that high-speed access is crucial to our economic growth, as it allows access to huge social, economic and health benefits. On the other hand, could such a tax reduce growth, by limiting technological innovation? The Conservatives have promised that if elected, they will scrap this broadband levy and instead aim to fund high-speed internet access by providing ‘BT’s rivals with regulatory incentives to roll out new telecoms networks’. This highly contentious issue is discussed in the articles below.
The Broadband tax: dead in the water? BBC News, Rory Cellan-Jones (23/2/10)
Broadband tax plan condemned Press Association (23/2/10)
Social tariff users need to be made aware of broadband tax exemption Broadband Expert (17/2/10)
Broadband tax could dissuade technology innovation Broadband (27/1/10)
Tories pledge rise in broadband speed Financial Times, Andrew Parker and Ben Fenton (9/2/10)
Fast broadband: an election issue? BBC News, Rory Cellan-Jones (3/2/10)
Questions
- What will be the effect of a tax on landlines? Illustrate this on a diagram and think about who will be affected. What type of tax does it represent: direct, indirect, specific, ad-valorem, etc?
- Is the tax fair? Why is it argued to be regressive?
- How will the Conservative party’s aim to provide regulatory incentives to BT’s rivals allow them to provide high-speed internet access? Is their solution better than Labour’s proposal?
- Why might the provision of high-speed internet access (a) stimulate economic growth and (b) constrain economic growth?
- Use a growth model to illustrate the importance of technological progress in achieving high levels of economic growth.
- How will a tax affect households? Consider the impact on income and consumption and hence on aggregate demand.
UK Parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee has concluded that the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is not working as it should. Thanks to a total emissions cap that is too low in a time of recession, the carbon price has fallen. The result is that there is no longer sufficient of an incentive for firms to invest in green technology. As the Financial Times article (below) reports:
The committee has urged the government to consider other measures, such as a floor price for carbon dioxide emissions, which would provide industries with greater certainty over the price of carbon and help to ensure the system of pricing was effective.
The MPs said a price of €100 per tonne of CO2 could be necessary to encourage investment, compared with current prices of about €13.
So is the committee correct? Or is a low price of carbon merely temporary, with firms realising that the price will rise as the European economy recovers? The following articles examine the issues.
Carbon markets failing, say British MPs Financial Times, Fiona Harvey (8/2/10)
Carbon prices are going the wrong way Independent, David Prosser (8/2/10)
U.K. Lawmakers Call for Intervention in Carbon Market BusinessWeek, Catherine Airlie and Ewa Krukowska (8/2/10)
UK should press EU for tighter carbon caps Reuters, Nina Chestney (8/2/10)
MPs propose carbon tax to boost green investment Guardian, Terry Macalister (8/2/10)
As UK Cap and Trade Falters, Government May Prop Up Carbon Prices Environmental Leader (9/2/10)
EU ETS intervention call howled down CarbonPositive (9/2/10)
The report
The role of carbon markets in preventing dangerous climage change Environmental Audit Committee
Questions
- Explain how the ETS works.
- What determines the price of carbon in the ETS? Why has it fallen in recent months?
- Compare the alternative policy approaches for encouraging green investment.
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of setting a floor price for carbon permits? What would be the effect on the balance of demand for and supply of premits?
- Discuss whether the total number of permits allocated should be reduced (i.e. the cap tightened).
- Compare the relative merits of giving the allocation of permits away with auctioning them.
- Compare the relative merits of a cap-and-trade system with green taxes.