Ministers from around the world met in Durban in the first two weeks of December 2011 to hammer out a deal on tackling climate change. The aim was that this would replace the Kyoto Treaty, due to expire at the end of 2012.
International climate change agreements are particularly difficult to achieve, as there are several market failures involved. Also, there is considerable ‘gaming’, as each country seeks to negotiate a deal that benefits the world as a whole but which minimises the disadvantages to their own particular country.
The conference ended on the 11 December with a last-minute deal. Both developed and developing countries would for the first time work on a legally binding agreement to limit emissions. This would be drawn up by 2015 and to come into force after 2020. The following articles assess the significance of the agreement and whether it represents real progress or little more than a deal to work on a deal.
Articles
‘Modest’ gains as UN climate deal struck Independent (11/12/11)
Landmark deal saves climate talks Irish Examiner (11/12/11)
Durban climate change: the agreement explained The Telegraph, Louise Gray (11/12/11)
Durban climate conference agrees deal to do a deal – now comes the hard part Guardian, Fiona Harvey and Damian Carrington (13/12/11)
Climate deal: A guarantee our children will be worse off than us Guardian, Damian Carrington (11/12/11)
Durban climate deal: the verdict Guardian, Damian Carrington (12/12/11)
Australia hails Cop 17 agreement News 24 Australia (11/12/11)
Climate talks reach new global accord Financial Times, Andrew England and Pilita Clark (11/12/11)
Durban Climate Talks Produce Imperfect Deals Voice of America, Gabe Joselow (11/12/11)
Critics slam climate agreement t Sydney Morning Herald, Arthur Max (11/12/11)
Deal at last at UN climate change talks Euronews on YouTube (11/12/11)
World still in arrears on climate change pledges Reuters Africa, Barbara Lewis (11/12/11)
New UN climate deal struck, critics say gains modest Hindustan Times (11/12/11)
Climate change: ambition gap Guardian (12/12/11)
Canada leaves Kyoto to avoid heavy penalties Financial Times, Bernard Simon (13/12/11)
Durban Platform Leaves World Sleepwalking Towards Four Degrees Warming Middle East North Africa Financial Network, Ben Grossman-Cohen and Georgette Thomas (Oxfam) (13/12/11)
A deal in Durban The Economist (11/12/11)
Assessing the Climate Talks — Did Durban Succeed? Harvard University – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs – An Economic View of the Environment, Robert Stavins (12/12/11)
Questions
- What was agreed at the Durban Climate Change Conference?
- Why is it difficult to get agreement on measures to tackle climate change? How is game theory relevant to explaining the difficulties in reaching an agreement?
- How would you set about establishing the ‘optimal’ amount of emissions reductions?
- Why will the market fail to provide the optimal amount of emissions reductions?
- Why was it felt not possible for a legally binding international agreement to come into force before 2020?
Most people are risk-averse: we like certainty and are generally prepared to pay a premium for it. The reason is that certainty gives us positive marginal utility and so as long as the price of insurance (which gives us certainty) is less than the price we place on certainty, we will be willing to pay a positive premium. By having insurance, we know that should the unexpected happen, someone else will cover the risk. As long as there are some risk-averse people, there will always be a demand for insurance.
However, will private companies will be willing to supply it? For private market insurance to be efficient, 5 conditions must hold:
1. Probabilities must be independent
2. Probabilities must be less than one
3. Probabilities must be known or estimable
4. There must be no adverse selection
5. There must be no moral hazard
If these conditions hold or if there are simple solutions, then insurance companies will be willing and able to provide insurance at a price consumers are willing to pay.
There are many markets where we take out insurance – some of them where insurance is compulsory, including home and car insurance. However, one type of insurance that is not compulsory is that for cyclists. No insurance is needed to cycle on the road, but with cycle use increasing and with that the number of accidents involving cyclists also increasing, the calls for cyclists to have some type of insurance is growing. If they are hit by someone without insurance and perhaps suffer from a loss of income; or if they cause vehicle damage, they will receive no compensation. However, whilst the risk of accident is increasing for cyclists, they are still statistically less likely to cause an accident than motorists. Perhaps a mere £30 or £40 per year for a policy is a price worth paying to give cyclists certainty. At least, this is what the Association of British Insurers (ABI) is claiming – hardly surprising when their members made a combined loss of £1.2 billion!
Articles
Cyclists ‘urged to get insurance’ BBC News, Maleen Saeed (26/11/11)
Cyclists urged to get more insurance by … insurance companies Road.CC, Tony Farrelly (26/11/11)
The future of cycle insurance Environmental Transport Assocaition (24/11/11)
Questions
- With each of the above conditions required for private insurance to be possible, explain why each must hold.
- What do we mean by no moral hazard and no adverse selection? Why would their existence prevent a private company from providing insurance?
- Using the concept of marginal utility theory, explain why there is a positive demand insurance.
- What might explain why cyclists are less likely to take out insurance given your answer to the above question?
- Do you think cyclist insurance should be compulsory? If governments are trying to encourage more sustainable transport policy, do you think this is a viable policy?
In 2009, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness was published. This book by Richard Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein examines how people are influenced to make decisions or change behaviour.
According to Thaler and Sunstein, people can be ‘nudged’ to change their behaviour. For example, healthy food can be placed in a prominent position in a supermarket or healthy snacks at the checkout. Often it is the junk foods that are displayed prominently and unhealthy, but tasty, snacks are found by the checkout. If fashion houses ceased to use ultra thin models, it could reduce the incentive for many girls to under-eat. If kids at school are given stars or smiley faces for turning off lights or picking up litter, they might be more inclined to do so.
The UK government has been investigating the use of ‘nudges’ as a way of changing behaviour, and the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee has been considering the question. It has just published its report, Behaviour Change. The summary of the report states that:
The currently influential book Nudge by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein advocates a range of non-regulatory interventions that seek to influence behaviour by altering the context or environment in which people choose, and seek to influence behaviour in ways which people often do not notice. This approach differs from more traditional government attempts to change behaviour, which have either used regulatory interventions or relied on overt persuasion.
The current Government have taken a considerable interest in the use of “nudge interventions”. Consequently, one aim of this inquiry was to assess the evidence-base for the effectiveness of “nudges”. However, we also examined evidence for the effectiveness of other types of policy intervention, regulatory and non-regulatory, and asked whether the Government make good use of the full range of available evidence when seeking to change behaviour.
The report finds that nudges
… used in isolation will often not be effective in changing the behaviour of the population. Instead, a whole range of measures – including some regulatory measures – will be needed to change behaviour in a way that will make a real difference to society’s biggest problems.
So is there, nevertheless, a role for nudges in changing behaviour – albeit alongside other measures? Read the report and the articles below to find out!
Articles
Lords report calls for regulation over persuasion to improve public health Wales Online, David Williamson (19/7/11)
Government’s ‘nudge’ approach to health is not enough, according to House of Lords and Work Foundation HR Magazine, David Woods (20/7/11)
How can I tell if I’ve been nudged Independent, Natalie Haynes (20/7/11)
Healthier behaviour plans are nudge in the wrong direction, say peers Guardian, Sarah Boseley (19/7/11)
‘Nudge’ is not enough, it’s true. But we already knew that Guardian, Jonathan Rowson (19/7/11)
Nudge not enough to change lifestyles – peers BBC News, Nick Triggle (19/7/11)
Why a nudge is not enough to change behaviour BBC News, Baroness Julia Neuberger (19/7/11)
House of Lords findings: why green Nudges are not enough The Green Living Blog, Baroness Julia Neuberger (19/7/11)
Lords Science and Technology Sub-Committee publish report on Behaviour Change YouTube, Baroness Julia Neuberger (14/7/11)
Report
Press Release Lords Science and Technology Select Committee (19/7/11)
Behaviour Change Lords Science and Technology Select Committee (online version) (19/7/11)
Behaviour Change Lords Science and Technology Select Committee (PDF version) (19/7/11)
Questions
- When may a nudge (a) be enough, (b) not be enough to change behaviour?
- What instruments does the government have to change behaviour?
- Distinguish between a ‘technical’ and an ‘adaptive’ solution to changing behaviour. Give examples.
- Why might adaptive solutions provide more of a challenge to policymakers than technical solutions.
- Can a nudge ever be transformative?
Economics is about choice – and choices occur in all parts of our lives. One area is personal relationships. Are we making the best of our relationships with family, friends and sexual partners? Increasingly economists are examining human behaviour in such contexts and asking what factors determine our decisions and whether such decisions are rational.
A recent book looks at the economics of marriage and goes under the title of ‘Spousonomics‘. Its authors, Paula Szuchman and Jenny Anderson, use economics “to master love, marriage and dirty dishes”. As they say:
Every marriage is its own little economy, a business of two with a finite number of resources that need to be allocated efficiently.
They look at ways in which such resources can be allocated efficiently. They also look at apparently irrational behaviour and seek to explain it in terms of various ‘failures’ (akin to market failures). They also examine how these failures can be rectified to improve relationships.
So is this economics stepping on the toes of relationship counsellors and psychologists? Or is this the legitimate domain of economists seeking to understand how to optimise in the context of scarce resources – including time and patience?
Spousonomics gets to heart of the matter Belfast Telegraph (19/1/11)
Run your marriage with ‘Spousonomics’: A new book says applying economic rules with transform your relationship Mail Online, Lydia Slater (31/1/11)
Spousonomics: How Economics Can Help Figure Out Your Marriage Book Beast (31/1/11)
Spousonomics Lesson #1: Loss Aversion YouTube (15/1/11)
Economist’s Explanation For Why Getting Married Isn’t Rational Huffington Post, Dan Ariely (15/1/11)
How Economics Saved My Marriage Newsweek, Paula Szuchman (30/1/11)
Want your marriage to profit? New York Post, Sara Stewart (29/1/11)
Spousonomics: blog, Paula Szuchman and Jenny Anderson
Questions
- How would you define ‘rational behaviour’ in a personal relationship?
- Why may marriage be a better deal generally for men than for women?
- Give some examples of asymmetry of information in marriage and why this may lead to bad decision making?
- Give some examples of risk averse and risk loving behaviour in personal relationships?
- Why are many actions in marriage apparently irrational? Could such actions be explained if the concept of ‘irrationality’ is redefined?
- Why may a simple demand curve help to explain why sexual relationships tend to wane in many marriages?
- Why does moral hazard occur in marriage? Does a combination or moral hazard and asymmetry of information help to explain divorce?
- Should marriage guidance counsellors study economics?!
Here’s an interesting example of oligopoly – one you probably haven’t considered before. It’s the art market. And it’s not just one market, but a whole pyramid of markets. At the bottom are the ‘yearning masses’ of penny-poor artists, from students to those struggling to make a living from their art, with studios in their attic, garden shed or kitchen table. At the top of the pyramid are those very few artists that can earn fantastic sums of money by selling to collectors or top galleries. Then there are all the layers of markets in between, where artists can earn everything from a modest to a reasonable income.
The pyramid is itself depicted as a work of art, which you can see in the linked article below. It’s worth studying this piece of art carefully as well as reading the article.
A guide to the market oligopoly system Reuters, Felix Salmon (28/12/10)
Questions
- Identify the increasing barriers to entry as you work up the art market pyramid.
- Are there any other market imperfections in the art market that you can identify from the diagram?
- What are the key differences between the ‘primary market, tier 1’, the ‘primary market, tier 2’ and ‘the secondary market’?
- Are artists ‘rational maximisers’? If so, what is it they are trying to maximise? If not, why not?
- How would you set about determining the ‘worth’ of a piece of art? How do possible future value of a piece of art determine its present value?