Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 12

In the late 2000s, Zimbabwe experienced hyperinflation. As a post on this site in January 2009 said, two estimates of the inflation rate were made: one of 5 sextillion per cent (5 and 21 zeros); the other of 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion per cent (65 and 107 zeros). In January 2009, in a last attempt to save the Zimbabwean currency, a new series of banknotes was issued, including a Z$100 trillion note.

Prices were typically being adjusted at least twice a day and people had to carry large bags of money around even to buy a couple of simple items. The currency was virtually worthless. As the Guardian article below states:

Hyperinflation in Zimbabwe left pensions, wages and investments worthless and spread poverty as everyday items became unaffordable. It also caused severe cash shortages, because the government could not afford to print bank notes to keep pace with inflation.

The solution was to allow other currencies, mainly the US dollar and the South African rand, to be used alongside the local currency. Although the Zimbabwean currency was still legal tender, it effectively went out of use. Prices stabilised and since then inflation has been in single figures.

But many people still have stocks of the virtually worthless old currency, either in cash or in savings accounts. The Zimbabwean government has now said that it will exchange Zimbabwean dollar notes for US dollars at the rate of US$1 = Z$250tn (250,000,000,000). People have until September to do so. Up to now, they have mainly been used to sell as souvenirs to tourists! For people with Zimbabwean dollars in their bank accounts, they will get a minimum of US$5. For amounts beyond Z$175,000tn they will get an additional US dollar for each Z$35,000tn.

Historical examples of hyperinflation

As case study 15.5 in Economics 9e’s MyEconLab points out, several countries experienced hyperinflation after the First World War. In Austria and Hungary prices were several thousand times their pre-war level. In Poland they were over 2 million times higher, and in the USSR several billion times higher.

Germany in the 1920s
But even these staggering rates of inflation seem insignificant beside those of Germany. Following the chaos of the war, the German government resorted to printing money, not only to meet its domestic spending requirements in rebuilding a war-ravaged economy, but also to finance the crippling war reparations imposed on it by the allies in the Treaty of Versailles.

From mid 1921 the rate of monetary increase soared and inflation soared with it. By autumn 1923 the annual rate of inflation had reached a mind-boggling 7,000,000,000,000 per cent! As price increases accelerated, people became reluctant to accept money: before they knew it, the money would be worthless. People thus rushed to spend their money as quickly as possible. But this in turn further drove up prices. (The note shown above is in old billions, where a billion was a million million. So the note was for 50,000,000,000,000 marks.)

For many Germans the effect was devastating. People’s life savings were wiped out. Others whose wages were not quickly adjusted found their real incomes plummeting. Many were thrown out of work as businesses, especially those with money assets, went bankrupt. Poverty and destitution were widespread.

By the end of 1923 the German currency was literally worthless. In 1924, therefore, it was replaced by a new currency – one whose supply was kept tightly controlled by the government.

Serbia and Montenegro 1993–5
After the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992, the economy of the remaining part of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) collapsed. The government relied more and more on printing money to finance public expenditure. Prices soared.

The government attempted to control the inflation by imposing price controls. But these simply made production unprofitable and output fell further. The economy nosedived. Unemployment exceeded 30 per cent.

In October 1993, the government created a new currency, the new dinar, worth one million old dinars. In other words, six zeros were knocked off the currency. But this did not solve the problem. Between October 1993 and January 1994, prices rose by 5 quadrillion per cent (5 and fifteen zeros). Normal life could not function. Shops ran out of produce; savings were wiped out; barter replaced normal market activity.

At the beginning of January 1994 a ‘new new dinar’ was introduced, worth 1 billion new dinars. On 24 January this was replaced by a ‘novi dinar’ pegged 1 to 1 against the Deutsche Mark. This was worth approximately 13 million new new dinars. The novi dinar remained pegged to the Deutsche Mark and inflation was quickly eliminated.

Articles

Zimbabweans get chance to swap ‘quadrillions’ for a few US dollars The Guardian (13/6/15)
175 Quadrillion Zimbabwean Dollars Are Now Worth $5 Bloomberg, Godfrey Marawanyika and Paul Wallace (11/6/15)
Zimbabwe is paying people $5 for 175 quadrillion Zimbabwe dollars Washington Post, Matt O’Brien (12/6/15)
Zimbabwe dollars phased out BBC News Africa (12/6/15)
Zimbabwe ditches its all but worthless currency Financial Times (12/6/15)
Zeroing in Thomson Reuters, Breaking News, Edward Hadas (12/6/15)

Old articles

Could inflation fell Mugabe? BBC News (28/7/08)
ZIMBABWE: Inflation at 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion percent IRIN (21/1/09)
The Worst Episode of Hyperinflation in History: Yugoslavia 1993-94 Roger Sherman Society, Thayer Watkins (31/7/08)

Questions

  1. Why have several governments in the past been prepared to allow hyperinflation to develop?
  2. Itemise the types of cost imposed on people by hyperinflation.
  3. Does anyone gain from hyperinflation?
  4. What are the solutions to hyperinflation?
  5. What difficulties are there in eliminating hyperinflation? What costs are imposed on people in the process?
  6. Why might the causes of hyperinflation be described as always political?

A deal has just been signed between 26 African nations to form a new free trade area, the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). The countries have a population of 625 million (56% of Africa’s total) and a GDP of $1.6 trillion (63% of Africa’s total). The deal effectively combines three existing free trade areas: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community and the East African Community.

Although the deal has been signed by the nations’ leaders, it still needs parliamentary approval from each of the countries. It is hoped that this will be achieved by 2017. If it is, it will mark a major step forward in encouraging intra-African trade.

The deal will involve the removal of trade barriers on most goods and lead to a reduction in overall tariffs by more than 50%. The expectation of the leaders is that this will generate $1 trillion worth of economic activity across the 26 countries through a process of trade creation, investment, increased competition and the encouragement of infrastructure development. But given the current poor state of infrastructure and the lack of manufacturing capacity in many of the countries, the agreement will also encourage co-operation to promote co-ordinated industrial and infrastructure development.

Up to now, the development of intra-African trade has been relatively slow because of poor road and rail networks and a high average protection rate – 8.7% on exports to other African countries compared with 2.5% on exports to non-African countries. As a result, intra-African trade currently accounts for just 12% of total African trade. It is hoped that the development of TFTA will result in this rising to over 30%.

Much of the gains will come from economies of scale. As Kenyan academic Calestous Juma says:

“By having larger markets, it signals the possibility of being able to manufacture products at a scale that is cost-effective. For example, where you need large-scale investments like $200m to create a pharmaceutical factory, you couldn’t do that if you were only selling the products in one country.”

The question is whether the agreement signed on the 10 June will lead to the member countries fully taking advantage of the opportunities for trade creation. Agreeing on a deal is one thing; having genuinely free trade and investing in infrastructure and new efficient industries is another.

Videos and audio
African leaders ink trade deal Deutsche Welle (11/6/15)
African leaders sign pact to create ‘Cape to Cairo’ free trade bloc euronews (10/6/15)
Africa Free Trade Analysis BBC Africa, Calestous Juma (9/6/15)

Articles

African Leaders To Sign Free Trade Agreement To Create Common Market International Business Times, Aditya Tejas (10.6.15)
EAC, COMESA and SADC Blocs Ink ‘Historic’ Trade Deal allAfrica, James Karuhanga (11/6/15)
Tripartite Free Trade Area an Opportunity Not a Threat allAfrica, Sindiso Ngwenya (9/6/15)
Africa a step closer to free trade area Business Report (South Africa), Rob Davies (11/6/15)
The Cape to Cairo trade ‘super bloc’ is here; 15 surprising – and shocking – facts on trade within Africa Mail & Guardian (Kenya), Christine Mungai (8/6/15)
The tripartite free trade area agreement in Africa is bound to disappoint Quartz Africa, Hilary Matfess (10/6/15)
Africa creates TFTA – Cape to Cairo free-trade zone BBC News Africa (10/6/15)
Will the Cape to Cairo free-trade zone work? BBC News Africa, Lerato Mbele (10/6/15)
African free trade still some way off BBC News, Matthew Davies (10/6/15)
Zambia not to benefit from Africa’s TFTA Medafrica, Geraldine Boechat (10/6/15)

Questions

  1. Distinguish between a free trade area, a customs union and a common market.
  2. What does the law of comparative advantage imply about the gains from forming a free trade area?
  3. Distinguish between trade creation and trade diversion.
  4. Why is it likely that there will be considerable trade creation from TFTA? Would there be any trade diversion?
  5. Why are small countries with a relatively low level of economic development likely to experience more trade creation than larger, richer ones?
  6. What barriers might remain in trade between the TFTA countries?
  7. Why might smaller, less developed members of TFTA be worried about the removal of trade barriers?
  8. Why might concentrating on developing local capacity, rather than just lowering tariffs, be a more effective way of developing intra-African trade
  9. What ‘informal’ barriers to trade exist in many African countries?
  10. Why is it that ‘Ordinary Africans are most probably not holding their breath’ about the gains from TFTA?

The period from the end of the Second World War until the financial crisis of 2007–8 was one of increasing globalisation. World trade rose considerably faster than world GDP. The average annual growth in world GDP from 1950 to 2007 was 4.2%; the average annual growth in world merchandise exports was 6.7%.

And there were other ways in which the world was becoming increasingly interconnected. Cross-border financial flows grew strongly, especially in the 1990s and up to 2007. In the early 1990s, global cross-border capital flows were around 4% of world annual GDP; by 2007, they had risen to over 20%. The increasing spread of multinational corporations, improvements in transport, greater international movement of labour and improved communications were all factors that contributed to a deepening of globalisation.

But have things begun to change? Have we entered into an era of ‘deglobalisation’? Certainly some indicators would suggest this. In the three years 2012–14, world exports grew more slowly than world GDP. Global cross-border financial flows remain at about one-third of their 2007 peak. Increased banking regulations are making it harder for financial institutions to engage in international speculative activities.

What is more, with political turmoil in many countries, multinational corporations are more cautious about investing in such markets. Many countries are seeking to contain immigration. Fears of global instability are encouraging many firms to look inwards. After more than 13 years, settlement of the Doha round of international trade negotiations still seems a long way off. Protectionist measures abound, often amount to giving favourable treatment to domestic firms.

The Observer article considers whether the process of increased globalisation is now dead. Or will better banking regulations ultimately encourage capital flows to grow again; and will the inexorable march of technological progress give international trade and investment a renewed boost? Will lower energy and commodity prices help to reboot the global economy? Will the ‘Great Recession’ have resulted in what turns out to be merely a blip in the continued integration of the global economy? Is it, as the Huffington Post article states, that ‘globalization has a gravitational pull that is hard to resist’? See what the articles and speech have to say and what they conclude.

Articles

Borders are closing and banks are in retreat. Is globalisation dead? The Observer, Heather Stewart (23/5/15)
Is Globalization Finally Dead? Huffington Post, Peter Hall (6/5/14)

Speech
Financial “deglobalization”?: capital flows, banks, and the Beatles Bank of England, Kristin Forbes (18/11/14)

Questions

  1. Define globalisation.
  2. How does globalisation affect the distribution of income (a) between countries; (b) within countries?
  3. Why has the Doha round of trade negotiations stalled?
  4. Examine the factors that might be leading to deglobalisation.
  5. What are the implications of banking deglobalisation for the UK?
  6. Are protectionist measures always undesirable in terms of increasing global GDP?
  7. What forces of globalisation are hard to resist?

Interest rates are the main tool of monetary policy and crucially affect investment. There has been much discussion since the end of the financial crisis concerning when UK interest rates would eventually rise. Uncertainty over just when, and by how much, interest rates will rise affects business confidence and hence investment. Businesses therefore listen carefully to what the Bank of England says about future movements in Bank Rate. But Mark Carney has now spoken about another cause of uncertainty and its impct on investment. This is the uncertainty over the outcome of the referendum on whether the UK should leave the EU.

By 2017, the Prime Minister has promised a referendum on staying in the EU, but Mark Carney has urged for this to be held ‘as soon as possible’. Whether or not the UK remains in the EU will have a big effect on businesses and with the uncertainty surrounding the UK’s future, this may soon turn to a lack of investment. As yet, businesses have not responded to this uncertainty, but the longer the delay for the referendum, the more inclined firms will be to postpone investment. As Mark Carney said:

“We talk to a lot of bosses and there has been an awareness of some of this political uncertainty – whether because of the election or because of the referendum … What they’ve been telling us, and we see it in the statistics, is they have not yet acted on that uncertainty – or to put it another way, they are continuing to invest, they are continuing to hire.”

Leaving the EU will have big effects on consumers and businesses, given that the EU is the UK’s largest market, trading partner and investor. With a referendum sooner rather than later, uncertainty will be more limited and any reaction by businesses will take place over a shorter time period. There are many other factors that affect business investment, some of which are related to the UK’s relationship with the EU and the following articles consider these issues.

EU referendum should be held ‘as soon as necessary’, says Mark Carney BBC News (14/5/15)
Business want an early EU referendum, Mark Carney indicates The Telegraph, Ben Riley-Smith (14/5/15)
EU poll should take place ‘as soon as necessary’, says Bank of England Chief The Guardian, Angela Monaghan (14/5/15)
Threat of business leaving the EU is fuelling business ‘uncertainty’, says Bank of England governor Mark Carney Mail Online, Matt Chorley (14/5/15)
Bank of England’s Mark Carney urges speedy EU referendum Financial Times, George Parker (14/5/15)

Questions

  1. Why is the EU important to the UK’s economic performance?
  2. If the UK were to leave the EU, what impact would this have on UK consumers?
  3. What would be the impact on UK firms if the UK were to leave the EU?
  4. Consider an AD/AS diagram and use this to explain the potential impact on the macroeconomic variables if the UK were to leave the EU.
  5. Why is uncertainty over the UK’s referendum likely to have an adverse effect on investment?

A new group of economies, known as MINT, are seen as strong current and future emerging markets. We’ve had the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and now we have the MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey).

In 2014, Nigeria became Africa’s fastest growing nation. A large part of Nigeria’s success has to do with growth in some of its key industries.

Nigerian’s reliance on the oil and gas industry created an attractive economy for further development and it now has high growth in a diverse range of sectors, including mobile phones, champagne, private jets and ‘Nollywood’. Despite the uncertainty and political unrest caused by Boko Haram, Nigeria is attracting a significant amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in a range of sectors, indicating its growing diversity and attractiveness to some of the world’s largest multinational companies.

Boko Haram has certainly had a dampening effect on Nigeria’s growth, as has the lower oil price, but this may create opportunities for further diversification. Furthermore there are concerns about how the wealth of the nation is concentrated, given that poverty is still prevalent across the country. However, Nigeria is certainly emerging as a success story of Africa and surely the question that will be asked is will other African nations follow suit?

The following article from BBC News considers the Nigerian economy.

Nigeria’s ‘champagne’ economy bucks Boko Haram effect BBC News, Vishala Sri-Pathma (27/3/15)

Questions

  1. Is a falling oil price necessarily bad for the Nigerian economy?
  2. Explain why Boko Haram is likely to have a dampening effect on economic growth in Nigeria.
  3. Do you think other African nations will be able to replicate the success of Nigeria? Which factors may prevent this?
  4. If the number of millionaires is increasing significantly, but poverty is persisting, does this tell us anything about what is happening to inequality in Nigeria?
  5. Is is possible to reduce inequality in Nigeria while maintaining economic growth? Might it even be posible for greater equality to be a driver of economic growth?
  6. The Nigerian currency is weakening. What has caused this and why may this be a cause for concern?