Under the Basel II arrangements, banks were required to maintain particular capital adequacy ratios (CARs). These were to ensure that banks had sufficient capital to allow them to meet all demands from depositors and to cover losses if a borrower defaulted on payment. Basel II, it was (wrongly) thought would ensure that the banking system could not collapse.
There were three key ratios. The first was an overall minimum CAR of 8%, measured as Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital as a percentage of total risk-weighted assets. As Economics 7th edition page 509 explains:
Tier 1 capital includes bank reserves (from retained profits) and ordinary share capital, where dividends to shareholders vary with the amount of profit the bank makes. Such capital thus places no burden on banks in times of losses as no dividend need be paid. What is more, unlike depositors, shareholders cannot ask for their money back. Tier 2 capital consists largely of preference shares. These pay a fixed rate of interest and thus do continue to place a burden on the bank even when losses are made (unless the bank goes out of business).
Risk-weighted assets are the value of assets, where each type of asset is multiplied by a risk factor. Under the internationally agreed Basel II accord, cash and government bonds have a risk factor of zero and are thus not included. Inter-bank lending between the major banks has a risk factor of 0.2 and is thus included at only 20 per cent of its value; residential mortgages have a risk factor of 0.35; personal loans, credit-card debt and overdrafts have a risk factor of 1; loans to companies carry a risk factor of 0.2, 0.5, 1 or 1.5, depending on the credit rating of the company. Thus the greater the average risk factor of a bank’s assets, the greater will be the value of its risk weighted assets, and the lower will be its CAR.
The second CAR was that Tier 1 capital should be at least 4% of risk weighted assets.
The third CAR was that equity capital (i.e. money raised from the issue of ordinary shares) should be at least 2% of risk weighted assets. This is known as the ‘core capital ratio’.
Before 2008, it was thought by most commentators that these capital adequacy ratios were sufficiently high. But then the banking crisis erupted. Banks were too exposed to sub-prime debt (i.e. debt that was excessively risky, such as mortgages on property at a time when property prices were rapidly declining). Much of this debt was disguised by being bundled up with other securities in what were known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy: the largest bankruptcy in history, with Lehmans owing $613 billion. Although its assets had a book value of $639, these were insufficiently liquid to enable Lehmans to meet the demands of its creditors.
The collapse of Lehmans sent shock waves around the world. Banks across the globe came under tremendous pressure. Many held too much sub-prime debt and had insufficient capital to meet creditors’ demands. As a result, they had to be bailed out by their governments. Clearly the Basel II regulations were too lax.
For several months there have been discussions about new tighter regulations and, on 12 September 2010, central bankers from the major countries met in Basel, Switzerland, and agreed the Basel III regulations. Although the overall CAR (Tier 1 and 2) was kept at 8%, the Tier 1 ratio was raised from 4% to 6% and the core Tier 1 ratio was raised from 2% to 4.5%, to be phased in by 2015. In addition there were two ‘buffers’ introduced.
As well as having to maintain a core Tier 1 ratio of 4.5%, banks would also have to hold a ‘conservation buffer’ of 2.5%. “The purpose of the conservation buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions.” In effect, then, the core Tier 1 ratio will rise from 2% to 7% (i.e. 4.5% minimum plus a buffer of 2.5%).
The other buffer is a ‘countercyclical buffer’. This will be “within a range of 0% – 2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital and will be implemented according to national circumstances.” The idea of this buffer is to allow banks to withstand volatility in the global economy. It will be phased in between 2016 and 2019.
The Basel III agreement will still need to be ratified by the G20 countries meeting at Seoul on 10 and 11 November this year. That meeting will also consider other elements of bank regulation.
So will these extra capital requirements be sufficient to allow banks to withstand any future crisis? The following articles discuss this question.
Articles
Global bankers agree new capital reserve rules BBC News (12/9/10)
Q&A: Basel rules on bank capital – who cares? BBC News, Laurence Knight (13/9/10)
Basel III and Sound Banking New American, Charles Scaliger (17/9/10)
Wishy-washy rules might come back to haunt regulators Financial Times, Patrick Jenkins (18/9/10)
Basel III proposal released Newsweek, Joel Schectman (17/9/10)
New Bank Rules May Not Prevent More Meltdowns FXstreet, Henrik Arnt (16/9/10)
Basel III CBS Money Watch, Mark Thoma (14/9/10)
Basel III: To lend or not to lend Investment Week, Martin Morris (16/9/10)
Taming the banks The Economist (16/9/10)
Basel’s buttress The Economist (16/9/10)
Do new bank-capital requirements pose a risk to growth? The Economist, guest contributions
Myners: New rules ‘ignore bank liquidity’ BBC Today Programme, Robert Peston and Lord Myners (18/9/10)
Official press releases and documents
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards Bank for International Settlements Press Release (12/9/10)
The Basel iii Accord Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA)
Details of the new capital requirements Bank for International Settlements
Details of the phase-in arrangements Bank for International Settlements
Questions
- What impact will a higher capital adequacy ratio have on banks’ behaviour?
- For what reasons may the Basel III regulations be considered too lax?
- When there is an increase in deposits into the banking sector, banks can increase loans by a multiple of this. This bank deposits multiplier is the inverse of the liquidity ratio. Is there a similar bank capital multiplier and, if so, what determines its size?
- Why will Basel III be phased in over a number of years? Is this too long?
You may have heard that house prices are stalling. August’s house price numbers from the Nationwide Building Society revealed that the average UK house price fell by 0.9% which came on the back of a 0.5% fall in July. The Nationwide talks of an ‘unwinding of the demand-supply imbalance that drove up prices for much of the last year’. It seems that the house price rises last year have, over recent months, induced additional supply by encouraging home-owners to put their property on the market. Unfortunately, there are indications that housing demand has weakened during 2010 though, of course, this gives buyers a greater degree of bargaining power.
But, you might wonder how we can get a handle on the strength of housing demand. Well, one particularly useful piece of information in assessing housing demand is the number of mortgage approvals for purchasing property. After all, there are not many of us that can reach into our back-pocket to find the £166,507 that the Nationwide estimates is needed to buy the average UK property.
If we look at Table A5.4 from August’s edition of Monetary and Financial Statistics, which is published by the Bank of England, we find that the number of mortgage approvals for house purchase in July was 48,722. Now, this was marginally up on the 48,562 in June, but, of more significance is the fact that July’s number was over 8% lower than in July 2009 when approval numbers stood at 53,126. Indeed, this number was to rise further through 2009, hitting 59,117 in November. This indicates a strengthening of housing demand at the time and helps us to appreciate why house prices rebounded last year.
But, the start of 2010 was to see mortgage approval numbers fall away and they have essentially flatlined over recent months at between 48,000 and 50,000. This time the numbers indicate a weakening of housing demand and so help to explain why house price growth has seemingly ceased and gone into reverse.
It remains to be seen how the balance between housing demand and supply will ‘play out’ over the remainder of the year. Will, for instance, some properties be taken off the market in response to this weaker demand? Could housing demand weaken further in response to economic conditions or to economic uncertainty? The answers to these questions will help to determine that all important balance between housing demand and supply. But, by monitoring the mortgage approval numbers we have a ready-made barometer on the strength of housing demand. Feel free to see which way the barometer needle swings in future!
Articles
UK mortgage approval rise but total lending weakest since March Telegraph (31/8/10)
House prices set to slump even further as home loans stay scarce Independent, Sean O’Grady (1/10/10)
Housing market ‘faces double dip’ Press Association (31/8/10)
UK mortgage approvals beat estimates as banks make more funds available Bloomberg, Scott Hamilton (31/8/10)
Data
Mortgage approval numbers and other lending data are available from the Bank of England’s statistics publication, Monetary and Financial Statistics (Bankstats) (See Table A5.4.)
Questions
- What variables do you think are important in affecting the level of housing demand?
- What variables do you think are important in affecting the level of housing supply?
- Using a demand-supply diagram illustrate how shifts in housing demand and/or supply may have affected house prices (i) during 2009 and (ii) during 2010.
- What would you expect to happen to the strength of housing demand in the coming months? How will this impact on house prices?
What will happen to interest rates over the next two or three years? There is considerable disagreement between economists on this question at the moment.
There are those who argue that recovery in the UK, the USA and Europe is faltering. With much tighter fiscal policy being adopted as countries attempt to claw down their deficits, there is a growing fear of a double-dip recession. In these circumstances central banks are likely to keep interest rates at their historically low levels for the foreseeable future and could well embark on a further round of quantitative easing (see Easy money from the Fed?). But what about inflation? With demand still expanding in developing countries and commodity prices rising, won’t cost pressures on inflation continue? Those who forecast that interest rates will stay low, argue that the pressure on commodity prices will ease as global demand slows. Also, in the UK, now that sterling is no longer depreciating, this will remove a key ingredient of higher inflation.
These views are not shared by other economists. They argue that interest rates could soar over the next two years. In fact, one economist, Andrew Lilico, the Chief Economist at Policy Exchange argues that interest rates in the UK will reach 8% by 2012. Central to their argument is the role of the money supply. The monetary base has been expanded enormously through programmes of quantitative easing. And yet, consumer credit has fallen. When the economy does eventually start to recover strongly, Lilico and others argue that there is a danger that consumer credit and broad money will expand rapidly, thereby fuelling inflation. But won’t the spare capacity that has built up during the recession allow the increase in aggregate demand to be met by a corresponding increase in output, thereby keeping inflation low. No, say these economists. A lot of capacity has been lost and output cannot easily expand to meet a rise in demand.
It’s not uncommon for economists to disagree! See, by reading the articles below, if you can unpick the arguments and establish where the disagreements lie and whose case is the strongest.
Articles
America’s century is over, but it will fight on Guardian, Larry Elliott (23/8/10)
Rates to remain low for foreseeable future Interactive Investor, Rhian Nicholson (18/8/10)
BoE gets benefit of doubt on inflation – for now Reuters, Christina Fincher (19/8/10)
BGilts reflect continued uncertainty AXA Elevate, Tomas Hirst (23/8/10)
A bull market in pessimism The Economist (19/8/10)
Interest rates ‘may hit 8%’ by 2012 says think tank BBC News (22/8/10)
Interest rates ‘may hit 8pc’ in two years Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (21/8/10)
Bernanke Must Raise Benchmark Rate 2 Points, Rajan Says Bloomberg, Scott Lanman and Simon Kennedy (23/8/10)
Inflation, not deflation, Mr. Bernanke Market Watch, Andy Xie (22/8/10)
Inflation comes through the door and wisdom flies out of the window Telegraph, Liam Halligan (21/8/10)
Data
British Government Securities, Yields Bank of England
Bankstats: Data on UK money and lending Bank of England
Questions
- Summarise the arguments of those who believe that interest rates will stay low for the foreseeable future.
- Summarise the arguments of those who believe that interest rates will be significantly higher by 2010.
- What factors will be the most significant in determining which of the two positions is correct?
- Why are the yields on long-term bonds a good indicator of people’s expectations about future inflation and monetary policy?
- Why has consumer credit fallen? Why might it rise again?
- Why may unemployment not fall rapidly as the economy recovers? Is this an example of hysteresis?
Letter writing has, in many walks of life, rather gone out of fashion. For instance, many of us of a slightly older disposition remember how putting pen to paper was an important part of courtship and the building of relationships. Well, one modern-day couple who are getting very used to an exchange of letters is the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The latest inflation numbers from the Office for National Statistics show that the annual rate of CPI inflation for July was 3.1%. While the inflation rate is down from the 3.2% recorded in June it remains more than 1 percentage point above the government’s central inflation rate target of 2%. Consequently, Mervyn King will again be writing to the Chancellor to explain why this is the case.
Since the turn of the year, the annual rate of CPI inflation has, with the exception of February, been consistently above 3%. Even February was a narrow escape for the Governor because inflation came in at exactly 3%! Another way of putting the recent inflation record into perspective is to note that over the first seven months of 2010 the average annual rate of CPI inflation has been 3.3%.
The slight fall in July’s annual inflation rate is attributed, in part, to falls during July in the prices of second-hand cars and petrol whereas these prices were rising a year ago. Furthermore, the average price of clothing and footwear fell by some 4.9% between June and July of this year as compared with a fall of 3.2% in the same period a year ago. The result is that the annual rate of price deflation for clothing and footwear went from 1.4% in June to 3.1% in July.
Of course, within the basket of consumer goods price patterns can vary significantly. One significant upward pressure on July’s overall annual inflation rate was the price of food and non-alcoholic beverages, especially vegetables. The average price of food and non-alcoholic beverages rose by 1% between June and July which has seen the annual rate of price inflation for food and non-alcoholic beverages rise from 1.9% in June to 3.4% in July.
The fact that July shows inflation running in excess of 3% will surprise very few. In the latest Inflation Report the Bank of England reports that the Monetary Policy Committee’s view is that ‘the forthcoming increase in VAT was expected to keep CPI inflation above the 2% target until the end of 2011’. The Committee then expects what it describes as a ‘persistent margin of spare capacity’ to force inflation to fall back. But, the Committee also feels that the prospects for inflation are ‘highly uncertain’. Therefore, it is difficult to gauge just how many more letters will be passing across London between the Governor and the Chancellor in the coming months. Nonetheless, it would be probably be advisable for the Governor to make sure that he has a sufficient supply of postage stamps at his disposal, just in case!
Articles
UK inflation rate slows again in July BBC News (17/8/10)
Bank of England’s King forced to write another letter to Osborne as prices stay high Telegraph (17/8/10)
Inflation falls to 3.1% in July Financial Times, Daniel Pimlott (17/8/10)
Dearer food keeps inflation high UK Press Association (17/8/10)
Bank ‘surprised’ at inflation strength Independent, Russell Lynch (17/8/10)
Letters
Letter from the Governor to the Chancellor and the Chancellor’s reply Bank of England (17/8/10)
Data
Latest on inflation Office for National Statistics (17/8/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Statistical Bulletin, July 2010 Office for National Statistics (17/8/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Time Series Data Office for National Statistics
For CPI (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) data for EU countries, see:
HICP European Central Bank
Questions
- What does the Bank of England mean by a ‘persistent margin of spare capacity’? By what economic term is this phenomenon more commonly known?
- Why do you think the current rate of inflation is above target despite the spare capacity in the economy?
- Since the annual rate of CPI inflation remains in ‘letter-writing territory’ would you expect the Monetary Policy Committee to be raising interest rates some time soon? Explain your answer.
- What impact might the persistence of above-target inflation have for the public’s expectations of inflation?
- What impact can we expect the increase in the standard rate of VAT next January to have on the annual rate of CPI inflation? Is such an effect on the rate of inflation a permanent one?
The US economic recovery is slowing. As consumer and business confidence wanes, so there is growing talk of a double-dip recession. So what’s to be done about it? How can aggregate demand be boosted without spooking the markets?
One solution would be for a further fiscal stimulus. The one instituted in January 2009 in the depth of the recession has virtually worked itself out, with many short-term projects financed by the stimulus having come to an end. But any further stimulus would cause further worries about America’s balooning public-sector deficit, which already is predicted to be some 10.6% for 2010 (up from 1.1% in 2007).
The alternative is to use monetary policy. But, with the Federal Reserve rate already at between 0% and 0.25% (where it has been since the end of 2008), there is no scope for further cuts in interest rates. If monetary policy is to be used to give an additional boost to the economy, then further quantitiative easing is necessary. This is what the Federal Reserve decided to do on 10 August. As the Independent (see link below) states:
The US Federal Reserve decided last night to extend its $1.55 trillion programme of quantitative easing in an attempt to rejuvenate an economic recovery that the central bank admitted was turning out “more modest” than it expected.
The interest rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee bowed to calls from across the financial markets to extend its support, saying it would pump new money into the markets at a rate equivalent to about $200bn a year, and it left the duration of its efforts open-ended.
So how successful is this policy likely to be? The following articles look at the issues.
Articles
‘Light’ quantitative easing for slow US economic recovery New Statesman (11/8/10)
Fed sets the printing press rolling again to juice recovery Independent, Stephen Foley (11/8/10)
US Federal Reserve reveals plan to buy government debt Herald Scotland, Douglas Hamilton (11/8/10)
Some questions and answers on the Fed`s new policy Money Control (11/8/10)
Fed downgrades recovery outlook Financial Times, James Politi and Michael Mackenzie (10/8/10)
Fed acts as US recovery loses steam ABC News, Peter Ryan (11/8/10)
Top Fed Official, Warns Fed Risks Repeating Past Mistakes Huffington Post, Thomas Hoenig (11/8/10)
Austerity or stimulus? Some economists ha
The Fed must address Main Street’s credit crunch The Economist, Guillermo Calvo (15/8/10)
The Fed has options to lower real interest rates The Economist, Mark Thoma (15/8/10)
Fear of renewed recession in America is overblown; so is some of the optimism in the euro area The Economist (12/8/10)
Analysts’ view: Economists divided on effectiveness of Fed move Reuters (11/8/10)
If the Fed’s going to monetise debt, now’s the time to do it The Economist, Laurence Kotlikoff (13/8/10)
A former Fed official offers advice to Ben Bernanke The Economist, Joseph Gagnon (17/8/10)
America’s century is over, but it will fight on Guardian, Larry Elliott (23/8/10)
Federal Reserve documents
Press Release on monetary policy Federal Reserve (10/8/10)
Information on Federal Open Market Committee Federal Reserve
Questions
- What are are the arguments for using quantitative easing?
- Explain the process by which quantitative easing increases (a) narrow money and (b) broad money.
- How has the US and global economic situation changed since June 2010?
- Could the Fed’s policy be described as one of quantitative easing or merely one of maintaining the existing quantity of money? Explain.
- What are dangers in pursuing a policy of quantitative easing?
- What are the arguments for pursuing tight fiscal policy at the same time as loose monetary policy?
- Why does Thomas Hoenig claim that the Fed risks repeating past mistakes?
- How could the real rate of interest be reduced if the nominal rate is virtually zero and cannot be negative?
- Explain what is meant by ‘seigniorage’ (see the final The Economist article above).