During the pandemic, most people who were not furloughed were forced to work from home. After lockdown restrictions were lifted, many employers decided to continue with people working remotely, at least for some of the time.
Today, this hybrid model, whereby workers work partly from home or local workspaces and partly in the office/factory/warehouse etc., has become the ‘new normal’ for around 26% of the working population in Great Britain – up from around 10% at the end of the national lockdowns in the Spring of 2021.
Increasingly, however, employers who had introduced hybrid working are requiring their employees to return to the office, arguing that productivity and hence profits will rise as a result. Amazon is an example. Other employers, such as Asda, are increasing the time required in the office for hybrid workers.
Hybrid working had peaked at around 31% in November 2923 as the chart shows (click here for a PowerPoint). The chart is based on the December 20 database, Public opinions and social trends, Great Britain: working arrangements from the Office for National Statistics (see link under Data, below).
But why are some employers deciding that hybrid working is less profitable than working full time in the office. And does it apply to all employers and all employees or only certain types of firm and certain types of job?
The first thing to note is that hybrid work is more common among certain groups. These include older workers, parents, graduates and those with greater flexibility in scheduling their work, especially those in managerial or professional roles with greater flexibility. Certain types of work on the other hand do not lend themselves to hybrid work (or working completely from home, for that matter). Shop workers and those providing a direct service to customers, such as those working in the hospitality sector, cannot work remotely.
Benefits of hybrid working
For some employees and employers, hybrid working has brought significant benefits.
For employees, less time and money is spent on commuting, which accounts for nearly an hour’s worth of the average worker’s daily time. According to the ONS survey, respondents spent an additional 24 minutes per day on sleep and rest and 15 minutes on exercise, sports and other activities that improved well-being compared to those who worked on-site. Working at home can make juggling work and home life easier, especially when workers can work flexible hours during the day, allowing them to fit work around family commitments.
Employers benefit from a healthier and more motivated staff who are more productive and less likely to quit. Hybrid work, being attractive to many workers, could allow employers to attract and retain talented workers. Also, employees may work longer hours if they are keen to complete a task and are not ‘clocking off’ at a particular time. Working from home allows workers to concentrate (unless distracted by other family members!).
By contrast, office working can be very inefficient, especially in open offices, where chatty colleagues can be distracting and it is difficult to concentrate. What is more, employees who are slightly unwell may continue working at home but may feel unable to commute to the office. If they did, they could spread their illness to other colleagues. Not allowing people to work from home can create a problem of ‘presenteeism’, where people feeling under the weather turn up to work but are unproductive.
One of the biggest benefits to employers of hybrid work is that costs can be saved by having smaller offices and by spending less on heating, lighting and facilities.
With hybrid working, time spent on site can be devoted to collaborative tasks, such as meetings with colleagues and customers/suppliers and joint projects where face-to-face discussion is required, or at least desirable. Tasks can also be completed that required specialist equipment or software not available at home.
Problems of hybrid working
So, if hybrid working has benefits for both employers and employees, why are some employers moving back to a system where employees work entirely on site?
Some employers have found it hard to monitor and engage employees working from home. Workers may be easily distracted at home by other family members, especially if they don’t have a separate study/home office. People may feel detached from their co-workers on days they work from home. After a time, productivity may wane as workers find ways of minimising the amount of time actually working during declared work times.
Far from improving work-life balance, for some workers the boundaries between work and personal life can become blurred, which can erode the value of personal and family time. This can create a feeling of never escaping from work and be demotivating and reduce productivity. Employees may stay logged on longer and work evenings and weekends in order to complete tasks.
Unless carefully planned, on days when people do go into the office they might not work effectively. They may be less likely to have profitable ad hoc conversations with co-workers, and meetings may be harder to arrange. Misunderstandings and miscommunication can occur when some employees are in the office but others are at home.
Some employers have found that the problems of hybrid working in their organisations have outweighed the benefits and that productivity has fallen. In justifying its ending of hybrid working from 1 January 2025, Amazon CEO, Andy Jessy, wrote in a memo to staff in September 2024:
To address the … issue of being better set up to invent, collaborate, and be connected enough to each other and our culture to deliver the absolute best for customers and the business, we’ve decided that we’re going to return to being in the office the way we were before the onset of COVID. When we look back over the last five years, we continue to believe that the advantages of being together in the office are significant.1
But is the solution to do as Amazon is doing and to abandon hybrid working and have a mass ‘return to the office’?
Improving hybrid working
There are ways of making hybrid working more effective so that the benefits can be maximised and the costs minimised.
Given that there are specific benefits from home working and other specific benefits from working on-site, it would be efficient to allocate time between home and office to maximise these benefits. The optimum balance is likely to vary from employer to employer, job to job and individual to individual.
Where work needs to be done in teams and where team meetings are an important element of that work, it would generally make sense for such meetings to be held in person, especially when there needs to be a lot of discussion. If the team requires a brief catch up, however, this may be more efficiently done online via Teams or Zoom.
Individual tasks, on the other hand, which don’t require consultation with colleagues or the use of specific workplace facilities, are often carried out more efficiently when there is minimum chance of interruption. For many workers, this would be at home rather than in an office – especially an open-plan office. For others without a protected work space at home or nearby, it might be better to come into the office.
The conclusion is that managers need to think carefully about the optimum distribution between home and office working and accept that a one-size-fits-all model may not be optimum for all types of job and all workers. Recognising the relative benefits and costs of working in different venues and over different hours may help to achieve the best balance, both for employers and for workers. A crucial element here is the appropriate use of incentives. Workers need to be motivated. Sometimes this may require careful monitoring, but often a more hands-off approach by management, with the focus more on output and listening to the concerns of workers, rather than on time spent, may result in greater productivity.
1Message from CEO Andy Jassy: Strengthening our culture and teams, Amazon News (16/9/24)
Articles
- Hybrid working is the ‘new normal’, according to ONS
Personnel Today, Jo Faragher (11/11/24)
- Hybrid working is here to stay but needs better managing
Business Live, Dylan Jones-Evans (18/11/24)
- The permanently imperfect reality of hybrid work
BBC: Worklife, Alex Christian (11/12/23)
- The diminishing returns of in-office mandates
BBC: Worklife, Alex Christian (12/6/24)
- The Advantages and Challenges of Hybrid Work
Gallup: Workplace, Ben Wigert and Jessica White (14/9/22)
- 9 Challenges of hybrid working and how you should tackle them
Manager Talks, Ankita (10/3/24)
- 5 Challenges of Hybrid Work — and How to Overcome Them
Harvard Business Review, Martine Haas (15/2/22)
- Post-Christmas blues as UK bosses try to turn back clock on hybrid working
The Guardian, Joanna Partridge (3/1/25)
- ‘It didn’t come as a surprise’: UK workers on being forced back into the office
The Guardian, Rachel Obordo (3/1/25)
- Amazon tells staff to get back to office five days a week
BBC News, Natalie Sherman (16/9/24)
Data
Questions
- Why may hybrid working be better for (a) employees and (b) employers than purely home working or purely working in the office?
- Why are many firms deciding that workers who were formerly employed on a hybrid basis should now work entirely from the office?
- What types of job are better performed on site, or with only a small amount of time working from home?
- What types of job are better performed by working at home with just occasional days in the office?
- Does the profile of workers (by age, qualifications, seniority, experience, family commitments, etc) affect the likelihood that they will work from home at least some of the time?
- How would you set about measuring the marginal productivity of a worker working from home? Is it harder than measuring the marginal productivity of the same worker doing the same job but working in the office?
- How may working in the office increase network effects?
- How may behavioural economics help managers to understand the optimum balance of home and on-site working?
The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has been investigating road fuel pricing in the UK. In July 2022, it launched a study into the development of the road-fuel market over recent years. The final report of this study was published in July 2023 and covered the refining, wholesale and retail elements of the market.
In the retail part of the market, the CMA noted some potential causes for concern: retailer fuel margins had increased; there were geographical variations in pricing; filling stations with fewer competitors tended to charge higher prices; retail prices tended to rise rapidly when oil prices increased but fell slowly when oil prices fell (known as ‘rocket and feather’ pricing patterns); motorway service stations charged considerably higher prices than supermarkets or other filling stations.
In response to these findings, the CMA has been publishing an interim report every four months. These reports give average pump prices and margins. They also give relative average pump prices between different types of retailer, and between each of the supermarkets.
The latest interim report was published on 26 July 2024. It reiterated the finding of the 2023 report that the fuel market has become less competitive since 2019. What is more, it continues to be so. In particular, the range of retail prices and the level of retail margins remain high compared to historic levels. The interim report estimates that ‘the increase in retailers’ fuel margins compared to 2019 resulted in increased fuel costs for drivers in 2023 of over £1.6bn’.
Price leadership
Road fuel retailing is an oligopoly, with the major companies being the big supermarkets, the retail arms of oil companies (such as Shell, BP, Esso and Texaco, operating their own filling stations) and a few large specialist companies, such as the Motor Fuel Group (MFG), the EG Group and Rontec, whose filling stations sell one or other of the main brands. But although it is an oligopoly producing a homogeneous product, it is not a cartel (unlike OPEC). Nevertheless, there has been a high degree of tacit collusion in the market with price competition limited to certain rules of behaviour in particular locations. A familiar one is setting prices ending in .9 of a penny (e.g. 142.9p), with the acceptance by competitors that Applegreen will set it ending at .8 of a penny and Asda at .7 of a penny.
One of the main forms of tacit collusion in areas where there are several filling stations is that of price leadership. Asda, and in some areas Morrisons, have been price leaders, setting the lowest price for that area, with other filling stations setting the price at or slightly above that level (e.g. 0.2p, 1.2p or 2.2p higher). Indeed, other major retailers, such as Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Esso and Shell took a relatively passive approach to pricing, unwilling to undercut Asda and accept lower profit margins.
Things changed after 2019. Asda chose to increase its profit margins. In 2022 it did this by reducing prices more slowly than would previously have been the case as wholesale prices fell. In other words, it used price feathering. Other big retailers might have been expected to use the opportunity to undercut Asda. Instead, they decided to increase their own margins by following a similar pricing path. The result was a 6 pence per litre increase in the average supermarket fuel margin from 2019 to 2022.
More recently, Asda has increased its margins more than other major retailers, making it no longer the price leader. The effect has been to put less pressure on other retailers to trim their now higher profit margins.
Remedies
The 2023 CMA report made two specific recommendations to deal with this rise in profit margins.
The first was that the CMA should be given a statutory monitoring function over the fuel market to ‘hold the industry to account’. In May this year, legislation was passed to this effect. This requires the CMA to monitor the industry and report anti-competitive practice to the government.
The second was to introduce a new statutory ‘open data real-time fuel finder scheme’. This would give motorists access to live, station-by-station fuel prices.
Several major retailers already contribute to a voluntary price data sharing scheme. However, this covers only around 40% of UK forecourts. According to the CMA, it ‘falls well short of the comprehensive, real-time, station-by station data needed to empower motorists and drive competition’. The CMA has thus called on the new Labour government to introduce legislation to make its recommended system compulsory. This, it is hoped, would make the retail fuel market much more competitive by improving consumer information about prices at alternative filling stations in their area.
Articles
CMA reports
Questions
- What forms can tacit collusion take?
- Why are fuel prices at motorway service stations so much higher than in towns? What is the relevance of the price elasticity of demand to the answer?
- What are the main findings of the CMA’s July 2024 Interim Report
- What is meant by rocket and feather pricing?
- What recommendations does the CMA make for increasing competition in the retail road fuel market?
- Find out how competitive retail fuel pricing is in two other developed countries. Why are they more or less competitive than the UK?
The ‘Big 4’ supermarkets in the UK – Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Asda and Morrisons – have a 69.5% share of the Great Britain grocery market (see data link below). The next four – Aldi, Co-op, Lidl and Waitrose – have a 23.8% share. If two of the Big 4 were to merge, would there be a significant decline in competition? This is a question the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has been considering in the light of Sainsbury’s planned £7.3 billion takeover of Asda (owned by the US retailing giant, Walmart).
In a recently published provisional report, the CMA argues that “the merger could lead to a substantial lessening of competition at both a national and local level.” The CMA has concerns that the merger:
…could lead to a worse experience for in-store and online shoppers across the UK through higher prices, a poorer shopping experience, and reductions in the range and quality of products offered. It also has concerns that prices could rise at a large number of Sainsbury’s and Asda petrol stations. …The combined impact means that people could lose out right across the UK and that the deal could also cost shoppers through reduced competition in particular areas where Sainsbury’s and Asda stores overlap.
Sainsbury’s and Asda currently have a combined market share of 31.2%. This is slightly larger than Tesco’s 27.7%. But would this give the merged companies too much market power? Would there not still be intense competition between the new Big 3? And, with the growth in the German discounters, Aldi and Lidl, as well as competition from Waitrose, the Co-op, Marks & Spencer and Iceland, would there be any significant decline in competition and choice and a rise in prices?
To answer this, it is crucial to define the grocery market. The CMA argues that the major competitors to any Big 4 company are the other Big 4 companies, rather than the German discounters or other supermarkets. Unlike Aldi and Lidl, the Big 4 have a range of facilities, such as fish and meat counters, delivery and a large range of branded products.
At a national level the CMA finds that the merger would reduce competitive pressure, so that a Big 3 would be less competitive than the Big 4, with higher prices and with reduced quality, range of products and in-store services.
At the local level the effects are likely to be serious. Often the consumer has very limited choice of supermarkets at a local level. If a particular area has just two supermarkets, Sainsbury’s and Asda, then the merger of the two could result in a substantial loss of competition. The only alternative for consumers in such areas would be to use small shops, which tend to be more highly priced anyway and do not compete head-to-head with the supermarkets, or to drive to another area or to shop online, depending on how far rival supermarkets are prepared to deliver. Similar arguments apply to supermarket petrol stations, where the only competition to supermarkets is from roadside petrol stations, often selling more highly priced petrol.
In response to the CMA’s findings, Sainsbury’s chief executive, Mike Coupe, claims that they focus too much on competition between the Big 4 and do not take into account competition from Lidl and Aldi, both of which are expending rapidly and now have a combined market share of 12.8% (compared with 10.7% two years ago).
Sainsbury’s and Asda also claim that there would be considerable scope for economies of scale, with lower costs being achieved through purchasing and logistics. In a joint statement they state that:
Combining Sainsbury’s and Asda would create significant cost savings, which would allow us to lower prices. Despite the savings being independently reviewed by two separate industry specialists, the CMA has chosen to discount them as benefits.
The two companies and other interested parties have until 13 March to respond to the provisional findings. The CMA will then issue its final report by 30 April 2019. If it sticks to its provisional findings, then either the merger will be blocked or the merging companies would have to ‘sell off a significant number of stores and other assets – potentially including one of the Sainsbury’s or Asda brands – to recreate the competitive rivalry lost through the merger.’ This might be very difficult to achieve as the new buyer would have to be big enough to provide effective competition to the remaining Big 3. Perhaps this could be an opportunity for Amazon to move into in-store grocery retailing. Or there may be some private equity company that would like to do the same.
It is likely that if the CMA sticks to its ruling, the two supermarkets will apply for a judicial review of the CMA’s decision.
Articles
Competition and Markets Authority Report
Data
Questions
- In what market segments do the Big 4 supermarkets compete?
- Research earlier investigations of the supermarket sector by the UK competition authorities. What were their findings?
- In what ways might the proposed takeover of Asda by Sainsbury’s affect consumers’ interests (a) at a national level; (b) at the local level?
- What is the ‘GUPPI index’? How is it calculated and how is it used in assessing the effects of the proposed takeover? (See pages 88–91 and 109–11 of the CMA’s Provisional Report and pages I5–I15 of the Appendices and Glossary.)
- Distinguish between horizontal and vertical mergers. How is the distinction relevant in drawing lessons from the Tesco takeover of Booker for the Sainsbury’s takeover of Asda?
- Rather than blocking the takeover, one alternative would be for the CMA to permit it, subject to the sale of specific stores where there are problems of the merger limiting competition in a particular locality. Do you think that this would be a better alternative than blocking the takeover? Explain.
Oligopoly is the most complex market structure, characterised by a few large firms which dominate the industry. Typically there are high barriers to entry and prices can be very sticky. However, perhaps the most important characteristic is interdependence. With this feature of the market, oligopolies, despite being dominated by a few big firms, can be the most competitive market structure.
There are many examples of oligopolies and one of the best is the supermarket industry. Dominated by the likes of Tesco, Morrisons and Asda, competition in terms of branding, product development and quality is constant, but so is price competition. During the recession, you could hardly watch a TV programme that included advert breaks without seeing one of the big four advertising their low prices.
However, in the past few years, the supermarket industry has seen competition grow even further and the big four are now facing competition from low-cost retailers, including Aldi and Lidl. This has led to falling sales and profits for the likes of Tesco and Morrisons.
Tesco, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s and Asda have all felt the emergence of discount retailers and have seen their customer numbers fall. All have reacted with rounds of price cuts and new deals, and this price war looks set to continue. Morrisons have just announced a 14% average price cut on 135 products to match earlier changes in pricing strategies by the other main competitors. As I’m writing this during the Algeria v. South Korea match, I have just seen an advert from Sainsbury’s, promoting their milk chocolate digestive biscuits, priced at £1. The advert explicitly states that they are ‘less than Morrisons’, where the price is £1.50. This was soon followed by another from Sainsbury’s saying that the Cif bathroom spray is £1.50, which is ‘less than Tesco’, priced at £2.75. I need say no more.
So, what is it about this industry which means it is so susceptible to price wars? Are all oligopolies like this? The following articles consider the supermarket industry and the price wars that have emerged. Think about this sector in terms of oligopoly power and consider the questions that follow.
Morrisons announces another round of price cuts/a> BBC News (22/6/14)
Tesco suffers worst sales for decades The Guardian, Sarah Butler and Sean Farrell (4/6/14)
Britain’s Morrisons to cut prices on 135 products Reuters (22/6/14)
Morrisons slashes more prices by up to 41pct The Telegraph, Scott Campbell (22/6/14)
Sainsbury’s and Netto in discount store tie-up BBC News (20/6/14)
Slow to respond, Tesco now pays the price Wall Street Journal, Peter Evans and Ese Erheriene (19/6/14)
One million fewer customer visits a week at Tesco The Guardian, Sean Farrell (3/6/14)
Asda only one of big four to grow share as Lidl achieves highest ever growth Retail Week, Nicola Harrison (3/6/14)
Will Asda shoot itself in the foot with in-store cost cutting? The Grocer, Alec Mattinson (28/5/14)
Tesco sales slide at record speed as discounters pile on the pressure Independent, Simon Neville (3/6/14)
Quester: Back J Sainsbury to prove doubters wrong The Telegraph, Graham Ruddick (11/6/14)
Questions
- What are the key characteristics of an oligopoly?
- How do the above characteristics explain the conduct of firms in an oligopoly? How relevant is this to the supermarket industry?
- In many oligopolies, prices are sticky. Why is it that in the supermarket industry price wars break out?
- Is the kinked demand curve a relevant model to use when talking about the supermarket industry?
- What other industries fit into the category of an oligopoly? Is the kinked demand curve model relevant in these industries?
- Would there be an incentive for the big 4 supermarkets to collude and fix price? Explain your answer.
- Interdependence is the key characteristic in an oligopoly. Can this explain the behaviour of the supermarkets?
- Given that oligopolies are characterised by high barriers to entry, how is that Aldi and Lidl have been able to compete with them?
UK Supermarkets: a prime example of an oligopoly. This industry is highly competitive and over the past decade, but particularly since the onset of the credit crunch, price wars have been a constant feature of this market. You could barely watch a full programme on commercial TV without seeing one of the big supermarkets advertising that their prices were lower than everyone else’s! So, despite oligopoly being towards the ‘least competitive’ end of the market structure spectrum, this is an example of just how competitive the market can actually be.
With household incomes being squeezed, in particular by another oligopolistic industry (energy) and with the ‘middle market’ being pinched by higher-end retailers and budget retailers, the supermarket sector is facing uncertain times. Asda’s sales growth has continued to slow and in response, the giant supermarket chain will be launching a £1 billion price-cutting campaign. Tesco is the market leader, but Sainsbury’s and Asda have been battling over the second spot. One of Asda’s selling points is its low prices. Perhaps not as low as Aldi and Lidl, but this new pricing strategy will aim to bring its prices further below Tesco, Sainsbury’s and Morrisons and close the gap with the two big discount supermarkets. As Andy Clarke, Asda’s Chief Executive, said:
We regard ourselves as the UK’s leading value retailer and it is against this backdrop that I have today set out our strategic priorities which will improve, extend and expand the business over the next five years.
So, what will be the impact of lower prices? It appears as though Asda is marketing itself towards the budget end of the pricing spectrum, perhaps aiming to become fiercer competitors with Aldi and Lidl and let Tesco and Sainsbury’s do battle with the higher-end retailers, such as Waitrose and Marks and Spencer. Lower prices should cause a substitution effects towards Asda’s products, as many of them will have relatively price elastic demand. If the other supermarkets don’t respond, this should lead to sales growth. However, the key to an oligopoly is interdependence: the actions of one firm will affect all other firms in the market. The implications then, are that Tesco may react to this pricing strategy by engaging in its own price cuts, especially as the Christmas period approaches. The characteristic of interdependence was evident in the aftermath of Asda’s announcement when shares in Tesco and Morrisons both fell, showing how the markets were responding.
Of course, there are many other factors that affect a consumer’s decision as to whether to shop at Asda, Tesco or any other big supermarket. In the area where I live, we have a Tesco and a Morrisons (a few years ago, we had neither!). I don’t shop at Asda, as the nearest branch is over 30 miles away – even if prices were significantly lower, it would be more expensive to get there and back and a lot less convenient. For others, it may be loyalty and not just of the ‘I’ve shopped there all my life’ kind! For some, clubcard vouchers from Tesco may be preferred to Asda’s offerings and thus tiny price differences between the supermarkets may have little effect on a consumer’s decision as to where to shop. Many products at supermarkets are relatively cheap and thus as the proportion of our income that we spend on these goods is pretty low, any change in price doesn’t cause much of an effect on our demand.
It’s not just a pricing strategy where money is being invested by Asda. More investment will be going into their online services and more stores will be created, kin particular in London and the South East where their presence is low, but demand appears to be high. Improving ‘product quality, style and design’ will also be on the agenda, all with the aim of boosting sales growth and securing its position as the second largest retailer in the sector, perhaps with a long term aim of one day overtaking Tesco. The following articles consider the supermarket battleground.
Supermarket battle heats up as Asda announces £1bn price-cutting plan The Telegraph, Graham Ruddick (14/11/13)
Sainsbury’s profits make it second biggest supermarket BBC News (13/11/13)
Asda to launch £1bn price-cut plan AOL, Press Association (15/11/13)
Asda takes fight to rivals with £1bn investment plan The Guardian, Angela Monaghan (14/11/13)
UK’s Asda promises £1 billion investment in price cuts Reuters (14/11/13)
Asda makes bid to woo shoppers with vow of five-year £1billion price war after it was overtaken in market share by Sainsbury’s Mail Online, Sean Poulter (15/11/13)
Sainsbury’s overtakes Asda on demand for its premium lines Independent, Simon Neville (14/11/13)
Asda to put £1bn into lowering prices over five years The Grocer, Thomas Hobbs (14/11/13)
Wal-Mart posts $3.7bn quarterly income BBC News (14/11/13)
Questions
- What are the key characteristics of an oligopoly?
- What is meant by a price war? Who benefits?
- How important is the concept of price elasticity of demand when deciding whether or not to cut the price of a range of products?
- Why is the proportion of income spent on a good a key determinant of the elasticity of demand of a product?
- How can market share be calculated?
- Many suggest that the ‘middle market’ of the supermarket sector is slowly disappearing. Why is this?
- How effective will Asda’s price cutting strategy be? Which factors will determine its effectiveness?