The UK energy regulator, Ofgem, has announced that the UK energy price cap will rise in October by an average of 2%. The energy price cap sets the maximum prices for electricity and gas that can be charged by suppliers to households. For those paying by direct debit, the maximum electricity price per kilowatt-hour (kWh) will rise from 25.73p to 26.35p, with the maximum daily standing charge rising from 51.37p to 53.68p. As far as gas is concerned, the maximum price per kWh will fall slightly from 6.33p to 6.29p, with the maximum daily standing charge rising from 29.82p to 34.03p. Ofgem estimates that this will mean that the capped cost to the average household will rise from £1720 to £1755.
The average capped cost is now much lower than the peak of £4279 from January to March 2023. This followed the huge increase in international gas prices in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine and the cutting off of gas supplies from Russia. Note that although the suppliers received these capped prices, average consumers’ bills were limited to £2500 from October 2022 to March 2024 under the government’s Energy Price Guarantee scheme, with suppliers receiving a subsidy from the government to make up the shortfall. But despite today’s cap being much lower than at the peak, it is still much higher than the cap of £1277 prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: see Chart 1 (click here for a PowerPoint).
So is the capped price purely a reflection of the international price of gas, or is it more complicated? The picture is slightly different for gas and electricity.
Gas prices
As far as gas prices are concerned, the price does largely reflect the international price: see Chart 2 (click here for a PowerPoint).
The UK is no longer self-sufficient in gas and relies in part on imported gas, with the price determined in volatile international markets. It also has low gas storage capacity compared with most other European countries. This leaves it highly reliant on volatile global markets in periods of prolonged high demand, like a cold winter. Is such cases, the UK often has to purchase more expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG) from global suppliers.
Additionally, taxes, environmental levies and the costs of the nationwide gas distribution network contribute to the overall price for consumers. Changes in these costs affect gas prices. These are itemised below in the case of electricity.
With electricity pricing, the picture is more complex.
Electricity prices
Electricity generation costs vary considerably with the different methods. Renewable sources like wind and solar have the lowest marginal costs, while natural gas plants have the highest, although gas prices fluctuate considerably.
So how are consumer electricity prices determined? And how is the electricity price cap determined? The price cap for electricity per kWh and the daily standing charge for electricity are shown in Chart 3 (click here for a PowerPoint).
Marginal cost pricing. The wholesale price of electricity in the UK market is set by the most expensive power source needed to meet demand on a day-by-day basis. This is typically gas. This means that even when cheaper renewables (wind, solar, hydro) or nuclear power generate most of the electricity, high gas prices can increase the cost for all electricity. The wholesale price accounts for around 41% of the retail price paid by households.
It also means that profits for low-marginal-cost producers could increase significantly when gas prices rise. To prevent such (low-carbon) suppliers making excess profits when the wholesale price is high and possibly making a loss when it is low, the actual prices that they receive is negotiated in advance and a contract is signed. These contracts are known as Contracts for Difference (CfDs). CfDs provide a fixed ‘strike price’ to low-carbon generators. The strike price is set so as to allow low-carbon generators to recoup capital costs and is thus set above the typical level of marginal cost. If the wholesale price is below the strike price, payments to generators to cover the difference are funded by amounts collected from electricity suppliers in advance using the CfD Supplier Obligation Levy. If the wholesale price is above the strike price, the difference is returned to consumers in terms of lower electricity bills.
Policy costs. Electricity bills include an element to fund various social and environmental objectives. This element is also included in the cap. From October to December 2025, this element of the cap will be 11.3%. The money helps to subsidise low-carbon energy generation and fund energy efficiency schemes. It also funds the Warm Home Discount (WHD). In the October to December 2025 price cap, this amounted to a discount for eligible low-income and vulnerable households of £150 per annum on their electricity bills. The WHD element is included in the standing charge in the price cap. From October 2025, more generous terms will mean that the number of households receiving WHD will increase from 3.4 million to 6.1 million households. This is the main reason for the £35 increase in the cap.
Network costs. These include the cost of building, maintaining and repairing the pipes and wires that deliver gas and electricity to homes. From October to December 2025, this element of the cap will be 22.6%.
Supplier business costs. These include operating costs (billing, metering, office costs, etc.) and servicing debt. From October to December 2025, this element of the cap will be 15.4%.
Profit Allowance. A small percentage is added to the price cap for energy suppliers’ profits. This is known as the Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) allowance and is around 2.4%. This has a fixed component that does not change when the overall price cap is updated and a variable component that rises or falls with changes in the cap.
Reliance on gas, low gas storage facilities, marginal cost pricing and the commitment to invest in low-carbon electricity and home heating all add to the costs of energy in the UK, making UK electricity prices among the highest in the world.
Articles
Information and Data
Questions
- Why are the UK’s energy prices among the highest in the world?
- What are the arguments for and against subsidising wind power?
- What is the Contracts for Difference scheme in low-carbon energy. What CfDs have been awarded? Assess the desirability of the scheme.
- Is the capping of gas and electricity prices the best way of providing support for low-income and vulnerable consumers?
- How are externalities relevant in determining the optimal pricing of electricity?
On the day he came to office, President Trump signed a series of executive orders. One of these was to set in motion the process of withdrawing from the UN Paris climate agreement. Section 3(a) of the order reads:
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations shall immediately submit formal written notification of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The Paris Agreement is an international treaty on climate change. It was adopted on 12 December 2015 and came into force on 4 November 2016, 30 days after the point was reached when at least 55 countries accounting for at least 55% of global emissions had ratified the treaty.
Currently, all UN countries are signatories to the agreement and only Iran, Libya and Yemen are yet to ratify it. The agreement commits countries to limiting global warming to well under 2°C above pre-industrial levels and preferably to no more than 1.5°C. This would involve reducing greenhouse gas emissions and/or taking carbon absorbing measures.
Since 2020, each country has been required to submit its own emission-reduction targets, known as ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs), and the actions it will take to meet them. Every five years each country must submit a new NDC more ambitious than the last.
Rich countries are expected to provide finance to low-income countries. This is required to help poor countries adopt green technologies and to adapt to the harmful effects of climate change (e.g. through irrigation schemes and flood defences).
Countries set target dates by which emissions would be fully offset by carbon absorption measures (‘net zero’). The UN’s goal is to reach global net zero by 2050. According to the UN Climate Action site:
As of June 2024, 107 countries, responsible for approximately 82 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, had adopted net-zero pledges either in law, in a policy document such as an national climate action plan or a long-term strategy, or in an announcement by a high-level government official. More than 9000 companies, over 1000 cities, more than 1000 educational institutions, and over 600 financial institutions have joined the Race to Zero, pledging to take rigorous, immediate action to halve global emissions by 2030.
The Paris Agreement has helped to cut emissions or slow their rate of growth in most countries. Although net zero by 2050 may be unlikely, warming will be less than without the agreement.
The USA and the Paris Agreement
In April 2016 the USA signed the Paris Agreement. As stated above, the Paris Agreement came into effect on 4 November 2016.
President Trump came to office for the first time in January 2017. In June 2017, he signed an executive order in which he announced that the USA would withdraw from the agreement, arguing that it undermined the US economy and put it at a competitive disadvantage. He claimed that global warming is a hoax concocted by China designed to undermine the competitive power of the USA.
However, despite Trump’s intention to withdraw from the agreement, its terms did not allow a country to begin a withdrawal procedure for at least three years after the agreement was ratified (i.e. not before 4 November 2019) and then a year’s notice has to be given. This notice was given on 4 November 2019. In the meantime, the USA had to abide by the terms of the treaty. During this period, US representatives at COP meetings used the opportunity to promote fossil fuels. Withdrawal took place on 1 November 2020, just one day after the presidential election and just over two months before the end of Trump’s first term of office.
On 20 January 2021, his first day in office, President Biden signed an executive order to rejoin the agreement, which took place on 19 February 2021. He committed to cutting total greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50% by 2030. To achieve this, his administration adopted a number of emissions-reducing measures, for example requiring all new passenger vehicles sold after 2035 to be emissions free, giving tax credits for clean electricity generation, providing federal funds for smart agriculture and setting greener appliance and equipment standards.
But, as we have seen, newly elected President Trump for the second time announced that the USA would withdraw from the Paris agreement and would prioritise fossil fuel production, under the mantra, ‘drill, baby, drill’.
The economics of climate change
Climate change is directly caused by market failures. One of the most important of these is that the atmosphere is a common resource: it is not privately owned; it is a global ‘commons’. Individuals and firms use it at a zero price. If the price of any good or service to the user is zero, there is no incentive to economise on its use. Thus for the emitter there are no private costs of using the atmosphere in this way as a ‘dump’ for their emissions and, in a free market, no incentive to reduce the climate costs.
And yet when firms emit greenhouse gases into the atmosphere there are costs to other people. To the extent that they contribute to global warming, part of these costs will be borne by the residents of that country; but a large part will be borne by inhabitants of other countries.
These climate costs are external costs to the firm and are illustrated in the figure. It shows an industry that emits CO2. To keep the analysis simple, assume that it is a perfectly competitive industry with demand and supply given by curves D and S, which are equal to the marginal private benefits (MPB) and marginal private costs (MPC), respectively. There are no externalities on the demand side and hence MPB equals the marginal social cost (MSB). Market equilibrium is at point a, with output at Qpc and price at Ppc. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)
Assume that the emissions create a marginal cost to society equal to MECc. Assume that the MEC increases as output and total emissions increase. The MECc line is thus upward sloping. At the market price of Qpc, these external climate costs are equal to the purple vertical line. When these external climate costs are added to private costs, this gives a marginal social cost given by MSC = MPC + MECc. The gives a socially optimal level of output of the product of Q* at a price of P*, with the optimum point of c.
In other words, other things being equal, the free market overproduces products with climate externalities. If the output is to be reduced to the social optimum of Q*, then the government will need to take measures such as those advocated in the Paris Agreement. These could include imposing taxes on products, such as electricity generated by fossil fuels, or on the emissions themselves. Or green alternatives, such as wind power, could be subsidised.
Alternatively, regulations could be used to cap the production of products creating emissions, or caps on the emissions themselves could be imposed. Emissions permits could be issued or auctioned. Only firms in possession of the permits would be allowed to emit and the permits would cap emissions below free-market levels. These permits could be traded under a cap-and-trade scheme, such as the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme. Again, such schemes are advocated under the Paris Agreement.
Effect of the USA’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and promoting fossil fuels will increase US emissions. Scientific consensus is that this will have a negative effect on climate change. Only part of these climate costs will be borne by the USA, although the severity of recent fires in California, fanned by strong Santa Ana winds, and more violent hurricanes are two examples of costs of climate change to the USA itself.
A bigger worry is whether the USA’s withdrawal will encourage other countries, such as Argentina, to do likewise. Then the climate costs of US withdrawal will be greater.
But all is not bad news. The transition to green energy is well advanced and the costs of solar and wind power are decreasing. Global investment in clean energy has increased by 60% since 2015. China is investing heavily in renewable energy technology, which is giving it a significant trade advantage. The EU has taken significant actions to promote green energy and technology. Similarly, industrial processes that economise on emissions are developing apace and it is becoming increasingly profitable for private companies to make climate-friendly investments without subsidies. In the USA itself, many Democratic states and local governments, and even some Republican ones, will continue to adopt climate-friendly policies.
In this environment, the Trump administration does not want to fall behind in the development of new technologies and markets. And with Elon Musk having a significant influence on Donald Trump, the USA’s investment in EVs and battery technology is likely to continue. This will help to reduce the price of green energy and transport.
Videos
Articles
- Trump vows to leave Paris climate agreement and ‘drill, baby, drill’
BBC News, Matt McGrath (20/1/25)
- What is the Paris climate agreement and why has Trump withdrawn?
BBC News, Esme Stallard and Mark Poynting (21/1/25)
- Six Trump executive orders to watch
BBC News (21/1/25)
- The real message behind Trump’s withdrawal of US from the Paris climate agreement
Sky News, Tom Clarke (21/1/25)
- Trump signs order to withdraw US from Paris climate agreement for second time
The Guardian, Dharna Noor (20/1/25)
- Explained: how Trump’s day one orders reveal a White House for big oi
The Guardian, Oliver Milman and Dharna Noor (22/1/25)
- Donald Trump can’t stop global climate action. If we stick together, it’s the US that will lose out
The Guardian, Bill Hare (6/11/24)
Trump to pull US from Paris climate agreement: What could this mean for the environment?
ITV News, Martin Stew (21/1/25)
- 10 reasons why US president-elect Donald Trump can’t derail global climate action
The Conversation, Wesley Morgan and Ben Newell (8/11/24)
- Trump has rejected the Paris agreement again, but game theory shows how other countries can still lead by example
The Conversation, Renaud Foucart (27/1/25)
Information
Questions
- Summarise the Paris Agreement.
- Using a diagram similar to that above, illustrate how the free market will produce a sub-optimal amount of solar power because the marginal social benefit exceeds the marginal private benefit.
- How might game theory be used to analyse possible international decision making in the context of US climate policy?
- Is it in America’s interests to cease investing in green energy and green production methods?
- Go through each of the reasons (not specific to Australia) given in The Conversation article linked above why ‘Donald Trump can’t derail global climate action’. To what extent do you agree with each one?
In many countries, train fares at peak times are higher than at off-peak times. This is an example of third-degree price discrimination. Assuming that peak-time travellers generally have a lower price elasticity of demand, the policy allows train companies to increase revenue and profit.
If the sole purpose of ticket sales were to maximise profits, the policy would make sense. Assuming that higher peak-time fares were carefully set, although the number travelling would be somewhat reduced, this would be more than compensated for by the higher revenue per passenger.
But there are external benefits from train travel. Compared with travel by car, there are lower carbon emissions per person travelling. Also, train travel helps to reduce road congestion. To the extent that higher peak-time fares encourage people to travel by car instead, there will be resulting environmental and congestion externalities.
The Scottish experiment with abolishing higher peak-time fares
In October 2023, the Scottish government introduced a pilot scheme abolishing peak-time fares, so that tickets were the same price at any time of the day. The idea was to encourage people, especially commuters, to adopt more sustainable means of transport. Although the price elasticity of demand for commuting is very low, the hope was that the cross-price elasticity between cars and trains would be sufficiently high to encourage many people to switch from driving to taking the train.
One concern with scrapping peak-time fares is that trains would not have the capacity to cope with the extra passengers. Indeed, one of the arguments for higher peak-time fares is to smooth out the flow of passengers during the day, encouraging those with flexibility of when to travel to use the cheaper and less crowded off-peak trains.
This may well apply to certain parts of the UK, but in the case of Scotland it was felt that there would be the capacity to cope with the extra demand at peak time. Also, in a post-COVID world, with more people working flexibly, there was less need for many people to travel at peak times than previously.
Reinstatement of peak-time fares in Scotland
It was with some dismay, therefore, especially by commuters and environmentalists, when the Scottish government decided to end the pilot at the beginning of October 2024 and reinstate peak-time fares – in many cases at nearly double the off-peak rates. For example, the return fare between Glasgow and Edinburgh rose from £16.20 to £31.40 at peak times.
The Scottish government justified the decision by claiming that passenger numbers had risen by only 6.8%, when, to be self-financing, an increase of 10% would have been required. But this begs the question of whether it was necessary to be self-financing when the justification was partly environmental. Also, the 6.8% figure is based on a number of assumptions that could be challenged (see The Conversation article linked below). A longer pilot would have helped to clarify demand.
Other schemes
A number of countries have introduced schemes to encourage greater use of the railways or other forms of public transport. One of these is the flat fare for local journeys. Provided that this is lower than previously, it can encourage people to use public transport and leave their car at home. Also, its simplicity is also likely to be attractive to passengers. For example, in England bus fares are capped at £2. Currently, the scheme is set to run until 31 December 2024.
Another scheme is the subscription model, whereby people pay a flat fee per month (or week or year, or other time period) for train or bus travel or both. Germany, for example, has a flat-rate €49 per month ‘Deutschland-Ticket‘ (rising to €58 per month in January 2025). This ticket provides unlimited access to local and regional public transport in Germany, including trains, buses, trams, metros and ferries (but not long-distance trains). This zero marginal fare cost of a journey encourages passengers to use public transport. The only marginal costs they will face will be ancillary costs, such as getting to and from the train station or bus stop and having to travel at a specific time.
Articles
- Why a pilot scheme removing peak rail fares should have been allowed to go the distance
The Conversation, Rachel Scarfe (8/10/24)
- Return of peak rail fares a costly blow for commuters and climate, Scottish Greens say
Bright Green, Chris Jarvis (6/10/24)
Commuters react to return of peak train fares in Scotland
BBC News (1/10/24)
- Perth peak rail fares to Edinburgh rise by almost 60 percent as pilot scheme ends
Daily Record, Alastair McNeill (4/10/24)
- Ditch peak-time rail fares across UK, campaigners say
iNews, Adam Forrest (30/9/24)
- Train fares reduced by up to 20% in East Yorkshire
Rail Advent, Roger Smith (26/9/24)
- Deutschland-Ticket: Germany’s popular monthly transport pass will soon be more expensive
Euronews, Angela Symons (24/9/24)
- Fare Britannia: a new approach to public transport ticketing for the UK
Greenpeace report, Leo Eyles, Tony Duckenfield and Jim Steer (19/9/24)
- Ministers urged to trial monthly ‘climate card’ in North of England to save rail commuters money and cut emissions
About Manchester, Nigel Barlow (20/9/24)
Questions
- Identify the arguments for and against having higher rail fares at peak times than at off-peak times
- Why might it be a good idea to scrap higher peak-time fares in some parts of a country but not in others?
- Provide a critique of the Scottish government’s arguments for reintroducing higher peak-time fares.
- With reference to The Conversation article, why is it difficult to determine the effect on demand of the Scottish pilot of scrapping peak-time fares?
- What are the arguments for and against the German scheme of having a €49 per month public transport pass for local and regional transport with no further cost per journey? Should it be extended to long-distance trains and coaches?
- In England there is a flat £2 single fare for buses. Would it be a good idea to make bus travel completely free?
A happy New Year for 2024. Let’s hope that the coming year brings some good news amidst all the the gloom of war, squeezed living standards, the effects of climate change and the rise of authoritarian regimes.
One piece of good news is the growth in environmental debt swaps in developing countries. These are known as debt-for-nature swaps (or debt-for-environment swaps or green debt swaps). As Case Study 26.16 in Economics (11th edition) and Case Study 15.19 in Essentials of Economics (9th edition) explain:
A debt-for-nature swap is where debts are cancelled in return for investment in environmental projects, including protecting biodiversity, reducing carbon emissions and mitigating the effect of climate change. There are two types of scheme: bilateral and commercial.
In a bilateral swap, a creditor country agrees to cancel debt in return for the debtor country investing a proportion of the amount in environmental projects. In a commercial swap, the debt owed to banks is sold to an international environmental agency at a substantial discount (or sometimes even given away); the agency then agrees to cancel this debt in return for the country funding the agency to carry out various environmental projects.
The first debt-for-nature swap was made as far back as 1987, when environmental NGO, Conservation International, arranged for Bolivia to be forgiven $650 000 of its debt in exchange for the establishment of three conservation areas bordering the Beni Reserve (see either of the above case studies). In the 1990s and 2000s, debt-for nature swaps became popular with creditors and by 2010, the total debt cancelled through debt-for-nature swaps was just over $1 billion.
However, the popularity waned in the 2010s and with COVID, many developing countries were diverting resources from long-term sustainability and mitigating the effects of climate change to emergency healthcare and relief.
More recently, debt-for-for nature swaps have become popular again.
In May 2023, Ecuador benefited from the biggest debt swap to that point. The agreement saw $1.6bn of its commercial debt refinanced at a discount in exchange for large-scale conservation in and around the Galápagos Islands. At least $12m per year of the money saved will be channelled into conservation in the archipelago, with its unique flora and fauna.
Such projects are set to increase, with potentially significant beneficial effects for biodiversity, climate and the environment generally. At the COP28 summit in December 2023, a task force was set up by a group of multilateral development banks to promote an increase in the size and number of debt-for-nature swaps.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), developing economies will need an annual $2.4 trillion of investment in climate action in the coming years. So far, the market for debt-for-nature swaps is set to rise to around $800bn. If they are to make a significant contribution to tackling climate change and loss of biodiversity, they need to be scaled up massively, especially as the cost of servicing debt has risen with higher global interest rates.
Nevertheless, as part of a portfolio of measures to tackle debt, climate change, loss of biodiversity and damage to the environment more generally, they are making an important contribution – a contribution that is set to rise.
Video and Webinar
Articles
Questions
- Identify other types of debt swap and discuss their importance.
- Why are debt-for-nature debt swaps in the interests of debtor countries, creditors and the world generally?
- What is ‘green washing’? How may debt-for-nature swaps be assessed to prevent such green washing?
- Why are many developing countries’ debt burdens skyrocketing?
- Why may a developing country’s solution to its growing debt be detrimental to the environment?
- Assess the Belize debt-swap deal in tackling both its debt and conservation.
The global average temperature for July 2023 was the highest ever recorded and July 3rd was the world’s hottest day on record. We’ve seen scenes of wildfires raging across much of southern Europe, people suffering searing temperatures in south-west USA, southern India and western China, flash floods in South Korea, Japan and eastern USA. These are all directly related to global warming, which is causing weather systems to become more extreme. And as the planet continues to warm, so these problems will intensify.
The Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, in a press conference on 27 July warned that:
Climate change is here. It is terrifying. And it is just the beginning. The era of global warming has ended; the era of global boiling has arrived. The air is unbreathable. The heat is unbearable. And the level of fossil-fuel profits and climate inaction is unacceptable. Leaders must lead. No more hesitancy. No more excuses. No more waiting for others to move first. There is simply no more time for that.
The environmental, human, social and economic impact of global warming is huge, but concentrated on just part of the world’s population. For many, a more variable climate is at worst an inconvenience – at least in the short term. But it is the short term that politicians are most concerned about when seeking to win the next election.
Tackling climate change requires action to reduce carbon emissions now, even though the effects take many years. But one person’s emissions make only a minuscule contribution to global warming. So why not be selfish and carry on driving, flying off on holiday, using a gas boiler and eating large amounts of red meat? This is what many people want to do and governments know it. Many people do not like green policies as they involve sacrifice. Examples include higher fuel prices and restrictions on what you can do. So, despite the visions of fires, floods and destruction, governments are wary about raising fuel taxes, airport duties and charges to use old high-emission cars in cities; wary about raising taxes generally to provide subsidies for sustainable power generation; wary about banning new oil and gas fields that would reduce reliance on imported fuel.
Because the external costs of carbon emissions are so high and global, government action is required to change behaviour. Education can help and scenes of devastation from around the world may change the hearts and minds or some people. Also, the prospect of profits from cleaner and more fuel-efficient technology can help to spur innovation and investment. But to meet net zero targets still requires policies that are unpopular with many people who might be inconvenienced or have to pay higher petrol, energy and food prices, especially at a time when budgets are being squeezed by inflation.
Part of the problem is a distributional one. The people most affected by the cost-of-living crisis and higher interest rates are those on lower incomes and with higher debts. Politicians know that it will be hard to win the votes of such people if they are faced with higher green taxes. As elections approach, politicians are likely to backtrack on many environmental commitments to appeal to such people.
This is beginning to happen in the UK, with the government declaring that it is on the side of the motorist. Indeed, Rishi Sunak has just announced that the government will authorise more than 100 new licenses for new oil and gas wells in the North Sea. This is despite the United Nations, various other international bodies, climate scientists and charities calling for a halt to all licensing and funding of new oil and gas development from new and existing fields. The government argues that increased North Sea production would reduce the reliance on imported oil.
Video
Articles
- July 2023 the Hottest Ever Month on Record, Likely Warmest in ‘Tens of Thousands of Years’
The Wire, Aathira Perinchery (28/7/23)
- Climate threat ‘existential’ says Biden, as world faces hottest July
BBC News, Heather Sharp and Emma Owen (27/7/23)
- UN chief says Earth in ‘era of global boiling’, calls for radical action
Aljazeera (27/7/23)
- Why it’s time to prepare for the worst on climate change
Financial Times, Robert Pindyck (6/7/23)
- The planet heats, the world economy cools – the real global recession is ecological
The Guardian, Larry Elliott (9/7/23)
- Climate change will reshape global supply chains — it can reduce welfare on Earth by 20%: Ivan Rudick
The Economic Times (India), Srijana Mitra Das (30/6/23)
- Rishi Sunak defends granting new North Sea oil and gas licences
BBC News (31/7/23)
- The oil industry has succumbed to a dangerous new climate denialism
The Conversation, Adi Imsirovic (31/7/23)
- Dismay as Rishi Sunak vows to ‘max out’ UK fossil fuel reserves
The Guardian, Severin Carrell, Peter Walker and Helena Horton (31/7/23)
- What are the Conservatives’ green policies – and what could be scrapped
Sky News, Jennifer Scott (31/7/23)
- Rishi Sunak signals he is ready to soften UK green policies
Financial Times, George Parker and Lucy Fisher (24/7/23)
- Green campaigners fear UK policy backlash after ULEZ keeps Uxbridge Tory
Politico, Charlie Cooper and Bethany Dawson (23/7/23)
- Climate policy and economic inequality
VoxEU, Diego Känzig (25/6/23)
- The untapped potential of education in the battle against climate change
VoxEU, Noam Angrist, Kevin Winseck, Harry Anthony Patrinos and Joshua Graff Zivin (14/7/23)
Questions
- In what sense is the environment a ‘public good’? How is the concept of externalities relevant in analysing the private decisions made about the use of a public good?
- How may game theory be used to help understand the difficulties in reaching international agreement about climate change policies?
- What is meant by ‘net zero’? Is carbon capture and storage an acceptable alternative to cutting carbon emissions?
- In what ways could policies to tackle climate change be designed to reduce income inequality rather than increase it?
- What are the arguments for and against banning (a) petrol and diesel cars; (b) gas boilers; (c) fossil-fuel power stations? How much notice should be given if such bans are to be introduced?
- What is meant by ‘nudge theory’? In what ways could people be nudged into making greener decisions?
- What are the arguments for and against granting new licences for North Sea oil and gas drilling? Explain where you feel the balance of the arguments lies.