Original post (24/4/12)
The result of the first round of the French presidential elections on 22 April make it likely that François Hollande will be the new president.
M. Hollande can be described as an austerity sceptic. In other words, he questions the wisdom of trying to meet the target agreed by eurozone countries of reducing public-sector deficits to no more than 3% of GDP.
If elected, M. Hollande promises to adopt a more Keynesian stance of stimulating demand in order to prevent a slide into recession. This would mean a reversal of cuts and a growth, at least temporarily, of the public-sector deficit.
Currently France’s deficit is much higher than the 3% target. In 2010 it was 7.1%; in 2011 it had fallen somewhat to 5.2%. But it is set to rise in 2012, thanks to the slowing economy in France and most of the rest of Europe.
And it is not just in France that ‘austerity sceptics’ are on the ascendant. In the Netherlands the centre right government of Mark Rutte fell. He was unable to get his coalition partners to agree to sufficient cuts to achieve the 3% target. And yet, the Netherland’s deficit is considerably lower than most eurozone countries’. In 2012 it is projected to be just 4.6% of GDP.
So if doubts about the 3% target could lead to a change in policy in the Netherlands and France, what hope is there that the targets could be adhered to by countries with much larger deficits and where the pain of the cuts is already causing political turmoil?
The growth in austerity scepticism has spooked the markets. The day following M. Hollande’s first round victory and the fall of Mark Rutte’s government, stock markets around Europe plummeted and bond prices rose. The higher bond prices will make it even harder for governments to refinance maturing government debt. Take the case of France. As Robert Peston remarks in his article below:
According to IMF figures, 59% of France’s government debt is held overseas – which means that well over half of all lending to the French state is not motivated by sentimentality or patriotism in any way.
To put that figure into context, just 24.8% of UK general government debt is provided by foreigners.
Perhaps more relevantly, the French government has to borrow a colossal sum equivalent to 18.2% of GDP this year and 19.5% next year to finance debt that is maturing and the current deficit.
So what are the implications of the rise in austerity scepticism? Will it make deficits harder to finance? Will a collapse of confidence push the eurozone into a deep recession. Might the eurozone break apart? Or will a dose of Keynesian policies turn the tide and allow growth to resume, making it easier to service government debts? The following articles explore the issues?
Update (7/5/12)
François Hollande was indeed elected president on 6 May. The question now is to what extent he will be able to enact measures to simulate the economy. In his campaign he had talked about renegotiating the European treaty on budget discipline. Angela Merkel, responding to M. Hollande’s victory, said that the European fiscal treaty had been agreed and could not be renegotiated. Nevertheless, she said she was happy to consider new growth strategies that did not involve increased budget deficits.
Articles
François Hollande’s potential spending spree in France has caused concern in austerity Europe The Telegraph, Bruno Waterfield (23/4/12)
European turmoil, American collateral Guardian, Robin Wells (24/4/12)
Political risk returns to eurozone debt crisis Financial Times, Richard Milne (23/4/12)
The rise of Europe’s austerity foes Business Spectator, Karen Maley (23/3/12)
Europe: A crisis of the centre BBC News, Paul Mason (24/4/12)
Is Hollande enemy or prisoner of finance? BBC News, Robert Peston (23/4/12)
President Hollande and the IMF BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (23/4/12)
French Bond Yields Test Hollande’s Economic Fealty Bloomberg, Mark Deen and Anchalee Worrachate (24/4/12)
Dutch and French politics bring us back to reality BusinessDay (South Africa), Ron Derby (24/4/12)
Crisis topples governments like dominos Deutsche Welle, Bernd Riegert (24/4/12)
Eurozone leaders push for growth BBC News (25/4/12)
Additonal articles (after 6 May)
Francois Hollande to set France on new course after win BBC News (7/5/12)
Europe elections: German Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomes Francois Hollande but warns Greece The Telegraph, 7/5/12)
A Merkel-Hollande bust-up? Less likely than you might think Guardian, Philip Oltermann (7/5/12)
Merkel Rejects Stimulus in Challenge to Hollande BloombergBusinessweek, Patrick Donahue and Tony Czuczka (7/5/12)
François Hollande’s chemistry with Angela Merkel crucial for Europe Guardian, Ian Traynor (7/5/12)
Q&A: End of austerity? BBC News (7/5/12)
Austerity and the people’s verdict Guardian letters, Shanti Chakravarty and others (8/5/12)
Europe: The big debate BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (11/5/12)
Data
European Economy: Economic data Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Eurozone Statistics ECB
French Economic Statistics INSEE, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
Netherlands Statistics CBS, Statistics Netherlands
Questions
- Why do investors worry about the pursuit of Keynesian expansionary fiscal policies? Are their fears justified?
- How important is it for countries, such as the Netherlands, to retain their AAA credit rating?
- What determines bond yields?
- Do a search to find the policies advocated by M. Hollande. Assess the likely economic impact of these policies.
- What conditions are necessary for the pursuit of a tough austerity line to achieve economic growth in (a) the short term of 12 to 18 months; (b) the longer term of several years?
- Is an increased use of public-private partnerships a solution to finding a way of delivering greater infrastructure expenditure without increasing the short-term deficit?
Executive pay has been a contentious issue in recent years, with bankers’ bonuses stealing many headlines. Shareholders have been voicing their opinions on bonuses paid to top executives and the management teams at the banks in question are unlikely to be too pleased with the turn of events.
Nearly one third of shareholders from Credit Suisse opposed the bonuses that were set out to be paid to their executives; more than 50% of shareholders from Citigroup rejected the plan to pay their Chief Executive £9.2m for 2011 and, at the end of April, almost a third of shareholders at Barclays refused to support the bank’s pay awards. Barclay’s Chief Executive was to be paid £17.7m, but this revolt is just another indication of how the tide is turning against having to pay big bonuses to retain the best staff.
Bonuses are essentially there to reward good performance. For example, if a company or bank achieves higher than expected profits, you may support a bonus for the key individuals who achieved this. However, in the case of Barclays, the £17.7m package for the Chief Executive was to be paid, despite him saying that his bank’s performance in 2011 was ‘unacceptable’. I wonder what bonus might have been suggested had the performance been ‘acceptable’?
Revolts over big bonuses are not a new thing for 2012. Over the past few years, more and more resentment has been growing for the huge pay increases received by top managers. Many big companies around the world have seen shareholder revolts and this could mean the tide is beginning to turn on big bonuses. The following articles consider this contentious issue.
Credit Suisse and Barclays investors revolt over pay Reuters, Matt Scuffham and Katharina Bart (27/4/12)
Aviva rocked by shareholder rebellion over pay Guardian, Jill Treanor and Julia Kollewe (3/5/12)
Tide turns on bank bonuses as revolt hits UK Scotsman, Bill Jamieson and Tom Peterkin (28/4/12)
Barclays AGM: ‘We can’t pay zero bonuses, the consequences would be dire’ Telegraph, Harry Wilson (27/4/12)
Barclays shareholders have spoken. The overpaid must listen Guardian, Chuka Umunna (27/4/12)
Barclays suffers executive pay backlash Financial Times, Patrick Jenkins (27/4/12)
Aviva to review pay policy amid investor concerns Wall Street Journal, Jessica Hodgson and Vladimir Guevarra (30/4/12)
UBS faces shareholder opposition over executive pay New York Times, Julia Werdigier (3/5/12)
Low returns stir Europe-wide revolt on bankers’ pay Reuters, Steve Slater and Sinead Cruise (25/4/12)
Barclays targeted over bonuses Telegraph, Louise Peacock (9/4/12)
UBS gets stinging rebuke from shareholders on pay Reuters, Katharina Bart (3/5/12)
Vince Cable urges investors to keep up the pressure on executive pay Guardian, Jill Treanor (4/5/12)
Questions
- To what extent do you think high bonuses are the most important variable to a company in retaining the best staff?
- In The Telegraph article by Harry Wilson, Barclays’ Chairman is quoted as saying: ‘We can’t pay zero bonuses, the consequences would be dire’. What would be the consequences if Barclays did pay zero bonuses?
- What would be the consequence if all UK firms paid zero bonuses?
- How would smaller bonuses affect shareholder dividends?
- The Guardian article by Chuka Umunna says that ‘excessive pay and rewards for failure are bad for shareholders, the economy and society.’ Why is this?
- Should those receiving big bonuses be forced to give them up, if their company has under-performed?
- What are the main arguments for and against paying out big bonuses?
The trendy US fashion retailer Abercrombie & Fitch entered the UK in 2007 with the opening of a flagship store close to Savile Row in London. Located in the upmarket Mayfair area of London, Savile Row is famous for its traditional men’s tailors.
Recently Abercrombie & Fitch decided to go one step further by opening a childrenswear store directly on Savile Row. This move upset the local retailers and was met with protests.
This was just the latest in a history of controversy surrounding Abercrombie & Fitch which has included a product boycott and a lawsuit concerning employment issues. Should all this bad publicity be a concern for the company?
We expect tastes to be one of the key determinants of demand. If taste for a company’s product declines, its demand curve shifts to the left. This means it can sell less at any given price and consequently will have a knock-on effect on profits. Somewhat surprisingly, therefore, the PR expert, Mark Borkowski, quoted in the Guardian article above, suggests that all this adverse publicity may have in fact helped the company because:
“…the focus is on the brand. They’ve got a very keen identity of who they are, what they want, who they want to consume their products, and they’ve stuck to it.”
It is also clear that the company is very aware of the importance of protecting its brand – even going as far as paying television actors NOT to wear their clothes! Abercrombie & Fitch has also been reluctant to cut its prices during the current recession, perhaps because of a fear of harming its brand.
Abercrombie & Fitch with its ‘crappy clothes’ threatens staid Savile Row Observer, Euan Ferguson (11/03/12)
Savile Row cannot live in the past Guardian, Charlie Porter (24/04/12)
Sorry chaps, Abercrombie & Fitch simply doesn’t fit Savile Row Guardian, Gustav Temple (24/04/12)
Savile unrest … the tailors who want to stop Abercrombie & Fitch London Evening Standard, Josh Sims (27/04/12)
Questions
- What are the distinctive features of the Abercrombie & Fitch brand?
- What are the key features of competition in this industry?
- Why might Abercrombie & Fitch be keen to open up a store on Savile Row?
- Why might the local tailors object to Abercrombie & Fitch opening a store nearby?
- Why do you think negative publicity appears to have little effect on Abercrombie & Fitch?
- Why do you think television coverage could harm the Abercrombie & Fitch brand?
Figures released by the Bank of England show that M4 fell by 5.0% in the year to March 2012. This record fall comes despite over £320 billion of assets purchased by the Bank under its quantitative easing programme. These are funded by the creation of reserves in the Bank of England. (See the Bank of England site for details of the timing and amounts of QE.)
Because of the considerable injection of new money into the banking system, notes and coin plus banks’ reserve balances in the Bank of England rose by 44.9%. So how is it that this measure of narrow money has increased massively and yet M4 has fallen?
One problem with using figures for changes in M4 to gauge economic activity is that they include intra-financial sector transactions – transactions between ‘other financial corporations’ (OFCs). Such transactions do not impact on the real economy. For this reason, the Bank of England prefers to focus on a measure that excludes these transactions between OFCs, a measure known as ‘M4 excluding intermediate OFCs’. This measure rose by 2.7% in the year to March 2012. Although this was positive, it was still weak.
So why does quantitative easing seem to be having such a small effect on bank lending? The following articles look at the issue.
Articles
Record collapse in UK money supply blamed on banks The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (2/5/12)
UK March mortgage approvals rise unexpectedly London South East (2/5/12)
UK March Net Consumer Lending +GBP1.4 Billion NASDAQ, Jason Douglas and Nicholas Winning (2/5/12)
M4 Hits Record Low; Non-Residents Sell Gilts Market News International (2/5/12)
Data
Bankstats (Monetary & Financial Statistics) – March 2012 Bank of England (2/5/12): see Tables A1.1.1, A2.1.1 and A2.2.3
Questions
- How does quantitative easing impact on the narrow measure of money: notes, coin and banks’ reserve balances in the Bank of England?
- How might an increase in narrow money lead to an increase in broad money (such as M4)?
- How is it that notes, coin and banks’ reserve balances rose so rapidly in the year to March 2012, while M4 fell and even M4 excluding OFCs rose only slightly?
- Does this suggest that money supply is endogenous? Explain.
- How does requiring banks to rebuild their capital base impact on the relationship between narrow and broad money?
On 2 May 2012, Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, gave the BBC Today Prgramme’s public lecture. In it, he reflected on the causes and aftermath of the banking crisis of 2007/8.
He said that the main cause of the banking crisis was the risky behaviour of the banks themselves – behaviour that they had been allowed to get away with becuase regulation was too light. The cause was not one of inappropriate fiscal and monetary policy.
According to Dr King, there had been no classical macroeconomic boom and bust. True there had been a bust, but there was no preceding boom. Economic growth had not been unsustainable in the sense of being persistently above the potential rate. In other words, the output gap had been close to zero. As Mervyn King puts it
Let me start by pointing out what did not go wrong. In the five years before the onset of the crisis, across the industrialised world growth was steady and both unemployment and inflation were low and stable. Whether in this country, the United States or Europe, there was no unsustainable boom like that seen in the 1980s; this was a bust without a boom.
In terms of monetary policy, inflation had been on track and interest rates were not too low. And as for fiscal policy, government borrowing had been within the Golden Rule, whereby, over the cycle, the goverment borrowed only to invest and kept a current budget balance. Indeed, the period of the late 1990s and early to mid 2000s had become known as the Great Moderation.
So what went wrong? Again in the words of Dr King:
In a nutshell, our banking and financial system overextended itself. That left it fragile and vulnerable to a sudden loss of confidence.
The most obvious symptom was that banks were lending too much. Strikingly, most of that increase in lending wasn’t to families or businesses, but to other parts of the financial system. To finance this, banks were borrowing large amounts themselves. And this was their Achilles’ heel. By the end of 2006, some banks had borrowed as much as £50 for every pound provided by their own shareholders. So even a small piece of bad news about the value of its assets would wipe out much of a bank’s capital, and leave depositors scurrying for the door. What made the situation worse was that the fortunes of banks had become closely tied together through transactions in complex and obscure financial instruments. So it was difficult to know which banks were safe and which weren’t. The result was an increasingly fragile banking system.
But doesn’t his imply that regulation of the banking system had failed? And if so why? And have things now been fixed – so that banks will no longer run the risk of failure? Dr King addresses this issue and others in his speech and also in his interview the next day for the Today Programme, also linked to below.
Podcasts
The Today Programme Lecture BBC Radio 4, Sir Mervyn King (2/5/12) (Transcript of speech)
Also on YouTube at Governor’s Today Programme lecture, 2 May 2012
Sir Mervyn King: The full interview BBC Today Programme, Sir Mervyn King talks to Evan Davis (3/5/12)
Sir Mervyn King analysis ‘verging on delusional’ BBC Today Programme, Dylan Grice and Ngaire Woods (3/5/12)
Articles
Sir Mervyn King rejects criticism for crisis BBC News (3/5/12)
The boom and bust of Mervyn King BBC News, Robert Peston (3/5/12)
Sir Mervyn King admits BoE failed over financial crisis The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (3/5/12)
Sir Mervyn King admits: we did too little to warn of economic crisis Guardian, Larry Elliott (2/5/12)
King Says BOE Will Risk Unpopularity to Prevent Crises Bloomberg, Jennifer Ryan and Scott Hamilton (3/5/12)
Data
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OECD (See Annex Tables 1, 10, 14, 18, 27, 28, 32, 33, 61 and 62)
Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England (See for example, A Money and Lending: counterparts to changes in M4, alternative presentation > Seasonally adjusted > Public sector contribution > PSNCR)
Questions
- Why was the period of the late 1990s and early to mid 2000s described as the Great Moderation?
- Chart the size of the output gap, the rate of inflation and public-sector deficits as a percentage of GDP in the UK and other major economies from 1995 to 2007. Is this evidence of the Great Moderation?
- To what extent would evidence of house prices, consumer debt, bank lending and the balance of trade deficit suggest that there was indeed a boom from the mid 1990s to 2007?
- What, according to Dr King were the main causes of the credit crunch?
- What, with hindsight, should the Bank of England have done differently?
- What UK body was responsible for regulating banks in the run up to the credit crunch? Why might its regulation be described as ‘light touch’?
- In what sense was there a moral hazard in central banks being willing to bail out banks?
- What banking reforms have taken place or will take place in the near future? Will they address the problems identified by Dr King and prevent another banking crisis ever occurring again?
The result of the first round of the French presidential elections on 22 April make it likely that François Hollande will be the new president.
